Chapter 51 Anti-Surrender Outline-2

2. Why should we prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally at this time, as well as public opinion and mass issues? Here we need to understand the experience of the failure of the Great Revolution of 1927. At that time, not being mentally prepared was the main reason for failure; now, it is necessary to be prepared. At that time, it could no longer be a national front, but we also had places where we were too absolute; now, we must persist in a long-term national front. At that time, it was the overall failure of the revolution, and the party's line was to retreat and then attack; now, there is no question of retreat along the line, but now it is a matter of local temporary tactical conservation or concealment while continuing to attack and then preparing to attack (if surrender become a fact).

At that time, due to the advent of the reactionary period, the Party was unprepared and inexperienced, resulting in confusion in the ranks and wrong steps (such as putschism); now, in occupied areas, and preparing to retreat in areas occupied by surrenderers, an orderly retreat should be made ( Some temporary, some long-term) or counter-offensive, while in other areas the offensive policy continues. At that time, a large number of new party members left the party or defected; now, under certain circumstances, such things may happen, so preparations must be made first.Historical experience - at the moment of revolutionary change (even if it is a temporary partial change), the fall of garbage is inevitable, and it is not a bad thing; but we must pay attention to leading new party members, especially a large number of young students, they will be useful in the future.

At that time, the domestic and international situation was dark, but now it is basically bright. At that time, the central government was ruled by opportunism, and the reformed central government had no experience; this is not the case now. At that time, a large number of cadres and backbones had not yet been formed; now they have. Above, I made eight comparisons.Even so, we must still prepare ourselves ideologically and organizationally, prepare public opinion, and prepare the masses in order to successfully overcome difficulties, develop the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Chinese Revolution to a higher stage, and avoid possible failures.

3. Why insist on the national front, cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the Three People's Principles when surrender becomes a reality? The main reasons have already been explained when explaining the future of the War of Resistance.Here just say: (1) During the entire process of resisting Japan, it must be the national united front. Although many landlords and bourgeoisie went away due to rebellion and became enemies, the rebellion of the landlord and bourgeoisie was gradual, not simultaneous. The ingredients have to work with it.To ignore this is to make a big mistake.Therefore, throughout the anti-Japanese process, the united front should still be the united front of all parties, classes, nationalities, groups, and armies.

(2) The same is true for the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Some members of the Kuomintang left and became enemies, but the few remaining members should still cooperate.We must use the real Kuomintang to oppose the fake Kuomintang and strive for an intermediate Kuomintang.The future of an equal alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party still exists.KMT-CCP ​​cooperation is the organizational basis of the united front, ignoring this point will also be a big mistake. (3) The same is true for the Three People's Principles, which are the political foundation of the United Front and the applicable principles and guidelines in the process of resisting Japan.We must use the true Three People's Principles to oppose the false Three People's Principles and strive for the intermediate Three People's Principles. This is the policy that should be adopted when several types of Three People's Principles exist.There are differences between the Three People's Principles and Communism in the process of resisting Japan, but they have a common point in the process of resisting Japan. The political platforms of the revolutionary phase are basically non-conflicting.Therefore, it is wrong for many people inside and outside the Party to belittle the Three People's Principles and regard them as fundamentally reactionary, deceitful and empty ideas or dogmas.This kind of thinking is due to the failure to distinguish the true Three People's Principles from the false Three People's Principles.

(4) On the issue of ideological struggle, in the past two years, especially in the past six months, those who wrote articles on behalf of the Kuomintang, including the Trotskyist Ye Qing, published many "mixed and mixed" not only against communism but also against the true Three People's Principles The idea of ​​"Three People's Principles", that is, the false Three People's Principles or the intermediate Three People's Principles, should be severely criticized.Among them, the arbitrary call for the so-called "national conditions" theory and "unification" theory is the most arrogant.In fact, what they say is that only the Three People's Principles and the Kuomintang are suitable for the national conditions, but they are the fake Three People's Principles and the fake Kuomintang that are least suitable for the national conditions, while communism and the Communist Party are completely suitable for the national conditions.The so-called disunity between the border areas and the Eighth Route Army, and the intention to cancel it to complete the so-called unification is actually a false unification that is anti-national, anti-democratic, and anti-people's livelihood, which completely violates the interests of the War of Resistance, and completely violates the differences in unification or the struggle in unification. Arbitrary empty words of the historical facts of this society.Before the old semi-feudal regime is transformed into a truly revolutionary democratic regime, the Border Region and the Eighth Route Army must exist. Only when the revolutionary democratic regime is established and the danger of anti-communism disappears, can the two give up their particularity as they are now, otherwise they will only be counter-revolutionary requirements only.

