Chapter 3 Chapter 3

On April 21, the People's Liberation Army crossed the Yangtze River in an overwhelming manner. On the 23rd, Nanjing was liberated. It braved the heavy rain and pursued bravely. Five armies of the Kuomintang army fled in other places with more than 80,000 people, and took advantage of the victory to occupy Hangzhou on May 3, forming a strategic encirclement of the Tang Enbo Group that retreated to Shanghai. On April 21, 1949, Mao Zedong and Zhu De issued an order to march across the country.This is the manuscript drafted by Mao Zedong himself. Shortly after crossing the river, the central government made a deployment for how the Shanghai campaign should be fought. On April 27, the Central Military Commission instructed the General Front Committee, Su Yu, and Zhang Zhen: "The Kuomintang troops in Shanghai may withdraw quickly." The Third Field Army should not approach Shanghai too closely to avoid scaring the enemy away. On May 8, the Central Military Commission also instructed that in the battle to capture Shanghai, "it is necessary to close all the enemy's escape routes."However, the Central Military Commission also instructed that the launch of the Shanghai campaign, especially the general attack on the urban area, should be determined according to the progress of the preparations for the takeover.The general offensive can only be launched after the preparations for taking over are ready, so that "Shanghai can be taken over proactively and in an orderly manner."This is an important decision of the Central Military Commission to preserve and take over Shanghai.

The Central Military Commission fully estimated the possibility of the US government's armed intervention in Shanghai and formulated a series of measures.According to the deployment of the Military Commission, when the Third Field Army attacked Shanghai, the Second Field Army assembled on the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line as a strategic reserve, ready to cooperate with the Third Field Army to deal with possible armed intervention by US imperialism.At the same time, a series of strict foreign-related policies were stipulated for the troops attacking Shanghai, so as not to create an excuse for imperialist armed intervention.The Central Military Commission also believes that the faster the KMT's Shanghai defenders are eliminated, the less likely the U.S. imperialist armed intervention will be.

Shanghai is the largest city in my country and the economic and cultural center of the country.In order to completely return Shanghai to the people, the upcoming Shanghai campaign should not only annihilate the Kuomintang troops defending Shanghai, but also preserve the urban area of ​​Shanghai from being destroyed by artillery fire, so as to facilitate future construction.Su Yu, the deputy commander of the Third Field Army, and Zhang Zhen, the chief of staff, who presided over the work of the Front Committee of the Third Field Army and directly commanded the Shanghai campaign, considered several plans to capture Shanghai in accordance with the spirit of the Central Military Commission and the General Front Committee's instructions on capturing Shanghai, combined with the enemy's situation.Finally, it was decided to detour from the two wings of Shanghai, attack Wusongkou, block the retreat of the Kuomintang army, and lure and annihilate its main force in the suburbs.This plan can not only prevent the Kuomintang from transporting more materials from Shanghai, but also help to preserve the integrity of the urban area.However, considering that in order to ensure his retreat at sea, Tang Enbo must concentrate his forces to fight desperately on both sides of Wusongkou.This will be a tough and vicious battle, and the troops will have to pay a high price. On May 7, Su Yu and Zhang Zhen reported this plan to the Central Military Commission and the General Front Committee.The next day, the Central Military Commission replied to the approval.

Based on this, the Front Committee of the Third Field Army decided to use the 9th and 10th Corps to command 4 armies each, start from the north and north corridors of Taihu Lake, detour from the Pudong and Puxi wings, target Wusong and Gaoqiao, pincer Wusongkou, and cut off the enemy's The army fled by sea to force the Shanghai defenders to surrender and strive for a peaceful settlement of the Shanghai issue;The Third Field Army issued the "Songhu Campaign Combat Order" on May 10, and its specific deployment is: Ye Fei, the commander of the 10th Corps, and Wei Guoqing, the political commissar, commanded the 26th, 28th, 29th, and 33rd armies, and were attached to the 5th and 6th artillery regiments of the special forces column and an engineering battalion.First of all, the main force captured Wusong and Baoshan, blocked the mouth of the Huangpu River, and blocked the ship transportation of the Kuomintang army.The rest of the troops divided and wiped out the enemies in Kunshan, Anting, Taicang, and Jiading areas, and the Northwest Area of ​​Shanghai cooperated with the 9th Corps to attack Shanghai.

