Chapter 17 CHAPTER 13 LAW - DIFFERENCES FROM OTHER SOCIAL CONTROL POWERS

Although throughout the history of organized societies the law has played an enormous and decisive role as a regulator of human relations, it is clearly not enough in any such society to rely on the law alone as a socially controlling force.In fact, there are other tools that can guide or guide people's behavior, and these tools are used to supplement or partially replace legal means in the process of achieving social goals.These tools include power, administration, morality and custom.Needless to say, the analytical distinctions one draws between the four instruments of control mentioned above are not always precise.Power overlaps with administration to a certain extent, and morality sometimes merges with custom.At the same time, it should be pointed out that it is not always easy to conceptually separate the law from the four control tools mentioned above.That difficulty becomes even more pronounced when we consider the relationship between power and law.

Regarding the concept of power, people have not yet reached a unified understanding.Bertrand Ruussell said, “Power can be defined as the production of intended results.” Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan declared, “Power Participation in decision-making.” According to Max Weber, power is “the possibility that an actor within a certain social Whatever the basis on which this possibility rests." Neither the first nor the second definition above places law in a position necessarily opposed to or in conflict with the concept of power that underlies both definitions.A "production for results" is complete when a legislature passes an effective law, or a court makes a binding final judgment.For effective law enforcement, legislators and enforcers also need and use this power in a broad sense.Undoubtedly, participation in decision-making also forms an important part of the functions of the legislator or enforcer.

A more pertinent problem arises when we look at law in light of Max Weber's conception of power.It is true that coercive and prohibitive laws should be applied to those in society who do not obey and resist the law, but we cannot say that the elimination of resistance from the objects of legal regulation is a feature of legal control.We have pointed out above that a feasible and effective legal system must be based on the wide acceptance of the people, and the existence of a considerable amount of dissatisfaction and opposition indicates that the law is a pathology rather than an abnormality.In addition, as we shall show below, when people's resistance to those in power comes from legal norms that set the authority's authority, there is a certain opposition between power and law.

In order to properly understand the relationship between power and law, it is necessary for us to focus on that pure form of power.Power in this sense aims at the absolute domination of men: a man with absolute power seeks to impose his will without restraint on those under his control.This form of governance has a distinctive feature, that is, it is often a high-handed order issued by the ruler out of temporary likes and dislikes or for emergency, rather than a principled action based on the long-term needs of the ruled. Power understood in this absolute sense stands in contrast to the notion of law.One of the basic functions of law is to restrain and limit power, whether it is private power or government power.Where laws rule, the free exercise of power is hindered by rules that force those in power to behave in certain ways.By promulgating standards of conduct designed to guide future action, the law narrows the scope for matter-of-fact judgments that follow no pattern and thus make people unpredictable.

Of course, it is entirely possible for a country's constitution or general laws to confer an absolute power on a government agency.This is the case, for example, when the law gives officers of the secret police carte blanche to use any appropriate means against suspected violators of national security.If that happens, however, the law recognizes a realm of unlimited discretion without legal standards and limits.The U.S. Supreme Court has wisely acknowledged that actions that cannot be justified by the application of normative standards present political issues outside the jurisdiction of the law that are not subject to court jurisdiction.

In the reality of social life, power and law rarely appear in pure form.The emergence of a social power that is completely unrestricted by norms is often a temporary phenomenon that indicates a state of extreme crisis or severe paralysis of the government.When this contingency occurs, it is rare that there will be a total despotism of sadism everywhere, without warning and without rational planning.On the other hand, law does not usually permeate and regulate all aspects of human activity.There will always be areas of openness in terms of power and discretion which the law cannot or only partially penetrates.The typical state of affairs in a political state is characterized neither by the rule of unlimited power nor by strict normative control.

A typical situation of a social order characterized by a certain interpenetration of power and law.There have been countries in which the private relations between citizens have been seldom regulated by law, while at the same time the power of the government has been little, if any, checked.Frederick the Great's Prussia, Napoleon's France, Justinian's Byzantine Empire can all be considered examples of this.Early Roman laws did not interfere in the internal affairs of the family and gave the male head of the family great discretion over his wives, children, and slaves.In nineteenth-century America, employers were also rarely limited in their power to hire and fire their employees, fix their pay grades, and adjust their working conditions.In our time, the president of the United States enjoys a great deal of discretion in the conduct of the country's foreign affairs.

Where there are autonomous spheres of power, those in power may be willing to submit to voluntary constraints of some legal nature.Dictators, such as Alexander the Great, Marcus Aurelius, Justinian, Frederick the Great, all without completely giving up all the privileges they had , voluntarily exercise their supreme power within the framework of certain legal rules. Employers in the United States in the 19th century also often concluded labor contracts.The president of the United States may rely on executive orders to limit the conditions under which he can exercise full power in a certain field of foreign relations.

There are also other examples that illustrate the interaction between power and law.For example, the intrusion of power into the judiciary may occur in the field of law enforcement.In ancient Rome, wealthy citizens could sometimes buy favors from officials or receive immunity from civic duties, while landowners in the Roman Empire often resorted to central administration to resist law enforcement.Similar situations are not uncommon in modern civilized countries.In the fields of criminal law and tax law, the enforcement of the law has sometimes yielded to influential figures in society, and the law on the books does not always correspond to the law practiced in action, even in those who insist on administration by the rule of law. In society, there are still enclaves of ill-controlled power.

An examination of the character of power domination in the construction and functioning of societies shows that power represents dynamic and changeable principles in social relations.When power is unchecked, it can be likened to free-flowing, high-flowing energy, and the results are often destructive.The exercise of power is often marked by relentless and intolerable repression; where it reigns unchecked, it easily creates tension, friction, and mutation.Furthermore, in social systems where power is unimpeded, the tendency is often for the powerful in society to oppress or exploit the weak.In an international system dominated by unbridled power politics, great powers tend to impose their will on the weaker members of the international community, and to achieve their ends through expansion and conquest when necessary.