4. The problem of supporting Chiang Kai-shek Supporting Chairman Chiang's slogan was right in the past, and it is right now. As long as Chiang leads the war of resistance, we will still support it (of course on the condition of the war of resistance), and we should not show disrespect to Chiang. However, it is possible that Chiang could not persist in the confrontation under certain circumstances.Even at that time, how we express it needs to be carefully considered.Of course, we had to express it at that time, but it must be an appropriate expression. The principle should be beneficial to the unity of the majority in the resistance war and the continued cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the slogan of "anti-Chiang" should not be revived casually and rashly.

Chiang is hostile to the Communist Party. This is a fact he himself expressed. We must strictly prevent him and his subordinates from destroying our party. There is no doubt about it. It is still our policy to actively help Jiang and urge Jiang to move forward.Don't say "KMT surrender" to the outside world, but "landlord and bourgeois capitulator". 5. Anti-Wang issue "It's wrong to think that Wang is finished, Wang can still play a big role", this is absolutely correct.There is no doubt that Wang's traitor system has done more harm to China than other traitors.Wang has his followers and sympathizers in the government, party headquarters, and part of the army.

Anti-capitulation must be linked to anti-Wang, which is more convenient and practical. 6. The issue of anti-Japanese and anti-rape In the event of a serious rebellion, the party should try its best to deal with it appropriately, and the principle of not breaking away from the majority of the Kuomintang is the principle. At that time, the slogan of resisting Japan and eradicating rape was necessary, and the war of resisting Japan and eradicating rape (at the same time resisting Japan and eradicating rape) was inevitable, but we must not act rashly without leaving the majority of the Kuomintang.A war against rape can (and must) be waged only when it is understood and demanded by the majority.For example, the current campaign against Wang is in line with this principle.

7. Democracy and people's livelihood issues Without a revolutionary democratic government, it is impossible to lead the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. The broad masses of the people in the country long for a anti-Japanese, democratically centralized and clean government that provides freedom to the people. To join forces with it in the campaign against surrender and continue the war of resistance. The same is true for the connection with "improving people's livelihood".However, only by resisting Japan can it be possible to implement democracy, and only by resisting Japan and democracy can it be possible to improve people's livelihood. This is the reality of today's political situation and should be understood.

