Chapter 42 5. Make up your mind to play Jinzhou

The opinions of Mao Zedong and Lin Biao were unified, and the opinions of the Central Military Commission and the Northeast Bureau were unified. The main force of the Northeast Field Army will go south to the Beining line, and the sharp knife will be directed at Jinzhou. Make up your mind, hundreds of thousands of horses will move quickly.At that time, most of the main forces of the Northeast Field Army were not in South Manchuria, and a large amount of military rations had to be transported to the grain producing areas in North Manchuria.Before deciding to go south to the Beining line, in order not to be discovered by the enemy about our army's strategic intentions, our army has not been able to make a big move.Now if you want to move in quickly without letting the enemy notice as much as possible, the best mode of transportation can only be the railway.In this way, the burden of transporting people and military supplies fell on Lu Zhengcao, director of the Northeast Railway Administration.

The Northeast Railway General Administration and the Northeast Field Army Railway Column under the leadership of Lu Zhengcao immediately acted day and night.Under the general coordination of Li Fuchun, the logistics minister of the Northeast Military Region, more than 2,600 people were first organized by the railway column to rush to repair the railway, including the Songhua River Bridge between Harbin and Changchun and the tens of kilometers south of Fuxin. Even the sleepers were completely burned. ruined railway.In just over a month, the railway from Harbin to Qinghemen (Qinghemen is not far from Yixian, and Jinzhou is to the south of Yixian, which was still in the hands of the enemy) was fully repaired and opened to traffic.At the same time, 1244 wagons, carriages and a batch of locomotives were mobilized and necessary preparations were made.

Beginning on September 10, 1948, large-scale military transportation operations on the Northeast land were fully launched.At this time, the weapons and ammunition prepared by He Changgong, the minister of military industry, and the oil, military rations, military uniforms and other materials prepared by Li Jukui, the chief of staff of the logistics department, had filled countless wagons.According to statistics at the time, before the start of the decisive battle, 35 million kilograms of grain, more than 10,000 tons of oil, 10 million bullets, 200,000 artillery shells, 25,000 kilograms of explosives, and 150,000 hand grenades were prepared and delivered to the frontlines throughout the Northeast. , nearly 1 million sets of winter uniforms.

On August 29, the Northeast Field Army headquarters issued a combat mobilization order to each column and each independent division.In the mobilization order, the arrangement for the battle is: Besiege Changchun with part of the force, and move southward with the greatest force to advance to the Beining line. With the movement of raids, we will resolutely annihilate all the enemies scattered on the Beining line, cut off and destroy the connection between the Northeast enemy and North China, and make the two enemies close to each other. Completely trapped in hopeless isolation, and seek to lure the enemy of Changchun to break out of the siege, and annihilate the enemy during the breakout, thereby seeking to accelerate the early liberation of the entire Northeast.

While mobilizing the columns, Lin Biao telegraphed the Central Military Commission on August 24: "Our troops can be dispatched at the end of this month or the beginning of September. Around September 6, we can start operations in the cities along the Beining line." Call again for advice or supplements. On September 7, 1948, the day before the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was held in Xibaipo, Mao Zedong sent another telegram to the headquarters of the Northeast Field Army because Lin Biao and others from the Northeast could not come to Xibaipo to attend the meeting. In this telegram, Mao Zedong first stated that he was very happy that Lin Biao and others could agree with the Central Committee's opinions, "very good and very comforted."Then he told Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou the main spirit of the central meeting's discussion: "From July this year to June next year, we hope to wipe out about 115 brigades of the enemy's regular army. This number will be distributed among the field armies and corps." Finally, Specific requirements were put forward for the Northeast Field Army:

You are required to cooperate with the Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu corps to annihilate about 35 brigades of the Wei Lihuang and Fu Zuoyi armies, and capture all cities on the Beining, Pingsui, Pingcheng, and Pingbao lines except Beiping, Tianjin, and Shenyang.To achieve this goal, proper deployment and command of battles, and proper adjustment of combat rest are the decisive keys.If you can annihilate the enemy on the line from Jinzhou to Tangshan in September, December or a little longer, and conquer the points of Jinzhou, Yuguan (according to: Shanhaiguan), and Tangshan, you can achieve the goal of annihilating 18 enemy brigades .In order to annihilate these enemies, you should now prepare to use the main force on this line, disregarding the two enemies of Changchun and Shenyang, and prepare to annihilate the enemies who may be aided by Changchun and Shenyang when attacking Jinzhou.Because the Jin, Yu, and Tang points and their nearby enemies are isolated from each other, it is more reliable to attack and annihilate to win. ... If during your Jin, Yu, and Tang battles, the enemies of Chang and Shen poured out their nests to aid Jin, then you can continue to wipe out and aid the enemy without leaving the Jin, Yu, and Tang lines, and strive to put Wei Lihuang's entire army on the spot annihilate.This is the most ideal situation.Here you should pay attention to: (1) Establish the determination to capture the three points of Jin, Yu and Tang and fully control the line. (2) Establish your determination to fight your unprecedented war of annihilation, that is, dare to fight Wei Lihuang when the whole army comes to help him. (3) In order to adapt to the above two determinations, reconsider the combat plan and prepare the military supplies of the whole army (food, ammunition, recruits, etc.) and deal with the prisoners.

This is the requirement of the Central Military Commission for the Northeast War, and it is also the general blueprint for the war in the Northeast.This telegram has now been included in the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", which is the famous "Operation Policy on the Liaoshen Campaign". Lin Biao fully agreed with the deployment of the Central Military Commission at this time. On September 10, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou said in a telegram to the Central Committee: The main force of the Northeast is going south. As the future and tasks pointed out in the call, we may and should strive for a fundamental change in the situation in the Northeast and North China.In the Northeast, the enemy had to abandon Changchun, and because of our relationship with North China on the Beining line and the enemy's perception of the emptiness of the battlefields in Central China and the battlefields in Guanzhong, Shenyang was trapped in a blockade and starvation situation, so Shenyang also had to be abandoned in the end. , in order to save the situation in the pass.On the whole line of Beining (including Jinzhou, Tangshan, and Tianjin), as long as there is no fundamental change in the current enemy position (small changes are irrelevant, as long as there are no major changes), our troops can confidently attack any target on this line. Annihilate and seize.Only Jinzhou has slightly more enemies on this line, but the main force of this enemy is not many, and there are more new troops. As long as our army's attack can block the enemies going south from Jinzhou, especially the 54th Army south of Jinzhou, Then Jinzhou has become a target that can be seized with certainty.

Obviously, Lin Biao fully agreed with Mao Zedong's deployment at this time, and believed that it was "completely sure" to attack Jinzhou.It was not easy for Lin Biao to have such a change. It was the positive result of Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission's repeated and patient work.During this period, Mao Zedong sent Lin Biao telegrams, some sources said there were "more than 70 telegrams", and some sources said "83 telegrams"; the telegrams from Lin Biao to Mao Zedong were roughly the same. Lin Biao made the deployment of the main force of the Northeast Field Army in the early stage of the decisive battle: three verticals, four verticals, seven verticals, eight verticals, nine verticals, eleven verticals, two verticals and five divisions, Pao Zong, and several independent troops in the Jichareliao Military Region. The division and the cavalry division jointly attacked the Jinzhou-Tangshan section of the Beining line, cutting off the connection between the enemy in the Northeast and North China; Attack Shenyang who may come out to rescue the enemy in the direction of Jinzhou; the fifth and sixth columns are arranged between Shenyang and Changchun to prevent the enemy of Shenyang from sending aid to Changchun, and at the same time prepare to prevent the enemy of Changchun from breaking out.The twelve verticals and five independent divisions continued to besiege Changchun under the command of the commander of the First Corps Xiao Jinguang and political commissar Xiao Hua.

On September 12, 1948, the Northeast Field Army's second, third, sixth, and artillery units boarded secretly at Siping, Meihekou and other stations and drove southwest.They were the first large troops of the Northeast Field Army to go south from the north. Within 9 days, 64 consecutive military trains composed of locked boxcars were secretly dispatched, sending 100,000 main troops of our army to Fuxin and other places.Due to the careful organization of our army, the secrecy work was excellent, and even the railway employees along the way didn't know what was in the car, and the Kuomintang intelligence agency certainly failed to detect it.When our army suddenly had a large number of main forces appearing on the Beining Line battlefield, the enemy didn't know anything about it.