But on the other hand, since law erects obstacles to the unrestricted exercise of power and attempts to maintain a certain social equilibrium, we must in many respects regard law as a limiting force in social life.Law is very different from the aggressive and expansive tendencies of naked power, because what it seeks is compromise, peace, and agreement in the political and social spheres.A well-developed legal system often seeks to prevent the emergence of repressive power structures, and an important means it relies on is to achieve the decentralization and balance of power through the broad distribution of power among individuals and groups.When such a structure of rights is established, the law strives to protect it from serious interference and disruption.If adjustments and arrangements made through legal control are only temporary and transitory, then the legal attempt to ease social tensions becomes very illusory and of little value.Wherever the rule of law is firmly established, the law will seek to avoid indiscriminate, disorderly and continuous change, and will seek to protect the existing social order with certain safeguards of continuity and permanence. . The law's efforts to create a degree of stability in the social order in a way imbues the system with an inertia against dynamics.The above considerations effectively explain the fact that law is often behind the times—as many legal critics have noted.Really far-reaching changes in legal systems usually come from outside: they are often brought about by the exercise of political power to advance legislative action, and the more profound the changes, the more power is likely to play a role in bringing them about.For example, it is doubtful whether the Napoleonic Code, which broke completely with the feudal era, could have been enacted into law without the pressure of a powerful administrator. In periods of crisis and social change, new groups or coalitions of differing interests demand legal recognition of their claims, and the law in such periods can save itself from collapse only by exhibiting a considerable degree of flexibility and adaptability.The active forces at work in human social and political life always seek to infiltrate the defensive armor that law protects existing institutions and spheres of influence;As we have seen, law seeks to create obstacles to the naked domination of power, but we must also recognize that power sometimes tends to give law the necessary stability in social life and protects it from disruptive changes. set limits on attempts at intrusion. Given the above facts, it is not difficult to understand why those who admire power, struggle, and conflict are skeptical of the law.For example, Friedrich Nietzsche, a prominent proponent of the philosophy of power, believed that law had only a very secondary role.In his view, the essence of life is the unyielding struggle for power; he maintains that the full play of the will to power should not be unduly restricted by legal restrictions and inviolable norms.He reduced the task of law to merely securing a temporary truce between contenders for power, the prelude to a new phase in the eternal conflict. In evaluating Nietzsche's views, it is difficult to deny the fact that the will to power is often a powerful motivating force in both private and social life.In an individual's life, the desire for power can manifest in many ways, depending on the idiosyncratic qualities of the individual concerned; it may be directed towards gaining political and social influence, acquiring money and wealth, or subjugating women.In social life, struggles for power and domination among groups, classes, and nations are at the root of many decisive events in the historical arena.In our time, the role of power in international relations has been more fully reflected.Unchecked political power is one of the most dynamic and unbridled forces in the world, and the danger of its abuse is always present.As the German historian Friedrich Meinecke pointed out, a person empowered is always faced with the temptation to abuse it, to transgress the boundaries of justice and morality. "One could liken it to a spell attached to power - it's irresistible". Although we recognize the importance of the concept of power in discussing political and other social processes, we must note that there has been a recent tendency to exaggerate the role played by the desire for power in human affairs.There are a considerable number of men, some of whom are the most valuable servants of mankind, who act from other motives than the acquisition or extension of power.They may act out of service to the public interest, or out of sympathy for the