Chapter 16 Chapter 12 Law—A Synthesis of Order and Justice

We have tried in the previous two chapters to show that, if a legal system is to function properly, it must strive not only to achieve justice but also to create order.This assertion may be questioned, because it is impossible for any man-made system to realize two values ​​at the same time, that is, one servant cannot serve two masters.This suspicion may be right when the two masters pursue distinct ends, issue inconsistent orders, and almost every definite action they undertake finds their ends to be at odds.But on the other hand, when the two masters strive for common major goals and cooperate with each other in the pursuit of these goals, only in relatively rare cases parting ways, the service to either master Obviously does not exclude the service of another master.In a sound legal system, the two values ​​of order and justice usually do not conflict, on the contrary, they tend to be closely related and harmonious at a higher level.A legal system that fails to satisfy the requirements of justice is incapable of providing order and peace to political entities in the long run.But on the other hand, justice is also impossible to achieve without an orderly system of judicial enforcement to ensure that the same situation gets the same treatment.Therefore, the maintenance of order is to some extent conditioned by the existence of a reasonable and sound legal system, and justice needs the help of order to play some of its basic functions.The synthesis of these two values ​​that people demand can be summed up in the statement that the law aims to create a just social order.

If there is not even a minimum of orderly routine in the judiciary of a country, then one can say that the country has no "laws".This can happen when there are no rules, standards, or general principles to guide private and official conduct, no stylized procedures for resolving disputes, and courts that are completely indifferent to their previous decisions.Of course, a practice of "justice without law" might be possible if judges were sages who, by intuition or infallible instinct, consistently found the right decision in each case.But that doesn't work in an imperfect society where people are prone to serious errors of judgment.

As we noted earlier, justice requires equal treatment of identical or closely similar situations.Since, in an organized society, different judges may disagree seriously as to what circumstances require the same decision, a body of criteria must be established which is binding on the judiciary, and knowing this, it is important to It is almost an indispensable condition for the exercise of judicial functions.Without the help of such standards, even if a judge is only one person, it will be difficult for him to enforce the law fairly, equally and impartially. Because people have such a strong desire to obtain a certain degree of normative guidance, it is difficult to establish a trial system that relies entirely on the free and unlimited wisdom of judges in historical reality.However, this does not mean that normative guidance is always provided by formal rules, regulations, statutes or precedents.Those rules of conduct which to some extent are consistent with the judiciary may be social, ethical, or religious in nature, may be based on convention and custom, or may be inherent in the social institutions prevailing in a particular society. logically formed.Plato, in his early writings, vilified the use of fixed and restrictive norms in the judicial system, but even so, he still wanted judges to be bound by his social and moral philosophy of the Republic.He made a detailed elaboration on the contents of Utopia in the book "The Republic".

The judicial system without jurisprudence is one pole, and the opposite pole is a set of rules that are well-organized and explained in detail but fail to conform to the sense of social justice.Equal treatment under such a set of rules was considered to be an equality of mistreatment.Except in a robot society, it would be very difficult for government authorities to maintain and enforce such a legal system full of grossly injustices.Since men will not long endure what they regard as utterly irrational and intolerable social conditions, a legal order without a solid basis of justice rests on a shaky foundation.As John Dickinson said, "What we need is not just a system with definite general rules, but a system in which the rules are based on justice, that is, on the It is based on the consideration of certain requirements and abilities of human nature. Otherwise, the system would not be feasible; certainty, and that certainty is the very raison d'être of the system".The natural law tradition throughout the ages has tended to the position that a normative system that is completely or largely devoid of justice does not deserve to be called "law."

It is possible to dispute this view, because many people have endured the oppression of slavery for centuries, and in other historical situations, the lower classes have often suffered in silence and without complaint. standard of living.Our answer to the above question about slavery is that the laws of slavery gave the slaveholder unlimited power over the slave, so that the treatment of the slave depended entirely on the "laws" made by the slaveholder for the slave class.The history of slavery in Rome tells us that when the treatment of slaves in large agricultural areas was extremely cruel and inhumane, the social order was sometimes seriously disrupted by slave revolts and even protracted slave wars.As for the second argument above, there can be no doubt that it is true that the misery, misery, and powerlessness of beings have been humiliatingly suffered because their religious beliefs or other beliefs have led them to believe that the existing order of Yes, it was arranged by God.Assuming that this belief is unreasonable, and that these unfortunate classes actually deserve more rights than they are entitled to, the above examples merely demonstrate that the sense of injustice involves a It is a subjective component that requires a sense of unjustified discrimination as a condition for the feeling.The possibility of shaping the sentiments of justice through education or indoctrination is one of the factors that make justice subject to certain historical and psychological contingencies.On the other hand, when the sense of justice is thoroughly aroused in many, the usual result is some form of flourishing social action.

So far we have only discussed two extremes, justice without order and order without justice.The vast majority of viable legal systems have avoided these two extreme forms and found some workable way of synthesizing the two values ​​of justice and order.Even so, the two values ​​of order and justice occasionally diverge. It may happen, for example, that a judge in a lawsuit concludes that applying a rule established in an earlier case would do less justice to a party in the current case.However, he may still decide to follow precedent because the other party is relying on the continued validity of that rule, or because he values ​​legal certainty and stability.In such cases, the two main values ​​in the legal system conflict, and this conflict is resolved in a judicial manner that tends to be orderly and predictable.We intend to discuss this issue later when discussing the principle of precedent.

But on the other hand, it may also happen that a judge or other body concerned with the administration of the law decides that the continuity of order must give way to the imperatives of justice in a particular case.In this case, the customary universality of law will be sacrificed in a specific situation to meet the needs of realizing individual justice.The requirement to depart from or relax established norms in the interest of justice is seen as necessary, even though the order tends toward routine and rigid adherence to rules. Aristotle recognized this problem early on when he pointed out that "for some cases it is impossible to make laws, and therefore a special kind of statute needs to be created." Regarding how to solve these cases, he proposed the following method, "When the law establishes a general rule and thereafter an exception to that rule arises, then the legislator's statement has its imperfect and erroneous side because of its absolute character, and those who enforce the law We should first determine what the legislator would have decided had he been in the present situation, and what laws he would have enacted if he had known the problems of the situation, and then correct the incompleteness of the existing statute accordingly.” .However, we must realize that judicially imposing exceptions or limitations to the original legal rules is in many cases tantamount to starting a new normative standard that should be applicable to all similar situations in the future.Judges will find the classifications and distinctions made by the current law too crude and too general, so they will advocate their replacement by more precise and highly rigorous generalizations.

