Chapter 7 Volume 4-2

G: I know it will fade and look ridiculous. SOCRATES: So, you must understand that we are trying to do the same thing by selecting fighters and giving them music and gymnastics education.What we endeavor to achieve is nothing but that they believe and accept our laws as fully as wool is dyed, so that their beliefs about terrible things and other things may be given by good nature and educated to be firmly rooted, and that their "color" is not washed out by joy, that lye that has the strongest power to fade people's beliefs, nor by anguish, fear, and desire, which outweigh any Alkaline water with strong fading ability is washed away by other alkaline water.This mental capacity, this complete maintenance of the legally correct beliefs about what is fearful and what is not, is what I claim to call courage, if you agree with me.

G: I have no objection.For, I think you have a correct understanding of bravery, and as for the same manifestations that are not caused by education and have nothing to do with the law, I don't think you would call them For bravery, I will be given another name. Sue: You are absolutely right. G: Well, I accept this statement you make about bravery. Su: Good.You are also right to add the qualifier "citizen" to "brave" in accepting my account.We shall discuss this more fully later, if you are interested, but what we are looking for at present is not bravery but justice, and for that purpose I think we have said enough.

G: Makes sense. SOCRATES: There are two remaining qualities that we are looking for in this country, temperance and the object of our whole study—justice. G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Is there any way we can ignore moderation and find justice directly? G: I neither know of any way, nor do I want to discover justice first, lest we should overlook moderation.Therefore, if you want to make me happy, please consider moderation first! Su: I don't want to make you happy, I certainly won't. G: Then study it! Su: I will definitely come to study.Temperance, so far as is known, is more like harmony or harmony than the first two qualities.

G: Why? SOCRATES: Temperance is a good order or control over certain pleasures and desires.That's what people mean when they say "your own master" which I find odd - we hear other things like that - don't we? G: Yes, that's right. S: Isn't it funny to say "one's own master"?For a man who is his own master is certainly his own slave, and a man who is his own slave is also certainly his own master, for all these two expressions refer to the same man. G: Undoubtedly. SOCRATES: But I think it means that there is a better part and a worse part of the human soul, and that the so-called "master of itself" means that the worse part is controlled by the better part of nature. .This is undoubtedly a compliment.A man is condemned and called his own slave when, through bad upbringing or associating with bad people, his better and smaller part is dominated by his worse and larger part and the immoderate.

G: That looks good. SOCRATES: Now let's look at our new country.You'll also see one of those two cases here.For, since the better part of a man rules over his worse part, he may be called temperate and master of himself.Then you should admit that we are right when we say that this country is its own master. G: I've seen the country.You are right. SOCRATES: It can also be seen that all kinds of desires, pleasures, and torments arise in children, in women, in slaves, and in those multitudes of inferiors who are nominally called free men. G: Exactly. SOCRATES: On the other hand, simple and well-measured desires, guided by human thinking, aided by reason and true belief, are found only among a few, only among the most gifted and best educated. seen among people.

Grid: Yes. SOCRATES: Don't you see this in this country too?Do you not see that here the desires of the multitude of inferiors are ruled by the desires and wisdom of the superior few? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: So if there is any country that should be called master of its own pleasures and desires, that is, its own master, it must be ours. G: Not bad at all. SOCRATES: On all the above grounds, can this country not also be called temperate? G: Of course. SOCRATES: Again, if there is any country where the rulers and the ruled agree on who should rule, it is only ours, don't you think?

G: I firmly believe so. SOCRATES: That being so, in what part of the citizenry do you think moderation exists?In the rulers or in the ruled? G: There are two parts of people. SOCRATES: So, you see, we were not quite wrong to conjecture just now that temperance is like a kind of harmony? G: Why? SOCRATES: Because its function is different from that of bravery and wisdom, which are located in different parts of the country and make the country brave and wise.Temperance doesn't work that way.It runs through all the citizens, putting the strongest, the weakest, and the middle (whether in terms of wisdom, or—if you like—in strength, or in numbers, wealth, or whatever ) are combined to create harmony, just like running through the entire scale, combining various strong and weak notes to produce a harmonious symphony.We may rightly affirm, therefore, that temperance is this agreement between the good and the bad parts, as to who should rule and who should be ruled, whether in the state or in individuals. and coordination.