burden and hardship of their fellow men.This is how many of the great religious leaders and moralists in human history have behaved, and so have some of the most eminent political leaders.If such persons strive to gain power over others in order to be able to achieve their ends, the acquisition of this power is for them only a secondary end, an instrumental means to a more valuable end. .It is possible to fully agree with Meinecke on the point that those who hold power are tempted to extend their power beyond what justice and morality dictate.But one need not agree with his conclusion that the "spell on power" is irresistible. Nietzsche also made a mistake when he saw the will to power as the supreme governing principle regulating the whole of human life.The will to gain and extend power does not play a visible role in the lives of many people.They always strive to follow the flow of social life, and are content with their small place in the social order as long as their basic needs are met.They are often also reluctant to accept lifestyle changes because it will require greater financial resources and more energy on their part.The tendency to conserve energy is as much a part of the physical and psychological reality of human life as the tendency to expend energy. Perhaps more importantly, when the will to power manifests itself in society, it always collides with an organizing principle that equals or exceeds it in importance and force—the will to law. And be countered and limited by this principle.The will to power is rooted in the desire to dominate others and to subject them to their influence and control, while the will to law is rooted in the human tendency to oppose the impulse to power, that is, the desire to be free from the arbitrary domination of others.One of the most important meanings of the legal system is that it can be regarded as a tool to limit and restrain people's desire for power.It seems plausible to say that in a considerable number of civilized societies the law has achieved a certain degree of success in its efforts to prevent the expansion of oppressive power, whether private or governmental. Administration is the exercise of power in specific situations for the realization of some private or public purpose.Administration usually involves the management of some kind of property, company, government agency, or other form of private and governmental enterprise; this fact distinguishes it from power in a broad sense.Landowners manage their property by issuing orders regarding the proper cultivation and protection of their land.The executor of a will takes steps aimed at disposing of and altering the estate of the deceased.The official in charge of the company is concerned with the beneficial and convenient actions that promote the company's business: he issues orders to employees, makes plans for production, hires and fires workers.The above situation is an example of private administration.The situation in which government officials take administrative measures in the public interest is what we call the sphere of public administration.Typical examples of public administration are: decisions and actions in the handling of foreign affairs, the construction of roads and dams, the protection of national natural parks, and the management of transactional institutions. What is the relationship between public administration and law?Two German public law teachers, Georg Jellinek and Paul Laband, made in-depth discussions on this issue.According to Jelinek's theory, the pure administrative activities of the state are not suitable to be included in the category of law.In his view, the establishment of administrative organs by the state, the management of government property, and the issuance of instructions and orders to state officials do not belong to the legal field.In his view, not everything expressed in the form of regulations should be regarded as law.For example, Jelinek believes that a statute issued by the state ordering the construction of canals or roads, providing for the establishment of universities, calling for the relief of residents in flooded areas, or organizing an official expedition to the Antarctic should be regarded as a statute. administrative measures and should not be considered as a legal measure.Rules that operate only within the administrative sphere and do not create obligations or rights for anyone outside the sphere of administrative jurisdiction cannot become law.Such a rule has as little to do with the law as a directive given by a private person for the management of his household or property.Rules of law are only those which delimit the sphere in which men freely act in