Instances of this development can be found both in Roman law and in English law.Thus when the English Court of Chancery first granted compulsory performance, it did so on the grounds of equity or conscience, because the judicial officer held that the common law remedy for damages could not adequately compensate the plaintiff for the defendant's losses due to breach of contract.What began as an equitable departure from the common law, however, becomes A "rule of equity".For the same reason, when the Roman consuls allowed litigants to re-suit and defend in cases where the ancient civil law (ius civile) was considered to be incomplete because of its rigidity and narrowness, this innovation was incorporated into a system known as the jurisprudence. in the independent legal department of the ius honorarium.Such developments aptly demonstrate one of the properties of law as an instrument of what may be called progressive differentiation, that is, of adapting legal categories and distinctions increasingly to the complexities and variety of life. Sex and infinity.Sir Henry Maine was quite justified in describing these two historical institutions of equity as instruments of legal development and legal reform.But we must also bear in mind that this evolution of equity provides evidence in favor, not against, of the essentially normative nature of law.

However, the term "equity" is also used in a very different or more restrictive way.An equitable decision may be neither based on an existing rule of law nor intended to create a new series of precedents.Its sole purpose is to treat the parties fairly in a case characterized by a certain combination of facts which cannot possibly recur in reality in the same or similar manner. HG Hanbury quite rightly points out that "every legal system is bound to find from time to time particularly difficult cases of cries of grievance--if judges decide such cases according to the rules, they will necessarily An unbearable burden of guilt arises in conscience.” In view of the historical implications of the Anglo-American system of equity, it may be more desirable to describe this aspect of the judicial process in terms other than equity.The Germans adopted the term "Billigkeit"; we might as well adopt the Greek word "epieikeia" or the phrase "individual equity" for the phenomenon.However, it should be pointed out that no matter what term is chosen, since this judicial tool for achieving justice lacks the normative elements unique to legal governance, we should clearly distinguish it from the original meaning of the term "law". Aristotle once made a clear distinction between them in his book "Nicomaachean Ethics".

Although there are fewer situations in which "epieikeia" is required than is sometimes believed, most legal systems have developed some way of dealing with it.The ancient Romans granted their emperors wide-ranging privileges that were not subject to the law.Whenever the emperor (or the jurists who were his advisers) considered that the application of a written rule or other rule would lead to an improper or unjust result, he had the power to declare the rule invalid in the hearing of that particular case.Under canon law, the archbishop can also exercise the same power of exemption from applicable law.Under the U.S. legal system, judges have the discretion to "balance various principles of equity" in certain situations; judges in most states are empowered to consider individual circumstances when imposing prison terms on minors and to The power to consider the distribution of property in adjudicating divorce cases; the power of pardon possessed by the executive head, which is essentially the power to be fair or reasonable when some mitigating elements are not or cannot be fully considered by the court; Exercise what Justice Frank called "fact discretion" to correct the rigidity and inadequacy of the law.As long as the powers given to "epieikeia" are kept within strictly defined and reasonable limits and are exercised to such an extent that they do not impair normative institutions, even in those cases where judges are not empowered to make substantive changes to the legal system In a legal system where the privilege of change exists, it is safe and desirable to empower judges with such powers.

