Chapter 31 2. Peng Dehuai's real intention

After the start of the armistice negotiations, the United States did not give up its hegemony policy. Although the battlefield between the two sides was relatively calm for a while, the United States refused to use the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line, especially the stubborn refusal to include the issue of withdrawing all foreign troops. A stalemate ensued because of the inclusion of the agenda. In view of this, Peng Dehuai called Li Kenong, Deng Hua, and Xie Fang at 10:00 on July 16 to further analyze and elaborate on the current negotiation principles and operational principles.Fully estimated that our side may encounter many difficulties in the prospect of insisting on the 38th parallel and withdrawing troops, and believed that serious military struggles were still needed. "Only two or three more major military victories can make the enemy overcome difficulties Retreat." Stressed that "the military policy is still actively preparing for a protracted war, and there should be no relaxation or wavering in the slightest until the withdrawal of foreign troops in North Korea is realized."At the same time, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army were informed about the education and specific preparations for the sixth campaign tactical exercise, further unifying the idea of ​​promoting talks through fighting.

On this basis, Peng Dehuai called Mao Zedong on July 24 about organizing a counterattack to cooperate with the negotiations.After analysis, Peng Dehuai believes that US imperialism is in a state of contradiction. "I have a few more victorious battles, fighting to the south of the 38th parallel, and then withdrawing to the 38th parallel as the boundary for peace talks, gradually withdrawing foreign troops in North Korea in proportion, insisting on rationality and discipline, and through complicated struggles, to strive for peace. may still exist."Then he proposed, "We (the army) will try to complete the preparations for the counterattack in mid-August. If the enemy does not attack, it will be held until September. It is best to wait for the enemy to attack, and I will rely on the position to attack."

On July 26, Mao Zedong replied in a telegram agreeing with Peng Dehuai's opinion, pointing out: Whether the enemy really wants to cease fighting and negotiate a peace can be determined after the Kaesong Conference is held a few more times.Before the armistice agreement is signed and the war has not really stopped, it is absolutely necessary for our army to actively prepare for the September offensive. After the armistice negotiations entered into specific discussions on the issue of the military demarcation line, when the U.S. representatives became more arrogant and made no concessions, on July 31, Deng Hua, the Volunteer Army negotiator, and Xie Fang called Peng Dehuai, suggesting that "negotiations require the cooperation of combat victories, and Military preparations for a rupture are required...The campaign preparations should be completed before August 15 (Sunday), and it is advisable to prepare for a counterattack after the rupture within August....If the negotiations are still continuing, it is best to take advantage of the enemy's attack To strike forcefully,...or I will launch a regional initiative to attack the enemy. In short, negotiations need a political offensive, especially the combination of victory in battle is more beneficial."

On August 1, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai, giving principled instructions and asking questions about the deployment of troops and grain and ammunition reserves for the September campaign.Under such circumstances, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao Zedong on August 8 the operational intentions and actions of the sixth campaign based on Mao Zedong's instructions, combined with the analysis and judgment of the enemy's situation, and the preparations for the Volunteer Army and the People's Army to conduct tactical exercises and education and specific work. Basic idea: In the next battle, regardless of attack or counterattack, prepare for continuous fierce fighting for 20 days to one month.If our frontline casualties are serious and we can no longer continue to fight, we will send the five armies of the second echelon, seven armies of the 20th and 39th armies, and two armies of the People's Army into battle in due course, and continue the offensive for another month.I can last two months of continuous attacks, breaking my previous short attacks of six to seven days.Consuming about 40,000 enemies per month, it seems likely that the U.S. imperialists will succumb and seek peace, and withdraw foreign troops in North Korea with the 38th parallel as the boundary.At the same time, we are still fighting for a long time.The key to the campaign is the timely replenishment of materials and soldiers, and it is not known whether the rear can meet the requirements.