relation to one another. Jerry Neck's above views were supported by Raben.According to Rabbin, law exists "in the sphere of the determination of the mutual rights and duties of particular citizens: by its very nature, law presupposes a multitude of persons who may be in conflict." Rabbin and Jay Rineke agrees that as long as the sphere of will of the administrative state or of any other natural or legal person is not connected with some other sphere of will (for if such a connection were to occur, conflicts between different conflict or compromise), the law has no place.A state that is concerned with exercising discretion in the management of its affairs can be seen as a political and ethical phenomenon rather than a legal framework.The state enters the legal sphere only when it confers rights on private individuals or when it demarcates its own sphere of free activity by imposing duties on private individuals. The Soviet jurist E. B. Pashukanis (E. B. Pashukanis) proceeded from a completely different philosophical premise, but also reached a conclusion very similar to that of Jelinek and Raben.Pasukanis distinguishes legal rules from social-technical rules.All law, he declared, is conditioned on the existence of separate and conflicting private interests.In societies where private, discrete commodity owners exchange products by contract, law is the classic tool of social control.According to Pasukanis, law is superfluous in a society where there are no conflicting individual interests to regulate.In his view, in a socialist society where there is no conflict of opposing interests, legal rules will be replaced by socio-technical rules.These socio-technical rules constitute typical forms of adjustment in a social organization in which "unity of purpose" dominates.Pasukanis illustrates his theory with the following example: The legal norms of railway liability are conditioned on private demands and individual private interests; the technical regulations on railway transport are conditioned only on a single purpose—say, to maximize shipments.For another example, the treatment of a patient includes a series of rules for the patient himself and for the medical staff, but since these rules are formulated from a single purpose - the recovery of the patient's health - these rules Rules are technical. Other examples of purely technical rules, according to Pasukanis, include production planning in a collectivized economy, mobilization orders in times of war, and targets imposed by Jesuit leaders on their members.Plans and arrangements of this nature do not involve the adjustment or adjudication of conflicting private demands, but are aimed at achieving some collective goal.To paraphrase Pasukanis himself: "The more systematic the development of the principle of the regulation of powers (without any indication of a separate and autonomous will), the less the field of law applies." Hans Kelsen took a different view on this issue.In his early writings, he argued that there was no significant distinction between administration and law, and pointed out that every regulation of public administration was in fact also a legal decree.He came to this conclusion because he extended the term law to include various mandatory norms or measures enacted by state agencies.In his view, what we call executive is mostly functionally impossible to distinguish from legislative or judicial activity.In all these cases public policy is carried out in the same way, by imposing a coercive decree on the opposite of a desired state of affairs.As an institution of coercion, the state is a "King Midas whose touch becomes law." ’” Although Kelsen made some distinctions between legal and administrative activities in his later writings, he still insisted that those differences did not indicate a real difference in their (Limited by historical conditions) difference. Kelsen's refusal to draw a clear distinction between law and administration is unacceptable to those who see law as a limitation of power rather than its exercise.If there is no restriction on the power of the public administration to pursue its ends by whatever means the officials of the government deem expedient, it would be contrary to the law, for it would degenerate into a mere rule of power.In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "discretion, if no standard is set for the exercise of this power, is the sanction of despotism." Those administrators who do as they please and are not bound by "rational factors," cannot be considered to be working within a legal framework.In a legal state, the administrative activities of the government are carried out within the scope of rules or