Chapter 32 3. Opinions of Zhou Enlai and others

The plan for the sixth campaign is based on the idea of ​​fighting to promote talks, so the timing, scale, and especially the effect of fighting will definitely affect the solution of the North Korean issue. After Mao Zedong received Peng Dehuai's telegram on August 8, he issued an order on August 10 to "please Zhou and Nie Xun to gather and study immediately and put forward their opinions."According to Mao Zedong's instructions, on the night of the 10th, Zhou Enlai invited Nie Rongzhen, Acting Chief of the General Staff, Liu Yalou, Commander of the Air Force, Chen Xilian, Commander of the Artillery, Yang Lisan, Director of the General Logistics Department, and Li Tao, Director of the Operations Department of the General Staff, to study Peng Dehuai's call and discuss the next step. plan.Everyone analyzed the situation that it was the rainy season in North Korea, it was difficult to transport food and ammunition, and the air force was not yet ready and could not be dispatched to cooperate in operations. They also considered the practical factors of launching a big fight due to the inconvenience of peace talks, and agreed that no matter from the military Or from a political point of view, September is not suitable for a big fight, but "it is beneficial to step up preparations and delay the launch of a big fight."

On the morning of the 11th, Zhou Enlai reported the discussion to Mao Zedong in writing.The airfield for the Air Force's participation in the war was not yet ready. The Central Military Commission decided to postpone the Air Force's participation in the war until November. Stalin's opinion had not yet been answered, so the above research opinion was not notified to Peng Dehuai in time. After receiving the combat plan issued by Peng Dehuai on August 17, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram from the Central Military Commission to Peng Dehuai and reported to Gao Gang; after being reviewed and revised by Mao Zedong, it was sent on August 19.The telegram put forward specific opinions on the current operational policy and the issue of preparing for the sixth campaign without fighting.

The Central Military Commission first stated in the message that due to the lack of airfields directly used by our air force in North Korea, the Central Military Commission considers that the air force will not be able to launch operations until November. Therefore, the current combat policy of our army must be reconsidered from all aspects.The analysis then pointed out: Regarding the North Korean negotiations, the enemy only intends to achieve a military truce without hindering his policy of world tension. Therefore, he opposes the 38th parallel as the dividing line, and the political reasons are stronger than the military reasons.Its delay in negotiations is an attempt to force me to make concessions on the one hand, and on the other hand it is to delay the San Francisco meeting and facilitate the Congress to pass the budget and increase taxes.The enemy dares to delay like this, naturally because he knows that we are seeking peace in good faith.But the enemy is also afraid of taking responsibility for the breakdown of the negotiations. The reason is that he knows that our strength in North Korea has been strengthened. To the opposition of Britain and France.Now that the United States has obtained the agreement of Britain, France and other countries not to use the 38th parallel but the Kansas line he proposed as the southern line of the demilitarized zone, which is what he called the defensive line, and is preparing to make some adjustments, so the enemy dares to At this point, deadlock with us.

The Central Military Commission stated: In order to achieve a fair and reasonable settlement of the truce negotiations, and to prepare for the failure of the negotiations and the breakdown of the responsibility to fall on the enemy, except for the opinions on the negotiations, which can be found in Chairman Mao’s telegram to Comrade Kim Il Sung on August 17, in combat , we should also cooperate and adapt to the requirements of the negotiation.In September, if our pre-planned campaign plan can indeed wipe out part or only one division of the US Third Division, the Puppet Second Division, and other enemies, and at the same time, quickly advance to Yeoncheon, Cheorwon, and Qin If we want to decompose an area or only advance to one place, without causing the enemy to rush back to the original position or even invade our position, then this campaign is still meaningful.But judging from the current specific situation, not only the air force will not be able to participate in the battle in September and will not be able to cover the transportation south of the Qingchuan River, but other aspects will not make it easy for us to achieve the expected goal of this campaign.First of all, the rainy season in North Korea will not end until the end of August. Bridges on the Qingchuan River, Daedong River, Xinchengchuan, and Fucheng have not yet been repaired. The food for continuous fighting for one month cannot be fully guaranteed in September.The ammunition can be used for one month of combat consumption based on the current reserves in the front, but the degree of rain erosion is unknown. Some warehouses are far away from the front line, so they cannot be supplied in time.And after the battle is launched, no matter how big or small the victory is, it is possible for the battle to continue to develop. Our food and ammunition reserves are only one month, and the rear transportation has not been repaired. If the enemy sees through this point, I will fall into a passive position.Secondly, from a tactical point of view, in the negotiations in September, the possibility of the enemy attacking us is relatively small. Therefore, our army must attack the fortifications, and the front of the battle is not wide, and the enemy is deep. It is easy for them to support each other.I can only use eight armies to break in on the front line, and the enemy has 16 divisions to respond to, except for the east of Linti. Even if I wiped out part of the enemy at the beginning of the battle, after the break-in, we will infiltrate in a detour and expand the results. And advance the position, it must go through repeated fierce battles, the time may be greatly prolonged, and the result may have a negative effect on the negotiations.Now that we have a lot of troops in our hands, and the air force and artillery are gradually strengthened, the enemy cannot help but worry about this during negotiations.If you fail to win the battle, you will easily expose your weaknesses.If the negotiation is on the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone, there is still a possibility of compromise in September, and it is also possible to seize the initiative by not launching a battle.Based on all these, I hope you will reconsider the plan for the September campaign, whether it is possible to step up preparations and not launch them. In this way, it can prevent the enemy from provoking and breaking up, and can also strengthen front-line training and logistical preparations.