The divergence between the claims of order and the demands of justice arises in a situation other than the one in which the concretization of justice becomes necessary.As long as an existing legal system satisfies people's basic needs and requirements, the society will think that the legal system is just, or its reasonable degree is at least acceptable to people.Because of changes in economic or social conditions, advances in technology, failures in government management, or corruption of the ruling elite, measures that only generally satisfy people's needs may still cause people to feel dissatisfied, and people It will also be considered that the current legal system should be replaced by a legal system that can better satisfy people's sense of justice.A social crisis or revolution can sometimes lead to a substantive reform of the legal system, or prompt There is a great overhaul of the legal system, and the purpose of this reform or overhaul is to bring these two most important legal goals into harmony, or at least to narrow the distance between them. Our examination of the nature of law above concerns the question of the existence or non-existence of a legal system.Maurice Hauriou once claimed that law has not only form but also content.The form of law is the rules and the judicial acts that enforce those rules; its content is that of those rules designed to realize certain values.As we pointed out at the beginning of this section, a social system is not worthy of being a legal system if it is completely devoid of legal formal elements; but this basic requirement of generality does not preclude sometimes deviating from rules and principles for the sake of individual equities. , nor exclude the practice of preserving areas of administrative and judicial discretion. It also prevents a social system from being a legal system if it simply ignores one of the main substantive values ​​implicit in the conception of justice.This would arise, for example, if a society did not safeguard the life, bodily integrity, and personal property of its members against infringement.Moreover, if the competent authorities of a social system deprive its members of individual liberty and individual rights, then that society is not so much founded on laws as on unlimited power.The fact that the social system that practiced slavery treats slaves as chattels and not as persons confirms, on the other hand, the fact that a certain degree of liberty is an essential attribute of personality, and thus a sine qua non of justice. made of.Furthermore, Aristotle believes that justice requires "a certain equality", which means at least the requirement that those who are considered to be in an equal or substantially similar position by the prevailing views at the time and place should be treated equally. treat.If we do not realize the significance of Aristotle's above-mentioned point of view, then we will reduce political action or social action to a kind of despotism, that is, a series of actions that do not correspond to what ordinary people usually call "laws". specific measures. But on the other hand, the existence or non-existence of a legal system is not conditioned by the sequential structure that people prescribe for these three basic components of justice (security, liberty, and equality).As long as the integrity of a legal system is not destroyed or seriously undermined by the disregard of its complementary or conflicting values, it is still possible for the legal system to be centered on security, Limited freedom is too much.Because these three values ​​are deeply rooted in human nature, achieving a reasonable balance between them is the mark of a truly successful legal system. "The law must be stable, but not static".This quote by Roscoe Pound reveals an eternal and irrefutable truth.A completely unstable legal system can only be a series of specific measures formulated only to deal with temporary changes.It will lack logical self-consistency and continuity.In this way, when people arrange transactions or make plans for the future, they will have no way of knowing whether yesterday's law will become tomorrow's law. "The law, as a guide to conduct, is empty talk if it is unknown and cannot be known."These conditions do not correspond to the law in its true sense, since excessively fluid and ever-changing conditions would cause the law to change from day to day. However, stability and certainty alone are not enough to provide us with an effective and viable legal system.The law must also obey the just claims made by progress.A legal system that cannot keep up with the needs or requirements of the times, and clings to the concepts of the previous era that are only transient is obviously not advisable.In a changing world, law cannot function effectively if it is viewed as merely a permanent instrument.We must find some kind of harmony between these contradictory forces of movement and stasis, conservatism and innovation, rigidity and inconsistency.As the glue that holds loose social structures together, law must deftly link the past to the present without losing sight of the imperatives of the future. Many changes in the law happen slowly and gradually.These changes are often limited to particular aspects of the legal system, or to specific issues within a particular framework.The parts of the legal order that are affected