G: I totally agree with you. SOCRATES: Well, so far we may consider that we have found three qualities in our country.What else is left that makes our country a virtue again?What remains is clearly justice. G: Obviously yes. SOCRATES: Now, O Glaucon, is the time for us to watch as closely as hunters surround the hideouts of wild animals.Be careful not to let justice slip by, don't let it slip away from us and disappear unknowingly.It's clearly somewhere nearby.Keep your eyes wide open and try to spot it.If you see it first, please tell me quickly. G: I wish I could, but you'd better think of me as a follower who can only see what you point to, so that you can use me most effectively.

Su: In that case, for the sake of victory, please follow me forward! Ge: Please just go ahead, I will follow. Su: This really seems to be an unreachable place, it's all dark! G: It is indeed dark and not easy to find. Su: No matter what, we have to move forward! G: OK, move on. SOCRATES: [I see something and call to him] Well, Glaucon, I think I have found its trail, and I believe it cannot escape. G: I'm glad to hear that. Sue: Really, we are really stupid. G: Why? Su: Why?If you think about it, this thing has been dangling in front of us from the beginning, but we can't always see it.We are as absurd as a man trying to find something that is always in his own hands.We don't look at the thing that is right in front of us, but pay attention to the distance.This may be why we can't find it all the time.

G: What do you mean? S: I mean, we've been talking about it in some way, but we've never been aware that we're talking about it. G: Your preface is too long for an impatient audience.Let's get down to business! SOCRATES: Then listen and see if I'm right.When we established our country, we laid down a general principle.I think this principle, or some principle of this kind, is justice.You will remember that this principle we have laid down, and often speak of, is this: that every man must perform in the state that office which suits his nature best. G: Yes, we said that.

SOCRATES: Furthermore, we have heard it said by many people, and we have often said it ourselves, that justice consists in doing one's own thing and not doing that of others. G: Yes, we've said that too. SOCRATES: Then, my friend, do your own thing—that is justice in a way.But, do you know where I deduced this conclusion from? G: I don't know, please tell me. SOCRATES: I think that after we have examined temperance, courage, and wisdom, what remains in our city-state is the quality of justice, which is capable of producing temperance, courage, and wisdom in this city-state, and after they are born. Protect their quality.We have also said that if we find three, justice is the one that remains. Grid: Definitely. SOCRATES: But if we are asked to judge, which of these four qualities will best make our country good, is it the agreement of the rulers and the ruled, or what the laws teach soldiers about What to be afraid of and what not to be afraid of is the belief in the soldiers' hearts maintained?Or is it the wisdom and guardianship of rulers, or this quality in children, in women, in slaves, in free men, in artisans, in rulers, in the ruled, each of whom does his part as a man? What about not interfering in other people's affairs? — This seems to be difficult to judge. G: It's really hard to judge. SOCRATES: It seems that the quality "everyone does his part in the state" is compared with wisdom, temperance, and courage in making the state perfect. Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: Is not justice, then, the quality which compares with the other three in its ability to perfect the state? G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Let us examine this question from another angle, if this convinces you.Didn't you entrust the rulers of the country to try legal cases? G: Of course it is. Su: They try cases only for one purpose, that is, everyone does not take other people's things, and does not allow others to take possession of their own things. Is there any other purpose besides this? G: Only for this purpose. SOCRATES: Is this a just purpose? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: So we can probably agree on this too: Justice is having one's own thing and doing one's own thing. G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Now think about it, do you agree with me on the assumption that a carpenter does a shoemaker's work, or a shoemaker a carpenter's work, that they exchange tools or positions, or even that the same man tries to do both? Two things, you don't think this exchange of occupations will do much harm to the country, right? G: I don't think there will be much harm. SOCRATES: But I think that if a man is born a craftsman or a businessman, but because of wealth, or the ability to control elections, or physical strength, or some other such advantage, he is tempted to try Climbing up to the ranks of soldiers, or a soldier attempting to rise to their unworthy rank of legislator and protector, or the exchange of tools and positions, or the same man performing all these functions at the same time, I think you will feel that too. Exchange and interference will mean the destruction of the country. G: Absolutely. Su: It can be seen that the interference and replacement of these three types of people is the most harmful to the country.So this can rightly be called the worst possible thing. G: Exactly. Su: Don't you claim that the greatest harm to your own country is injustice? G: Why not? S: Then this is injustice.We say, on the contrary, that when these three men, the merchant, the auxiliaries, and the defenders, do their own thing in the state without interfering with each other, there is justice, and the state is made just. G: I don't think that's the case. SOCRATES: We cannot yet finalize this definition of justice.But if it can also be admitted as a definition of justice when applied to individuals, then we admit it, for what else do we have to say?Otherwise we shall seek other justice.But now let's finish the research on the definition of justice just now.In this work we have assumed that if we find something big with justice and see justice in it, we can see more easily what justice looks like in individuals.We used to think that this big thing was the city, and thus built the best city we could, because we knew well that in this good country there would be justice.Let us, therefore, apply again to the individual what we find in the city-state.If what is seen in both places is the same, that is enough, and if justice is any different in individuals, we shall go back to the city-state and test it there.These two observations, put together and studied together, seem to rub against each other, and it is probable that the light of the fire will illuminate us, and we shall bear it in mind when it thus appears. G: You've come up with a great program that has to be done. SOCRATES: Then, if two things have the same name, one larger and the other smaller, are they also the same, or are they not the same despite having the same name? Grid: same. SOCRATES: Is there no difference, then, between a just individual and a just state, as far as the concept of justice is concerned? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: Now, when these three natural men in the city do their own things, the city is considered to be just, and the city is also considered to be just because of certain other sentiments and characters of these three kinds of men. Moderate, brave and wise. ①Jι (character), here is similar to Aristotle's ι.Aristotle's "Nicomagian Ethics" 1105b20, summed up all the spiritual factors of human beings into πM′θη (emotion), Jι (character) and δNLM′μJι (ability), and explained these concepts clear explanation. Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: So, my friend, personally.We may also assume that the individual has in his soul the same constituent parts as are found in the city-state, and have reason to expect that he will be given the same name for the "feelings" of these same constituents as in the state. G: Undoubtedly. S: Ah, we have come across another easy task, that is, to study whether there are these three qualities in the soul. G: I don't think it's an easy problem to solve.Because, Socrates, perhaps the saying is true: "If you don't enter the tiger's den, how can you find the tiger's cubs." Sue: Obviously so.Let me tell you, Glaucon, I also think that the question cannot be clarified by any means with our present method of argument. The correct way to solve this problem is another one with a difficult and long road.But using our method to solve the problem to a certain extent, it may still be possible to achieve the same level as the previous problem. G: Isn't that enough?For my part, this is satisfactory at this stage. Su: In my case, I am indeed satisfied. G: So don't get bored, let's get on with it. SOCRATES: Is it not necessary, then, to admit that in each of us there are the same qualities and habits as in the city?For the city cannot acquire these qualities except from individuals.Now, if anyone thinks that when passion arises in a city-state, it does not come from the individual citizens of the city-if they are supposed to have this quality like the Thracians and Scythians and generally speaking of the northerners-then is ridiculous.Others, such as the love of wisdom (which is supposed to belong chiefly to our country), or the greed of wealth (which is found in the Phoenicians and Egyptians, and they equal to each other), and both should be considered to be due to the quality of the individual citizen. ① Refer to Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" 1103a-b.Moral virtue is the result of "habit" (θB).None of the moral virtues is due to nature, but to be acquired through the practice of application.Legislators make citizens good by making them habitual. ②θNμBJιδD′ (passion) is a quality between reason and desire. Grid: Yes. SOCRATES: That is the case, and there is no difficulty in understanding it. G: Of course not difficult. SOCRATES: But if it is further asked: Is the quality of the individual three separate components or is it a whole?Answering this question is not so easy.That is, do we engage one part of ourselves when we learn, another part of us when we are angry, a third part when we demand the gratification of our natural desires, or, in each of our Does the whole soul work together in an activity?Determining this is difficult. G: I feel the same way. SOCRATES: Now let us try to determine the question: are they one thing or different several? G: How can you be sure? Su: There is a truth that is very clear: the same part of the same thing is related to the same thing, and cannot have opposite actions or be affected by opposite actions at the same time.So whenever we see this opposite in the same thing we know it's not the same thing but a different thing at work. Greg: Very good. Sue: Please pay attention to my words. G: Tell me! SOCRATES: Is it possible for the same part of the same thing to be both moving and still at the same time? G: Impossible anyway. SOCRATES: Let us also understand more clearly in order to avoid disagreements in the course of future discussions.For example, if a person stands still, but his head and hands are shaking, if someone thinks that this is the same person who is both moving and still at the same time.I think we should not take this statement as a correct statement, we should say that one part of this person is still and the other part is moving, isn't it? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: Suppose the other side of the argument wants to make this kind of joke more cleverly. He says that the tip of the top is fixed at one place and rotates, and the whole top is simultaneously moving and still. The same can be said.For our part we should object to this statement, since in this case what is at rest and what is moving are not the same part of the thing.We should say that within themselves there is the straight part of the axis and another part of the circumference; looking at the straight part the revolving bodies are at rest if they are not inclined in any direction, and if looking at the circumference they are in athletic.However, if the axis is tilted to the left or right, forward or backward when turning, then the rotating object cannot be said to be stationary in any way. Grid: Yes. SOCRATES: Then there will be nothing of the kind to confuse us any more, to make us believe even a little bit that the same part of the same thing in relation to the same thing can simultaneously act or be affected in opposite ways. Actions. G: I believe not again. SOCRATES: But we say it anyway: instead of examining all such objections and proving their falsehood, let us assume that they are false, and proceed on this assumption, but keep in mind that as soon as we discover If our assumption is wrong, all the conclusions derived from it should be withdrawn. G: We have to. SOCRATES: Also I would like to ask: Do you agree that these and the like are opposites of each other: assent and dissent, seeking and refusal, attraction and repulsion? --whether active or passive, for it makes no difference to the contrary. G: Yes, they are all opposites. SOCRATES: Well, thirst and hunger, and desire in general, and wishes and hopes, don't you put all these things into one of the classes just mentioned?Don't you think the soul of the man who asks is asking for what he wants, and the man who wants something is attracting it to himself?Or also, when a man wants something, does his heart, longing for its own request, not nod to his wish (as if someone were asking him the question), and let him have it? ? G: I would think so. SOCRATES: What do you think about unwillingness, dislike and non-demand?Shall we not classify them in the rejection and rejection of the soul, and in general in the class opposite to all the former? G: No, it should. SOCRATES: Since what has been said about desire in general is true, do we not regard desire as a class, the most obvious examples of which are what we call thirst and hunger? G: We will think so. SOCRATES: Don't these two desires, the one for drink and the other for food? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: So, as far as thirst is concerned, we say that thirst is the soul's desire for drink, what else is involved here besides drink, have we mentioned anything?Do we specify, for example, whether we desire a hot beverage or a cold one, more or less, in a word, what kind of beverage is desired?But if thirst is accompanied by heat, then desire will ask for a cold drink, and if thirst is accompanied by cold, then desire will ask for a hot drink, no?If the degree of thirst is greater, the demand for drink will be more, and if the degree of thirst is less, the demand for drink will be less, isn't it?Mere thirst itself never asks for anything else than that which its nature requires, viz. drink itself, and the same is true of hunger's desire for food.isn't it? G: That's right.Every desire in itself demands only that which its own nature requires.It is this particular desire that demands that particular thing. SOCRATES: An objection may be raised here that no one wants drinks without good drinks, and food without good food.Because all people want good things.Therefore, since thirst is desire, it demands good drink.The same goes for other desires.We must not be careless about this objection, and we must not be confused. G: There might be some truth to the objection. S: But we should still think that something of a specific nature is related to a correlative of a specific nature, and that which is only itself is related to a correlative of itself. G: I don't understand what you mean. SOCRATES: You should understand that the so-called larger is a relative name. G: I know that very well. S: Isn't that about smaller things? G: It is related to smaller things. SOCRATES: Something much bigger is related to something much smaller, isn't it? Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: What is larger at a certain time is related to something smaller at a certain time, and what is larger is related to what is smaller, isn't it the same? G: Same thing. SOCRATES: It is like the more to the less, the double to the half, and so on, and the heavier to the lighter, the faster to the slower, and the hotter Isn't the one related to the cooler one, and all that sort of thing? G: That's right. Sue: How about science?Is it the same reason?Science alone is only about knowledge itself, or whatever else we should assume to be the object of science, but a particular science is about a particular kind of knowledge.I mean, for example, since there is a science of building houses, it is different from other sciences, isn't it called architecture? G: What's not? SOCRATES: Isn't that because it has specific properties that no other science has? Greg: Yes. S: It has this specific property, isn't it because it has a specific object? Isn't it the same with other sciences and arts? G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Well, if you now understand what I mean, you must also understand that this is the purpose of what I said earlier about relative relations.I said before: only what is itself is related to what is only itself, and things of a certain quality are also related to things of a certain quality.I do not mean at all that they are of the same kind as they are to each other, so that the science of health and disease is also the science of health and the science of disease, and the science of vice and virtue is therefore the science of ugly and the science of beauty.That was not what I meant.I mean only that science becomes a science when it ceases to be about scientific objects in general, but becomes about specific objects, that is, about disease and health, which makes it not It is no longer simply called "science", but a specific science, that is, medicine. G: I see.I also think so. Su: Besides thirst.Don't you think thirst is one of those things that are essentially related things?Thirst is undoubtedly related to something. G: I think so too; it's about drinks. Su: Then, if the drink is of a certain kind, thirst is also of a certain kind, but it does not matter whether there are more or less, good or bad drinks related to the simple itself of thirst. Simplicity relates to the simplicity of the drink itself.isn't it? G: Undoubtedly. SOCRATES: So the thirsty soul, if it is only thirsty, desires nothing but drink, it desires this very much and strives for it. G: That's pretty obvious. SOCRATES: If, therefore, there is something in a man's soul that pulls him away from drinking when he is thirsty, then this thing must be something else, something different from that which is thirsty and draws him like an animal. Same thing to drink, no?For we have said that the same thing, with the same part of itself, cannot have opposite actions in the same thing at the same time. G: It is impossible. SOCRATES: So I think that in the simile of the archer it is wrong to say that his hand draws and pushes the bow at the same time, but that he pushes with one hand and draws it with the other. G: Exactly. SOCRATES: Then, can we not say that there is such a thing: a person is thirsty but does not want to drink? G: It's certainly common. SOCRATES: What is one to say about these cases?Are there not two different things in the souls of those people, the one that tells them to drink and the one that keeps them back, and the one that stops them is more powerful than the one that tells them to drink? G: I think so too. Su: Moreover, if the stopper of this kind of behavior comes out to stop it, it will stop it based on rational considerations, while the puller is pulled by emotion and disease.isn't it? G: Obviously yes. SOCRATES: Then we have good reason to suppose that they are two and different from each other.One is used by people to think and reason, which can be called the rational part of the soul; the other is used by people to feel the turmoil of material desires such as love, hunger, thirst, etc., which can be called the irrational part or desire part of the soul. That is, a companion of every kind of contentment and pleasure. G: It makes sense for us to assume that. SOCRATES: Let us then establish that these two things do exist in the human soul.Passion, that is, that thing by which we get angry.Is it a third thing besides the above two, or is it the same kind as one of them? ①Passion (θNμK′), according to Plato, if not corrupted by bad education, passion is by nature an ally of reason.But taken literally, passion may belong to the irrational part of the soul.Therefore, as Glaucon suggests, it should