Eight, friction problem After the Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee, the destructive and surrender-ready frictions and armed struggles in Hebei and Shandong, especially in the border areas, must be resolutely resisted.This kind of resistance is useful, but it must be strictly self-defensive, and must not go beyond this limit, giving the provocateurs an excuse to break the united front.The purpose of this self-defensive, defensive anti-friction struggle is to consolidate the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.For this purpose, detente and concessions are also necessary under certain conditions. Reunification does not forget struggle, and struggle does not forget reunification. The two cannot be neglected, but reunification is the main thing, "grinding without cracking." Beware of provocations and don't be fooled. 9. Non-development of Party Organizations in Allied Armies and Withdrawal of Party Organizations from Certain Armies Based on experience in the past six months, the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee's decision not to develop the Party in the anti-Japanese cooperating army is fundamentally correct.The development of the Communist Party in the Chinese army should generally be limited to traitors and troops preparing to become traitors. The purpose is to destroy them, and others should not be developed.Any army that has turned into an army of traitors, or is directly preparing to become an army of traitors, should adopt a resolute policy of sabotage.When some anti-Japanese troops have encountered problems that hinder cooperation due to party organization problems, they should publicly withdraw in order to continue the cooperation. 10. Aid to friendly parties (1) Do our utmost to assist those progressive elements, but the degree of assistance varies according to the degree of progress. (2) Refuse to aid those retrogressive elements and hopeless elements, lest they expand their power and come back to us.There have been many lessons in this regard in the past.In a word, there is no unconditional assistance. (3) To do everything possible to strengthen the work of all patriotic progressives and push them to oppose surrender must be done by many capable cadres, and we must not relax for a moment.Intensive work should also be done on intermediate elements. The work of the ministries of the Central Committee after the Eleventh and Sixth Plenary Sessions In the past three years, especially since the Sixth Plenary Session, various central working departments have been gradually restored and established. In addition to the Military Commission, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the Enemy Area Work Department, and the Youth Commission, which have been established for a long time, the United Front Work Department, the Women's Commission, the Work Commission, The Ministry of Finance and Economics, the Ministry of Cadre Education, the General Political Department, the Party Newspaper Committee, the North Central China Committee, the Northwest Committee, and the Southern Committee were all newly established, and the Secretariat also improved its organization, with a total of 16 agencies.The restoration and establishment of these central work departments is a major achievement and a joyful event after the destruction of the Long March. 12. Central Organizational Issues (1) Once a week after the Politburo meeting. (2) The secretariat handles daily events. (3) Notifications, use the name of the central government for major events, and use the secretariat for minor events. (4) Personnel allocation is based on the principle of ensuring the integrity of the central leadership while strengthening local leadership. (5) The ministries of the central government are both tightened and strengthened. Thirteen. Cadre education In the past two years, under the direct guidance of the central government, the Anti-Japanese University, Shaanxi Public School, Party School, Marxist-Leninist College, Luyi, Youth Training Class, Women’s University, Worker’s School, Health School, Communication School, Organization Department Training Class, There are 17 schools including administrative staff training classes, border area party schools, Lu Xun normal schools, border area middle schools, Lu Xun elementary schools, and childcare centers. More than 30,000 students have been educated and have not yet been educated.This is a great achievement, unprecedented in eighteen years.These students can't see their major work achievements now, but they will be able to see them in a few years. This approach should continue in the future.For material and enemy reasons, it is divided into border areas and North China.For those going to North China, the command and management still belong to the central government, but the Northern Bureau is entrusted to supervise it. Fourteen, learning sports (1) After the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee, the study campaign for all Party cadres initiated by the Central Committee is of paramount importance to improving the theoretical and cultural level of all Party cadres. (2) Serving cadres in various organs of the party, government, military, civilian and academic institutions should work and study at the same time. (3) According to its degree, culture and theory are either equally or emphatically emphasized. (4) It is a long-term university. (5) A two-hour study system per day. (6) Working, producing and studying at the same