change to some degree, while much of its original structure remains the same.The fragmentary or incomplete nature of most legal reforms explains precisely the fact that stability and change tend to be interconnected and interpenetrating in legal life. Questions of legal rest and motion are closely related to the topics we discussed in the previous section.As law seeks to promote the orderly values ​​of society, it necessarily pays attention to the ideas of continuity and stability.Order in social life, as we know it, is concerned with constructing patterns of human action or behaviour, and such patterns can only be established by making today's behavior the same as yesterday's.If the law does not act as a brake on frequent and chaotic changes, the result is chaos and disorder, because no one can predict the information and events that will emerge tomorrow.Thus, the principle of precedent and compliance with enacted statutory norms will be appropriate instruments for the promotion of order. But on the other hand, the pursuit of justice in law enforcement sometimes requires considerations of a different nature.The principle of precedent, shaped by people's desire for order and regularity, requires that factual situations that were decided in a particular way in the past should be decided in the same way today; nevertheless, the equality expected by justice is not necessarily what was decided in the past Equivalent to today's Judgment Room.In some cases, what justice requires is an equality in space, not an equality in time.Justice requires equal treatment of individuals, groups, or situations who, according to the standards of today's society, deserve equal treatment.Thus, a conflict arises between following precedent and justice as soon as past value judgments no longer coincide with present value judgments.In such cases, the delicate task of maintaining a salutary balance between respect for precedent and deference to justice falls to the judiciary. The case of Oppenheim v. Kridel is an example of the existence of such conflicts and their resolution through judicial action.In that case, the New York Court of Appeals held that a woman could prosecute her husband's mistress for adultery.However, based on the principle that a married woman has no standing to sue, common law precedent has in the past limited this right of action to the husband.But the court rejected those precedents on the grounds that social, political and legal changes had transformed the relationship between the sexes and placed them on an equal footing.In the "School Segregation Case" (School Segregation Case), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an early jurisprudence advocating racial segregation on the grounds that the current concept of racial equality has made this jurisprudence lose its continuing validity. Reconciling equality in time (that is, the application of earlier jurisprudence to the same or substantially similar situations) and equality in space (that is, equal treatment of people and things that should be treated equally according to contemporary social philosophy) is the is a rather daunting task.It involves the proper measurement of the speed at which law should adapt to the changing currents of the times, and the assessment of the permanence and certainty of emerging social ideals or tendencies.When a court is faced with the task of denying an earlier judicial principle, it must also consider other issues.For example, the degree of confidence that a party to the litigation has in the continuing validity of the rules contained in the precedent, and the court's position on setting aside earlier jurisprudence have implications for legal relationships and transactions not involved in this litigation but which are Concluded under the same earlier rules - the effects of - etc. The ordering function of law, reflected in the principles of precedent and deference to statute, has a tendency to make law rigid and conform to the current social and economic status quo.It enhances the retroactive force and inertia force inherent in the law, and makes the legal system have a certain degree of resistance to change.Attempts to fully overcome this deficiency from within the legal system through judicial action are no easy task.The really effective remedies often come from the outside, or through the exercise of political power to promote legislation to improve the law, or to establish an equitable system to supplement or amend the legal system in the strict sense.The Romans and the English developed their own equitable procedures and institutions as amendments to the stylized and rigid character of their strict law, and to correct the deficiencies arising from the conservatism of the orthodox legal system, noting This point is quite instructive.These procedures demonstrate