Chapter 15 Chapter Eleven: The Quest for Justice

The order element of law is concerned with the adoption of certain organizational rules and standards of behavior by a group or political society.The purpose of these rules and standards is to give some pattern and structure to the vast but chaotic human activities, so as to avoid uncontrolled disturbances.According to this understanding, the concept of order is concerned with the form of social life rather than the substance of social life.A description of the structural features of a legal system tells us nothing about the content and practical consequences of the norms and institutional arrangements that make up the legal framework.

We must take the ordering role of law seriously to guard against arbitrary and wholly unforeseen methods of dealing with people, which are bound to have disturbing effects on the life of society.We must also recognize, however, that the adoption of coherent and well-defined rules that provide a degree of security to people's expectations is not sufficient to create a satisfactory pattern of social life.This is true, mainly because removing randomness from human relationships provides no safeguard against a regime's use of irrational, infeasible, or oppressive rules.It is perfectly possible for a family to enforce such an order that all decisions of the family are entrusted to the youngest child, and all members of the family are obliged to faithfully abide by his decisions.A country may also adopt a legal system in which judges are elected on the basis of the amount of property they own, or in which bribery and fraud are rewarded and honesty is will be banned.A government may also apply to an unpopular or disfavored minority some articulated and justly enforced disenfranchisement and disqualification rules.

It is the concept of justice that turns our attention to the fairness and reasonableness of the rules, principles, and standards that are part of the normative edifice.Order, as we have seen, is concerned with the formal structure of social and legal institutions, whereas justice is concerned with the content of legal norms and institutional arrangements, their impact on human beings, and their role in promoting human happiness and The value of civilization construction.In the broadest and most general sense, the concern of justice can be thought of as the fitness of the order of a group or the institutions of a society to achieve its fundamental ends.If we do not attempt to give a comprehensive definition, it is possible to point to the degree to which the legitimate needs and claims of the individual are met, while at the same time promoting productive progress and increasing social cohesion - the key to the maintenance of civilization. What is necessary for social life—is the goal of justice.

We should never assume that everyone who thinks about this topic accepts the above description of justice in general.Even those who are inclined to subscribe to the basic ideas underlying this description are likely to interpret "the legitimate needs and claims of the individual" in very different ways.They may also disagree on the means of serving the public interest in ways that promote productive progress, and on the degree to which justice requires or desires social cohesion. Justice has a Protean face, capricious, ready to take different shapes at any moment, and possessing very different visages.When we take a close look at this face and try to unravel the secrets that hide behind its surface, we are often deeply mystified.From a philosophical point of view, thinkers and jurists have put forward various "true" views of justice over the centuries, and these views often claim to be absolutely valid.From the perspective of the pragmatism of social order, people have also adopted many different ideological approaches to solve the problem of "good society".A brief examination of those influential theories and historically important social institutions that underscore different attitudes towards the achievement of justice may thus help us to point out the fundamental nature of the problem. confusing aspects.

In Plato's Republic, he developed a doctrine of a just republic in which the collectivist ideal found powerful expression.He believes that justice consists in the harmonious relationship between the various parts of the social organism.Every citizen must do his duty in the position to which he belongs, and do what is most suitable to his nature.Since Plato's proposed state is a state of classes—he divides these classes into ruling, auxiliary, and productive classes—Plato's justice is that members of each class must devote themselves to the work of that class and should not Interfering with work done by members of other classes.Some are born to be rulers, some are born to assist rulers in their duties, and others are destined to be farmers, artisans, or merchants.If a man fit only to be a peasant or an artisan tried to rule over his fellow man, he would be considered not only foolish, but unjust.The rulers of the state, with the aid of their assistants, are bound to make each man find his proper place in life and make him fully discharge the duties imposed by that place.The idea underlying this thought of justice rests on the assumption that an individual is not an isolated self, incapable of doing what he pleases, but rather a dependent member of some universal order who must make his The individual wishes and tendencies of the individual are subordinated to the organic unity of the whole collective.

Aristotle takes a different view on this question.In his view, justice consists in "a certain equality."From the point of view of the distributional meaning of the concept of justice, it requires that things in this world be distributed fairly to members of society according to the principle of proportional equality.Equal things are given to equal people, and unequal things are given to unequal people.Aristotle's measure of equality is worth and civic virtue.If Party A deserves twice as much as Party B, then his share of income should be twice as large as Party B's. Although Aristotle emphasized equality as the measure of justice, he was willing to tolerate widespread inequalities in the social structure.He accepts the rule of a truly superior man, if one can find such a man to govern the country.He even defended slavery, albeit with certain concerns and qualifications.He believed that it was natural and necessary for men to dominate women in family organization.Thus, his notions of proportional equality are quite consistent with his views on social stratification and the recognition of privilege.

American sociologist Lester Ward advocates a more egalitarian view of justice.According to Ward, justice consists in "an artificial equality imposed by society on social conditions which are otherwise unequal".He favored the adoption of a social policy that attempted to achieve unlimited equality of opportunity among all members of a society or nation.Every individual, regardless of gender, race, nationality, class or social background, should be given the full opportunity to live a worthwhile life.This state of affairs, Ward believed, could be achieved only through a careful educational program aimed at intellectual equality of all members of the upper and lower classes of society.Ward was convinced that intelligence had nothing to do with class background, and that it depended to a large extent on environmental factors, particularly on whether all people had access to all available information and whether To be able to open up to all the intellectual heritage of the past and the wealth of knowledge of the present.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels proposed broader plans for the equalization of resources and economic status.They fully opposed the disparity in income levels at that time, and advocated the use of public ownership of the means of production as a means of correcting economic inequality.In addition, they also imagined the possibility of realizing such a social system in the future, in which people can achieve true equality, because all individual needs can be satisfied by that time. The British philosopher and sociologist Herbert Spencer (Herbert Spencer) took an attitude on the question of justice that was fundamentally at odds with the viewpoints of the above-mentioned commentators.He believes that the highest value associated with the concept of justice is not equality, but freedom.Spencer argued that every individual is entitled to whatever benefit he can derive from his nature and abilities.Everyone should be allowed to assert his rights, acquire property, pursue a business or profession of his own choice, move freely and express his thoughts and religious feelings without restriction.The only limitation Spencer wishes to recognize on the exercise of the aforementioned rights and liberties is that each must be aware of and respect the inviolable activities of others, since everyone else enjoys the same free assertion.Every man's liberty should be limited only to those liberties enjoyed equally by all.Spencer summarized the above concept of justice into such a classic formula, "everyone is free to do what he wants, provided that he does not violate the same freedom enjoyed by anyone else" .