time. (7) Pay equal attention to automaticity and coercion, consistent with theory and practice. (8) Diligent scholars are rewarded, lazy ones are punished. (9) Governments at all levels, schools, and troops all set up cadre education leading organs and personnel 15. Production Movement In all possible places, in all possible opportunities, and in all possible types, we must develop the agricultural, industrial, and cooperative movements of the people, government agencies, military schools, and solve all or part of the problems of food, clothing, housing, and supplies by our own methods. Overcome economic difficulties to benefit the War of Resistance Against Japan. The production campaign in the Border Region this year has been carried out in earnest.We must continue to sum up experience to achieve the purpose of solving difficulties. 16. Youth Movement Since the Sixth Plenary Session, there have been achievements.It is right for the Youth Committee and the Youth Joint Office to concentrate on guiding the Youth Movement. Youth movement policy: Adhere to the youth united front, continue to adopt the attitude of the May 4th to the Third Youth League, and use it to win the majority of young people under the banner of continuing the war of resistance and the democratic republic. 17. Women's Movement The central government issued guidelines for the women's movement and began the work of establishing the Women's Committee.Local women's work guidance organs are also gradually being established.The cadres we lack the most are women cadres, and we have not summed up the experience of the women's movement. This shortcoming must be remedied.Without a group of capable and full-time women cadres, it is impossible to carry out the women's movement. 18. Labor movement Published the work policy of the labor movement, began to establish a labor committee, and opened a workers' school.The labor movement is relatively weak in the mass movement, and there are too few workers in the party. We should make progress in these two aspects in the future. 19. Anti-rape work Under the new environment, the enemy's conspiracy to sabotage our party, our army and the border region government has gradually become serious, and it will become more serious in the future, which greatly increases the importance of our anti-corruption struggle.Therefore, the whole Party must pay more attention to this aspect, and must send and train a necessary number of capable cadres to this department. When members of the Kuomintang are arrested or captured due to spy work or armed attacks against us, the principle of not killing or surrendering is generally the principle (no surrender means not forcing them to write a surrender letter, not forcing them to renounce their beliefs), in order to win over the Kuomintang. most of. 20. Party Organization Issues (1) Lean and capable.Now is not the time for general development. Generally speaking, development should be stopped and leanness should be the principle. (2) Strict. (3) Eliminate saboteurs and defend the party. (4) Class education, Marxism-Leninism. (5) Strictly implement secret instructions. 21. Self-reliance The party, the army, everything. Ready for the harshest environments. 22. North China Issue The situation in North China may become extremely serious, and the main force of the enemy may attack North China. Therefore, the Eighth Route Army and the North China Party must pay serious attention to the possibility of this situation, and carry out military, political, financial, party organization, and united fronts. Preparation, based on the principle of persevering in guerrilla warfare to cope with the greatest difficulties. The party in North China has the responsibility to provide the central government with the necessary funds, and the political significance of such funds is enormous. 23. Issues in Central China We must greatly develop the work of the Party, guerrilla warfare, and mass movements in central China, and establish our own base areas from the complicated environment to serve as the hub of the long-term national war of resistance.There must be better united front work and be linked with the development and progress of the work of the New Fourth Army.The cadres in the border regions are mainly transported to central China as a principle. 24. Defending the Border Areas (1) The border area is the basic base area, the seat of the central government, and a place of prestige throughout the country, which must be resolutely defended; (2) The enemy's attack on the border area is a step to promote China's surrender; (3) The enemy has the possibility of attacking Yan'an; (4) Even if Yan'an falls, still stick to the border area, and everyone prepares to live a life of guerrilla warfare, the most difficult but most vivid life; (5) Eating is the first problem, overcome difficulties by self-reliance; (6) Students and staff go to the front in large numbers; (7) Properly protect and educate young students, new cadres, and new party members; (8) To preserve a leading group, an educational group, and a military group, relying on good terrain and good people, there must be a way. 25. Mobilize a large number of students and staff to go to the front line (1) Strengthen education and strengthen front-line work; (2) Still go to the front line after graduation, and the front line is stronger in the morning; (3) Because of the enemy's situation; (4) Because of funds; (5) decide to go to 10,000 people; (6) Mobilize well