the just force of law, that is, a force generally guided by teleology aimed at balancing law with social good. In conclusion, we can say that both the backward pull and the forward push are crucial to the proper functioning of any legal system.The contrast between past-focused and future-focused forces in legal development is not the same at different stages of a country's historical development.An ideal legal system might be one in which necessary legal amendments are made at the appropriate time in an orderly manner, and such amendments are made only to innocent victims of legal change Take minimal damage. Those jurists who regard the maintenance of order and domestic peace as the sole or primary task of law tend to regard law as the mandate or order of government—instructions or orders issued for the purpose of accomplishing these ends and ensuring its success.Maintaining public order is extremely difficult without some degree of cooperation in government action, all the more so in a complex and divided society.However, state governance always involves the problem that only a few people can exercise guiding power, or exercise coercive power when necessary.It is usually impossible to obtain the unanimous consent of all members of society for measures of social control that affect the interests and welfare of all members of society, so these measures must be enacted by a few people who are endowed with special powers or privileges.John Austin (John Austin) and his followers pointed out that the institution with the right to require people to obey its decrees is the "sovereign", and the orders issued by the sovereign are the essence and core of the law. However, there exists another school of legal philosophy whose founder is Eugen Ehrlich.As noted above, Ehrlich and his followers saw law as a collection of arrangements, daily practices, and principles of justice observed by members of society, rather than the sum of orders issued by a sovereign.They believe that the law is co-existing with people, reflected in their marriage arrangements, property transactions, inheritance, but also in the internal laws of their groups and associations, so it is necessary for understanding the legal order. Even more significant is the study of how the government enforces its orders through court decisions (which Ehrlich sees as exceptions).This school of legal sociology tends to emphasize those factors in the legal system that tend to make the legal system a spontaneous, non-coercive instrument that regulates the various aspects of living together and interacting in society. Claims and demands made by ordinary people in this relationship. In judging the above two opposing theories, it is not necessary to force people to accept that they are necessarily mutually incompatible and mutually exclusive.A government may heed and follow the basic imperatives of justice when it issues laws and decrees; its formal codes may basically reflect the general beliefs of the people.But on the other hand, many social arrangements, customs, and usages may be in perfect conformity with the requirements of public order.Therefore, the absolutist theory that claims that law is either only connected with the government or order, or is only equal to people's social customs and their ideals of justice, cannot be said to be a true portrayal of reality. However, there is likely to be a disagreement between the laws enacted by the government and the living law that people follow in real life.It is possible for the common people to reject some of the legal regulations imposed on them and to circumvent them as much as possible.Conversely, governments may also refuse to accept prevailing social mores and try to change them by force if necessary.If this were to happen, people would be divided as to whether government orders represent the "true" law or popular belief represents the "true" law. In a democracy, potential differences between government decrees and social interests are thought to be reduced to a very small extent by means of a universally elected legislature, since under this approach the first duty of elected representatives is to faithfully reflect the governed interests of the recipient.It is supposed that the laws enacted by the legislator should only record and express the wishes and needs of the people.However, in reality as we know it, the above assumptions are not always possible in democracies.Legislators may misinterpret people's wishes or sacrifice them for the special interests of big economic corporations.They may also enact laws they deem necessary to enhance domestic security or to meet emergencies, but these laws may not enjoy popular support because they severely restrict or limit the rights and liberties of the people.In a non-democratic society, the potential for a disconnect