standards, and before making a policy decision or individual judgment, the administrator must seriously consider whether his actions exceed the freedom granted to him by the law scope of discretion. The above questions lead us to a discussion of administrative law issues.What is the nature and role of this legal branch?Jurisprudence scholars seem to have very different views on this issue.Berle describes administrative law as "law adapted to convey the will of the state, from its origin to its application".Others describe administrative law as "the law of statutory discretion." (law of statutory discretions) However, none of these definitions distinguish public administration from administrative law.The primary concern of administrative law is not to convey any form of the will of the state.In its most basic form, administrative law is concerned with the limitations on the exercise of this will.It would be incorrect to say that the task of administrative law is to enumerate and describe the discretionary powers conferred on government officials and executive agencies.The primary concern of administrative law is the constraints imposed by the legal system on the exercise of this discretion by government officials and administrative agencies.However, this does not mean that a legal provision that confers administrative power without at the same time restricting or restricting the exercise of that power loses the character of a legal provision.If one is to determine whether a country's public administration is governed by legal constraints, it is necessary to consider the country's public law system as a whole.If the country's executive and administrative agencies follow normal procedures in the discharge of their duties, if their activities are governed by rules that place certain limits on the exercise of unlimited discretion, and if there are certain measures of abuse of power, then we can say that the country has an effective system of administrative law.It should be emphasized that the rules governing discretion are not necessarily all made by the legislature or the judiciary; they may be the product of the executive and executive agency's own rule-making activities.It is hard to imagine, however, that a currently effective system of administrative law would prevent government officials from arbitrarily phenomenon of abuse of power. Jelinek and Raben argue that rules and regulations that operate within the sphere of the administration itself and affect only the internal distribution of governmental power should be excluded from the sphere of law.But this view is still not convincing.An organizational system that prevents power frictions and conflicts within government by separating the functions and authorities of one agency from those of other agencies and defining their respective areas of operation is, in our view, fully within the legal frame of reference.Even in organizations in which "unity of purpose" predominates between regulators and regulated (as Pasukanis points out), referring to the rules and regulations in such organizations in terms other than law seems There is nothing redeeming. In the nineteenth century, the American government focused almost exclusively on legal constraints designed to strictly limit the scope of the administration.The scope of discretion in administration is inevitably reduced to a point of no alternative.As Roscoe Pound pointed out, it was not uncommon at the time for the law to paralyze the administration.Almost every important measure of policing or administration is prohibited by law. ... What other countries refer to administrative, reviewing and supervisory agencies before action, in the United States, it is referred to the courts, and people prefer to use general laws to inform individuals of their obligations, rather than leaving him free to act according to his own judgment , and prefer to prosecute him and impose the prescribed penalty when his free actions violate the law.Reducing administration to the absolute minimum was then considered a fundamental principle of our constitution.In other words, while some other countries have gone to one extreme and accepted bureaucracy, we have gone to the other extreme and accepted the rule of law. In the 20th century, and especially in the 1930s, people's tendencies began to swing the other way.A large number of administrative agencies responsible for supervising and managing various fields of economic and social life have sprung up one after another.Consequently, there has been a tendency to remove or weaken judicial checks on the actions of these agencies. The underestimation of executive power in the nineteenth century was replaced at the