politically and organizationally; (7) It will be convenient for leading education and fighting guerrilla warfare in the future, but there are still a lot of personnel; (8) Cadres must be properly distributed; (9) Students must consider as much as possible to stay behind; (10) The name of the school must be preserved, the front and rear are the same. Twenty-sixth, Seventh Congress[27] (1) The election shall be completed before August 1; (2) meeting in October; (3) Struggle to unite the whole party against surrender; (4) Those who can come and those who can open. 27. Struggle on two fronts (1) Against the Right: Cannot see the danger of capitulation against communism; succumbed to the pressure of the Kuomintang; There is no way out for the current situation (lost future); no class position; Fear sinks in the face of hard struggle. (2) Opposing "Left": Dark China, dark world, dark border area, dark self; Prepare to destroy the united front, deny the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, reject the Three People's Principles, and isolate yourself to work blindly. (3) Veteran cadres should be the backbone, leading the new party members and cadres to advance to a higher stage of the war of resistance and attack difficult positions. Twenty-eight, unity overcomes all (1) Must be more united: As long as the central government and senior cadres are united, the whole party will be able to unite. As long as the Communist Party is united, it will be invincible.The savior of the people of the whole country is the Communist Party. (2) It must be more concentrated. Individuals are subject to the organization, the minority is subject to the majority, the lower level is subject to the higher level, and the entire party is subject to the Central Committee. (3) The whole country is united as one, centralized command, and victory over everything. in conclusion (June 13) 1. The current situation (1) Among the factors of capitulation, the vacillation of the Chinese landlord and bourgeoisie is the main one, and this is quite right. (2) To overcome two possible surrenders - 1. To overcome the surrender of small groups. 2. Overcome most surrenders.The former is a present possibility, given the majority of the war of resistance; the latter is a possibility in the future, if most of them surrender.But doing the current work is to facilitate the future work, and the two are inseparable. (3) According to the definition of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, the stage of stalemate is the balance between the forces of the enemy and ourselves under certain conditions. So, not only can we not say that the stage of stalemate is now, but if Li Jingwei appears, it means that the enemy has already formed (it is trying to organize) it. The new strategic ally of the Chinese army and use it in combat—to detour behind our anti-Japanese positions (the national counter-revolutionary is the strategic ally of imperialism, there is no doubt about it). A big defeat was fought.At that time, it was Japanese imperialism and Li Jingwei (Franco of China) who hit me, so it was more serious than the previous strategic retreat, not a stalemate. (4) The Japanese imperialists are organizing two new strategic alliance armies, one is the international capitulationists and the other is the Chinese capitulationists. The former is used to encircle the outside of China, and the latter is used to detour the interior of China.The direction of our efforts is to mobilize the international and domestic anti-surrender forces to repel these two enemy allies.Before repelling, there is no stage of stalemate. (5) It is wrong to say that the frontal enemy (the main force of Japanese imperialism) may still launch a military attack.Although it has difficulties in finance, economy, manpower, and military strength, it still has the possibility of military attack in terms of strength and time.Therefore, not only do we need to defeat the new enemy attacking from the side, but we also need to prepare to continue defeating the old enemy attacking from the front in order to achieve a balance between the enemy and ourselves and the stalemate. (6) But this does not mean that the stalemate can only occur when the front and side enemies are equal in strength to our anti-Japanese troops in all respects.It's not equal strength, but: my strength ten enemy's weakness ten international containment = stalemate stage. (7) Thus, the stalemate can occur in three situations: 1. The territory is large, the number of people is large, and the front line is consolidated, resulting in a stalemate between the enemy and ourselves.For example, the middle of the Russian Civil War, the middle of the European War.From the Anti-Japanese War to the present, China has a large area and a large number of people, but the front line is not solid (political corruption, surrenderers make trouble), so there is no stage of stalemate.If we can work hard to overcome the danger of capitulation and transform politics in the process of overcoming, the front will be strengthened and the stage of stalemate will come.This is the first type. 2. The area is small (that is, the direct base area is small, but the country is large), the number of people is small, but the front is strong, and they can also hold each other.For example, the ten-year Red Army War, to some extent, the Northeast Volunteer Army for a period of time.In the future, assuming that there is a major rebellion, the remaining small groups may also cause a stalemate. As long as the "encirclement and suppression" can be continuously broken, this kind of stalemate will exist.The current situation in North China can be said to be a temporary stalemate between small groups. If the situation in North China is prolonged, it will become a long-term stalemate between small groups. 