between government policy and the hopes and emotions of the people is multiplied; and it is also likely that the state apparatus will be used primarily to maintain and consolidate The current regime pays little attention to the reaction of the general public to the measures it enacts or to the inherent justice of the legal system. A perceptive legal philosophy would argue that, under any political or social system, law cannot be either wholly governmental or wholly social.This kind of legal philosophy first believes that law is produced in the tense and harmonious relationship between society and its rulers, and second, that the legal system reflects the subtle interaction between commanding factors and social factors; In different countries and in different historical stages, they are often dominant alternately.Some kind of compromise must be found between the government and the people to protect the integrity and effectiveness of the legal system.If the government goes too far beyond what the people can accept, or, conversely, if a country in progress is held back by a government that favors regress, the whole or part of the legal system is in trouble. When the norms formulated by legislators are fully consistent with the value judgments and real interests of the whole society, an ideal situation will be achieved, but political reality often cannot realize this ideal.The legislator may be the representative of the group of conquerors, and will impose the value judgment system of the conquerors on the majority of the conquered.They may also be agents of the economically or politically dominant groups, whose views on what constitutes desirable social policy may be tinged with class prejudice or class interests.Of course, it is also possible that the leaders of the government are noble reformers who are determined to raise the ethical standards of society or to correct the slow development caused by obstinate adherence to outdated customs.From the last possibility mentioned above, we can see that it seems short-sighted to think that the function of positive law promulgated by the government is only to reflect and record the views and habits of the people.Positive law is a tool that can be legitimately used to overcome social inertia and can also pave the way for a fundamental revision of a people's way of life. When we speak of an extreme case in the field of "ethics-command coordination," we risk going beyond the institutional scope of law.In the absence of normative guidance issued by government-appointed bodies, we risk a situation in which law is superseded by anarchy.Such a situation may arise, for example, when different classes or factions in society follow and practice completely irreconcilable "living laws."If this happens, the law may disappear completely or to a large extent, and be temporarily replaced by feuds or civil wars between rival groups. Another extreme can occur when the social order is completely despotic.In an autocratic order, the content of the law—at least some of it—may be wholly irrational and deemed unacceptable by most people.When the law degenerates into a tyrannical despotism, and is intolerably incompatible with the people's sense of justice, the question of the effectiveness of such utterly unjust legal measures is raised to the fore. And need to figure out a way to go about it. If people say that a legal norm is valid, it means that this legal norm is binding on those to whom it is directed.Generally speaking, the coercive power of legal provisions is the essence of law as a defender of social peace and justice, so the validity of legal norms is a problem rooted in the legal process.If a valid law creates a duty or a prohibition, it can only require obedience and compliance with it from those to whom the duty reaches.如果它授予私人以权利或权力，那么这些权利和权力就必须得到其他私人的尊重，而且在它们遭到侵损时应当得到司法机关的保护。再者，一项有效的法律还必须由那些受托执法的机构付诸实施。 一项法律规定的有效性必须同其在社会秩序中的实效（efficacy）区别开来。用哈里·W·琼斯（Harry.W.Jones）的话来讲，“只有当构成社会的人——无论是官员还是大多数私人公民——的实际行为与宪法规定、制定法规定或判例法规定所指定或认可的标准相一致时，这些规定才在该社会中具有实效”。因此，实效问题所涉及的乃是法律规范适用于的那些人是否真正遵守这些规范的问题。而另一方面，对法律有效性的探求，则是试图确定一项法律规范是否应当被遵守，亦即私人或政府官员是否应当遵守它。在法律制度的一些部门中，在一项法规的有效性与实效之间完全有可能发生冲突。例如，一部被法院确认为符合宪法的法规，却有可能无法在实际生活中起到社会行为有效标准的作用。 从纯粹行为主义的观点来看，法律的有效性问题提出了一系列棘手的难题，因为它所涉及的是法律规范在理论上是否存在的问题，而不是人们在实际的现实世界中遵守或执行法律方面的可见的行为。斯堪的纳维亚的法律现实主义学者阿尔夫·罗斯（Alf Ross），为了在一些准先验的有效性浅滩中航行，曾试图把这个问题归入以心理本质为标志的领域。他认为，有关一项法律规范有效的定论，是就司法判决者的行为态度而言的。那些规范之所以有效——即在执法官的心目中的确起到了影响作用并在解决法律争议时得到了适用，乃是因为执法官员认为这些规范具有社会约束力。 罗斯所持的有效性观念，乃是以某种“关于法官精神生活的假设”为基础的，即法官在其社会的规范性意识形态的驱动下所进行的那部分精神活动。从这个论点出发，罗斯否弃了正统的行为主义对司法行为所作的解释，因为这种解释会把人们局限于只对司法行为模式进行纯粹外部性的考察。他坚持认为，有必要理解法官的内心反应，这是从法官按照自己的经验（以毫无个人偏见的方式获得的经验）认为法律规范乃是其社会中具有约束力的指令这一意义上来讲的。 罗斯认为，这种认识法律有效性问题的进路所具有的主要的实际意义乃在于这样一个事实，即它为人们做出有关一条法律规则将在未来的法律判决中被法庭所适用的预测提供了基础。但是罗斯并不象霍姆斯法官那样把关于法院实际上将会干什么的预测同法律本身的现象等而视之。