beginning of the twentieth by an exaltation of its benefits in many ways.Pound makes an interesting comparison, comparing "this revival of administrative justice" to the rise of equity in sixteenth-century England.Equity, he pointed out, began its development as a form of executive justice, that is, as a movement away from the courts; however, it later became an integral part of law. "The common law survived, and the only permanent outcome of the effort to return to jurisprudence was the emancipation and modernization of the law."He is convinced that the new administrative justice in the United States will have similar developments and results, and the historical development of recent decades seems to confirm his prediction.There seems to be an emerging trend of administrative law being integrated and incorporated into the overall system of public law. In order to efficiently manage public affairs in a complex industrial society, it is necessary and inevitable for the United States to strengthen administrative control.In a complex society, where there are many conflicting interests to be regulated, and where the public welfare must be protected from antisocial and destructive behavior, direct action by the government becomes imperative. It's a must.However, we must also clearly understand and face some inherent dangers in administrative control.A system of public administration that focuses only on results and not on human rights has the potential to lead to dictatorship and oppression.The examples of certain totalitarian states clearly attest to the fact that a purely administrative state does not give due respect to the dignity of the human person.Therefore, in order for the rule of law to be maintained in society, administrative discretion must be reasonably limited. However, where to draw the line between administrative discretion and legal restriction obviously cannot be determined by a simple formula.Allowing considerable leeway for discretion may be crucial to the effective achievement of an important social purpose.But on the other hand, it is also possible in many cases to pre-determine the ways and means of implementing administrative purposes through statutes or administrative rules, and to make the typical operating methods of the agency known to the public.Moreover, no matter how much unrestricted discretion is given to the agency, in general, when such discretion is abused, individuals afflicted by such conduct should have some way of recourse to justice. court.We cannot regard governance efficiency as an ultimate goal in itself, but should regard appropriate measures to realize the protection of human rights as a basic condition of enlightened and progressive administrative justice. The discussion of the previous two sections shows that whether power takes general or specific forms of expression, it takes only a neutral attitude towards the question of value, and it can be helpful or harmful. form manifested.Morality, on the other hand, is a value-focused concept related to normative patterns designed to promote good and repel evil in individual and social life.In relation to the relationship between the moral imperative and the individual's attitude towards the self, the moral imperative is defined as a calling, that is, a call to realize one's own potential and one's creative talents in a socially responsible way, so as to achieve true happiness and Inner satisfaction.What Lon Fuller called the "morality of aspiration" has only a remote and indirect relation to law, as we shall discuss later.More often, however, the term morality is applied to human relationships in which friction and conflict may arise between individual wills emphasizing themselves and between conflicting emotions .The purpose of morality, taken in its social sense, is to enhance social harmony by reducing the sphere of influence of undue selfishness, reducing harmful behavior to others, and eliminating mutually damaging strife and other potentially divisive forces in social life.These various purposes are by no means alien to those of legal arrangements.So here arises a question, that is, how can we separate and define the respective scopes of morality and law? An influential theory holds that the distinction between law and morality can be seen in the fact that law regulates people's external relationships, while morality governs people's inner lives and motivations.This theory was first proposed by Thomasius and later elaborated by Kant; it has been accepted by many jurisprudence scholars since then.Since people usually associate this view mainly with Kant's name, we will refer to it as "Kant's theory" in the following. According to