3. From the above-mentioned stalemate of small groups to stalemate of large groups, it was achieved through the expansion of the united front and the victory of the struggle against "encirclement and suppression".If the strategic counter-offensive cannot be held at that time (it is still during the campaign counter-offensive), it will still be a stalemate. (8) If most of the mutinies inevitably occur during the course of the War of Resistance, then the course of the War of Resistance may have to be organized into an entire stage of stalemate according to the following formula: Most of the temporary stalemate after Wuhan (the current situation is in a certain situation) It can be said to be a stalemate in a sense, but because the front line is not solid, it can only be said to be temporary at this time)—a small stalemate after a certain time—a major stalemate after a certain time. The main feature of this change is that the front is not consolidated to consolidated.To maintain a stalemate for a long time, the front line must be consolidated. With this condition, even if it is small, it can be stalemate, and if nothing is big, it cannot.Therefore, we should strive for large quantity (many people, large land), but the main thing is to be strong in quality.The so-called consolidation of the front refers to the consolidation of the anti-Japanese base areas plus the consolidation of the united front. (9) There is indeed a stalemate in North China, but this is still temporary. We proposed "persist in guerrilla warfare in North China" in order to turn the temporary into a long-term one.If everything else is dark and North China remains (similarly, the New Fourth Army, the Shensi-Kansu-Ningxia Border Region), then although it is limited geographically and numerically, since there are no other anti-Japanese troops left, it becomes the only anti-Japanese army. It also has the meaning of strategic stalemate.This is a difficult situation, but we should also be prepared.Most of the sky is dark, and the Communist Party is left to fight against the Japanese. We must continue to do it, and we can do it.Do this for three to five years, awaken the people, attract friendly troops, and gradually form a new and large anti-Japanese front. At that time, we will become the core and leading force for resisting Japan and saving the nation. So, in any case, our future is bright, although the road is difficult. (10) At present, it is time to reorganize the relationship between the enemy and the enemy (the forces between the enemy and the enemy). It depends on who wins the majority, and more importantly, whose quality is better, so as to determine who belongs to the winner.Who will win and who will lose? This question is currently unresolved, and the two sides are re-preparing conditions. The front will inevitably be reorganized, and it will inevitably be reorganized.One part of our allied army (the landlord and bourgeoisie part) may become the enemy's allied army, but I will never let it be transferred. I must win another part of it, and I may win another part of it.I still have a large number of allied forces that have not been mobilized. The Chinese peasants, Japanese workers, peasants and soldiers, the international proletariat, and the power of the Soviet Union can defeat the enemy if they are mobilized. The enemy is counter-revolutionary, and we are revolutionary. This qualitative difference determines who will win the final victory.But the strategy of commanding the war, in particular, determines who wins and loses.Without the latter, relying solely on good quality, there is still no victory. 2. Change problem (1) When we talk about preparing ourselves to deal with new possible situations and possible miahas, we are following the general line of the Sixth Plenary Session.Under the general line of the Sixth Plenary Session, prepare to deal with possible Miyah (or Hacha), and prepare to adopt a temporary retreat policy in areas that may be occupied by Miyah.So far, it is impossible to imagine a 180-degree change in the Sixth Plenary Session.That is to say, if there is a change, it is not a change of line, but a partial temporary change of tactics or tactics to prevent unexpected attacks. This must first be clarified.We must stick to the general line of the past. (2) What we must strive for at present, and what we must strive for with all our strength of the party, is to overcome the possibility of surrender, win the majority to resist Japan, support and help, supervise and criticize the Kuomintang and Chiang, so that they can benefit from the struggle against Wang and from the future development Overcoming the tendency to capitulate is the central task at present. (3) Therefore, unity, unity, and long-term cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party should be emphasized instead of other things.Only by emphasizing these can we overcome the crisis of surrender, and only by emphasizing these can we better prepare ourselves to deal with possible incidents.Everything was done to isolate the capitulators and not to isolate themselves. 