Chapter 30 1. The decision of China and North Korea

After the second phase of the offensive in the fifth campaign, Peng Dehuai sent Deng Hua and others back to China to report the situation to Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission and ask for instructions on the battlefield policy.Peng Dehuai told Deng Hua and his party to listen to Kim Il-sung's opinions when passing through Pyongyang, and asked Park Il-yu and Deng Hua to bring a letter he wrote to Kim Il-sung to exchange views on issues related to military strategy. On May 30, 1951, Deng Hua and his party arrived in Pyongyang and listened to Kim Il Sung's opinions.On the same day, Jin Shuancheng sent a letter to Peng Dehuai (Peng Dehuai received it on June 7). After agreeing with Peng Dehuai's analysis of the current military and political situation and future combat policies, he specifically proposed how to defeat the enemy in a relatively short period of time. A proposal for a major counter-offensive against the enemy at the end of June or mid-July.

Kim Il-sung said in the letter: "It is an undeniable fact that the Korean War is more difficult due to the increasing armed forces of the U.S. interveners. It is more brutal and protracted." It is not in my favor either in military or political terms." Therefore, "I do not intend to prolong my military operations."Kim Il Sung proposed that the general attack date can be scheduled for the end of June or mid-July; the rainy season should be fully utilized and the attack should be carried out 10 days before the rainy season begins; aviation should be used as cover; the three mechanized divisions of the Korean People's Army are planned to be organized into an independent mechanized The corps is used under the joint command; the necessary food and ammunition should be accumulated along the 38th parallel; continue to collect food to ensure the supply for at least 20 days; suggest to Chairman Mao Zedong to mobilize the air force to cover the transportation route; the final date of the general attack can be seen Depends on climatic conditions.

On June 7, Peng Dehuai forwarded Kim Il Sung's letter to Mao Zedong. Meanwhile, with the development of the Korean War situation, both sides of the war have become evenly matched, and both are seeking new strategies.At the end of May, the United States released balloons to the Soviet Union willing to negotiate a ceasefire along the 38th parallel.The Soviet Union notified China and North Korea of ​​this situation. In order to adapt to the new situation of strategic transformation, on June 3, Kim Il Sung came to Beijing to discuss with Mao Zedong on the issue of operational policy and the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, and consulted Stalin for his opinions. On June 11, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai to inform him of the results of his talks with Kim Il Sung on combat issues.Mao Zedong said in the telegram:

We have already negotiated with Comrade Kim Il Sung not to carry out a major counter-offensive campaign for the next two months, and we are preparing for a sure-fire and steady counter-offensive in August. ... If there are no unexpected changes (that is, landings) within two months from June to July, we must accomplish the following: a. Maintain the three lines of defense of Cheorwon, Pyeongkang, and Icheon by means of active defense, and prevent the enemy from going beyond the Icheon line ; B. Quickly replenish the Third Corps and the Nineteenth Corps to 45,000 troops per army, and have considerable training; C. The 13th Corps has completed its rest; D. Strengthen the firepower of each army division, especially the anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery fire; E. Quickly build at least one road from Xichuan to Ningyuan to Dechuan, preferably two, and stockpile a considerable amount of grain in Xichuan, Dechuan, and Mengsan areas for emergency use.

On June 13, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai again, inquiring about the situation after the enemy occupied Jinhua and Tiorwon, and told him: "Comrade Deng Hua and four other comrades have been ordered to return to the front on the 15th. Report to Hua." On June 16, Peng Dehuai replied to Mao Zedong, reporting the situation after the enemy occupied Jinhua and Cheorwon and our military deployment.Subsequently, from June 25th to 27th, Peng Dehuai presided over an enlarged meeting of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army, organized and communicated the Central Committee’s policies and various important decisions on the Volunteer Army’s operations, and discussed how to implement the strategic policy of protracted combat, active defense, and small wars of annihilation. question.

With the truce negotiations about to start, on July 1, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao Zedong the Volunteer Army's initial plan to implement the central strategic policy and prepare for the sixth campaign in cooperation with the truce negotiations.Peng Dehuai said in the telegram: It is absolutely necessary to fully prepare for protracted warfare and strive for peace talks to end the war.I can hold the banner of peace, which is beneficial to both the Korean people and the Chinese people.Adhere to the 38th parallel as the boundary, both sides can get along. If the United States insists on the current occupied area, I will prepare to counterattack in August. Before the counterattack, I must let him advance for dozens of miles, so that it will be more beneficial to me militarily and politically.Striving for one, two or three more major military victories will affect the possible split of the so-called United Nations, and the US military will inevitably reduce its fighting will.

It also explained that if the enemy invaded the North in a hurry and the 3rd and 19th Corps were not prepared enough, they would "carry out a moderate battle" in mid-August with the first-line defensive troops plus the second echelon and four armies. On July 2, Mao Zedong replied to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Kim Il-sung, requesting to make arrangements for the negotiations. At the same time, he further instructed the Volunteers to "extremely vigilant" when negotiating. To deal with a possible major attack by the enemy army before and during the negotiation period, a large-scale air bombing will be carried out in the rear to force me to conclude an alliance under the city. In case of a large-scale enemy attack, our army must counterattack aggressively. Defeat it."

Accordingly, on July 8, the Volunteer Army Command issued instructions on preparations for the campaign to the heads of various ministries.On the basis of analyzing the characteristics of the enemy's situation after the five battles, the instruction emphasized the need to combine the experience of the past battles with the attack on the enemy's fortified positions at the middle level in order to attack the enemy's fortified positions in depth in the sixth campaign. Break through the wave of learning, and get more annihilation of the enemy in the sixth battle. The education preparations are completed before the end of July or the beginning of August, and we are ready for action at any time.

Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai focused on cooperating with the armistice negotiations and gaining the initiative on the battlefield. The counter-offensive campaign envisioned, that is, the sixth campaign, has been placed in front of all volunteer commanders and fighters...