他曾试图否弃法律的理想性与现实性这种传统的二元论；这表现在他把法律的有效性与实效视为法官的某些行为态度，而这种态度又源出于他们对建立在其社会中的规范性结构做出的精神反应。罗斯认为，通过这种理论建构，他已把法律的有效性问题从规范性“应然”的领域中切割了出来，并将其牢固地扎根于人的态度和精神体验这个经验性“实然”的土壤之中了。 罗斯对有效性现象所持的上述认识进路，不能被视为是解决该问题的一种令人满意的方法。对于一项法律规范是否有效这个问题的回答，并不完全也不主要取决于对法官“毫无偏见的行为态度”以及隐于这些态度背后的驱动力的分析。首先，法律有效性问题的范围并不局限于司法审判领域。众所周知，对于一个被要求遵守某一法律命令而他本人却认为该命令是不合理的人来说，他也可能不得不面对这个问题。第二，对可能在此一法律领域中做出某一判决的法官的精神反应进行探究，似乎并不是该项法律规范有效与否的最终的试金石。有可能出现这种情况，例如，尽管一项判决已具有了“已决事件”的效力，但它却会被法学界普遍断定为是具有错误观点的判决（并在一定的时间后会因此原因而被推翻）。确定一项规范有效与否的最可行的标准，似乎是处理该问题的观点所具有的合理性和说服力，该观点与可适用的规则和原则的一致性以及该观点同整个法律制度的精神和价值模式的相符性。 罗斯认为，通过他的理论建构，他已把法律的有效性问题从规范性理想领域中切割了出来，并把它变成了一种现实的现象。然而，当我们对导向宣称一条规范有效或无效的精神活动进行详尽分析时，我们就会发现这些精神活动经常要涉及价值判断方面的规范性的和价值论的结论以及对公正标准的探求。价值领域与事实世界之间的二元论，并不会因在语义上将规范性“应然”命题归为心理性的行为态度而被消除。 正如赫伯特·哈特（Herbet Hart）所指出的，在所有发达的法律制度中都有一套规则，这套规则旨在建立一个官方机制以对该制度的有效的和强制性的律令做出权威性的识别。他把这些规则称之为“确认规则”（rules of recognition），并将它们同调整社会中的人际关系以及区别正义行为与不正义行为的“首要”（primary）社会行为规则区分开来。 有关法律规范有效性问题的一些规则，具有一种纯粹的形式技术的性质，而且往往允许对其遵守与否做出简单的甚至几乎是机械的决定。一个国家的宪法或一般性法律可能规定，一项提案须经过立法议会三读通过，即必须在立法机关的两院中都获得多数赞成票，必须由国家首脑签署以及必须在官方的法律汇编中出版。如果这些形式上的要求都已达到，那么该法律就可以被认为是有效的而毋需顾及其内容的性质。 甚至在司法审判程序这一专门领域中，亦会不时发生有关价值论的和评价性的棘手问题。联合国宪章第18条规定，联合国大会的决议应以到会及投票之会员国之多数决定之。但另一方面，联合国大会对于“重要问题”之决议，则需要到会及投票之会员国三分之二多数决定之。显而易见，对联合国大会议程上的一个问题是否属于“重要问题”加以确定，有时就需要做出具有复杂和可能具有争议性质的价值判断。 在一些联邦制国家中，法律的有效性不仅取决于对某些形式性的立法程序的遵守，而且还要取决于对某些立法管辖权规则的服从。为社会所关注的某些领域是由联邦立法机关加以规定的，而其他的领域则是由政府附属单位的立法机构加以规定的。因此，在美国，对州际贸易和对外贸易的调整权都控制在国会手中，而各州立法机关则在决定公民于侵权、合同及州内关系等方面的权利与义务时具有广泛的权力。在盛行这种制度的地方，有关法律有效性的规则并不只具有纯粹的形式性质，而且还可以宣称某些题域超出了一个立法机关的管辖权范围。 一个国家的宪法或基本规范可能再进一步，规定法律的有效性应以遵守某些被认为体现了该社会秩序中的基本正义原则的标准为条件。例如，美国宪法就规定，未经法律的正当程序，不得剥夺任何人的生命、自由或财产；而且任何州不得拒绝给予任何人以相同的法律保护。美国宪法还禁止国会剥夺言论自由，禁止国会通过溯及既往的法律。1949年西德宪法也宣称，“个人尊严”在任何时候都将得到法律的保护。 赫伯特·哈特争辩说，旨在为法律有效性提供标准的确认规范的目的，乃是要增强法律的确定性和明确性；他指出，在早期不发达的法律制度中，法律规则、道德义务与社会习俗之间的分界线是极不清楚的。如果确认规则的主要目的在于促进对强制性法律规则的辨识，那么纯粹形式的识别标准就要比注重法律规则内容的实质性标准优越得多。要确定一项法案是否在立法会议上通过了三读、是否为实际投票人的多数票所赞同、以及是否已由国家首脑所签署等问题，通常来讲是一项较为容易的事情。当法律的有效性还取决于对具有管辖性质的限制条件的服从时，辨识的确定性便开始减小。例如，若把联邦政府的贸易和征税的权力同各州在这方面的权力分开，则必然会使美国最高法院在其判决中创设微妙的差别原则和不确定的标准。 当对正当程序的考虑或对要求保护个人尊严的考虑被纳入确定过程之中时，将法律中的有效规则同无效的或违宪的规则加以区别时所具有的便利便会达到最低点。在这里，由于需要诉诸毫不明确的和变幻无常的评价标准，所以明确规则的自主性与自足性便遭到了破坏。判断一条法规或其他法律措施是否同“正当程序”的命令相符合，往往需要做出高度精确的规范性考虑，亦即要求对法律制度中不同层次的规定间的协调共存问题进行认真的判断，对相互冲突的社会价值进行权衡以及对这些价值进行排序。在宪法领域中，罗斯在试图把法律有效性的问题归为一种对司法心理态度的事实解释方面所做的努力，遇到了特别严重的困难。 当我们在一国实在法并未明确阐述的一般正义原则中探寻有关确定规范约束力的法律标准时，我们便步入了法律有效性问题所涉及的最为敏感也最具争议的领域。例如在中世纪，教会权力机构在许多非宗教当局的支持下，拒绝承认那些被认为与神法或自然法相抵触的国家法具有有效性。教会中一些著名神父的典籍为此立场提供了理论依据。圣·奥古斯丁（St.Augustine）曾指出，不正义的法律根本就不是法律。圣·托马斯·阿奎那（St.Thomas Aquinas）也宣称，“人定法……如果违背理性，就被称之为不正义的法律，而且它所具有的并不是法律的性质，而是暴力的性质”。 在我们生活的这个时代，那种认为不正义的法律就不是法律的观点，已很少为法律哲学家或法庭的法官所赞同。这种理论有着明显的缺陷。一项制定法是否“违背理性”往往是十分不确定的，而且有关一项特定法规是否公正与合理的问题，人们也往往会产生广泛且重大的分歧。如果公开承认人们有权无视、废弃或不遵守一项不正义的法律，那么这些情形就会置法律制度的确定性与权威性于一种无法承受的压力与重负之下。正如西班牙的经院哲学家弗朗西斯科·苏亚雷斯（Francisco Suarez）所指出的，“必须作出有利于立法者的假定……，这是因为如果不存在有利于立法者的这种假定，那么就会给国民无视法律大开绿灯：法律不可能公正到足以使一些人不对它们产生怀疑，尽管这种怀疑所依据的显然是一些似是而非的理由。” 然而值得我们注意的是，也可能会发生这种情形，即一个暴虐政权会把一些完全蔑视所有文明礼仪标准的规则颁布于法律之中。例如，让我们假设一个政府下令灭绝或根除一个不受欢迎的宗教团体、种族群体或少数民族，允许暴徒对人们施以私刑，并命令（就象新约全书中的赫罗德国王一样）屠杀无辜儿童，或者以酷刑威胁手段强迫人们告发批评过政府的近亲属。如果无法获得真正的法律程序以对这些完全不公正的法律权威性提出质疑（在专制体制下通常情形就是如此），那么就应当赋予法律官员和平民以抵制适用和执行这些法令的权利。然而，出于法律安全的迫切需要，上述权利只能在极端的和无法解决的情形——即政府犯了令人难以容忍的错误的情形——中加以行使。另外，行使这种抵制权利的人还必须冒有这种风险，即他有可能错误地判断了合法行使这种权利的严格前提。 在希特勒时代以后，西德最高法院向前迈进了一步并在判决中指出，如果国家发布的命令是完全应受谴责的而且其不合理性已达到了令人难以容忍的程度，那么抵制执行这些命令的权利在某些情形下可以转变为一种不遵守这些命令的法律义务。该法院在一案例中认为，一条规定凡持枪者都负有义务处死一个“逃兵、懦夫或叛徒”而无须经过审判的法令，由于违反了“自然法”的基本原则，所以奉行此令者须受到惩罚。该法院还宣称，一项法规或其他官方法令，“当与普遍承认的国际法或自然法的原则发生冲突时，或当实在法与正义之间的分歧变得如此之不可忍受以致实在法因不公正而必须服从正义时，就达到了其有效范围的尽头”。这种立场为那些（根据那种能使抵制义务成为有效的状况之性质）可能发现自己承受着必须去遵守不合理的命令的极大压力的人设定了一些道德责任的高级标准。在这种情形下，法官必须表现出极大的智慧和对人性的理解，而且法官在裁定因未能抵制不合法的法令而应承担的责任时，还应当考虑当时为确保服从这些不合法的法令而行使的强制手段的性质与严厉性。但是在另一方面，我们也必须认识到，除非我们准备生产一代机器人，这些机器人甚至对最为专制和最无人性的强盗政权也将表现出奴隶般的、毫无怨言的顺从，否则就需要有责任心的人在执行极恶的命令时做出批判性的判断，即使他有可能因此而承受被剥夺基本权利的风险。在这一领域，法律科学所能做的不过只是提出一些解决这种问题的宽泛标准，并将其细节留待处理这类情形的法官根据特定的事实从司法上加以考虑。 赫伯特·哈特所持的立场同我们在本节中所主张的观点，在一些实质性方面大相径庭。哈特从法律与道德之间必须进行严格区别这一前提出发，得出结论认为，法律必须被认为包含了所有依据宪法上的或一般法律中的标准（这些标准是由实在法律制度确立的）而有效的规则，而毋须考虑这些规则的内在正义性。他坚持主张，如果人们采纳一种较为狭义的法律概念，而把令人厌恶的规则排除在外，那么就会一无所获，即使这些规则的不道德程度达到了登峰造极的地步，情况亦然。然而，他却没有明确指出，那些与正义或人们的道德感完全不相符合的规则必须在任何情况下都得到遵守。他指出，虽然这些规则也是法律，但是也存在着不遵守它们的道德权利甚或道德义务。 在一些情况下，这种观点有可能会导致极不可欲的后果。哈特认为，尽管一个个人可以以更高的正义为由而拒绝服从令人憎恶的法规，但是法院仍必须因该人不服从法律而制裁他。很显然，我们不能以一项法律虽然有效但在道德上很可耻为由而给予法官——法律制度的受托人——以拒绝适用此项法律的权利。因此根据哈特的理论，一个人如果因为拒绝执行一个疯狂的暴君所发表的有关屠杀大批无辜人民的并在形式上有效的命令而被科以死刑，那么即使在该暴君被废黜以后这个人也必须受到法院的制裁，除非人们采取了溯及既往的手段而废除了此项不公正的法律，或者立法院颁布了大赦令。但是，废除一项法律或颁布大赦令都非轻而易举之事。另外，即使在专制暴君统治时期，赋予司法机关以无视或反对主权者发布的令人憎恶的命令的权利，似乎也是可欲的，只要法官能鼓起勇气采取这种冒险的措施。 哈特认为，如果一项法律符合了国家实在性的“确认规则”所规定的标准，那么该项法律就是法律；他的这个观点源出于他所持的这样一个信念，即确认规则的首要目的乃是加强法律制度的确定性和稳定性。但是人们也有充分的理由可以认为，法律有效性的标准不应当同正义的基本标准完全相违背。如果法律的目的就是使人们在此星球上过有价值的生活，并帮助他们满足他们的基本需要，那么在政府同其公民或国民间的关系中发生“优势势力利用自己的权力削弱或消灭劣势势力”这种现象时，人们就有正当理由对某些法律的有效性提出质疑。 上述结论，即使从哈特十分强调的法律确定性的观点来看，也是站得住脚的。宣称一项法律规则有效的目的就在于确保该项法律规则得以有效的遵守和实施。