3. Several strategic issues (1) The issue of strengthening the party (organizational austerity).After the meeting in March last year[28] decided to greatly develop the party, the party has achieved a large number of developments throughout the country.The task now is to consolidate it, so its development must be temporarily and generally halted.Of course, it is not that no one is allowed to join the party, and some areas should still be developed.The purpose of stopping the development is to facilitate cleaning, eradication and education, and it will still be developed in the future. (2) The party should protect new party members and new cadres, and the main responsibility lies with old party members and old cadres.Between new and old party members and new and old cadres, it must be done well. If it is not done well, the old party members and cadres will bear the main responsibility.There are every reason to forgive new party members and cadres, but there is no such reason for old party members and veteran cadres.There have been some incorrect views on this issue in the past.This matter is roughly the same as the relationship between the main force and the local guerrilla forces. A large number of cadres should be promoted from among the new Party members. (3) Inner-Party education must be intensified.The unity of class education and national education.But at the moment we should focus on class education and not neglect united front education. To compile intermediate textbooks, we must focus on historical materialism on philosophical issues. (4) Promote local cadres.Without local cadres—middle-level, high-level—it is impossible to establish solid bases. Oppose the tendency of "imperial envoys", oppose the contempt for "bumpkins", and cancel the title of "bumpkins". (5) To protect revolutionary intellectuals, not to repeat the mistakes of the past.The revolution cannot be victorious without revolutionary intellectuals.The Kuomintang and us strive for youth, and the army must take in a large number of revolutionary intellectuals.It is necessary to convince the worker and peasant cadres that they can eat and not be afraid of them.Workers and peasants cannot improve themselves without the help of revolutionary intellectuals.Without intellectuals at work, one cannot govern the country, the party, or the army.Revolutionary intellectuals should also be recruited into the government, party offices, and popular movements. (6) The problem of stopping the development of the party and withdrawing the party among friendly parties and friendly troops.From the perspective of the overall situation, it is beneficial to stop and retreat, otherwise it will hinder the overall situation and break the united front.Without winning over the Chinese army, the revolution cannot be victorious, and at present the main thing to win is politically, and organizing a party will hinder political struggle. Rely on the mouth rather than the organization, rely on the upper level rather than the lower level (for the time being). While withdrawing from the party, they strengthened liaison and agreed to a certain independence of the united front work. Generally, the policy of organizational sabotage is adopted only in the army, government, and political parties of the true surrenderers, and in the rest, only the policy of political winning is generally adopted.Some special departments do not implement the withdrawal method. (7) It is of great significance not to kill Kuomintang members.It's not about not killing traitors, not killing certain traitors, and not killing those who endanger the revolution in an emergency. (8) Democracy and people's livelihood should not be overemphasized.Inappropriate.At present, anti-surrender (emphasis on the war of resistance) should be emphasized, and several emphasis should not be placed at the same time.It's connection not emphasis. Democracy and people's livelihood is a propaganda slogan in the Kuomintang area, not an action slogan. On issues such as conscription, taxation, production, etc., adopt an attitude of approval and criticism, not an attitude of fundamental opposition. (9) Local strategies.There should be clear local strategies that are appropriate to the local context and to each situation.The central government should pay attention to guidance in the future. (10) To strengthen the mass movement.The so-called preparation of the masses refers to this.Surrender cannot be overcome by lowering the class struggle, only by carrying out the class struggle correctly to cooperate with the united front.Unity without struggle is very dangerous.The masses are our last reliance, and also the last reliance of the War of Resistance. (11) The issue of Muslims. (12) Organizing internal party publications.We will start to do it immediately, and the localities will also do it. (13) Others. The general conclusion is this: Unity conquers all. The part of the report was published based on the transcripts kept by the Central Archives, and the conclusion part was published based on Mao Zedong’s revisions kept by the Central Archives, and revised according to the "Two Lines". -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Tianyu, that is, Tianyu Eiji (1887-1968), was then the Minister of Intelligence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. [2] Refers to the "Decision of the Central Committee Concerning the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks" passed at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on August 25, 1937. [3] Annan, now