Immanuel Kant took a position similar to Spencer's.He also uses the concept of liberty in order to assess the value and adequacy of a legal system.Starting from the premise that liberty is the only original and natural right belonging to every human being, Kant defines justice as "the sum of those conditions under which the will of one can be compared with that of another according to the universal law of liberty. the will to unite." Most of the theories we have discussed above use either equality or liberty as a focal point for exploring questions of justice.A Scottish philosopher, William Sorley, argued that it was impossible to formulate a satisfactory principle of justice without giving equality and liberty a place in the scheme of social organization.He pointed out that liberty and equality can easily be opposed, because the expansion of liberty does not necessarily increase the equality among people.A social system in which non-interference in private activities is established as the main principle of government policy may produce a highly unequal social formation.On the other hand, a mere emphasis on equality risks stifling the incentives for the virtues that are so helpful to the progress of civilization.Soley attempts to reconcile the ideal of liberty with a constructive form of equality through the following basic principles of social policy: (1) the development and instruction of man's spiritual and material powers by a universal system of education; (2) To provide access to the means of production and tools so that people can obtain appropriate occupations; and (3) to create a physical and social environment that facilitates rather than hinders personal development.

The theory of justice put forward by John Rawls is another attempt to combine the two values ​​of liberty and equality in analyzing the meaning of justice.Rawls' conception of justice is made up of two basic principles: (1) each person should have an equal right to the broadest basic liberties consistent with similar liberties enjoyed by others; Political and economic inequalities will be arranged so that they can reasonably be expected to be beneficial to everyone, and the positions and offices to which they depend are open to all.However, the above two principles should not be given equal importance in social policy: the first principle takes precedence over the second.This means that liberty can only be limited for the sake of liberty itself, and it also means that claims to social and economic equality must give way if they do not increase the total amount of liberty for all.

Liberty and equality are not the only guiding principles that have been proposed as the chief guiding lights for legislators entrusted with creating an appropriate legal system.Some commentators have also expressed the view that the maintenance of general security must be the most important driving force for legislative work.For the most part, the elevation of security to the highest legal values ​​is advocated not in the name of justice but in the name of some other principle, such as utility or the public interest.However, if we broadly understand justice as an effort to construct a social order suitable for human life through the use of legal means, then we can discuss the issue of achieving security under the heading of justice. Thomas Hobbes' legal philosophy is an example of a security-focused approach to political and social justice.According to Hobbes, the fundamental law of nature to which the sovereign should be concerned is to preserve peace wherever it can be achieved, and to organize its defense whenever peace is endangered. Hobbes believed that the protection of life, property, and contract constituted the most important task of legal ordering; liberty and equality should be subordinated to this noble goal of political activity.In the same way Jeremy Bentham proclaims security as the "principal and indeed primary end" of social control by law, while liberty and equality are assigned to a Subordinate status.He believes that legal control should focus its attention on issues such as the protection of the person and the inviolability of property rights. From the above considerations, we may perhaps arrive at the view that philosophers and legal thinkers throughout the ages have produced only confusing theories of justice.Nor can the intensity of that disorder be lessened as we pass from the blueprints and speculations of those who argue to the historical arena of political and social action.The various conceptions of justice that have influenced the social construction of different countries and different periods also have a bewildering diversity.While one could argue that the builders of empires and nation-states were motivated by the will to power rather than