Chapter 40 3. Whether to go south and how to go south

Changchun was besieged, and Wei Lihuang of Shenyang was afraid of being fooled by "siege the city and fight for aid", so he never considered sending troops to rescue.In this way, the main force of the Northeast Field Army basically has no battles to fight.It is uncomfortable for the soldiers to have no battle to fight, not to mention that the battlefield in the pass is in full swing. After nearly two dull months, the Northeast Bureau believes that it is still necessary to go south to fight, otherwise it will be difficult to break the deadlock.If Changchun is attacked now, judging from Wei Lihuang's attitude towards Changchun, he may not only not save Changchun, but may also withdraw the army into the pass according to the opinion put forward by the head of the US military advisory group, Badawi.Therefore, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou made consecutive reports to the Central Military Commission on July 20 and 22: "Recently, the Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau has rediscussed the issue of operations. Everyone believes that it is better for our army to go south to fight, and it is not appropriate to force it." And passively attack Changchun." Mao Zedong was very happy after receiving the telegram from the northeast, and said to himself repeatedly: "Lin Biao is finally going south."

In the middle of the night on the 22nd, after reading the call from Lin Biao and others that day, Mao Zedong immediately replied to the Northeast Bureau to express his agreement. Mao Zedong said: There are various favorable conditions for fighting in the south. The more our army advances to the enemy's rear, the more the enemy's stronghold hanging behind us will be forced to weaken or retreat. This truth has been proved by the entire southern front.Since we are not sure about attacking Changchun, we can and should stop this plan and change it to a plan to fight south in advance. Going south is a direction of action.Under this general direction, how to determine the specific campaign goals has become a very important issue.On this issue, Mao Zedong and Lin Biao had another disagreement.

According to the memoirs of many old comrades who worked with Lin Biao in the past, Lin Biao's head was born for war, and he almost only wanted to fight all day long.Regarding the decision of the army going south now, he thought for a long time before making up his mind.How to fight after going south, he has also thought about it.He is not going to fight Jinzhou, but to fight the weaker Yixian, Jinxi, Xingcheng, Shanhaiguan, and then Chengde.why?Because the troops in these cities are not strong, he has always had the shadow of the Siping fortified battle that has been difficult to erase for a long time in his mind. Troops suffered too much loss.More importantly, Jinzhou itself has 150,000 people from Fan Hanjie, and nearby Fu Zuoyi in North China has nearly 600,000 people. In addition, Wei Lihuang from Shenyang has also been suppressed. If you escape on the road, you must save Jinzhou), our army may be flanked and surrounded.As a commander, he was very careful.This kind of caution is an important feature of Lin Biao's command of operations.That is to say, after the start, he will desperately fight for time, fight for speed, bite and tear the enemy to death.But before the start, he was asked to make up his mind, but he was extremely cautious and thought twice.It can be said that this is a concrete manifestation of the word "slow" in the "four fast and one slow" tactics he advocated in himself.

Mao Zedong and Lin Biao thought differently.In Xibaipo Village, Mao Zedong took a comprehensive view of the overall situation, and he was unconstrained, with a lofty ambition and a grandeur that Lin Biao was far behind. The main consideration in his heart for the Northeast battlefield was that hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops must be wiped out in the Northeast. The entry of 100,000 troops increased the pressure on North China and the Central Plains, delaying the progress of the War of Liberation.Mao Zedong believed that the 1 million Northeast Army is fully capable of eating up 550,000 enemy troops.If these 550,000 enemy troops are not to be wiped out by the Northeast Field Army, who will be handed over to them?Therefore, on the one hand, Mao Zedong called Lin Biao many times, asking him to arrange an attack on Jinzhou; Let Fu Zuoyi's forces have the possibility to support outside the customs, and don't let Lin Biao's pressure be too great.This is called "strike in the Northeast, lead in North China".In order to accomplish this task, Mao Zedong and other five secretaries of the Central Committee specially received Nie Rongzhen and Yang Chengwu on August 3 and made specific arrangements.

Why did Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission insist that Lin Biao fight Jinzhou?This point will be understood as long as we open the map. There are two roads connecting the west of Liaoning and North China. One is through Chaoyang to Chengde. Most of this area is wilderness and desert.It is impossible for the Kuomintang army to pass through here with a large force. The other is the Liaoxi Corridor, a traditional channel connecting the inside and outside of the customs. The Beining line passes through it. There are not only railways, but also highways and seaports (at this time Qinhuangdao and Huludao were still in the hands of the Kuomintang army). The only way for mechanized troops to enter and exit was also the only way on land to obtain supplementary supplies at that time.Jinzhou is in the key part of the West Liaoning Corridor.From Du Yuming, Chen Cheng to Wei Lihuang, they all saw this clearly, and they all regarded controlling Jinzhou as the key to controlling the Northeast.If our army can capture the Jinzhou area, the Liaoxi Corridor will be cut off by our army. The hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops in the Northeast will have no way to escape, and the Kuomintang troops in North China will not be able to go out to support.In this way, our army can "close the door and beat dogs" in the Northeast.Therefore, for the entire northeast war situation, Jinzhou has become a strategic hub, which has the effect of affecting the whole body.Of course, the enemy also understands this point. If we want to "close the door and beat the dog", the enemy must try to open the door, or open the door to escape, or encircle us.Playing Jinzhou is a wonderful move, but also a dangerous move. It requires the strength to close the gate, and the strength to prevent the enemy from opening the gate after closing the gate.It was by no means that Lin Biao did not understand, but he was afraid of not having enough strength and being surrounded by enemy troops attacking from both sides.

When Mao Zedong talked with Nie Rongzhen and Yang Chengwu on August 3, when he deployed the task of "fighting in the Northeast and leading in North China", Yang Chengwu had a deep feeling. Yang Chengwu said: Chairman Mao has a lot of opportunities every day, and every battlefield in the country needs his painstaking efforts. It is really the so-called strategic planning that wins a decisive victory thousands of miles away.He not only explained the tasks to his subordinates, but also thought through the difficulties of carrying out the tasks for his subordinates.He knows the situation so well, all the battlefields in the country are like a game of chess, all in his hands.