this view, the law does not consider the underlying motivation, but only requires people to obey the existing rules and regulations from the outside, while morality appeals to people's conscience.The moral imperative requires people to act according to noble intentions—a sense of ethical duty above all—and it requires people to pursue the good for the sake of the good.A modern proponent of this theory, the Hungarian jurist Julius Moor, sums it up as follows: Ethical codes do not threaten the application of external means of coercion; external assurances about the enforcement of the code's requirements are of no use to them.Whether or not they are enforced is entirely in the heart of the individual concerned.Their only authority is based on the perception that they indicate the proper way of doing things.使道德规范得以实现的并不是外部的物理性强制与威胁，而是人们对道德规范所固有的正当性的内在信念。因此，道德命令所诉诸的乃是我们的内在态度、我们的良知。 但是另一方面，穆尔又指出，法律要求人们绝对服从它的规则与命令，而不论特定的个人是否赞成这些规则和命令；法律的特征乃在于这样一个事实，即它总是威胁适用物理性的强制手段。根据这一观点，道德是自律的（产生于人的内心），而法律则是他律的（从外界强加于人的）。 认为法律只与外部行为有关而道德则关注出自“善意”的内在动机的那种观点，并不能被人们当作对这两种社会控制力量之间的关系的一种普遍有效解释加以接受。这两种社会控制力量之间的关系要比康德氏理论所描述的更为复杂、更为模糊、更为易变。 首先，法律通常所关注的是一个行动应受法律规范裁判的人的心智倾向。例如，在刑法中，犯罪意图（mens rea）的证明乃是惩罚大部分罪行的一个基本必要条件。刑罚的种类和宽严程度也常常取决于促使被告犯罪的动机和意图。故意杀人通常要比激情之下而犯下的杀人罪受到更为严厉的惩罚。侵权法通常也很关注人之行动的主观心理动机。陪审团有权对蓄意殴打罪施以惩罚性的损害赔偿费，而在因过失造成伤害的情形下，陪审团则不具有这种权力。在美国许多州的法律中都规定，诽谤内容的真实性程度并不能为诽谤者开脱责任，除非散布这种诽谤性的语言是出于善意并为了达到正当目的。在法律的其他领域中，善意的表示可能是承认权利的前提，而权利享有者出于纯粹恶意而行使权利的做法也会致使该权利行使者承担不利于他的后果。在不公平竞争法中，如果一个人开办一项生意不是为了盈利而仅仅是因私怨而试图使另一个人的生意倒闭，那么该恶毒的动机就有可能导致侵权之诉。 从法律的角度来看，动机与精神状况往往是很重要的，而反过来看也是如此，道德并非对行为毫不关注。不表现为道德行为的善意，或者会产生不道德的或有害的非意图后果的高尚动机，都很难被视为是社会道德的有意义的表现。虽然从道德的角度来看，伴随着一项行为发生的态度和倾向同对该行为的评价颇有关系，但是一个社会的道德准则对人们的要求往往不只是培养纯洁的心灵。为了使个人将善意转化为符合道德的高尚行为，社会道德准则常常会将舆论的压力施加于他们。不道德的行为会受到公众的谴责，即使这一行为未越出法律所允许的范围。尽管法律不会因某人没有表现宽容与忍耐的德行而将他逮捕入狱，但是一个人的行为如果不断违反社会道德规则，那么他就会发现要在他所置身于的群体中做一个自尊的成员是很困难的。 对道德观念的历史发展的研究明确表明，道德命令的主要渊源并不能从个人的自律理性中得以发现。伦理体系得以建立，乃是源于有组织的群体希望创造社会生活的起码条件的强烈愿望。制定社会道德原则，就是为了约束群体间的过分行为、减少掠夺性行为和违背良心的行为，培养对邻人的关心，从而增加和谐共处的可能性。用库尔特·贝尔（Kurt Baier）的话来讲，“当遵循自私规则有害于他人时，道德规则便是用来压倒那些自私规则的普遍原则。”尽管反复灌输正当的思想态度是达到这一目的的一个重要手段，但是道德律令的主要目的则是引发被社会认为可欲的行为。我们有充分的理由把社会道德看成是对客观的价值等级的承认，而这些价值是用来指导特定社会中人与人之间的行为的。 在道德价值这个等级体系中，我们可以区分出两类要求和原则。第一类包括社会有序化的基本要求，它们对于有效地履行一个有组织的社会必须承担的任务来讲，被认为是必不可少的、必要的，或极为可欲的。避免暴力和伤害、忠实地履行协议、协调家庭关系、也许还有对群体的某种程度的效忠，均属于这类基本要求。第二类道德规范包括那些极有助于提高生活质量和增进人与人之间的紧密联系的原则，但是这些原则对人们提出的要求则远远超过了那种被认为是维持社会生活的必要条件所必需的要求。慷慨、仁慈、博爱、无私和富有爱心等价值都属于第二类道德规范。 那些被视为是社会交往的基本而必要的道德正当原则，在所有的社会中都被赋予了具有强大力量的强制性质。这些道德原则的约束力的增强，当然是通过将它们转化为法律规则而实现的。禁止杀人、强奸、抢劫和伤害人体，调整两性关系，制止在合意契约的缔结和履行过程中欺诈与失信等，都是将道德观念转化为法律规定的事例。 法律发展的历史揭示了这样一个明显的趋势，即通过建立有组织的社会的制裁手段来确保人们对正当行为的基本要求的服从（其中包括可能使用强力），但是正如我们所见的那样，一个官方制裁制度的存在并不是法律控制的一个绝对必要的条件（a conditio sine qua non）。例如，布罗尼斯劳.马林诺斯基（Bronislaw Malinowski）就曾经指出，原始社会中的规则因具有很强的强制力而必须被视为是法律规则，但是对它们的遵守却主要是靠有关当事人的相互利益来保证的。与此相似，在国际法中，与其说是对制裁的恐惧，不如说是国家利益或对世界舆论的考虑，导致了国家对条约和习惯规则的服从。 从另一方面来看，那些在法律权利与义务范围之外的道德准则，其特点是它们只具有较弱的强制力。尽管我们不能说那些由对他人的同情、仁慈及关心所驱使的行为仅仅是一个主观选择和决定的问题（例如，一个社会的宗教精神就可能会对个人施以道德要求），但是给予人们在纯粹道德问题上的自律程度要大于强制性的法律规范所允许的自由意志的范围，则是事实。在慈善与睦邻友爱的施与中，有一种自发和自愿的成分，而这种成分事实上就是这种行为道德品性的基本要素。一个人可能会认为有一种道德上的义务去帮助一个陷于经济困境中的人从债务中解脱出来，但是该债务人却无权要求他做出此种慷慨之举。这一事实的必然结果便是，任何可被用来维护法律权利的强制执行制度是无力适用于纯粹道德要求的。 尽管我们可以假定所有或大多数社会都以某种形式将法律规则与道德准则区别开来，但是上述两类社会规范之间的界线并不总是能够严格而准确地划定的。在原始社会中，这二者之间的界线就曾被混淆得一塌糊涂。正如赫伯特·哈特（Herbet Hart）所指出的，在人类社会的原始阶段，根本就没有明确规定的“确认规则”（rules of recognition），而这些规则是用以确定某些规则为“法律规则”并使这些法律规则区别于其他类型的规范（如道德规范或宗教禁忌）的。甚至就是希腊人的那种精致文明，似乎也未能有效地将法律规则与道德要求区分开来。我们有种种理由相信，在希腊民众法庭（popular courts）中执法的不受约束的非专业性陪审团，无论如何都分不清什么是法律所禁止者，什么是道德所耻者。在古罗马，法律控制所具有的特殊性第一次在历史上表现出其基本轮廓；然而，塞尔萨斯（Celsus）为法律所下的定义即法律乃是善与衡平的艺术，却仍含有很浓重的道德味道。中世纪英国的司法官们，乃是依据其良知命令来实施衡平法的，而这种良知命令是由占优势的道德理想和罗马天主教会的宗教信条形成的。普通法的法官们也往往是在他们认为罪犯伤害了社会的道德情感时而且是在没有明确规定该罪行要件的法规的情形下惩罚这类犯罪行为的。 启蒙运动时期的自然法理论，为人们在现代进行一场把法律从道德中解放出来的运动奠定了基础。许多思想家，如格老秀斯（Grotius）、普芬道夫（Pufendorf）、霍布斯（Hobbes）和洛克（Locke）等人，都将法理学与道德神学理论区分开来，并力图探究出法律所特有的性质。托马休斯（Thomasius）和康德（Kant）在把那些尚未被纳入法律之中的道德原则归入个人良知的范畴时，的确表达了他们那个时代的趋势。19世纪的实证主义法学也试图使这一趋势达致完善。约翰·奥斯丁就强调指出，必须从法律的适用和执行中排除伦理价值判断和道德推理。 汉斯·凯尔森也曾直截了当地宣称，从他对实在法制度的观点来看，“法律概念没有丝毫的道德涵义。”最近，赫伯特·哈特也为把这两种社会控制力量区别开来的实证主义主张作了辩护，尽管附上了一些限制条件。 需要强调指出的是，上述区分说一般来讲还未被扩大适用于立法领域。例如，这一学说的倡导者霍姆斯法官就宣称，“法律乃是我们道德生活的见证和外部沉淀。”法律的制定者经常会受到社会道德中传统的观念或新观念的影响。如前所述，这种道德中的最为基本的原则，大多己不可避免地被纳入了法律体系之中；此外，我们还应当注意，在那些已成为法律一部分的道德原则与那些仍处于法律范围之外的道德原则之间有一条不易确定的分界线。例如，时至今日，普通法还没有承认人们具有帮助一个生命垂危的人的法律责任。因此，一个医生没有任何义务去理睬一个生命垂危但仍可能有救的病人；任何人都不能要求某人扮演乐善好施者的角色（译注——此词源出于基督教《圣经》）去为一个流血不止的陌生人包扎伤口，或是在见到有人走向危险的机器时向他发出警告。也许在将来的某个时侯，随着其他国家的发展，帮助处于严重危难中的人的义务，会在某些适当的限制范围内从普通的道德领域转入强制性法律的领域。 在不公平竞争法中，近年来由法院和立法机构所进行的一些变革，必须归因于道德感的增强和提升，以及由此而盛行的这样一种信念，即商业社会必须依靠比道德谴责更为有效的保护手段才能抵制某些应受指责的毫无道德的商业行为。因此，在一个扭转早期法律趋向的案例中，美国最高法院宣判了一家著名的新闻收集机构有罪，因为该机构非法盗用了一个竞争者的新闻；此外，在欺诈性广告领域方面也有了一些新的发展。 