by considerations of justice, we should not lose sight of the fact that different socioeconomic systems have their own famous spokesmen strong defenses, and both were accepted by the majority.In assessing the hierarchy of values ​​that prevailed in these institutions, we can see that feudalism gave prominence to the idea of ​​security, while reducing the importance of liberty and equality.When the power of the national police has not been fully established, the feudal monarch often adopts the method of cooperating with the princes to prevent the feudal class from being attacked and plundered.As far as the princes are concerned, they also get a certain degree of security and support from the monarch because they swear allegiance and service to their monarch.The era of liberalism and capitalism, while not denying the importance of security and certain forms of equality such as equality of rights and opportunities, saw the promotion of liberty as a top priority of government policy.In socialist countries, people try to eliminate differences in income and property status, the ultimate (but realized in stages) goal is to meet people's needs equally.Likewise, diversity of viewpoints can be seen in the political sphere.Many different forms of government, such as democracy, benevolent dictatorship, patriarchal monarchy, and hereditary aristocracy, have, under certain historical and social conditions, fulfilled the tasks of political organization with some success, and All have also received the allegiance of citizens or citizens. Given the multiplicity of possibilities and alternative solutions, do we need to listen to the skeptics?Skeptics believe that conceptions of justice are entirely a matter of personal orientation or transient public opinion.Is it possible for us to claim that justice has some degree of objective validity?Are we able to make sensible and decisive choices between different and inconsistent approaches to the problem of justice?On a more fundamental level, can the conception of justice be considered a legitimate object of rational study, and a question worthy of sustained attention by jurisprudential thinkers and social scientists?We will discuss this issue specifically in the next section. The Protean character of justice may be one reason, though not necessarily the only one, why some modern legal philosophers believe that various theories of justice merely reflect the irrational preferences of their respective advocates .Kelsen, for example, has pointed out that the content of justice is not determined by reason; and he has attempted to support this proposition with the following argument: According to some ethical belief, human life is the highest of all values ; and accordingly, the killing of a human being, even in war, or as a means of atonement for a great crime, is absolutely prohibited.But there is also an ethical belief according to which the highest value is the interest and dignity of the nation; so according to this view every man should lay down his life and kill others in war, and The use of the death penalty as a means of sanctioning criminal behavior was also considered justified for the collective good. Kelsen argues that it is impossible to resolve the above-mentioned conflict of views on the justice or injustice of killing in a rational scientific way; that is what our feelings, our emotions, or our wills can resolve.It is equally impossible, in Kelsen's view, to identify in an epistemically meaningful way some of the other overarching values ​​that a just order of social life should strive to promote.One person may regard the protection and promotion of individual liberty as the primary purpose of legal ordering, another may declare the achievement of equality as the primary duty of the legislator, and a third may strongly prefer the value of security, Willingness to sacrifice liberty and equality in order to fully realize this value, even under necessary circumstances. According to Kelsen, the above examples show that the norms used as standards of justice vary from person to person and from group to group, and they are often irreconcilable with each other.It is impossible to establish the truth of the value judgments underlying the above norms on the basis of empirical facts.Rational inquiry cannot prove the validity of the social ends which justice is supposed to serve; all it can do is determine which means are necessary or helpful for the attainment of the said ends towards which human beings are striving.Kelsen concludes that, in the above cases, conceptions of justice must be regarded as irrational ideals. Alf Ross took the same approach as Kelsen for solving this problem.In his view, a statement to the effect that a certain norm or social institution is "just" or "unjust" is not