Chapter 41 4. Mao Zedong severely criticized Lin Biao

When Mao Zedong saw the overall situation and the big picture, he saw the game of Jinzhou, and he did not change his determination. After ordering the North China Corps to cooperate with the Northeast, he continued to put the burden on Lin Biao and insisted that Lin Biao "" "Close the door and beat the dog", eating up all the 550,000 Kuomintang troops in the Northeast.In the telegram to Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan on July 22, Mao Zedong already criticized: "Don't talk too much about the difficult conditions of the southward march, so that you mentally restrict yourself and lose your initiative." In the telegram on July 30, Mao Zedong pointed out more clearly:

"About your new battle plan, I think you should first consider fighting against Jinzhou and Tangshan. As long as possible, you should attack Jinzhou and Tangshan, and wipe out all or most of the Fan Hanjie Group." Under Mao Zedong's clear instructions, Lin Biao could not oppose the correct decision of the Central Committee, nor could he reject the correct deployment of the Central Committee, but he was still full of doubts.In the telegram to the Central Committee on August 1, he once again expressed his lack of confidence in attacking Jinzhou. He said: "Jinzhou often has six or seven divisions, and the urban construction has been completed, so we do not plan to attack Jinzhou. But the enemy If reinforcements come out, and most of them are wiped out during the reinforcements, then of course we can take advantage of the victory and attack Jinzhou. But according to the experience of fighting near Shenyang last winter, the enemy dare not come out to reinforce.” This kind of doubt was raised by Mao Zedong After the denial, Lin Biao stated in his telegram on August 8 that he would wait for the actions of the Yang Chengwu Corps in North China; In short, he has to do a good job of preparation.Therefore, "at present, the dispatch time is still uncertain."Under such circumstances, Mao Zedong drew up a telegram at 6 a.m. on the 12th, added "AAAA", that is, sent it as "urgent", and severely criticized Lin Biao:

Regarding the possibility of the enemy withdrawing from the Northeast to Central China, we told you before you had finished your winter operations. We hope that you must seize this group of enemies. If the enemy moves in large numbers from the Northeast to Central China, it will be extremely detrimental to the Central China Operation.Regarding the fact that you must prepare food in advance when you go south, you were also instructed to work hard to prepare two months ago.In the past two months, you have not said a word whether you have carried out our instruction. According to the phone call, it seems that this preparation work has not been carried out in the past two months, so that the army is now without food and cannot move forward.And the reason why you can't decide the date of dispatch is that in the past few days, you have placed several calls in succession on the enemy's situation.You telegraphed at 19 o'clock on the 6th, although you mentioned the food problem, but you said, "If the dispatch time of Yang Chengwu's troops can be brought forward, then our dispatch time can also be brought forward."In your telegram at 17 o'clock on the 8th, you did not mention the food problem at all, but said that the enemy's situation was serious, and concluded: "The time for the main operation in the Northeast will depend on the action of Yang Chengwu's troops sooner or later." You should take the enemy's situation in the south too seriously, especially you should not take the actions of Yang Chengwu's troops as your standard of action, and at the same time, after the time of Yang Chengwu's actions has been determined (Note: Mao Zedong told Lin Biao in his telegram on August 9 that Yang Chengwu The Chengwu Ministry decided to dispatch on August 21), but you said (less than three days apart) that "the sooner or later Yang Chengwu Ministry's actions will never be used as the criterion", and it was attributed to the food problem.For yourselves, you must be considerate of the enemy's situation, food, and rain gear. For Yang Chengwu's troops, everything seems to be no problem.Let me ask you that your dispatch is far away, and the solitary army of this department was sent out early. Fu Zuoyi had little concern in the east, and used great aid to Sui (note: referring to the former Suiyuan Province, which is in the western part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region today) to drive Yang Chengwu away, and returned to Sui. To deal with Yang Luo from the east (note: referring to the Second Corps of the North China Field Army of Yang Dezhi and Luo Ruiqing) and you, as in April this year, what benefit will it have on the battle situation?It is very wrong for you to adopt such a rash attitude towards Yang Chengwu's department.Judging the enemy's situation on the Beining line, judging from your recent telegrams, it also appears to be very hasty.For the sake of your prudence, the above is pointed out to you.If you do not agree with these points, you are expected to submit rebuttals.

According to comrades who are quite familiar with our army's military history materials, during the entire liberation war, Mao Zedong's telegrams criticizing subordinates were the most severe in attitude and tone.Especially for senior cadres such as Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou (at that time, Mao Zedong's telegrams to the Northeast Field Army were usually signed in the names of "Lin, Luo, and Liu" because they were the commander, political commissar, and chief of staff at the time). , Telegrams with such an attitude can be said to be "unprecedented and unprecedented" among all existing telegrams.It can be considered that Mao Zedong was really angry and couldn't bear it anymore.On the other hand, it can also be seen from this telegram that Mao Zedong's determination and boldness at this time are great, his concern for the Northeast War situation is deep, and his sustenance is heavy, otherwise this would not be possible.

Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou were all old subordinates of Mao Zedong, and they all came from the Fourth Red Army. Of course, they understood the weight of Mao Zedong's telegram.The next day, they sent a very long telegram to Mao Zedong, admitting that they believed some inaccurate news about the enemy's situation on the Beining line (for example, they heard about the The Ninety-Fourth Army and the New Eighth Army's reinforcements), made a wrong judgment, and stated that they must go south and "do their best to get dispatched as soon as possible."They also explained the situation realistically in the telegram. Due to the unprecedented flood in 50 years in the Northeast this summer, the railway and bridge were destroyed, and the railway could not be repaired until August 25 to Fuxin.Now the large troops must rely on the railway to go south quickly. Therefore, the troops will start to go south at the end of August.

After seeing this telegram, Mao Zedong finally breathed a sigh of relief. The Northeast Field Army went south to the Beining line, and it was not finally decided until now.