be of the same species as desire. G: It's probably the same species as one of them, desire. Sue: But, I once heard a story and believed it to be true. The story tells us: Leontius, the son of Aglaion, entered the city from Piraeus, passed under the northern city wall, and found several corpses lying on the execution ground. He felt that he wanted to see but was afraid and disgusted. They, he resisted for the time being, covered his head, but at last succumbed to the power of desire, he rushed to the corpse with wide eyes and cursed at his own eyes, saying: "Look, villain, let's see enough of this beauty!" G: I've heard that story too. Su: The moral of this story is to tell people that sometimes anger, as something other than desire, conflicts with desire. G: That's what it means. SOCRATES: Haven't we also seen many cases of this kind: when a man's desires outstrip his reason in power, he scolds himself, and is angry with this power within himself.Then in a struggle like that between two political factions the passions of man are the allies of reason.Passion joins desire on the side of desire—though reason does not agree with it—against reason, which I think is one of those things which you probably never admit to ever seeing in yourself. Something that has never been seen before in anyone else. G: Really, never had. SOCRATES: Again, suppose there is a man who thinks he is in the wrong, the more noble this man is, the hunger, the cold, or any other such misery that others may inflict upon him—he thinks this man is doing justice. of-- The less likely he is to feel angry, in my terms, his emotional refusal to be mobilized against that person.Am I right? Greg: Right. SOCRATES: But what happens to a man who thinks he has been treated unfairly?His passions will be stirred and raged, and he will fight on what he thinks is just, and will be more determined to win by hunger, cold, and other such afflictions, and his noble soul will not be at peace, Until either kill or be killed, or until the voice of reason is heard and cease, as a dog ceases barking at the shepherd's restraint.Is that so? G: Your analogy is very apt.As we said before, in our country the auxiliaries are like dogs, they obey the ruler, who is like the shepherd of the city. SOCRATES: You understand very well what I mean.But have you noticed this too? G: Which point? SOCRATES: We now think of passion exactly the opposite of what we had just imagined.We have just assumed that it is a kind of desire.But now it is very different, and we should well say that in the differences of the soul it is very much on the side of reason. G: Of course. SOCRATES: Is it also different from reason, or is it only a kind of reason, so that in the soul there are only two things instead of three, namely reason and desire?Or, just as the state is composed of three classes of persons—merchant, helper, and planner—so in the soul there is a third, the passions (which are the natural helpers of the intellect, if not corrupted by bad education)? Ge: There must be a third party. SOCRATES: Just as it has been shown to be something other than desire, so it would be sure if it could also be shown to be something other than reason. G: It's not hard to prove.One sees it also in children: they are full of passion almost from birth, but some we never see them using their reason, and most of them do so only much later. Sue: That's true, you said it very well.Also, one can see in beasts what you call the presence of passions.Moreover, in addition to these examples, we can also use the poem of Homer that we have quoted before as proof. This poem is: Beat your chest and heart and blame yourself. ① For in this line Homer clearly holds that the intellect, which judges good and bad, is one thing, and blames the irrational organ of anger, which is taken for another. ① "Odyssey" XX, 17.Referenced at 390D in Volume III of this book. G: You are quite right. SOCRATES: We sailed across the sea, arrived at our destination with difficulty, and came to a fairly unanimous opinion: what exists in the country also exists in the soul of each individual, and in the same amount. Greg: Yes. SOCRATES: Then, from this, can we not immediately draw the following corollary: The wisdom of the individual and the wisdom of the state are the same wisdom, and the quality that makes the name of wisdom for the individual and the name of wisdom for the country are the same quality? G: Of course it can be inferred. SOCRATES: We may also deduce that personal courage and national courage are the same bravery, that the quality which makes an individual famous for being brave is the same as that which makes a country famous, and that with respect to all other virtues the individual and the country are equally equal. There is this relationship. G: Certainly. 苏：那么，格劳孔，我认为我们以什么为根据承认国家是正义的，我们也将以同样的根据承认个人是正义的。 格：这也是非常必然的。 苏：但是我们可别忘了：国家的正义在于三种人在国家里各做各的事。 格：我认为我们没有忘了。 苏：因此我们必须记住：我们每一个人如果自身内的各种品质在自身内各起各的作用，那他就也是正义的，即也是做他本份的事情的。 格：的确，我们也必须记住这一点。 苏：理智既然是智慧的，是为整个心灵的利益而谋划的，还不应该由它起领导作用吗？激情不应该服从它和协助它吗？ 格：无疑应该如此。 苏：因此，不是正如我们说过的，音乐和体育协同作用将使理智和激情得到协调吗，既然它们用优雅的言词和良好的教训培养和加强理智，又用和谐与韵律使激情变得温和平稳而文明？ G: Exactly. 苏：这两者（理智和激情）既受到这样的教养、教育并被训练了真正起自己本份的作用，它们就会去领导欲望—— 它占每个人灵魂的最大部分，并且本性是最贪得财富的—— 它们就会监视着它，以免它会因充满了所谓的肉体快乐而变大变强不再恪守本份，企图去控制支配那些它所不应该控制支配的部分，从而毁了人的整个生命。 格：完全正确。 苏：那么，这两者联合一起最好地保卫着整个灵魂和身体不让它们受到外敌的侵犯，一个出谋划策，一个在它的领导下为完成它的意图而奋勇作战，不是这样吗？ 格：是这样。 苏：因此我认为，如果一个人的激情无论在快乐还是苦恼中都保持不忘理智所教给的关于什么应当惧怕什么不应当惧怕的信条，那么我们就因他的激情部分而称每个这样的人为勇敢的人。 格：对。 苏：我们也因每个人身上的这个起领导作用的和教授信条的小部分——它也被假定为是这个人身上的懂得这三个部分各自利益也懂得这三个部分共同利益的——而称他为智慧的。 G: Exactly. 苏：当人的这三个部分彼此友好和谐，理智起领导作用，激情和欲望一致赞成由它领导而不反叛，这样的人不是有节制的人吗？ 格：的确，无论国家的还是个人的节制美德正是这样的。 苏：我们也的确已经一再说明过，一个人因什么品质或该怎样才算是一个正义的人。 格：非常对。 苏：个人的正义其形象在我们心目中不是有点模模糊糊，好象它是别的什么，不大象它在国家里显示出来的那个形象吗？ 格：我觉得不是这样。 苏：这就对了。须知，如果我们心里对这个定义还有什么怀疑存留着的话，那是用一些很平常的事例就可以充分证实我们所说不谬的。 格：你是指什么样的事例呢？ 苏：例如假设要我们回答一个关于正义的国家和一个与正义国家有同样先天同样教养的个人的问题，即，我们是否相信这种人——如果把金银财宝交给他管的话——会鲸吞盗用它们，你以为有谁会相信这种人会比不正义的人更象干这种事的呢？ 格：没有人会这样相信的。 苏：这样的人也是决不会渎神、偷窃，在私人关系中出卖朋友在政治生活中背叛祖国的吧？ 格：决不会的。 苏：他也是无论如何也不会不信守誓言或别的协约的。 格：怎么会呢？ 苏：这样的人决不会染上通奸、不尊敬父母、不履行宗教义务的罪恶的，尽管有别人犯这种罪恶。 格：他们是决不会的。 苏：这一切的原因不是在于，他心灵的各个部分各起各的作用，领导的领导着，被领导的被领导着吗？ 格：正是这样，别无其他。 苏：那么，除了能使人和国家成为正义人和正义国家的这种品质之外你还要寻找什么别的作为正义吗？ 格：说真的，我不想再找了。 苏：到此我们的梦想已经实现了；而我们所作的推测①——在我们建立这个国家之初由于某种天意我们碰巧就已经想到它是正义的根本定义了——到此已经得到证实了。 ①见前文434D。 格：的的确确。 苏：因此格劳孔，木匠做木匠的事，鞋匠做鞋匠的事，其他的人也都这样，各起各的天然作用，不起别种人的作用，这种正确的分工乃是正义的影子——这也的确正是它①之所以可用的原因所在。 ①从语气看来，显然是指以正确的分工作为正义的定义。 格：显然是的。 苏：但是，真实的正义确是如我们所描述的这样一种东西。然而它不是关于外在的“各做各的事”，而是关于内在的，即关于真正本身，真正本身的事情。这就是说，正义的人不许可自己灵魂里的各个部分相互干涉，起别的部分的作用。他应当安排好真正自己的事情，首先达到自己主宰自己，自身内秩序井然，对自己友善。当他将自己心灵的这三个部分合在一起加以协调，仿佛将高音、低音、中音以及其间的各音阶合在一起加以协调那样，使所有这些部分由各自分立而变成一个有节制的和和谐的整体时，于是，如果有必要做什么事的话——无论是在挣钱、照料身体方面，还是在某种政治事务或私人事务方面——他就会做起来；并且在做所有这些事情过程中，他都相信并称呼凡保持和符合这种和谐状态的行为是正义的好的行为，指导这种和谐状态的知识是智慧，而把只起破坏这种状态作用的行为称作不正义的行为，把指导不和谐状态的意见称作愚昧无知。 格：苏格拉底，你说得非常对。 苏：如果我们确定下来说，我们已经找到了正义的人、正义的国家以及正义人里的正义和正义国家里的正义各是什么了，我想，我们这样说是没有错的。 格：真的，没有说错。 苏：那么，我们就定下来了？ 格：就这么定下来吧苏：这个问题就谈到这里为止了。下面我认为我们必须研究不正义。 格：显然必须研究它了。 苏：不正义应该就是三种部分之间的争斗不和、相互间管闲事和相互干涉，灵魂的一个部分起而反对整个灵魂，企图在内部取得领导地位——它天生就不应该领导的而是应该象奴隶一样为统治部分服务的，——不是吗？我觉得我们要说的正是这种东西。不正义、不节制、懦怯、无知，总之，一切的邪恶，正就是三者的混淆与迷失。 格：正是这个。 苏：如果说不正义和正义如上所述，那末，“做不正义的事”、“是不正义的”，还有下面的“造成正义”——所有这些词语的涵义不也都跟着完全清楚了吗？ G: How come? 苏：因为它们完全象健康和疾病，不同之点仅在于后者是肉体上的，前者是心灵上的。 格：怎么这样？ 苏：健康的东西肯定在内部造成健康，而不健康的东西在内部造成疾病。 Greg: Yes. 苏：不也是这样吗：做正义的事在内部造成正义，做不正义的事在内部造成不正义？ Grid: Definitely. 苏：但是健康的造成在于身体内建立起这样的一些成分： 它们合自然地有的统治着有的被统治着，而疾病的造成则在于建立起了这样一些成份：它们仅自然地有的统治着有的被统治着。 格：是这样。 苏：正义的造成也就是在灵魂里建立起了一些成分：它们相互间合自然地有的统治着有的被统治着，而相互间仅自然地统治着和被统治着就造成不正义，不是吗？ 格：的确是的。 苏：因此看来，美德似乎是一种心灵的健康，美和坚强有力，而邪恶则似乎是心灵的一种疾病，丑和软弱无力。 格：是这样。 苏：因此不也是这样吗：实践做好事能养成美德，实践做丑事能养成邪恶？ 格：必然的。 苏：到此看来，我们还剩下一个问题要探讨的了：即，做正义的事，实践做好事、做正义的人，（不论是否有人知道他是这样的）有利呢，还是做不正义的人、做不正义的事（只要不受到惩罚和纠正）有利呢？ 格：苏格拉底，在我看来这个问题已经变得可笑了。因为，若身体的本质已坏，虽拥有一切食物和饮料，拥有一切财富和权力，它也被认为是死了。若我们赖以活着的生命要素的本质已遭破坏和灭亡，活着也没有价值了。正义已坏的人尽管可以做任何别的他想做的事，只是不能摆脱不正义和邪恶，不能赢得正义和美德了。因为后两者已被证明是我们已经表述过的那个样子的。 苏：这个问题是变得可笑了。但是，既然我们已经爬达这个高度了，（在这里我们可以最清楚地看到这些东西的真实情况），我们必须还是不懈地继续前进。 格：我发誓一点也不懈怠。 苏：那么到这里来，以便你可以看见邪恶有多少种—— 我是指值得一看的那几种。 格：我的思想正跟着你呢，尽管讲下去吧！ 苏：的确，我们的论证既已达到这个高度，我仿佛从这个高处看见了，美德是一种，邪恶却无数，但其中值得注意的有那么四种。 格：这话什么意思？ 苏：我是说，有多少种类型的政体就能有多少种类型的灵魂。 格：倒是有多少种呀？ 苏：有五种政体，也有五种灵魂。 格：请告诉我，哪五种？ 苏：告诉你，其中之一便是我们所描述的这种政体，它可以有两种名称：王政或贵族政治。如果是由统治者中的一个卓越的个人掌权便叫做王政，如果是由两个以上的统治者掌权便叫做贵族政治。 格：对的。 苏：我们刚才说的这两种形式是一种政体。因为无论是两个以上的人掌权还是一个人掌握，只要他们是受过我们前面提出过的那种教育和培养的，他们是不会更改我国的那些值得一提的法令的。 格：一定的。