explanatory at all.Such a statement does not express any verifiable judgment and cannot even be a matter of rational argument. "Calling for justice is tantamount to banging on the table: an expression of emotion that turns a personal claim into an absolute justice." If one attempts to deal with the problems raised by Kelsen and Ross, one must start by thinking about the meaning of the term rational.The intellectual history of Western civilization offers a wealth of authoritative texts that can be used to support the proposition that a judgment or a conclusion can only be considered valid if it is based on certain, reliable, and unambiguous knowledge. "rational".Descartes (Rene Descartes) gave a strong defense of this proposition.He believed that a claim, to be rational, must be based on an insight like that of a mathematician.Only that which is considered to be absolutely necessary and which cannot be questioned falls within the sphere of rational cognition.Immanuel Kant imitated Descartes and stated in a clear statement that "every rational conclusion must express necessity".This view had many supporters in the 20th century.For example, Brand Blanchard, a contemporary American thinker, once said that for philosophers, rationality “usually means the faculties and functions of grasping necessary connections.” Louis Hogasanz. Luis Recasens Siches equated the logic of reason with the logic of mathematical physics, and this logic provides people with unquestionable forms of knowledge. However, there is also a broader conception of rationality that covers the entire field of study in which we seek convincing grounds for our views and evidence for our conclusions.In the field of evaluation, a rational argument or judgment, taken in its broadest sense, is based on (1) exhaustive consideration of all factual aspects relevant to the resolution of a normative problem; and (2) Historical experience, psychological findings, and sociological insights are used to defend the value judgments inherent in normative solutions.A rational argument and judgment of this nature may, from a logical point of view, be neither deductive nor inductive, nor strictly speaking compelling.It can be highly persuasive, however, because it relies on cumulative rational forces drawn from different but often interconnected fields of human experience.The force of such an argument is usually enhanced by its indication of the practical consequences of choosing between different goals or alternative courses of action.Arguments of this kind differ from rationalized forms of emotional desire by their independence and impartiality in the spirit in which solutions are sought, although we must admit that human beings are capable of There are still many limitations to this objectivity. This broad conception of reason is preferable to the narrower view of reason as the recognition of necessary truths.First, a broad view of rationality is consistent with everyday language usage because it refuses to limit the scope of rational judgments to that which can be reached with the aid of quasi-mathematical logic.Second, the narrow understanding of the concept of rationality puts many judgments and conclusions into the realm of feeling, emotion, and those arbitrary orientations, but strictly speaking, these judgments and conclusions belong to the realm of rationality. If we adopt a broad conception of rationality, we open the door to a rational approach to the question of justice.These studies may revolve around two different sets of questions.They are likely to be concerned with discussing and determining questions of empirical fact that concern the answer to the question of normative justice.They may also be devoted to axiological questions that require people to choose between competing or potentially conflicting values ​​of social orders.In the remainder of this section we intend to discuss the usefulness and possible limitations of rationality in dealing with the above two sets of problems. When two or more people disagree on issues of justice, the resolution of such disputes often depends on whether empirical evidence can be correctly identified and evaluated.Such disqualification of women is often justified on the basis of the assertion that women are intellectually inferior to men at a time when women have not been permitted to participate in the political process and to attend institutions of higher learning.And the factual reasons justifying discrimination against women are refuted when women demonstrate their competence in many fields of occupation and scientific work.As another example, the question of whether it is just or unjust to ban marijuana depends largely on the extent of the harmful consequences of drug use.It would be extremely difficult to justify a policy