Home Categories political economy Collected Works of Mao Zedong Volume I

Chapter 15 Speech at the Central Emergency Meeting[1]

(August 7, 1927) All reported by international representatives [2] are important.First, the Kuomintang issue has been a long-standing issue in our party and has not been resolved until now.The first is the question of joining, and then there is the question of who should join, that is, the question that industrial workers should not join.In fact, not only the industrial workers, but also the peasants are not determined to get them to join.At that time, everyone's basic concept was that the Kuomintang belonged to other people, but they didn't know that it was an empty house waiting for others to live in it.Later, like a new girl on a sedan chair, she reluctantly moved to this empty house, but she still had no determination to be the owner of this house.I think this is a big mistake.Later, some people advocated that industrial workers should also join. It was heard that Hubei had also made this decision, but it was only on paper and could not be implemented.In the past, the masses occasionally disobeyed the orders of the Central Committee and seized the subordinate party headquarters of the Kuomintang and became the masters of the house, but this was against the intention of the Central Committee.It is only now that the strategy has been changed and the workers and peasants have joined the Kuomintang as masters.Second, the peasant issue.The peasants want revolution, and the party close to the peasants also wants revolution, but the party headquarters at the top is different.Before I arrived in Changsha, I had no reason to object to the party’s decision to stand entirely on the side of the landlords. After I arrived in Changsha, I still couldn’t answer this question. It was not until I lived in Hunan for more than 30 days that my attitude was completely changed.I once made a report of my opinion in Hunan, and at the same time made a report to the Central Committee, but this report had an impact in Hunan, but had no influence on the Central Committee.The vast masses inside and outside the party want revolution, but the party's guidance does not make revolution. It is really suspected of being counter-revolutionary.This opinion was established under the direction of the peasants.I always thought that the opinions of comrade leaders were correct, so in the end I didn't quite stick to my opinions.My opinion was not established because they said it was unreasonable, so the party's opinion followed Xu Kexiang[3].Strangely enough, the Tang[4] army only admitted that only eight officers’ families were destroyed, while our party seems to admit that it does not know how many officers’ families were destroyed.In short, in the past the masses had too little influence on the leadership of the party.Thirdly, regarding the military, in the past we criticized Zhongshan for doing only military campaigns, but we did the exact opposite, not doing military campaigns but focusing on mass campaigns.Jiang and Tang[5] all started with guns, we don't care.Although it has been noticed now, there is still no firm concept.For example, the Autumn Harvest Rebellion had to do with the military. This meeting should pay attention to this issue, and the Standing Committee of the new Politburo must be stronger and pay attention to this issue.Hunan's failure this time can be said to be entirely due to the subjective mistakes of scholars, so we must pay great attention to military affairs in the future.It is important to know that political power is achieved through the barrel of a gun. [6] Fourth, organizational issues.From now on, the higher authorities should listen attentively to the reports of the lower ones, and only then can they turn from non-revolutionary to revolutionary.

It is published according to "Selected Readings of Mao Zedong's Works" published by People's Publishing House in 1986. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] This is a speech made by Mao Zedong at the emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (the August 7th meeting) held in Hankou on August 7, 1927.In April and July 1927, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei successively betrayed the KMT-Communist cooperation policy and anti-imperialist and anti-feudal policy decided by Sun Yat-sen, brutally massacred communists and revolutionary people, and the first civil revolutionary war was defeated.At this critical juncture of the Chinese revolution, the August 7th Conference resolutely corrected and put an end to Chen Duxiu's right-leaning capitulationism, and determined the general policy of carrying out the agrarian revolution and armed resistance to the massacre policy of the Kuomintang reactionaries.

[2] International representative, referring to Rominaz (1898-1934), a Soviet.In late July 1927, he came to China as a representative of the Communist International. At the emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held on August 7, he made a report on the party's past mistakes and new line. [3] Xu Kexiang (1891-1967), a native of Xiangxiang, Hunan.In the spring of 1927, he served as the head of the 33rd Regiment of the 35th Army of the National Revolutionary Army.On May 21 of the same year (Ma Day), he launched a counter-revolutionary incident in Changsha, destroyed the Hunan Provincial Federation of Trade Unions, the Provincial Farmers' Association and other revolutionary organizations, and arrested and killed Communists and revolutionary masses.

[4] Tang refers to Tang Shengzhi (1889-1970), a native of Dong'an, Hunan.In April 1927, he served as the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Front Army of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army, and soon became the commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army. [5] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek.Tang refers to Tang Shengzhi. [6] On August 18, 1927, Mao Zedong made a further elaboration on this idea in his speech at the first meeting of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China.He said: 1. The development of the autumn harvest riot in Hunan was to solve the peasants' land problem.No one can deny this.But to launch a riot, it is not enough to rely solely on the strength of the peasants, and there must be a military help.With one or two regiments of troops, riots can arise, otherwise they will eventually fail.Second, the development of the riot is to seize power.If you want to seize power, if you have no troops to defend or seize it, this is self-deception.The mistake our party made in the past was to ignore the military.Now 60 percent of our energy should be devoted to military campaigns, to seize and build political power at the barrel of a gun.

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