Song Shilun, commander of the 9th Corps, and Guo Huaruo, political commissar, commanded the 20th Army, 27th Army, 30th Army, and 31st Army, and was attached to the 4th Special Forces Column Artillery Regiment. First, they captured the positions along Pinghu, Jinshanwei, Fengxian, Nanhui, and Chuansha , cut off the enemy's retreat from Shanghai to the southeast.The rest of the main force will take control of Qingpu and the area west of Songjiang, and then stand by to attack Shanghai with the 10th Corps from the east, south, and west. Two arrows point directly to Shanghai. Nanxun.The headquarters of the 9th Corps.

In order to prepare for the occupation of Shanghai, on May 9, Commander Song Shilun and Political Commissar Guo Huaruo called a meeting of cadres above the group to convey instructions from the Central Military Commission, the General Front Committee, and the Third Field Army Front Committee. Song Shilun, formerly known as Song Jiyao, also known as Song Zhiguang. In 1925, he was admitted to the fifth period of Whampoa Military Academy, and then transferred to the sixth period of study. He joined the Communist Youth League of China in 1926 and became a member of the Communist Party of China the following year.During the period of the Red Army, he successively served as the captain of the Pingli guerrilla team, the minister of the military department of the Soviet government in Lianhua County, the principal of the 4th branch of the Hunan-Jiangxi Red Army School, the chief of staff of the independent division of the Red Army, the division commander, and the chief of staff of the Jiangxi Military Region. The fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign and the Long March. After arriving in northern Shaanxi in the winter of 1935, he served as the commander of the 30th Red Army and the 28th Red Army in northern Shaanxi. He led his troops to participate in the Eastern Expedition and Western Expedition.During the Anti-Japanese War, he served as the head of the 716th Regiment of the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army, the head and political commissar of the Yanbei Detachment, and the commander of the Fourth Column of the Eighth Route Army.During the War of Liberation, he served as the chief of staff of the Shandong Field Army, the director of the Executive Division of the Communist Party of China in the Executive Department of Beiping Military Mediation, and the deputy commander and division commander of the Bohai Navy.

Some of Guo Huaruo’s experiences are similar to those of Song Shilun. For example, Guo Huaruo was born in the fourth batch of Huangpu. He participated in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in the Central Revolutionary Base Area. He once acted as the chief of staff of the Red Army. He served as the head of the training of the Red Army School and the director of education of the Qingyang Infantry School.During the War of Resistance Against Japan, he served as the director of the First Bureau and the Fourth Bureau of the Operation Department of the Central Military Commission, and the principal of the Yan'an Artillery School.During the War of Liberation, Guo Huaruo served as the deputy commander of the Lunan Military Region and the deputy commander of the Sixth Column of the East China Field Army. Later, he served as a leader of the 9th Corps from the political commissar of the Fourth Column.Interestingly, after liberation, the two of them were successively transferred to the Academy of Military Sciences to serve as leaders, and then worked together in the same team.

On May 10, the head of the Third Field Army issued an order for the Songhu operation, and decided to use the 9th and 10th Corps to take a pincer-shaped offensive first, detour from the Pudong and Puxi wings, and approach Wusongkou. area, divide and annihilate the enemy. Combat Order of the Third Field Army's Songhu Campaign (May 10, 1946) Order Jingzi No.3 1. Our second and third field armies have crossed the river since April 20. So far, we have successfully broken through the enemy's defenses on the river and occupied the Beijing, Soviet, Hangzhou, Zhejiang-Jiangxi lines and key points in Beijing (Wuhu) and Huaihe. Liberate the vast areas south of the Yangtze River, pursue and wipe out all the six armies of the 4th, 20th, 28th, 45th, 66th and 51st armies, and the 68th, 96th, 106th, 88th, and 21st armies The majority of the army, one part of the May 4th, 123rd, 99th, and 7325th armies, has a total of more than 200,000 people (with about 170,000 internal prisoners).The remnants of the 68th, 55th, 96th, and 106th armies of the enemy on the western front have nearly fled to the south of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi line. Our second field has controlled most of the Zhejiang-Jiangxi road and is chasing and suppressing the fleeing enemy; After the 54th Army, 21st Army, the remnants of the 12th and 3rd Army, and the 99th Division fled to the Shanghai area, they are coordinating with the 37th, 75th, 12th, and 52nd Armies in the original Songhu area (including seven armies) Two or three divisions) covered the southward transportation of materials, and conspired to sabotage various public constructions in Shanghai and plunder assets.