of criminalizing drug use but not alcohol use if it could be shown that the consequences of drug use do not outweigh the harm caused by alcohol use. Of course, one cannot always establish a factual claim with completely sufficient evidence.For example, when trying to resolve the debate over the need to reduce television depictions of violence, one finds it difficult to ascertain the extent and extent of harm to children caused by such programming.Furthermore, when evaluating the possible impact and consequences of a proposed normative regulation, it is often necessary to rely on predictions and estimates that do not have unassailable certainty.While there may be doubt or speculation in private, it is clear that there is a rational inquiry approach to determining or resolving disputed issues of fact. There is also a second class of disputes concerning justice; in such disputes, the resolution of difficult questions depends on value judgments rather than on the determination of relevant factual grounds.Even in this realm of value evaluation and choice there are cases where reason clearly prescribes the course of action to be taken.An example of this would be a claim that requires the recognition of an ethical prescription to be so strong and compelling that it would be absurd to deny, reject, or overturn it.McCloskey (McCloskey) thinks, "assuming that someone puts the principle that 'it is a duty to promote the greatest suffering of mankind' or the principle that "it is a duty to kill as many people as possible" principle as an ultimate and irreducible principle, we should regard him as a madman, whatever his cultural grouping. The reason why the two above-mentioned principles of social ordering are regarded as completely unacceptable is based on the recognition that the vast majority of people want to live and do not wish to die violently, and that they will be cruel to other people. Respond to behaviors that cause them physical and emotional pain.This psychological fact is further confirmed by the almost universal adoption in organized society of legal norms against indiscriminate killing and against causing grievous harm to others.A rational examination of the basic features of human nature provides us with an almost irrefutable argument for normative protection of certain values ​​that are universally held by human beings—universal values ​​that are deeply rooted in the In the basis of human hope to live a good life. However, there are still many questions of justice that cannot be answered clearly in terms of right and wrong.Even though in a general sense no legislator can deny the value of life, there remains the question whether human life is an absolute value that must be protected at all costs.Are there other values ​​that take precedence over life—the fulfillment of which may justify sacrificing or ending human life—under certain circumstances?Is it just for a society to require its members to risk their lives in wars waged in order to preserve the dignity of the nation or to ensure the realization of ideals considered noble by that nation, such as liberty or social justice?Can the death penalty be justified as a means of protecting collective security from serious crimes?If a patient suffers from an incurable disease, should the medical profession be allowed to end the patient's life by euthanasia, or euthanasia? Kelsen argues, as he stated at the beginning of this section, that problems of justice involving judgments of fundamental values ​​cannot be resolved by rational methods.However, before making a final choice between conflicting values, people can often lay a solid rational foundation through the study of historical experience and the prediction of possible consequences.Is the death penalty a more appropriate means of protecting society than other forms of punishment in view of its potential deterrent effect, measurable by criminological data?Is it really human's emotional preconception to assume that abolition of the death penalty would create more danger of private vengeance, as some argue?Is it necessary to ban euthanasia because of the obvious danger of its misuse?Can wars waged for national or ideological purposes be justified in the atomic age when we weigh the massive destruction and human casualties that wars are quite likely to cause against the consequences of abstaining from the use of force at all? Even when those participating in the debate are in substantial agreement on the empirical basis and practical implications of the proposed answers, emotional preconceived tendencies can in some cases tip the scales toward a particular solution. method.Strong rational arguments against war and revolution may not work for an ideological fanatic who wants to see the world changed in the way he believes