On August 17, Peng Dehuai issued a combat order to the troops in the name of Zhisi and Liansi, and reported it to Kim Il Sung, the Central Military Commission, and the Northeast Military Region.The operational preorder, namely the "Sixth Battle Predetermined Plan", is slightly different from the basic idea on August 8, and its basic deployment is as follows: The eight armies of the first echelon of the Volunteer Army used the three armies of the 19th Corps to contain the enemy from Cheorwon to the west bank of the Imjin River, cut off the road from Cheorwon to Uijung, and resolutely prevented the enemy south of Cheorwon from going north for reinforcements; 47 and 42 The two armies surrounded and wiped out the US 3rd Division in the Cheorwon area.

With the 26th Army and the 20th Corps, except for each one to contain the enemy in front of us, concentrate the main force to break through, and then annihilate the 25th Division (two regiments) of the United States and the 2nd South Korean Army in the eastern and western areas of Jinhua as appropriate. division. The second echelon of the Volunteer Army, the three armies of the 3rd Corps, and the 38th and 40th Armies, a total of five armies, marched to the designated location after the start of the campaign, and entered into combat as appropriate to continue to expand the results of the battle.

The four corps of the People's Army were divided into two battles to cooperate with the volunteers from the east of the North Han River to the east coast. The pre-order requires all attacking units to complete full preparations for continuous in-depth battles before September 10, and the corps and army to study specific combat plans before August 25.The various ministries serving as the second echelon of the campaign made plans to advance before the 28th according to the distance.It is also required that the 9th Corps (owing to the 26th Army) should be prepared to respond to the 7th Corps of the People's Army in Wonsan and the main force on the southern front at any time.It is also clear that the allocation of special forces will be issued with supplementary orders.

After the preparatory order was issued, Peng Dehuai consulted the opinions of leaders at all levels.After Peng Dehuai received Deng Hua's and Xie Fang's opinions on the operational plan on August 20 and 22 respectively, he replied to Deng Hua and Xie Fang on August 24, further clarifying the intention of the campaign. Peng Dehuai said in the message: "The preparatory order on the 17th is to mobilize the entire army and actively prepare for combat, rather than specific deployment." In the area west of Hantancheon and the enemy's oblique position, the 3rd Division and the Turkish Brigade have about 230,000 troops.In fact, the 19th Corps only contained and blocked the 1st US Cavalry Division, the Commonwealth Division, and the 1st Division of the South Korean Army.The first part of the 26th Army held back the front of Jinhua North, and the main force detoured to the southwest of Jinhua to separate the connection between the 25th Division and the 3rd Division of the United States.After the main force of the 20th Corps opened the gap from the 2nd Division of the South Korean Army, it blocked or delayed the reinforcements of the 24th and 7th US Divisions.If the enemy in the Cheorwon area is wiped out and the enemy in the Jinhua area may be in chaos, the 26th Army and the 20th Corps can take advantage of the situation to wipe out part or most of the 25th Division of the United States and the 2nd Division of the South Korean Army; Enter the battle with the 15th Army and annihilate the enemies in the Jinhua area.The above is the real attempt of the first step plan for the next campaign.It also takes into account the conditions that the twenty-two regiments of the Air Force are preparing to enter the battle in early September.Therefore, the plan to wipe out the enemy in the first step of the campaign may be completed.If only one part of the first step plan is completed, or even can't be moved at all, when the attack takes six to seven days, it is planned to retreat the frontline troops in turn to lure the enemy to attack. From the south of Kang, Penglai Lake and Pinganchuan to the Anxia position (the 42nd and 26th armies withdrew to Yudongli and Jianbuli as the reserve), the 19th Corps and the 47th Corps also defended Shuoning and Jiuhua The first line of defense north of Ri and Kaesong attracted the enemy to attack. When the casualties were exhausted to a certain extent, I concentrated the 38th and 40th armies, a total of 100,000 people, and attacked from their flanks, seeking to wipe out two enemy divisions. Force, beat the enemy back to the 38th parallel.

