Chapter 43 6. Chiang Kai-shek is in a dilemma

Mao Zedong and Lin Biao were repeatedly arguing about how to fight the Northeast, and finally unified their opinions and formed a plan, and the battle is about to start. Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang are also arguing repeatedly, but their arguing is different from the above-mentioned ones. They are arguing about how to defend the Northeast.In the end, the arguments cannot be unified, and they will always be in a dilemma. Our Northeast Field Army is growing stronger and stronger, and will surely launch an even stronger attack on the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast. No one among the military and political personnel of the Kuomintang will doubt this.On this issue, the Chiang Kai-shek clique has no differences.However, they have great differences on how to deal with the current situation, with some advocating defense and some advocating withdrawal.Advocates of defense, of course, are using rhetoric such as "loyalty to the party and the country" to cover up the consequences of possible defeat, and such rhetoric is easy to hear.Those who advocate withdrawal are likely to be accused of cowardice and fear of death, so few people dare to speak out publicly.However, some people dared to say that it was not a senior member of the Kuomintang, but Badawi, the head of the U.S. Advisory Group in China who was more authoritative than the senior members of the Kuomintang. He formally proposed to Chiang Kai-shek in March 1948 that the Northeast should be abandoned. , the main force withdrew from the northeast.He said:

"Convinced of the futility of continuing to cling to the isolated cities of Manchuria. The isolated cities of Shenyang and Changchun cannot be supplied endlessly by air." Of course, Chiang Kai-shek has carefully considered this opinion, and he also understands the full rationality of this opinion.However, for Chiang Kai-shek, this completely correct opinion in the eyes of military strategists was unacceptable in terms of political strategy.Because there were several political factors that strongly influenced Chiang Kai-shek's decision at the time: (1) Chiang Kai-shek is busy convening the "National Assembly" and "executing the Constitution". He wants to realize his dream of "President of the Republic of China".Whether in front of the Chinese, or in front of the Americans who are more important to him, he must maintain an image of authority, capability, assurance, and confidence.At this time, there was already a discussion in the United States that China "needs an inspirational leader, and this seems to be something that Chairman Jiang cannot do".Under such circumstances, if he wants to continue to maintain his status as a dictator in China and become president smoothly, he must not abandon the Northeast.

(2) The general election in the United States is about to begin, which will also have a great impact on Chiang Kai-shek.Although the Truman administration in the United States has given Chiang Kai-shek a lot of assistance over the past few years, the Truman administration has a lot of dissatisfaction with Chiang Kai-shek, often criticizing Chiang Kai-shek and issuing some embarrassing instructions for Chiang Kai-shek.For this reason, Chiang Kai-shek sent a "Moral Restructuring Committee" headed by Chen Lifu to the United States and spent a lot of effort to carry out activities in all walks of life, hoping that the Democratic Truman administration would step down and the Republican candidate Dewey would come to power.If he abandons the Northeast at this time, whether Truman stays in office or Dewey comes to power, it will not do him any good.

(3) From a military point of view, if the Northeast is abandoned, hundreds of thousands of troops from the Northeast Field Army will inevitably enter the pass.And if Shenyang and Changchun can hold the Northeast, they can drag hundreds of thousands of Northeast field troops into the customs. It is precisely based on the above considerations that Chiang Kai-shek must hold on to Shenyang and Changchun for a period of time no matter what, as long as he can.But he is also very clear that if the Northeast Field Army is going to fight, the Northeast cannot be defended. Sooner or later, some elites he has trapped in the Northeast will be ruined, so he is always trying to keep his strength in military strength. A little capital.Therefore, in terms of commanding the Northeast War situation, as long as possible, he tried to move his main force to North China and transfer it to North China.All in all, Chiang Kai-shek has fallen into the dilemma of wanting to defend but not wanting to withdraw when considering the situation in the Northeast.

As the top military and political officer of the Kuomintang government in Northeast China, Wei Lihuang had the same and different considerations as Chiang Kai-shek.Those who are the same, speaking from an overall consideration, believe that the Northeast cannot be withdrawn and must be defended. If there is no such consensus, Chiang Kai-shek will not let him take on this important task.But on many specific issues, the two have considerable differences.First of all, Wei Lihuang was unwilling to withdraw his troops into the pass anyway.As one of the few second-level generals of the Kuomintang, because Chiang Kai-shek refused to let him lead troops for a long time, he has been a polished commander with only high positions but no strength for many years.Now that he finally has soldiers and power in the Northeast, he is not willing to give up easily.Secondly, in order to prevent the Northeast Field Army from entering the pass, and to allow his main force to retreat to the pass in case of crisis, Chiang Kai-shek has always advocated withdrawing the main force of the Kuomintang army in the Northeast to the Jinzhou area. Escape from sea or land.But Wei Lihuang disagreed with this arrangement.First, he was afraid of being eaten or smashed by the Northeast Field Army when the troops were moving, and second, he was afraid that if the troops stationed in the Jinzhou area retreated when they could not win the battle, he would lose all his power and have to fight against the enemy. Take the blame for Chiang Kai-shek's loss of the Northeast.Therefore, he advocated that the three points in the northeast, namely Shenyang, Changchun, and Jinzhou, should be guarded.

I would rather be conservative and prudent than take any risks.The main force must be placed in Shenyang, controlled by him, and mobilized by him. In addition to differences in overall consideration of the Northeast War situation, the personal relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang was also very abnormal.Chiang Kai-shek pushed Wei Lihuang up when he couldn't find a more suitable candidate.Wei Lihuang bit the bullet to clean up the mess when he had been out of work for a long time and no one dared to pick up the mess in the Northeast.Jiang didn't fully believe in Wei. Deep in his heart, he regarded Wei as a non-directed lineage (the key here is that Wei Lihuang was not born in Huangpu). Don't worry, he often bypassed Wei Lihuang and directly commanded the relevant corps or even Directly commanding the relevant armies and divisions made Wei Lihuang, the commander-in-chief, at a loss as to what to do.Wei Lihuang didn't trust Chiang Kai-shek even more, knowing that Chiang didn't trust him, and would throw him out as a scapegoat or scapegoat when necessary, so he was unwilling to follow Chiang Kai-shek's opinions everywhere.After Wei Lihuang went to the Northeast, Chiang Kai-shek went to Shenyang, Chiang Kai-shek sent Gu Zhutong and others to Shenyang, and ordered Wei Lihuang to go to Nanjing several times, but they couldn't talk about it.Some things even reached the point where no one would do them.

For example, through his relationship with the United States, Wei Lihuang got the United States to agree to transport the American equipment that aided the 10 divisions of the Jiang army in the Northeast directly to Yingkou, and the Northeast "Suppression General" received them.However, when Chiang Kai-shek knew about it, he believed that Wei Lihuang had exceeded his authority, and he was determined not to allow it. He demanded that it must be transported to Nanjing first, and Nanjing would arrange it. This matter was very tense, and the head of the American advisory group, Badawi, was afraid that the equipment would be embezzled, sold or used for other purposes by the Nanjing side (the main purpose of the United States’ willingness to aid the Kuomintang army was to use the Kuomintang’s forces to deal with the expansion of the Soviet Union. ), but it is inconvenient for several parties to fall out, dragging and pushing, pushing and pushing, this batch of equipment has not been able to be shipped to China.

This kind of disagreement between Chiang Kai-shek and Wei Lihuang existed from Wei Lihuang's arrival in the Northeast to his complete failure in the Northeast. The two were in conflict and friction.In several subsequent developments, we have been able to clearly see that it was this kind of contradiction and friction that contributed to the disastrous defeat of the Kuomintang army in the Northeast.