in.Deep-seated religious sentiments may shape a person's attitudes toward abortion and euthanasia.When the two values ​​of security and liberty conflict in the context of a proposed normative regulation or legislative scheme, innate psychological traits or a dominant cultural climate may cause a person to prefer security value.We should also take into account the fact that many people do not understand rational arguments very well at all, especially when they are of great complexity; It is quite possible to get carried away by their irrational impulses or prejudices. The conclusion of the above analysis is that questions of justice in social order are to a considerable extent open to rational discussion and impartial thinking; this is, of course, on the assumption that the term rational is not limited to those judgments expressing logical necessity or self-evident facts. Conditional.Therefore, Kelsen and Ross's view that the conception of justice must be regarded as an irrational ideal is unacceptable to us.However, it is also true that in difficult situations that require people to choose between ultimate values ​​or to prioritize them, the residual influence of irrationality often cannot be completely eliminated in the process of people's final decision. A well-known definition of justice put forward by Justinian's "Civil Law" and considered to be the first of the ancient Roman jurist Ulpian is expressed as follows, "Justice is to enable everyone to get what he deserves eternal will".Early in Rome's history, Cicero also described justice as "the disposition of the human spirit to enable everyone to get what is due to him." Both definitions above emphasize the subjective dimension of justice.Justice is conceived of as a certain attitude of the human spirit, a will to be fair and an inclination to recognize the claims and ideas of others.Just employers are willing to consider the reasonable demands of their employees.A just judge will be determined to avoid favoritism and prejudice against one of the parties in a lawsuit.The just legislator tends to focus on the interests of the individuals and groups he is obliged to represent. The will to give everyone his due is an important and universally valid component of the concept of justice.Without this element, justice cannot flourish in society.Just as Aristotle clearly saw, justice is a social virtue concerned with the relationship between people. "Justice itself is 'the good of others' or 'the interests of others' (good of others), because what it does is exactly what is beneficial to others."In order to function effectively, justice calls on people to free themselves from impulses that only have their own interests in mind. It is clear, however, that the mere cultivation of a mental attitude of justice and concern for others is not in itself sufficient to make justice reign.Good intentions to promote justice must also be implemented through practical measures and institutional means aimed at realizing the goals of a just society.St. Thomas Aquinas described justice as "the habit by which one man, with an eternal and unchangeable will, gives to each his due."He improved on the definition of justice in Justinian's Compendium Civil Law by explicitly stating that justice not only involves a certain spiritual preconceived tendency but also presupposes a pattern of behavior.A contemporary Swiss theologian, Emil Brunner, combined the spiritual and institutional components of justice in the following formula: "Whether it is he or it, it only needs to give everyone the that person or thing is just; an attitude, an institution, a law, a relationship, is just as long as it enables each person to get what he deserves." 亚里士多德关于分配正义与矫正正义的范畴，为各人应得的归于各人（suuum cuique）的原则在政治行动和社会行动中进行检验指出了主要的检验场域。另外，还有一个契约正义（contractual justice）的领域，该领域是正义概念的范围在一些特殊情形下所扩及者。最后，还有一个涉及同胞的个人行动的领域，关于该领域，语言习惯上有时也使用“正义”和“不正义”的说法。当然，对上述可以适用正义概念的种种情势，我们还需要作进一步的详尽阐释。 分配正义（distributive justice）所主要关注的是在社会成员或群体成员之间进行权利、权力、义务和责任配置的问题。属于此一正义范畴的各种问题所涉及的面是极为宽泛的，因此在这里我们只能就几个例子展开讨论。在一个社会中，凡达到一定年龄的人是否都应当被赋予选举和担任公职的权利？或者这些权利是否只应当留给某些特定等级的成员享有？人民是否应当被允许毫无障碍地、毫无限制地自由发表意见和集会？工作与服务的酬劳费用应当是多少？谁应当成为一个未留遗嘱而死亡的人的继承人，以及他们应当根据什么比例分享这份遗产？超过一定年龄的人是否应当有权得到养老金或其他特殊的救济金，以及这种救济金应当如何计算？应当使用何种税收制度来确保平均分配国民的收入？又应当建立何种禁止性的和惩罚性的制度以保护公共治安和安全？我们很容易发现，上述例子中所提出的正义问题，通常是由享有立法性权力的当局来处理的。 赫伯特·哈特则试图将分配正义概念局限于专断性歧视的情形。他指出，“正义观念的运用是不尽相同的，但隐于其间的一般性原则乃是，就人与人之间的相互关系而言，人们应当得到一种平等或不平等的相对地位”。从这一观点来看，一部正义的法律就是对相同的情形给予一视同仁的待遇的法律；而一部不正义的法律则会在毫无根据的情形下就以不平等的方式分配权利和义务。 哈特这种正义观念被限定得实在太过狭窄了。的确，以不平等的方式对待本应当以相同方式对待的人或群体，提出了有关正义方面的令人关注和意义重大的问题。然而，分配正义的意义并不只局限于要求无歧视。当拒绝给予一个社会的全体成员以基本自由时，当政府未能提供安全与治安方面的基本保障时，又当每个人都被按没收方式课税时，无论是语义上的用法还是任何其他重大原因，都不会妨碍人们把它们谴责为不正义。为人们提供机会以发挥他们的潜力并使他们获得最适合他们的社会职业的任务，也同样属于正义的题域。一个正义的社会秩序，除了满足人们对平等待遇的需求以外，还必须服务于人们的其他需求。 