2. In order to carry out the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou combat mission, I divided the Seventh Corps to control the Hangzhou, Yuhang, and Xiaoshan areas, and strived for a few days to rest and reorganize. The 2nd and 1st Army) and the Wenzhou and Qingtian areas (2nd and 3rd Armies) advanced, and cooperated with the 2nd Field Zhejiang Line to fight, the other served as Hangzhou guard, and the 8th Corps (owed to the 2nd and 6th Army) guarded Nanjing (24th, 34th Army) Zhenjiang and Jintan, Jurong, Lishui, Gaochun, Langxi, and Guangde (Second and Fifth Army) areas opened up local work to eliminate scattered bandits, and decided to encircle Shanghai with the Ninth and Tenth Corps and the Second and Sixth Army to cut off all the enemy's escape routes , block the smuggling of materials in Shanghai, and then wipe out the enemy or force the enemy to surrender, seek a peaceful settlement of Shanghai, and enter the urban area of ​​Shanghai on standby.The tasks of each department are divided as follows:

(1) The 10th Corps (less than the 31st Army) commanding the 26th, 3rd and 3rd Armies, attached to the 5th Special Vertical Artillery Regiment, the 6th Artillery Regiment and a battalion of engineers, should first use the main force to capture Wusong and Baoshan, blockade the Huangpu River Estuary, and intercept The enemy's export ships should be transported, and the rest should be divided and wiped out in Kunshan, Anting Town, Taicang, and Jiading. After that, the positions in this area should be controlled, and the northwest area of ​​Shanghai will cooperate with the Ninth Corps to attack Shanghai.Default:

1.The fifth and sixth regiments attached to the main artillery of the 29th Army (with a division to open up local work in the Wuxing area) and the 28th Army (with a division to serve as Suzhou city defense) should be dispatched from Wuta City (the 28th Army) on the evening of the 12th. , Changshu, and Zhitang (Second Ninth Army) were dispatched to capture Wusong and Baoshan before dawn on the 14th.For example, Wusong and Baoshan are difficult to capture at the moment, so we should use one part to monitor them temporarily, but we should use an effective part to cooperate with artillery fire from Wusong and Jiangwan to wedge into the Huangpu River to capture Yinhang Town, and effectively block the Huangpu River (the 28th Army also sent The first one controls Taicang, Jiading, Tianwan, Yinhang Town and the area to the north), and then stands by to cooperate with the Second and Sixth Army to attack Shanghai. 2. The first step of the 2nd and 6th Army should be to control Kunshan and Anting Town on the 13th (and first seize the Kunshan East Railway Bridge with one part) to support the main force of the 28th Army to fight, to cover the safety of its side and back, and then stand by along the Beijing-Shanghai route. Attack Shanghai from the left bank of the Suzhou Creek. 3.The 3rd and 3rd armies should assemble in the Changshu area on the 15th, and prepare to take over the security tasks of Taicang, Jiading, Baoshan, and Wusong, so that the 28th and 29th armies can participate in the attack on Shanghai, or go to Wuxing, Wujiang, and Suzhou areas to open up local work. The specific deployment of the above ministries will be decided by Commander Ye and Chief of Staff Chen. (2) The Ninth Corps (owed to the Third and Third Armies) and commanding the Fourth Artillery Regiment of the Third First Army should first use one part to capture positions along the lines of Pinghu, Jinshanwei, Fengxian, Nanhui, and Chuansha, and destroy the enemy from Shanghai to the east and south. Flee and retreat, and cut off the enemy in the Jiashan area. The rest of the main force will control the area west of Qingpu and the Song [Song] River (not included) according to the aircraft. Default: 1. The Second Seventh Army should assemble in Jiashan on the evening of the 14th (if there are enemies, attack and wipe them out), and control the Dadongbang Iron Bridge, and monitor the enemies on the Song [Song] River and Qingpu.If the enemy withdraws (does escape), he should immediately advance to the area east of Qingpu and west of Sijing Town, and stand by to capture Shanghai along the south of Suzhou Creek. 2.The 20th Army should attack the enemies of Huipinghu and Jinshanwei on the 14th, and take control of a part to be handed over to the Sanyi Army to take over. After that, they will assemble south of the Song [Song] River and on the right bank of the Huangpu River.If the Song [Song] River enemy escapes, we should immediately control the Song [Song] River and wait for orders to attack the Old French Concession and its south and Nanshi along the railway. 3.The 3rd and 2nd Army should take over the defense of the 20th Army's Pinghu and Jinshanwei areas on the 15th, and close the enemy's escape route to the south in Shanghai. 4.The 30th Army should attack Fengxian, Nanhui, and Chuansha along Jiaxing, north of Jinshanwei, and the right bank of the Huangpu River, attack and annihilate the enemy in this area, firmly control the positions on this line, and cut off all escape routes of the enemy in Shanghai. Strive to occupy Chuansha on the evening of the 16th. The specific deployment of the above ministries shall be decided by Commander Song, Political Commissar Guo, and Chief of Staff Qin. (3) Battle demarcation line: the south of Suzhou Creek (excluding Wusong River) and Pudong belong to the Ninth Corps, and the north of Suzhou Creek (including) and Zhabei Wusong belong to the Tenth Corps. 3. After I have completed the occupation of Shanghai, I plan to use the 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies and the main force of the Special Column to be assigned to the command of Song Guo of the Ninth Corps to guard the urban area of ​​Shanghai, and the Special Column to guard the Wusong Fortress; The 28th Army is responsible for the tasks of Suzhou, Jiaxing, Jiashan, Tongxiang, Pingwang, Changshu, Kunshan, and Wujiang; Work tasks in Shui, Tonglu, Xindeng, Chongde, Haining, and Yuanhua; the Three First Army was responsible for the security of the Song [Song] River, Qingpu, Jinshanwei, Pinghu, Haiyan, and Zhapu; the Third Army was responsible for Chuansha and Nanhui , the security of Fengxian; the third and third armies are responsible for the security tasks of Baoshan, Wusong, Jiading, and Taicang (the specific tasks will be ordered separately at that time). 4. Matters needing attention: (1) After we advance into or capture a designated area, if the enemy breaks up or resolves it peacefully, our ministries should be divided into security divisions, and the 20th, 26th, and 27th armies should enter the urban area of ​​Shanghai, and the rest of the ministries should not enter Shanghai. When Shanghai was captured, except for the three armies serving as urban guards, the rest should withdraw from the urban area within 24 hours after the battle ended. (2) All ministries should educate the institutes to earnestly implement the provisions of the Ministry's May 8th telegram on guarding the city. this order Commander and Political Commissar Chen Yi Deputy Commander and Second Deputy Political Commissar Su Yu Deputy Political Commissar Tan Zhenlin Chief of Staff Zhang Zhen On May 10, 1949, at the headquarters of Suzhou City Song Shilun and Guo Huaruo, the chief military and political officials of the 9th Corps (also