Subsequently, on August 21, the Central Military Commission telegraphed Peng Dehuai about issues such as troop mobilization, airport construction, troop replenishment, material supply, and transportation. The instructions to the Volunteers drafted by the Central Military Commission on the Volunteer Army’s planned sixth campaign correctly analyzed the enemy’s purpose in dealing with the negotiations and the reasons why they dared to delay the negotiations, and objectively explained the favorable and unfavorable factors for our sixth campaign , clarified the cooperation and adaptability of the Volunteer Army's operations and negotiations during the armistice negotiations, and established important operational guidelines.This policy has laid an important ideological foundation for regulating our combat operations and gaining the initiative in negotiations. On August 21 and 22, Peng Dehuai called the Central Military Commission twice, agreeing with the Military Commission's analysis of the situation and the proposed guidelines. On the 21st, when Peng Dehuai responded to the opinions of the Military Commission’s telegram instructions on the 19th, he affirmed the preparations for the troops’ combat mood, recovery of combat power, and tactics, and believed that “there are conditions for breaking the enemy’s current fortifications and achieving a certain degree of victory.” .However, compared with the fierce battle of more than one month, the preparations for food, ammunition, explosives, and transportation equipment were insufficient. "The current air force cannot participate in the battle in September, and the collapsed railway bridges cannot be fully repaired in August. The battle has expanded. There is no guarantee of supplies." Therefore, he agreed that "the battle in September should be changed to actively prepare for the battle, defend against the enemy's attack, and prepare for a counterattack at an appropriate time. If the enemy does not attack for the time being, the decision will be made in October." On the 22nd, Peng Dehuai said again: "Agreed to change the offensive in the September campaign to active preparation."

On August 21, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai to ask Peng Dehuai to consider Deng Hua's suggestion on August 18.Deng Hua once suggested in a report transferred by Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong on whether to propose an on-the-spot truce: In terms of military affairs, I should be prepared. Even if I am not conducting a campaign counterattack at present, I should also conduct a tactical counterattack as much as possible, regain some places, push the contact line forward, and better understand the enemy's position and its strength. Mao Zedong ordered Peng Dehuai to seriously consider: "Whether this kind of tactical counterattack can be carried out in September, how to proceed, how many troops will be used, how sure the victory is, and how the enemy will respond." Peng Dehuai received Mao Zedong's instructions. Reply on August 23 to agree.Said: "When there is no major campaign attack in September, you can choose the salient part of the puppet army to conduct a partial attack." On August 26, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai: "Our army has decided not to conduct a large-scale counterattack in September."

Since then, the Volunteer Army has transferred to cooperate with the Korean People's Army to smash the summer offensive of the "United Nations Army". The subsequent summer and autumn defensive operations showed that conducting tactical counterattack operations is more conducive to annihilating the enemy, more conducive to the stability of the front, and more beneficial to persisting in protracted operations.Therefore, in late October, Peng Dehuai decided that "the counterattack of the major campaign will not be carried out without the cooperation of the Air Force." Months of experience, adopting an active defense policy, the enemy consumes a lot, and the hostility against us is also very fearful."At this point, the sixth campaign plan was cancelled.

The purpose of the sixth campaign is to cooperate with the armistice negotiations. The two-step campaign plans to use thirteen corps of the Volunteer Army and four corps of the People's Army to cooperate. It is also planned to use ten air regiments and all tank artillery units in North Korea to support Cooperate with infantry to fight, but the target of annihilating the enemy is not big, and only plan to annihilate about two divisions of the enemy.The campaign plan has learned the lessons of the past with too much mouth, especially in the selection of the timing of the battle by the war director and the battlefield commander. Finally, it is determined that a large number of troops are in hand, and they are not ready to send out, so as to ensure the initiative. This is the art of war guidance. Quite profound, and also achieved results.According to Li Qiwei, the commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Army" released by the United States after the war, the "United Nations Army Combat Report" sent to the Security Council every half a month revealed that when the enemy learned of our army's preparations for war, it was quite disturbed inside.In his report, Li Qiwei repeatedly reminded the Security Council that the Chinese and North Korean troops would launch an offensive.An "insider report" written by American columnist Allen said that Ridgway had submitted to the US decision-making authorities "the darkest report" since the truce negotiations began.

The preparations for the sixth campaign effectively tied the enemy's hands and feet.At that time, the enemy obstructed and delayed the armistice negotiations in every possible way, but did not dare to break the negotiations; if they wanted to exert military pressure on me and force me to submit, they could only carry out a partial attack, but did not dare to let go of a full-scale attack. It can be said that their decision-making has always been in contradiction middle.The ancients said that "a soldier who does not fight but surrenders to others" said that the preparations for the sixth campaign were exactly this kind of action.