在民主政体的国家中，分配正义通常是由人民选举的立法机构予以执行的；而在非民主政体的国家中，这一权力则可能会由一个寡头政治的立法班子或独裁统治者执掌。在一些社会中，司法机关分享执行分配正义的这一特权，其表现是法官被赋予了制定一般性规则的自由裁量权。在古罗马，一家之长被赋予了广泛的权力，他可以发布命令和规定罚则以控制家庭成员和奴隶的行为。在中世纪社会，封建领主、诸侯和农奴的权利与义务，一般都是由采邑的习惯法确定的。在国际社会中，国际法则一直是规定和划定各国权力范围的手段。分配正义的问题，如工资水平和工时的确定，也可能在私人组织中发生。在中小学校和大专院校中，分配正义的问题也会因评分制度的公平性和分配奖学金的确当性等诸如此类的事情而变得颇为尖锐。 当一条分配正义的规范被一个社会成员违反时，矫正正义（corrective justice）便开始发挥作用，因为在这种情况下，要求对过失做出赔偿或剥夺一方当事人的不当得利，就成为势在必然了。矫正正义通常是由法院或其他被赋予了司法或准司法权力的机关执行的。它的主要适用范围乃是合同、侵权和刑事犯罪等领域。一种违约行为将通过一个规定支付损害赔偿费的判决而得到矫正，除非规定了某种其他救济手段（诸如强制照约履行方式）。在侵权行为人使他人遭受故意或过失损害的案件中，判以恰当补偿也是法官或陪审团的义务。在刑法领域中，矫正正义问题则表现在下述方面，即确定给予罪犯以何种刑罚的方面。 从一个更为狭义、更为限定的意义上来看，我们还有理由把正义概念适用于个人间、群体间或国家间的合同安排领域。在正常情形下，当两个或两个以上的当事人出于他们本身自由的而非胁迫的意志而在彼此之间承担了一定义务的时候，正义问题在这种合同背景中是不会发生的。然而，却可能会发生这样的情形，即一方当事人对另一方当事人隐瞒有关订约意图方面的信息或故意错误表达合同内容以引诱他方当事人接受一项报价。还可能会发生这样的事情，即一项私人协议或国际条约的一方当事人，使用某种优越的实力地位将其条件强加于实力较弱的一方当事人身上。另外，一个作为代表其工人、雇员或其他群体的谈判代理组织，可能会在毫不考虑那些它具有义务代表的人的根本利益的情形下就议订一项集体协议。在上述情形中，所达成的合同或所缔结的条约，尽管在形式上是自愿的结果而不是倚重权势强制的结果，但它却仍具有不正义的污点。 正义还有最后一个含义；同那些已经讨论过的含义相比，该含义具有更多的边际性质。正义的这个含义在亚里士多德的论著中起着显著的作用，而且在有关正义的当代话语中也并未完全消失。亚里士多德指出，“不正义这一术语，被认为既适用于违反法律的人，也适用于占有了比他应得的东西多的人，亦即不公平的人。因而很明显，奉公守法的人和公平的人都是正义的”。在上述文字中，正义与不正义这两个术语都未被局限于立法规范、司法解释规范和合同规定规范等领域。它们被扩大适用于个人行为的领域，并被用来特指一个人对另一个人所采取的违法的和不公平的行为。根据对该词的这种广义理解，一个残酷毒打孩子的人也可以被宣称为不正义。不正义还可以适用于一个无情地使另一个人的期望破灭的人（因为正是他的言行使该人燃起了这种期望）。 尽管上述最后一个例子可能是一个例外，但是各人应得的归于各人这一论式似可以含括上述讨论中所论及的所有有关正义的问题。使上述问题相联系的共同点在于它们都试图对政府的行动、组织的行动或个人的行动进行评价，而这种评价则是根据这样一个考虑进行的，即这些行动是否剥夺了人们应当得到的某种东西，或这些行动是否拒绝给予人们以某种他们有权利要求的东西。关于对社会成员应当设定什么义务和责任这个更深刻的问题，也同样属于各人应得的归于各人的原则的题中之意。 由于正义概念关系到权利、要求和义务，所以它与法律观念有着密切的联系。社会正义观的改进和变化，常常是法律改革的先兆。当18世纪的欧洲普遍得出这个结论——亦即使用严刑迫使人们供认所被指控的罪行是不正义的——的时候，人们便发动了一场运动，要求通过一项赋予反对自证其罪之特权的法律，而这场运动最终也获得了成功。当拒绝给予因其同事过失而遭受损害的工人以对其雇主进行起诉的权利是不公正的这一观点在19世纪的美国变得极为盛行的时候，有关颁布工人补偿法的要求也应运而起。 正义与道德之间的界限在这里变得凸显起来。规劝人们对其邻人要慷慨大方、至善至慈、体谅宽宏和诚善帮助的告诫，并不需要用法律规范加以贯彻和实施。这些道德要求旨在通过自愿的和非强制的行为而在实践中加以执行。但另一方面，当人们提出正义要求时，从很大程度上来讲，这些要求则是向那些有权力凭借以制裁为后盾的具有拘束力的规范手段控制人们行为的人提出的。 有关正义所关注的权利与义务往往只是未来行为的一种目标而在实在法中并无现存依据的观点，也隐含于上述种种考虑之中。正义乃是法律应当与其相协调的一个标准。然而，这并不意味着正义只是一种纯粹的理想或想象出来的梦想。正义的要求会在一个国家或其他共同体的实在法中得到广泛的实现，这也当然是完全可能的。 对正义问题所采取的上述进路，尚未得到人们的普遍接受。那些象凯尔森和罗斯一样强调正义非理性性质的论者，只倾向于给予“富有意义”的正义概念（a“meaningful”notion of justice）以一个狭窄范围。从这个严格限定的含义来看，正义实际上成了合法条性（legality）的一个同义词。凯尔森认为，正义乃是“通过忠实地适用实在制度的方式而维续其存在的”。一项一般性规则在根据其内容而应当得到适用的所有场合中都予以严格的适用，这就是正义。罗斯也采取了一种相似的观点，即“正义观念结果变成了这样一种要求，即一个判决应当是适用一项一般性规则的结果。同专制相反，正义乃是对法律的正确适用”。如果采用这一观点，那么实施一部令人憎恶的法律也就是正义的了，只要这一法律的适用不因人而异。 我们不能接受这种把正义同合法条性等而视之的观点。它同人类自文明初期就提出的有关正义概念的观点完全相悖。在任何地方或在任何时候，一个国家的实在法之所以一直是人们所抨击的对象，其理由就是实在法中的一些规定未能符合正义之标准。无论是在柏拉图式－基督教的传统中，还是在其他文化中，正义一直被认为是一种高级的法（higher law），而且社会中的实在法也应当与其相符合。如果正义概念被认为就是严格适用实在法，而不考虑实在法的内容，那么这就违反了此一概念的普遍惯用法。 虽然正义是衡量法律之善的尺度，但在确定某一特定法规是可欲的还是不可欲的的时候，它却并不是惟一可适用的标准。建构一个法律制度，会遇到许多必须加以解决的专门问题，而这些问题的解决则主要是依据权宜、功利和可行性等标准来进行的。在一个政治单位的各个法院之间对标的管辖权进行分配、在审判过程中向法院提出请求的形式、对政府各部门进行行政上的组织等，都是上述专门问题的实例。正是对有序安排与程序的需要，而不是对正义的追求，构成了在上述法律制度各个领域中制定政策的基础。 尽管对法律有序化来讲，正义并不是惟一至关重要的价值，但是正义概念有意义的适用范围仍是极为广泛的。正义的要求，除了包括其他东西以外，还包括了防止不合理的歧视待遇、禁止伤害他人、承认基本人权、提供在职业上自我实现的机会、设定义务以确保普遍安全和有效履行必要的政府职责、确立一个公正的奖惩制度等。所有上述要求，在某种程度上都同人类的共同需要有关系。这些需要中有一些是基本需要和首要需要，所以法律制度对它们的忽视给我们提出了一些具有特殊迫切性和重要性的问题；而对这些问题的追究则构成了我们下一节的主题。 在法理学思想史中，正义观念往往是同自然法概念联系在一起的。人类关于正义的思想演化同人类对假定的“自然法”的存在及其存在的重要意义的各种探究之间的关系极为深厚，因此任何一种适当的正义理论都不可能忽视这一永恒的问题。然而，试图对自然法问题进行讨论，却面临着一个最基本的困难，即这一概念的含义一直是因不同思想家而异的。特别是自然法与正义之间的关系，始终是哲学家之间与法学家之间发生重大分歧的根源。 亚里士多德认为，如果一条正义规则在任何地方都具有同样的效力，那么它就是“自然的”。但是，他并不认为所有的正义规则都具有这种性质。在他看来，尤其是那些分配正义的规则，是依人类平等与不平等这一不断变化的标准而确定的。圣·托马斯·阿奎那采用了一种与亚里士多德相同的进路。他将自然法视为人类普遍的和根深蒂固的品性——其中包括人类合群的理性冲动——强加在立法者权力之上的一整套现实的障碍。但是另一方面，他关于正义的观点却具有一种更为宽泛的适用范围。一位20世纪的法学家赫伯特·哈特，虽从不同的哲学视角出发，却也得出了一些相似的结论。他把自然法视为一束公认的原则，这些原则的基础存在于有关人类的某些基本真理之中。“对一些关于人性以及我们生活的世界极为明显的概括——的确是自明之理——所进行的思考表明，只要这些自明之理可以适用，那么就会存在一些行为规则，而这些规则则是任何社会组织为了存在下去而必须拥有的。”但在另一方面，他的正义观念却因含括了规范正义之标准而走得更远了，因为这些标准是随着法律制度发展中不断变化的条件而变化的。 古往今来，还有许多论者对自然法的内容持一种几乎不加限制的观点。特别是在启蒙时代，自然法往往被理解为一种符合正义要求的、完整的和既有的规则体系。这种观点在克里斯琴·沃尔夫（Christian Wolff）的哲学中达到了顶峰；他从他所认为的那种永恒不变的自然理性规定中推论出了一个精致的政治和法律制度。与上述那种绝对论的方法相反，鲁道夫·斯塔姆勒（Rudolf Stammler）则在20世纪提出了一种“具有日益变化内容的自然法”的观点，所谓具有日益变化内容的自然法，意指一套反映某个特定国家于某个特定时期的特定需要的正义原则。 晚些时候，卡多佐法官——同样用相对论的方法——也把自然法认定是普遍存在于理性人之中的正义标准与公平行事的标准，当然，这些理性人极为关注他们社会中的生活习惯。 关于这个问题还存在着第三种认识进路，这种进路直接反对我们在上面所论及的第一种观点。按照这种认识进路，自然法是一个涉及范围极为宽泛的术语，而正义在法律领域中只涉及一个相对较小的题域。约翰尼斯·梅斯纳（Johannes Messner）认为，自然法乃是指一种有关个人责任和社会责任的错综复杂的模式；在这些责任中，有些具有绝对的性质，而有些则具有偶然的性质；它们是从人的本性中派生出来的，而且他在经过分析后认为，这些责任对大量的人际关系以及为调整这些关系而制定的制度性手段具有相当的影响。但在另一方面，他却认为正义只具有一种狭窄的含义，亦即是说，正义是一种尊重现有主张并使本人的行为同他人的权利协调一致的习惯。艾尔弗雷德·维德罗斯（Alfred Verdross）认为，自然法乃是明显符合理性的社会有序化原则之总和，这些原则不仅同人类的尊严相一致而且还要求人类在社会中共存成为可能。在他看来，正义观念并不包含所有的自然法原则，而只包含那些将公民平等问题作为其目标的原则。尽管自然法哲学家之间存在着上述分歧与异义，然而要把他们的学说归纳为一种共通的原则也并不是不可能的。实际上，这些论者之间也存在着意见一致的地方，即自然法是由应当得到承认的原则和准则构成的，而不管它们在一个国家或其他共同体的实在法中是否得到了正式表达。正如菲利普·塞尔兹尼克（Philip Selznick）所指出的，“自然法的主要原则就在于宣称专断意志在法律上并不是终决性的”：就立法者颁布的法令而言，诉诸更高的正义原则始终是允许的。各个历史时期有关自然法思想方面的论述，无论多么不明确、多么费解，还是多么矛盾，但这一基本准则却似乎反映出了它们之间某种一致性的要素。 