known as the Eastern Front Corps), convened the headquarters overnight to analyze the military situation and study the plan. On May 11, in the name of the commander, political commissar, and chief of staff (Qin Jian), A combat order was issued to all affiliated armies regarding the 9th Corps' occupation of Pudong and the capture of Shanghai on standby. The order stated: The vanguard division of the 27th Army (attached to the 20th Army Engineer Battalion) gathered at Jiangjiaqiao and its vicinity in the northeast of Jiaxing City on the 12th of this month, besieged Jiashan City on the evening of the 13th, and seized the Dadongbang Iron Bridge. The shade set in the area between Jing Town, Dadongbang Town and Zhangliantang Town is on standby.For example, when the Qingpu enemy flees, the army will advance to the Yinji area between Qingpu, Yujing Town, and Tianma Mountain, and wait for orders to cooperate with its neighbors to capture Shanghai. On the evening of the 12th of this month, the 18th Army of the 20th Army gathered at the 18th Li Bridge in the southeast of Jiaxing and its vicinity. On the evening of the 13th, it rushed to wipe out the enemies of Pinghu (with 1 regiment) and Jinshanwei, and covered the 30th Army's eastward advance. After succeeding, the 31st Army sent troops to take over, and the division moved to the right bank of the Huangpu River south of Songjiang, between Zhangze Town and Songyin Town. If they flee, the main force of the army will quickly occupy it, that is, they will gather near the place and wait for orders to capture Shanghai. The 30th Army (a platoon of engineers from the Lightly Armed Corps) assembled in the area between Chenhongbang, Yuxiandai, Wangdian Town, and Zhangjiaqiao in the south of Jiaxing City on the evening of the 12th. Attacking and advancing along the Wei, Fengxian, and Nanhui lines, the army should disregard everything and overcome all difficulties. If the enemy along the way (along the Nanhui and Jinshanwei section roads) resists stubbornly, it should be surrounded and monitored with a small number of troops (to be handed over to the 31st Army to wipe them out).The main detour is to capture Chuansha before the 17th, and is responsible for cutting off all the eastward escape routes of the Shanghai enemy, so as to block and annihilate the enemy fleeing from Songhu and its vicinity.On the evening of the 13th of this month, the 31st Army entered between Dongzha Town and Xinfeng Town in the southeast of Jiaxing, and then followed up with the 30th Army. In addition, the main force should be controlled in the areas of Zhujiaqiao (not included), Nanhui City, and Situan Town, and be responsible for annihilating the unkilled enemies of the 30th Army in Nanhui and Jinshanwei (not included), cutting off all escape routes for the Shanghai enemy in this direction, and Block and annihilate the enemy fleeing from Songhu to this direction, and pay attention to close contact with the 30th Army to achieve coordinated actions. From the above combat orders of the 9th Corps, it is not difficult to see that Song Shilun and Guo Huaruo deployed the troops on two wings of the headquarters. The 27th Army and the 20th Army were on the left wing. The 31st Army and the 31st Army were on the right wing, cutting through Pudong in a detour, dividing and annihilating the enemy. Announcement of the Chinese People's Liberation Army On May 8, the Sanye Frontline Headquarters moved from Changzhou to the beautiful ancient city of Suzhou.At this time, the general front committee and a large number of cadres preparing to take over Shanghai gathered in Danyang, a small city north of Changzhou. The military progress of the People's Liberation Army's cross-river campaign was a full month earlier than expected, but the preparations for taking over Shanghai could not keep up with such a fast pace.According to Nanjing's experience, if you rush into a big city without proper preparation, you will inevitably be in a very passive position. The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China just held in March warned the whole party: in the face of the coming victory, we must guard against arrogance in the party, the mood of self-proclaimed heroes, the mood of stopping and not seeking progress, and the desire to enjoy life and not want to live longer. The emotions of hard life; instruct the whole party to take over the basic principles of Jiangnan cities: we must wholeheartedly rely on the working class, unite with other laborers, win over intellectuals, and win as many national bourgeoisie as possible who can cooperate with us to stand on our side this side. Mao Zedong once said to Chen Yi with emotion: "Our entry into Shanghai is a difficult time for the Chinese revolution. It has the nature of the whole country and the whole world." Most of the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army come from poor areas. , did some inappropriate things.Therefore, before entering a metropolis like Shanghai to take over, it is very necessary to conduct special training. Instructions of the Party Committee directly under the East China Bureau of the CPC on carrying out ideological and political work before and after entering Shanghai (May 8, 1949) Instructions on Political Work Before and After Entering Shanghai A. Before entering Shanghai: 1. Continuously use various methods to carry out ideological education among all staff, so that all comrades understand that it is a glorious and great job for us to take over and station in Shanghai.We must obey the organization's distribution, happily and resolutely complete the tasks entrusted to us by the party, and prevent anarchy and discipline such as unwillingness or scrambling to take over the work, or not being satisfied