反过来看，一些在过去曾被认为是不道德的因而需要用法律加以禁止的行为，则有可能被划出法律领域而被归入个人道德判断的领域之中。例如，在英国，成年男子之间相互同意的同性恋行为已被排除在刑法管辖范围之外，而美国的伊利诺斯州也制定了同样的法律。在英国，已经废除了自杀未遂罪；美国已普遍允许堕胎自由。婚外性关系己通过不实施刑事规定而不再成为一种罪行。还需要指出的是，在美国的许多州，违反婚约之诉以及情感疏远之诉都已被取消，其结果是曾应受侵权法规约束的行为已被转移到了道德评价的领域之中。在英国和美国的相关文献中，近年来对于道德应在何种程度上依靠法律规定的手段来加以实施的问题，也展开了一场可喜而激烈的争论。 如果在制定和不制定法律的问题上，法律与道德之间存在着如此紧密的互动关系，那么我们到哪儿去寻找那种坚持将这两种社会控制力量区分开来的学说的突破口呢？约翰·奥斯丁为什么要批评曼斯菲尔德勋爵将道德考虑纳入他的某些司法意见呢？当霍姆斯法官说，“如果能够把所有具有道德含义的语词从法律中清除出去，”那么这将是一种收获，但是他这样说的理由又是什么呢？ 显而易见，上述观点乃是旨在反对那种在实施与执行（与制定相区别）实在法时把法律标准与道德标准混为一谈的做法。如果法律规则与道德要求之间的界限是不明确的或极为模糊不清的，那么法律的确定性和可预见性就必定会受到侵损。在这种境况下，承担执法任务的机关便拥有了这样一种地位，即它们能够执行任何它们认为与占支配地位的集体意识形态相一致的道德原则。为法律所保障的自由领域，便会因此而受到与其对立的道德力量的侵犯。道德标准的阐述，通常要比大多数法律规则的阐述更笼统、更不准确，而这个事实就更加促进了敌对的道德力量的入侵。诉诸道德原则，会削减法律设定的权利和扩大法律限定的义务，因为道德原则的范围极为模糊，使得公民们不能够或难以估量它们的影响并据此调整自己的行为。通过使法典本身处于不明确或富有弹性的状况，进而使集体意识形态始终被用作执政当局达致其所欲求的结果的手段，这种做法也可以达到消减法律设定的权利和扩大法律限定的义务的目的。 由于颁布某些被视作法律命令或禁令的明确标准乃是法治所不可或缺的基本成份，所以在那种坚持要在司法中把法律与道德区分开来的要求背后，存在着一种颇为合理的价值论信念。然而，关于这一要求在司法过程中能够得到实现和贯彻的程度，却有着明确的限制。如果法律规则和法律原则能够得到明确无误的阐述，从而司法机关在裁定争议时无需再依赖法律范围以外的概念，那么上述坚持要求在司法中把法律与道德区分开来的要求也许就有可能实现。然而，数个世纪的经验告诉我们，任何法律制度都不曾也不可能达到如此之明确无误的程度。至于一个法律制度是否能够完全不使用含有道德涵义的广义概念，如诚信、犯意（犯罪意图）和违背良心的行为等概念，也是颇令人怀疑的。 当法律出现模糊不清和令人怀疑的情形时，法官就某一种解决方法的“是”与“非”所持有的伦理信念，对他解释某一法规或将一条业已确立的规则适用于某种新的情形来讲，往往起着一种决定性的作用。正如卡多佐（Cardozo）法官所言，法官们常常“为了对道德要求做出回应”而不得不在各处破例做出让步。弗兰克福特（Frankfurter）法官也持有同样的观点，他说，“司法机关的作用并非如此有限，它可以使联邦法院成为一种正义的工具，因为它必须正视数个世纪以来始终构成法律一部分的道德原则和衡平原则”。当法院因宣布一个先例无效而背离遵循先例的原则的时候，也有可能发生依赖道德观念的情况。另外，如前所述，如果一个法官被要求去执行一项与社会正义感完全不一致的法规，那么他就可能面临法律中的道德方面的问题。 当然，法律中还存有一些道德观念并不起任何重要作用的广泛领域。技术性的程序规则、流通票据的规则、交通规则的法令以及政府组织规划的细节，一般都属于这一类。在这些领域中，指导法律政策的观念乃是功效与便利，而不是道德信念。 经由上述的讨论，我们似乎可以认为，法律和道德代表着不同的规范性命令，然而它们控制的领域却在部分上是重叠的。从另一个角度来看，道德中有些领域是位于法律管辖范围之外的，而法律中也有些部门在很大程度上是不受道德判断影响的。但是，实质性的法律规范制度仍然是存在的，其目的就在于强化和确使人们遵守一个健全的社会所必不可少的道德规则。 习惯乃是为不同阶级或各种群体所普遍遵守的行动习惯或行为模式。它们所涉及的可能是服饰、礼节或围绕有关出生、结婚、死亡等生活重大事件的仪式。它们也有可能与达成交易或履行债务有关。 每个社会都有一些与社会生活中不太重要的方面相关的习惯。大多数社会对于一个人在各种不同场合该穿哪种服装都有一定的惯例。许多国家都有给亲属友好赠送结婚礼物的习惯。在葬礼及其他庄重的典礼上，更要遵守业已确立的习惯。当这类习惯被违反时，社会往往会通过表示不满或不快的方式来做出反应；如果某人重复不断地违反社交规范，那么他很快就会发现自己已被排斥在这个社交圈以外了。 可能还有一些其他种类的习惯；从更为明确和更为严格的意义上讲，这些习惯被视为是人们的一些具体义务和责任。这类习惯可能会关涉到婚姻和子女扶养的责任、遗产的留传、或缔结与履行协议的方式等问题。这类习惯所涉及的并不是社会常规、外在礼仪或审美等问题，而是重要的社会事务，亦即为了确保令人满意的集体生活而必须完成的工作。这类习惯完全有可能被整合进和编入法律体系之中，而且违反它们，就会受到法律制度所使用的典型制裁方式（其中可能包括由政府当局所使用的直接强力方式）的惩罚。因此，习惯法（customary）这一术语被用来意指那些己成为具有法律性质的规则或安排的习惯，尽管它们尚未得到立法机关或司法机关的正式颁布。 人们常常断言说，法律与习惯在早期社会是毫无分别的，而且社会习惯与习惯法之间所划定的界限本身也只是长期渐进的法律进化的产物。人类学家布罗尼斯劳·马林诺斯基则对这一观点提出了质疑。他试图表明，即使在早期社会，一些习惯规则也与其他社会规则显然不同，因为它们被认为是代表着一个人的明确责任与另一个人的正当要求。他指出：“经过详尽的研究，我们发现了一个明确的划分功能的制度以及一个刚性的相互承担责任的制度，而与此同时，责任感以及对合作的必要性的承认同自我利益、特权与益处之实现，也都一起被纳入了上述制度之中。”他指出，在原始社会，这些权利和义务并不是由司法官来执行的，相反，它们通常是自我执行的，因为人们需要他人的善意和帮助。一个人为了捕鱼就需要有一艘船，但他只有从他的捕鱼量中拿出一部分给船主，他才能得到这艘船。逃避责任的本地人很清楚他在将来会因此而遭殃的。 据此，马林诺斯基提出了这样一个命题，即原始社会就已经认识到了法律规则的特性：这些规则设定了明确的具有约束力的责任。他进一步强调指出，这些规则并不一定是靠与当今法律制裁相似的强制方式加以实施的；从心理上要求相互遵守规则的需要乃是当时促使人们服从规则的首要保证。马林诺斯基的论点颇有道理，它不仅很有启发性，而且也很有说服力。然而，至于原始社会的法律规则是否如同他所设想的那样已经成了整个习惯制度中的一个界定明确的范畴，在某种程度上仍是值得怀疑的和商榷的。 法律史学家和人类学家基本上认为，原始法律在很大程度上是以习惯规则为基础的，而且这些规则并未得到立法者的颁布，或未得到受过职业训练的法官以书面形式的阐述。然而需要指出的是，关于这种原始习惯法的起源问题，人们却提出了许多不尽相同的见解。 一种颇有影响的观点认为，一旦一个家族、一个群体、一个部落或一个民族的成员开始普遍而持续地遵守某些被认为具有法律强制力的惯例和习惯时，习惯法便产生了。这种观点认为，在习惯法的形成过程中，无需一个更高的权威对上述惯例与安排做正式认可或强制执行。按照这一观点，早期社会的法律产生于为公众舆论所赞许的日常生活中的非诉讼习惯之中。“促使人们依法遵守规则的并不是冲突，而是由合理交往与社会合作中的互让考虑所指导的日常实践。”这种观点所依据的乃是一种主要得到了历史法学派的法理学家们支持的——尤其是得到了萨维尼（Savigny）与普赫塔（Puchta）拥护的——法学理论。历史法学派认为，在早期社会中，法律规则并不是自上而下设定的，而是作为社会成员间体力协作及脑力协作以及他们间相互关系的结果自下而上生成的。按照萨维尼的观点，习惯法产生于一个民族的社会安排（这些安排是经由传统和习惯而得到巩固的而且是与该民族的法律意识相符合的），而不是源于政府当局的政令。 从整体上来看，上述观点的正确性在某些方面仍是颇令人怀疑的。这种观点是以原始社会的民主结构为其先决条件的，亦即是说，只有那些产生于整个群体的法律意识中的行为规则才能获得法律效力。然而，人们在当今对原始社会所进行的研究却表明，至少在许多的事例中，原始社会的形态结构并不是民主的，而是家长式的。很有可能的是，许多亲族或氏族，尤其在印欧语系地区，都是由一个人以权威和家长的方式加以统治的，而且这个人有时甚至操握着其群体所有成员的生杀大权。如果我们相信当时存在着这种权重之极的家长权威，那么原始社会的行为规则有时就可能是由这种独裁的首领决定的，或者至少是只有那些为他所赞许的习惯和惯例才可能成为法律制度的一部分。 许多事例表明，早期的个人专制制度后来渐渐让位给了特权阶级统治或贵族阶层统治。这种特权阶级或贵族阶层很可能是一些首领、一些长老，也可能是一些教士。这种贵族阶层在某种程度上很可能会成为执行习惯法的代理人。有些习惯可能尚未得到确定或仍处于相互冲突之中，而这种不确定性或冲突只有凭靠官方决定来解决。维诺格拉多夫（Vinogradoff）在很大程度上是一个萨维尼-普赫塔理论的拥护者；就是这样一位学者也承认，“我们……不得不假定……，长老、教士、法官、法学家（Witans）或某类专家在当时的有意识的活动，其目的就在于发现和宣布正当和正义的东西。”这个贵族特权阶级倾向于对法律知识进行垄断。由于当时尚无文字，也不知道如何书写，所以人们就不得不采用某些其他有效手段将社会习惯保留下来。通过让少数人牢记那些得到认可的行为方式并由他们将其经验一代一代往下传，习惯法发展过程中的某种稳定性和连续性便得到了保证。 然而，历史法学派的观点却在一个重要的方面是正确的：只有那些适应早期社会一般生活方式及那个时代的经济要求的习惯，才能得到统治者或处于统治地位的贵族阶层的执行。任何一个当权者都不可能长时间地实施与当时当地的社会需要背道而驰的规则或安排。如果我们从这一观点来认识这个问题，那么萨维尼关于法律产生于民族的法律意识的观点就具有了一种重要的真理成份。为了使行为规则能够发挥有效的作用，行为规则的执行就需要从这些规则有效运行的社会中得到一定程度的合作与支持。“与一个社会的正当观念或实际要求相抵触的法律，很可能会因人们对它们的消极抵制以及在对它们进行长期监督和约束方面所具有的困难而丧失其效力。”因此，我们可以有充分的理由认为，在早期习惯法的实施过程中，大众的观点、惯例和实践同官方解释者的活动之间始终存在着互动关系。对于早期社会生活中的基本法律模式，甚至连权力极大的统治者都不太可能加以干涉。 有些论者持这样一种观点，即只有那些曾为政府当局所施行的习惯和惯例，才能被视为法律规则。其他一些论者则走得更远，他们认为，只有那些用影响个人或其财产的刑罚手段来保证它们得到遵守的行为规则才是法律。我们拟在后面讨论习惯法问题以及这种法律形式在当今这个时代所具有的意义的章节中，对这些观点做进一步的批判性考察。