我们需要指出的是，的确存在着一些最低限度的正义要求：这些要求独立于实在法制定者的意志而存在，并且需要在任何可行的社会秩序中予以承认。这些要求中有一些必须从人的生理构造中寻找根源，而其他的一些要求则植根于人类所共有的心理特征之中。同样，还有一些要求是从人性的理智部分，亦即是从人的知性能力中派生出来的。这些法律有序化的基本规定的有效性为这样一个事实所证实，即它们在所有诞生于最为原始的野蛮状态的社会中都以某种形式得到了承认。然而，这些原则中无一应被视为是一种不受制于有限例外的无条件的绝对原则。 生理需要要求人吃一定量的食物和有一定量的睡眠；人的本能使人具有性欲。因此我们可以说，对一个社会全体成员或他们之间的某些群体规定了不足以维持健康的食物的法律、规定20小时为一个正常工作日的法律，或禁止男女性交的法律，都是与“自然法”相违背的。然而，在严重饥荒时期，人们可能不得不接受不足以维持需要的食物。当集体遇到非常时期时，他们可能不得不在一定时期内放弃充足的睡眠。对人的性欲的承认，并不妨碍对教士和尚或寺院秩序中的成员制定禁欲要求。 我们在上面讨论了人的生理需要，现在让我们再来看一下人的心理需要。也许首先需要指出的是，绝大多数人对保护生命都具有一种极强的欲望。由于人的生命时常会因他人的仇恨、妒忌或羡慕而遭到危害，所以就有必要用法律规定杀人为不合法的方法去阻止一个群体内部的自相残杀，因为这可能导致该群体的崩溃。当代人类学家一致认为，不曾有一个有组织的人类社会是在没有某种正当理由时就允许杀害群体成员的。 但另一方面，的确也有一些社会在灾荒条件下曾经为了节约粮食或者限制家庭成员的规模而把处死老人或婴儿的做法视为是正确和恰当的。也有一些社会曾赞同按宗教仪式把社会成员用来献祭，以抚慰众神从而拯救社会、免遭天罚。更有一些文化传统曾命令烧死寡妇，以象征夫妻间永恒不破的结合。即使在现代社会中，为缓和人口问题的各种压力，流产在某些保护措施下也得到了允许。虽然上述事例似乎进一步证实了法律规范和法律制度的相对性，但是它们并不影响这一事实的真相，即一般来讲，所有或几乎所有的社会都认为，故意杀害一个清白无辜的人是应受严责和谴责的。这一事实本身就是“自然”的社会法（natural social law）的一个重要范例。当然，在战时消灭生命，无论是在文明程度较低的文化传统中还是在文明社会中，都是以大规模的形式发生的。然而我们必须牢记的是，自然法理论所关注的乃是群体内部法律制度的某些基本内容，而战争——尽管人们做出了某些努力，试图对战争中发生的某些残酷现象进行调整——基本上只是法律权力以外的一种现象。 另一个关于普遍经验的事实是，人们欲求保护他们身体上的完整性并欲求在人格方面得到一定的尊重。如果法律允许殴打他人和致人残废，又如果法律让人的荣誉和名声完全操握在他人之手，那么社会秩序的运作就会遭到严重侵损。因此，故意或过失而使他人遭受伤害以及传播诽谤污语的做法一般都会遭到禁止，但是我们在这里仍必须指出，这种情形也是有例外的。在自卫情形下或为了预防严重伤害的目的而伤害一个人，就可能是正当的或至少是可以原谅的。在美国，为了维护人们评论政府官员的性格和习惯的自由，诽谤和造谣法便减少了对这些官员的保护。 人们对于欺骗和歪曲行为也会加以反对，至少在严重有损于他们利益的情形下是如此的。所有社会对于履行契约协议条款都设定了一些诚信（good faith）要求，并且还把一些重大欺诈方式规定为不合法。但在另一方面，某些不涉及严重欺诈的不正当行为，却未必会遭到法律禁止。 在财产关系领域中已经表明，几乎所有的社会都承认私人在工具、用具、装饰物以及其他供私人使用的物品方面的私有财产权。只有几个完全集体化的社会是例外，它们在某种宗教观念或伦理观念的鼓舞下试图使所有的东西都公有化，但是它们却无法长久地维持这一制度。在这里，人的心理需要也同样为普遍保护消费品私有权提供了一种根据。人除了具有一种占有的本能外，还希望将其人格与性格扩及到他们周围的东西上面，从而创造一个可以使他们感受到自由的外部范围。因此，社会秩序力图通过制裁偷窃来保护人的情感所关注的这一领域免受侵害，也就不是什么偶然的事了。所有上述文化交叉的模式与迭合现象，导使当代一位最重要的人类学家克莱德·克拉克洪（Clyde Kluckhohn）提出了这样一个问题，“难道我们不可能做出这样一种假设吗：即给定人类有机体的本性和人类情境的性质，这些道德原则无论如何都是应对着必然性而来的”？ 人之理性的命令还将其他一些限制条件强加于立法方面的完全自由意志之上。我们必须牢记人的本性包括了理性能力，因此上述命令就有可能在一个不同的意义上被视为是“自然的”。自然法的理性部分，在很大程度上是植根于人的认识能力之中的，这种能力会使人清楚地认识到人之非理性的与破坏性的冲动所会导致的社会危害，而且也清楚地认识到有必要通过法律力量来控制这些冲动。 例如，由于性关系会产生强烈的激情，而且对性关系毫无控制的沉溺也往往可能导致社会危害，所以所有社会（可能除了为数极少的几个早期社会和及其原始的社会以外）都先后制定了明确的规则来调整性行为。近亲之间的乱伦关系在任何地方都会受到制裁，因为这种关系中隐存着紊乱家庭关系和破坏家庭团结的取向。绝大多数社会都不赞许男女间的完全乱交现象并且将婚姻视为一种社会必要性，尽管婚姻所采取的形式可能是一夫一妻制、一夫多妻制或（极少数是）一妻多夫制。此外，几乎所有的社会都认为通奸是不可欲的并且都禁止强奸，尽管这类违法行为的定义因不同文化而异。 还有一些关涉到法律过程的原则，这些原则作为自然理性的命令也对人的精神产生了影响。其中的一项原则是，未违反法律者不应被判有罪。第二项原则则要求，在双方当事人间进行的法律争辩中，双方当事人都应当获得机会陈述己见。第三项原则主张，一个法律制度必须为保护权利和补偿损失提供公正的法庭，而且任何人都不应当在其自己的案件中充当法官。令人深感怀疑的是，人们是否能想象出上述原则的例外，即使有这样的例外，又有哪一个不曾被指责为对基本正义（elementary justice）的违反呢？ 所有上述例子都将人性之存在预设为经久不变的东西，以致它们有可能成为某些普遍的或近似普遍的规范性模式的一个基础。有关人类有机体所具有的上述永恒不变的成分究竟是什么的问题，论者之间并没有定论。一些心理学家认为，妒忌与竞争寻衅性（competitive aggressiveness）乃是人之本性的恒久特征，而其他一些学者则不赞同此论。总而言之，依据对人之基本本性的思考而得出的任何有关人在立法方面的基本需要的结论，都应当根据生物学和心理科学中所取得的进展而加以重新思考和修正，因为这些进展能使我们更深刻地更敏锐地洞察人格的奥秘与复杂性。 虽然人的构造中有一些成分乃是穴居人与高度文明的人所共有的，但是也有一些成分则显然不是固定不变的。文明发展的结果使人在道德情感方面的反应和细腻程度都发生了变化，而这些变化的存在一定会对法律发生影响。上述事实导致了这样一个后果，即自然法的宽容标准在社会与法律的发展过程中常常发生变化。 例如，一些禁止杀人的例外在很久以前有可能被认为是正当的，而在一个当代文明的社会中则会被认为是不可容忍的。杀害老人、遗弃体弱多病或患残疾的孩子、焚烧寡妇等都是这方面的例证。早时的法律一般都对严重犯罪的作为设定了严格责任，但是发达先进的法律制度却倾向于要求某种形式的犯罪意图（mens rea）作为刑事定罪的一个要件。在过去，人们对相对轻微的罪行也曾设定有死刑或其他严刑，然而在今天，当人们尚未宣布死刑因是一种违反文明正义的刑种而完全不合法时，死刑则通常只被限制适用于少数几种极为重大的罪行。又例如，一个现代国家的成员要求从其政府那儿获得的有关他们人身与财产的最低限度的安全，也同样要比个人与集体生活始终面临复杂棘手问题的社会所能期望的安全程度要高得多。我们必须得出结论说，对于一个有效可行的法律制度所必需的最低限度的正义要求，在发达与不发达的社会中并非完全相同。 当立法者所制定的法规违反了自然法基本原则的时候，提出关于这一违反自然法的法律是否有效和是否有拘束力的问题是具有合法性的。我们在本书讨论法哲学历史的第一部分已经指出，自然法的大多数倡导者——其中有圣·托马斯·阿奎那、格老秀斯（Grotius）、普芬道夫（Pufendorf）、洛克（Locke）和霍布斯——都一致同意，在实在法严重违背正义（decency）的情形下，应当承认私人和司法人员有权利甚至有义务反对这一应受谴责的法律。这种观点把自然法的基本规范视为是真正意义上的“法律”，并将它们置于多少与那些体现在成文宪法中的律令和命令相同的位置上，因为成文宪法中的这些规定也是实在法有效的条件。这一观点具有许多可取之处，只要它的适用范围局限于立法者所制定的极恶的、无人道的、明显不合理的法律；关于这个问题，我们拟在后面作出论证。 我们在本节中所提出的理论认为，不应当将“正义”和“自然法”两词作为同义词来使用。自然法乃是一个正义制度的最为根本的基础，它是由那些最低限度的公平和合理的标准组成的，没有这些标准，就不可能有可行的法律制度。而另一方面，正义概念则包括了被一个特定的政治和社会制度认为是正义的规范和原则，而不管这些规范和原则在一个正式的法律渊源中是否得到了文明承认。最后，还存在着一个第三层次，亦即最高层次， 它是由一个更完美的和更理想的秩序的蓝图规划构成的，而这一规划则是一个国家的实在法所无力实现的。据此观点，正义概念所关注的既是法律有序化的迫切的和即时的目的，也是法律有序化的较远大的和终极的目的。 在一个正义的法律制度所必须予以充分考虑的人的需要中，自由占有一个显要的位置。要求自由的欲望乃是人类根深蒂固的一种欲望。这种欲望连小孩都有，例如他们就有强烈的欲望去干即时心境使他们想到的任何事情，而且还常常对父母或老师所设定的约束感到烦躁。成年人对于随意迁徙以及最充分地发挥其体力和智力的事情都会感到高兴。人们赋予自由的那种价值为这样一个事实所证实，即监禁在任何地方都是作为一种刑事制裁手段而加以使用的，而且用监禁作为威胁的手段也被普遍认为是威慑不法行为的行之有效的手段。同样重要的是，希腊、罗马及其他一些地方的奴隶主还曾把解放（即释放奴隶使其获取自由）作为效忠服务的最高奖赏。朱利叶斯·凯撒（Julius Caesar）就如是说，“任何人生来都渴求自由、痛恨奴役状况。” 整个法律和正义的哲学就是以自由观念为核心而建构起来的。约翰·洛克宣称，“法律的目的并不是废除或限制自由，而是保护和扩大自由。”杰斐逊（Jeffeson）确信，自由乃是人生来就享有的和不可剥夺的一项权利。卢梭痛苦地疾呼，“人人生而自由；但却无往而不在枷锁之中。”康德宣称说，自由乃是“某个人据其人性所拥有的一项惟一的和原始的权利。”赫伯特·斯宾塞也持有一种与上述观点极为相似的观点。 这些哲学家对自由的呼吁，在各国政治实践中并非一直未受到关注。在当今世界的许多国家中，法律都承认了公民的某些基本自由。这些基本自由通常包括自由表达的权利（the right of free expression）、自由结社的权利、自由迁徙的权利、获得财产的权利和缔结合同协议的权利。上述权利往往会得到宪法的保护，亦就是说，至少是上述权利的核心内容不可以为立法或行政法令所违反。 然而，当我们研究各国历史和各文明史时我们却会发现，并不是所有的政治社会制度都认为自由是某个人都具有的一种自然的和基本的权利。在古代社会，为数众多的男女都被置于奴役状态之中，而且这种奴隶制度直到相对晚近的时候才从西方文明中消失。中世纪