with the original work.At the same time, we must realize that after entering the city, there will be many new problems before us. The work is great and difficult. Therefore, we must keep in mind what the Central Committee and Chairman Mao have repeatedly taught us, and we must continue to be modest, cautious, not arrogant, and not rash. , the style of hard work. Second, strengthen the discipline education of all personnel: a.The Importance of Discipline: The execution of discipline by government troops entering a city will directly affect the quality of the takeover work and the quality of the city’s revolutionary order. Although this issue has been emphasized many times in the past, it has been initially carried out to ensure the entry of government troops into the city. In the end, not only will there be no incidents of violating discipline [Xinziyan], but the revolutionary discipline of our party and our army will be used to influence the citizens, so that the urban revolutionary order can be quickly established. b.Materials for discipline education: 1.Announcements of the Chinese People's Liberation Army; 2.Three disciplines and eight points of attention; 3.Three conventions and twelve rules for entering the city; 4.5. Diplomatic discipline;Common sense of urban life and customs of urban people. c. Methods of discipline education: 1.Educate based on the fact that the troops violated discipline when they marched through the city, and other facts that may violate discipline in the city, combined with educational materials; 2.The mass education method is adopted, cadres conduct reading, discussion, review, etc., and soldiers mainly take classes.After the above-mentioned materials are completed, everyone can be mobilized to evaluate the qualifications for entering the city, and according to the specific conditions of the unit, make a contract for entering the city, challenge, etc.; 3.Take advantage of the marching breaks, gain time, use entertainment, individual conversations, etc. to educate. 3. Implement the takeover policy learning plan: a. Ordinary cadres should mainly study the reports of the political commissars. At the same time, they should still study the specific policies related to the takeover work of various departments, the general situation of Shanghai, and implement the study plans formulated by the party committees of various organs. b. In addition to studying the above documents, political cadres of various agencies must also study two documents: "Central Instructions on Treating Baojia Personnel in Newly Liberated Cities", "Central Instructions on Handling the KMT, the Three Youth League and Secret Service Organs". Fourth, pay attention to sorting out and improving the organization at any time.Due to our mission, on the one hand, many comrades must participate in the city takeover, and many comrades must stick to the original work, so there may be some transfers. In this way, we must always pay attention to adjusting the organization and improving the organization. First, we must strengthen and To enrich the leadership of the branch, the transfer of some personnel cannot affect the leadership role of the branch, and the team must also be organized in time.Secondly, such as the war committee (or club), group discipline inspection team, economic committee, entertainment team, etc. should also be sorted out or re-elected quickly. B. After entering Shanghai: 1. In addition to following the regulations of the real estate management committee to find a good house and distribute the house equipment, the front station or camp personnel should also deal with how to use the toilets, tap water, lights, telephones, doors and windows and other equipment in the house they live in. Those problems must be prevented. Understand clearly, educate the troops immediately before and after they enter the house, so as not to go wrong. 2. When entering Shanghai, all personnel must arrange their clothes. When walking on the street, they must follow the general rules of walking, and they must be orderly and energetic. 3. After entering the resident, they should abide by the rules of public housing, quickly learn to use and care for various utensils, and organize housework. 4. Immediately resume all kinds of work, study, and lecture systems, and are not allowed to go out casually.Those who have to go out have to ask for leave after approval, dress neatly, bring a pass from the Military Control Commission, ask about the way before going out, and return to the team on time to cancel the leave. 5. Pay attention to anti-rape and confidentiality work, increase vigilance, understand the political, economic and social conditions of the resident streets under the unified arrangement and leadership of the branch, and report the obtained materials quickly, but prohibit random arrests and beatings that violate the policy. 6. Propaganda can be carried out to the residents in the resident, explaining the eight chapters of the constitution announced by Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu, the three major disciplines and eight points of attention of our army, and the announcement of the Military Control Commission.When encountering new problems, you should ask your superiors for instructions, and you are not allowed to deal with them without authorization and express your opinions freely. 7. Slogans are not allowed. 8. Strictly guard against the growth of hedonic thoughts in the army. Even if there is a slight manifestation, it is necessary to pay attention to correction and education at any time, so as to maintain the hard and simple style of our party and our army. After receiving the above, I hope that all party committees and branches will study and implement it immediately!