Chapter 376 2. The establishment of the policy of large roundabout and large encirclement

Liberating Guangdong is a task clearly assigned to the Fourth Field Army by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission, but the formation of a specific combat plan has gone through a process. From May to early July 1949, in a series of telegrams to the four fields, the Military Commission gave several instructions on the issue of marching into Guangdong. When the Yisha and Hunan-Jiangxi campaigns were about to end, Mao Zedong had further considerations about solving the Guangdong issue. On July 16, he telegraphed Lin Biao, Deng Zihui and other commanders in the four fields to follow the overall deployment of Bai Chongxi's troops with a large-scale roundabout and encirclement policy, and pointed out: "Guangdong only has more than 40,000 broken and incomplete enemy troops. I have a guerrilla force of more than 40,000 people, and I only need two armies plus Zengsheng's two small divisions to solve the Guangdong problem. At most three armies plus Zengsheng's troops are enough. Send more troops."

However, in the supplementary message to Lin, Deng and others the next day, Mao Zedong put forward new opinions on marching into Guangdong: "Chen Geng's three armies and the two armies of the 15th Corps were led by Chen Geng through Ganzhou, Nanxiong, and Shixing South." Advance, prepare to occupy Guangzhou in 3 months, and then the two armies of the 15th Corps will cooperate with the armed forces of the South China Branch and the Zeng Sheng column to be responsible for managing the entire province of Guangdong." Regarding the above-mentioned opinions of the Central Military Commission, the Fourth Field Army stated: "I agree with the telegram on the 17th, and act in accordance with the instructions" (July 19, 1949 Lin Biao, Deng Zihui, Xiao Ke, Zhao Erlu to the Central Military Commission and Liu Bocheng et al. telegraph).

Liu Bocheng, Zhang Jichun, Li Da and others also called the Central Military Commission on the 18th: After discussion, they fully agreed with the deployment of the Central Military Commission on the 17th. "First, from a strategic point of view, Chen Geng's roundabout attack from Jiangxi to Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan is extremely necessary in the current situation where the enemy is weak and we are strong and the two sides are distributed. Second, the white bandits and the bandits on both sides In the case of separation without retreating to Guangdong, Guangdong can be obtained in this way, and Guangdong will leave Guangxi as early as possible, turning around the White Bandit's right and back, and cooperating with our North Route Army. The pincer maneuver of the battle made it impossible for the White Bandits to resist steadily Thirdly, Chen Geng took the opportunity to travel southward to Guangdong very smoothly, which could not only avoid cross-movement friction with the allied forces in western Hunan, but also reduce the difficulties of food and roads, and facilitate the four armies to immediately gather in Ji'an and Anfu areas to stand by. "

So far, the operational policy of great detour and great encirclement has finally been established.