然而，如果许多人都认为该项规则是完全不合理的或不正义的，那么这一目的就无从实现。在这种情形下，对该项规则的遵守及实施往往也会遭到破坏，从而使该规则部分失效。在纳粹德国，法律规定不得向遭迫害的少数民族提供援助或给予安慰，否则将受到严厉惩罚，但是许多受人尊敬的和一贯守法的公民却都无视这类法律。象拉尔夫·沃尔多·埃默森（Ralph Waldo Emerson）这样品行高尚和负有责任感的人，就曾在其日记中写道，他将不服从《逃亡奴隶法令》（Fugitive Slave Act）的规定，而且并不只是他一个人持有此观点，有许多人都站在他的一边。当一条规则或一套规则的实效因道德上的抵制而受到威胁时，它的有效性就可能变成一个毫无意义的外壳。只有用服从正义的基本要求来补充法律安排的形式秩序，才能使这个法律制度免于全部或部分崩溃。 在前一节中我们业已提出，必须对法律的有效性与法律的实效加以区分；我们还指出，对法律有效性的探求是旨在确定某一特定行为规则是否具备一条应得到遵守与实施的法律规则的资格条件。而另一方面，法律实效所涉及的则是另一个问题，即一项行为规则在社会秩序中是否在事实上得到了实施，亦即它是否得到了其适用对象的遵守以及是否为政府当局所实施了。 制裁（sanctions）问题是一个关系到法律实效的问题。人们之所以规定制裁，其目的就在于保证法律命令得到遵守与执行，就在于强迫“行为符合业已确立的秩序”。为一个法律制度所承认的制裁形式，通常都具有多样化的特征。在原始社会，它们可能呈现为自我的或社会的贝壳放逐形式。在发达的法律制度中，一般来讲，制裁是由政治性的政府机关加以执行的。在强制性法律的各种执行手段中，有罚款或监禁这样的惩罚手段、设定损害赔偿额（它们是通过强制方法而落实在败诉债务人的财产之中的）的手段、由法院强制照约履行或规定债务偿还期以作为惩罚的威胁手段、对一个玩忽职守的渎职官员进行弹劾或免职等手段。正如凯尔森所指出的，为发达的法律制度所特有的制裁形式，不仅只限于给人们施加心理压力的范围，而且还允许执行一些剥夺权利的强制性法令，即“作为某些情形的后果，强行剥夺生命、自由、经济价值和其他价值”。 一些有关法律的定义和理论认为，通过制裁可以增进强制力，而且制裁的作用远比其他促使人们有效遵守与执行法律命令的手段大得多。其中的一些定义和理论几乎把强制性制裁规定视为法律得以存在和得以有效的基本条件。例如，人类学家E·亚当森·霍贝尔（E.Adamson Hoebel）就把法律定义为“一种社会规范，违反这种规范，就要由拥有为社会所公认的执行制度特权的人通过威胁适用或实际适用物理力量（physical force）的方法对之进行制裁。”社会学家马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber）也宣称，“如果一种制度可以从外部得到这样一种可能性的保证，即人们都特别原意为遵守法规或惩处违法行为的目的而运用强制力（物理的或心理的强制力）的可能性”，那么这种制度就可以被称之为法律。其他一些法律哲学家也都持相同的观点。埃德温·W·帕特森（Edwin W.Patterson）认为，“每一种法律在某种意义上都具有一种法律制裁形式”，而且“制裁是每一法律体系和每一项法律规定的必要特征”。乔治奥·德尔·韦基奥（Giorgio De1Vecchio）也宣称，强制力与法律这两个概念在逻辑上是不可分的，“哪里没有强制力，哪里就没有法律”。汉斯·凯尔森甚至将法律描述为“一种强制性制度”和“一种强力的组织”。 如果上述种种论断必须被解释为意指制裁作为附属物乃是一个绝对必要的条件，亦即一项法律规范得以存在和得以有效的根本标准，那么我们就有必要就此断言展开论辩。在某个法律制度中都有一些具有促进性的（facilitative）规范而非强制性的规范。 在这类规范中，有赋予个人以权利的规范、授予组织以权力的规范以及对政府机构制定政策的自由裁量权领域进行确定的规范。对于不行使法律所赋予的权利、权力或自由裁量权，是毋须附设制裁的。在这个意义上可被视为是不具制裁性的规范的例子有：允许人们通过财产转让而移转所有权的规范、允许人们根据遗嘱处分财产的规范、允许人们在政治选举中投票的规范以及允许人们就公众利益问题畅所欲言的规范。 对于此一论辨，凯尔森答复说，“那些本身并未规定强制行为（因而并不命令，但却允许创立规范或明确允许一定的行为）的规范，是一些依附性规范（dependent norms），它们只有同那些明确规定强制行为的规范相联系，才会具有效力。”因此，允许人们通过转让或分配从所有者那儿获得所有权的任意条款（permissive Provision），乃是通过对任何妨碍受让人拥有其财产的第三者设定强制性制裁而得以实施的；赋予某些个人以投票权利的规定，其效力的实现乃是以对其他人和政府官员确立不得干涉有权者行使这一权利的强制性义务为条件的；授予行政机关以制定规则之权力的条款，只有在具体化这种授权以后才会具有意义，所谓具体化，就是在所颁布的规则不为其调整对象所服从的情形中，可通过设定惩罚而予以实施之。 凯尔森竭力主张法律强制理论的普遍性，但这种努力实际上却存在着一定的虚构性。赫伯特·哈特曾颇有说服力地指出，对于那些授予某些人以权利和权力的规则，我们必须从行使这些权利与权力的人的角度来考察。经过考察以后，我们就会清楚地看到，上述有关的授权乃是一种授权规范，而不是一种强制性规范。再者，我们也不能说，那些授予一国之公民以言论自由或投票权利的规范，其有效性是以其他限制或制裁那些企图干涉人们行使上述权利的人的规范为条件的。另一方面，除非对破坏这些权利的行为加以制裁，否则这些权利的实效就有可能遭到破坏。这会在下述情形中发生：在某些激进的政治群体中或在一般人中所盛行的那种偏狭的情绪，常常会促使人们产生取消他们毫无限制的言论自由或政治选择的意图。 在大多数法律制度中，除了一些允许行使权利和权力的规范以外，还存在着一些其他不具有强制实施因素的规范。由婚姻关系中所产生的合作义务，就属于这类规范。宪法中有时也包含有某些不能强制适用于某些高级官员之身的条款。制定法或司法判例会承认主权豁免原则，该原则禁止人们因一国的侵权行为及违约行为而对该国起诉，尽管人们可以得到一种救济手段以对抗对这一行为负有责任的个别官员（但是这种救济通常是无效的）。 在这些情形下，我们必须同意阿尔夫·罗斯的论断，“如果说每条法律规则都必须由强制力作为后盾，那么从这个意义上讲，强制力就不可能是法律概念的必要成分”。然而，罗斯还提出了一个更深刻的问题，即一个并不以强制力为基础的制度是否在任何情形下都具备一个法律制度的条件。他对这个问题的回答是否定的，其依据是他所得出的一个结论，即就整体而言，强制力乃是法律制度的“一个必要的不可分割的部分”。 尽管这一主张在罗斯所作的特定表述中有值得商榷的地方，但是它仍比那种认为制裁的存在乃是每一法律规范的显著标志的观点具有更大的解释力和具有更强的说服力。一个法律制度，如果没有可强制实施的惩罚手段，就会被证明无力限制不合作的、反社会的和犯罪的因素，从而也就不能实现其在社会中维持秩序与正义的基本职能。这就解释了这样一种普遍的现象，即所有成熟的和高度发达的法律制度都通过把强制性的国家机器置于执法机构和执法官员的支配之下以使法律得到最大限度的服从。尽管早期法律制度的特征是政府制裁机构的不完善而且还经常依赖于受侵害的个人与群体的自助形式，但是法律的进步却伴随着这样一种明显的趋势，即通过创立和维护官方程序（这种程序是用以执行和实施那些能确立约束性义务的法律规范的）来保证这些法律规范的实效。 然而，上述观点必须同那种认为政治上有组织的强制力乃是一套法律规则得以存在的绝对必要条件和主要标准的观点区别开来，因为后一种观点忽视了这样一个事实，即一个法律制度之实效的首要保障必须是它能为社会所接受，而强制性的制裁只能作为次要的和辅助性的保障。一个合理的和令人满意的法律制度之所以会得到社会大多数成员的遵守，乃是因为它服务于他们的利益、为他们所尊重、或至少不会在他们的心中激起敌视或仇恨的情感。强制只能用来针对少数不合作的人，因为在任何正常并运行有效的国家中，须用制裁手段加以对待的违法者的人数远远少于遵纪守法的公民。 有人可能会反对上述观点，因为有些法律制度或这些法律制度的某些部分并未被认为是合理的和正义的，而且公民服从它们只是出于害怕，因为如果不遵守这种法律，他们就可能会受到强制性的制裁。然而，在这种情形下，破坏和抵制这种法律制度的行为很可能会广为蔓延，并将逐渐削弱该制度的基础与强力。即使不是这样，这种制度的存在也不可能被期望维持多久，因为要少数政府官员将一个不为人们接受的法律制度强加给广大人民实是极为困难的。正如弗里霍夫（Freehof）所指出的，“警察权力（police power）当然是必不可少的，然而却永远是不充分的。如果大多数公民决定采用暴力，正如历史上多次发生的那样，那么警察权力也是无济于事的。秩序的真正生命力依然源自内部。是良知造就了我们所有的公民。”如果大多数公民不愿意遵守该法律，那么强制就会变的毫无意义，以强制作为威胁手段也会丝毫不起作用。 让我们假定存在着这样一种社会，在该社会中，社会团结达到了顶峰，结果使统治当局对强制力的运用变得毫无意义。该社会成员经由教育、劝说以及本人的经验而逐渐相信法律的有益作用，所以他们习惯于遵守法律。如果因政府强力的运用已变得多余而断言法律在这样的社会中已经不复存在，那么可以说这是对法律作用的一种误解。法律的主要作用并不是惩罚或压制，而是为人类共处和为满足某些基本需要提供规范性安排。使用强制性制裁的需要愈少，法律也就更好地实现了其巩固社会和平与和谐的目的。 因此，我们完全有理由认为，如果人们不得不着重依赖政府强力作为实施法律命令的手段，那么这只能表明该法律制度机能的失效而不是对其有效性和实效的肯定。既然我们不能根据一个社会制度的病态表现来给该制度下定义，那么我们也就不应当把强制的运用视为法律的实质。正如佩顿（Paton）曾确切指出的，“学术界对制裁的过于关注，导致了一种错误的法律观。健康观念使我们首先想到的并不是医院和疾病、手术和麻醉，而不论这些东西对于维护社会福利是多么必要。最好的医疗方法是预防疾病的发生，正如法律的真正益处在于它确保有序的平衡，而这种平衡能成功地预防纠纷。”正如药物效用的最佳状态乃是人体不再需要它，法律的最大成功也在于当局对公民的生命、自由和财产所进行的令人讨厌的干涉被降到最低限度。 对法律制裁理论来讲，最具挑战性的检验领域之一乃是国际法领域。约翰·奥斯丁（John Austin）不承认国际法具有法律性质，其依据是国际法的规则和原则并不是由一个最高政治主权者制定的，而且国际法没有规定任何法律制裁手段来保证其规定的遵守。汉斯·凯尔森对奥斯丁第二个依据的效力提出了质疑，其理由是根据国际法，在某些情形下是允许采取诸如报复性暴力行为、经济联合抵制以及诉诸战争等形式的强制性行为以对抗违反国际法的行为的。他认为，上述制裁手段在多数情况下是由一个权利受到侵损的国家来执行的，而不是由一个至高无上的公正的国际机构或国际政府来执行的，这对于确定国际法的法律性质来讲并不是至关重要的。上述两种观点所具有的一种共同倾向是，它们都把制裁视为所有法律的基本组成部分；它们的区别只在于它们对强制执行程度类型的认识有所不同，而这种程序被认为是满足有关法律制裁的要求的手段。 如果要做出国际法是一种真正的法律这样的评价，就必须首先承认这样一个事实，即国际法制度的规则如果不以国际法律社会或国际法律社会大多数成员国的接受为基础，那么该制度就不可能有效。应当强调指出的是，大多数调整国际关系的惯例和条约规