Previously, in order to strengthen the tactical exercise education of the units preparing to participate in counterattack operations, the Volunteer Army Command forwarded the 64th Army's breakthrough education on July 29, so as to promote the scientific organization of the units, correct teaching, and practical training. Improve the effect.The next day, in the name of the joint division, the 3rd Corps notified the establishment of the tactical research meeting and its activities to all units to "handle in accordance with it."According to Zhisi's instructions, the Volunteer Artillery issued a mobile artillery adjustment plan, requiring adequate preparations and hoarding of oil, bombs and food, actively cooperating with the troops in reconnaissance of a campaign nature, and earnestly understanding the enemy's situation and road conditions in the intended attack direction.In order not to make the 20th Corps, which had just entered the DPRK, repeat the lessons learned by other armies in the past, Zhisi not only ordered its senior cadres at all levels to go to the positions of the 26th and 27th Corps to conduct research first, but also to enable the Corps to gain initial experience in defensive warfare. , It is planned to order it to arrive in the south of Huaiyang in mid-August to take over the defense of the 27th Army.Zhisi also put forward preliminary opinions on the use of troops by the 9th Corps to participate in the Sixth Battle.

In order to mobilize the whole army and actively prepare for the battle, the Political Department of the Volunteer Army issued the political work instructions for the sixth campaign on August 21.According to the characteristics of the sixth campaign and the actual ideological situation of the troops, the directive put forward specific requirements for the ideological mobilization and political work before the campaign to be infiltrated into various preparations, and to ensure the uninterrupted attack and battle: First of all, it is necessary to summarize the training of the troops after the five campaigns, the preparations for the new campaign, especially the ideological education.Praise those who study hard, humbly review experience and lessons and make rapid progress, and thoroughly criticize those who have peaceful illusions, perfunctory and various incorrect thoughts and emotions.

On this basis, carry out a general and in-depth ideological mobilization of the campaign, so that everyone understands that fighting this campaign well is of great significance both in terms of military and political aspects, and thus thoroughly exposes the conspiracy and tricks of the US imperialists in the recent peace negotiations , Inspire the high righteous indignation and determination of all commanders and fighters to kill the enemy, mobilize everyone to formulate individual and collective meritorious plans, and strive for the complete victory of this battle. Emphasize that political work must coordinate with relevant business departments to fully plan and prepare food, ammunition, and communication equipment.Call out the slogan "Everything is for the front line", mobilize everyone to overcome difficulties and overcome difficulties, and ensure that the most difficult transportation work can be successfully completed in the section close to the front line. Unimpeded; fully study mine-sweeping, barbed wire and other techniques and various tactical actions in the attack, assist the commander and logistics agencies to inspect, supervise, and summarize and exchange experience in a timely manner. In order to ensure continuous and uninterrupted attacks, instructions and calls, combat troops must have a high degree of tenacity, organize while fighting, and command uninterrupted; try to organize non-combatant personnel to assist medical personnel and stretcher personnel, and try to rescue the wounded; Military democracy, at the same time, it is necessary to educate the troops to resolutely carry out orders; everyone should do the work of the enemy army, and strictly implement the captive policy to disintegrate the enemy army; it is necessary to promote class friendship and unite friendly and neighboring troops, especially to be considerate of the short formation time of the special forces and the lack of actual combat experience To deal with difficulties, educate the troops not to complain or embarrass them, and create conditions for them to enhance the emotions between infantry and special forces and achieve the goal of joint arms operations. After the Joint Division's preparation order for the sixth campaign was issued, each unit of the Volunteer Army combined with their respective combat tasks to further strengthen the material and spiritual preparations for combat, strengthen tactical and technical drills, and further increase the enthusiasm of the troops for training.At the same time, all corps and armies carefully studied and formulated combat action plans and marching plans in accordance with the pre-orders, and reported them to the Joint Division on time.The People's Army also studied the intentions of its superiors and the situation of the enemy and ourselves in detail, and formulated a specific combat plan and submitted it to the Joint Division.