Vietnam. [4] Tautman (1877-1950), then German ambassador to China. [5] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek.The second Chen refers to Chen Guofu (1892-1951) and Chen Lifu (born in 1900), both from Zhejiang Wuxing (now part of Huzhou City), both served as members of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Committee at that time.He refers to He Yingqin (1890-1987), a native of Xingyi, Guizhou, who was then chief of staff of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang government and minister of the military and political department. [6] Sun, refers to Sun Ke (1891-1973), a native of Xiangshan (now Zhongshan), Guangdong, who was the president of the Legislative Yuan of the Kuomintang government at that time.Yu, refers to Yu Youren (1879-1964), a native of Sanyuan, Shaanxi.Bai refers to Bai Chongxi, who was then the deputy chief of staff of the Military Commission of the Kuomintang government. [7] Konoe, Konoe Fumimaro, was the Prime Minister of the Japanese Cabinet at the time. [8] Refers to the Japanese puppet government established in Nanjing in March 1938 - the "Reformation Government of the Republic of China".It nominally governs the Japanese-occupied areas in the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui and the two special cities of Nanjing and Shanghai.In March 1940, it was incorporated into the puppet government of Wang Jingwei. [9] Refers to the Japanese puppet government established in Beiping in December 1937 - the "Provisional Government of the Republic of China".It nominally governs the Japanese-occupied areas in Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan and other provinces, as well as the cities of Peiping and Tianjin.In March 1940, it was merged into Wang Jingwei's puppet government and renamed "North China Political Affairs Committee". [10] Zhang Gaofeng, that is, Zhang Gufeng.At the end of July and the beginning of August 1938, the Japanese army provoked the Soviet army in the Zhanggufeng area at the junction of China and the Soviet Union.Under the strong counterattack of the Soviet army, the Japanese army was defeated and sued for peace, and an armistice agreement was signed at Zhanggufeng in Moscow. [11] Itagaki, that is, Itagaki Seishiro (1885-1948), was then the Minister of War in the Japanese Cabinet. [12] Ugaki, that is, Ugaki Kassei (1868-1956), served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Japanese Cabinet in May 1938, and resigned in September of the same year. [13] Hiranuma, namely Kiichiro Hiranuma (1867-1952), was then the Prime Minister of the Japanese Cabinet. [14] Refers to Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. [15] Molotov (1890-1986), then Chairman of the People's Committee of the Soviet Union and People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. [16] The four eastern provinces refer to the four provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Rehe.Rehe Province was abolished in 1955, and the original jurisdiction was merged into Hebei, Liaoning and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [17] Song refers to Soong Ching Ling.He refers to He Xiangning (1878-1972), a native of Nanhai, Guangdong.Deng Yanda (1895-1931) was born in Huiyang, Guangdong.They are all leftist leaders of the Kuomintang. [18] Feng Yuxiang (1882-1948), a native of Chao County, Anhui (now Chaohu City).In May 1933, in cooperation with the Communist Party, he organized the Chahar People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Zhangjiakou and served as the commander-in-chief. [19] Cai Tingkai (1892-1968), a native of Luoding, Guangdong.In 1932, he commanded the 19th Route Army to participate in the Songhu Anti-Japanese War.In 1933, he participated in organizing the Fujian People's Revolutionary Government that resisted Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. [20] Zhao Bosheng (1897-1933), a native of Huanghua, Hebei, served as the chief of staff of the 26th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army.Dong Zhentang (1895-1937), a native of Xinhe, Hebei, was the commander of the 74th Brigade of the 26th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army.Ji Zhentong (1901-1934), a native of Cang County, Hebei Province, was the commander of the 73rd Brigade of the 26th Route Army of the Kuomintang Army.In the spring of 1931, the 26th Route Army was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Jiangxi to attack the Red Army.In December of the same year, under their leadership, more than 10,000 members of the army responded to the call of the Communist Party of China to resist Japan and joined the Red Army in an uprising in Ningdu, Jiangxi Province, which was organized into the Fifth Army Corps of the Red Army. [21] Ji Hongchang (1895-1934), a native of Fugou, Henan Province, in May 1933, together with Feng Yuxiang, Fang Zhenwu and others, organized the Chahar People’s Anti-Japanese Allied Army in Zhangjiakou, served as the former enemy Commander in Chief and Commander of the Second Army.Ren Yingqi (1892-1934), a native of Lushan, Henan, organized the Chinese People's Anti-Fascist League with Ji Hongchang in May 1934 to carry out anti-Chiang anti-Japanese activities.On November 24, 1934, Ji Hongchang and Ren Yingqi were killed together in Beiping. [22] Zhang Xueliang, born in 1901, is from Haicheng, Liaoning.Yang Hucheng (1893-1949) was born in Pucheng, Shaanxi.On December 12, 1936, they jointly launched the Xi'an Incident, demanding that Chiang Kai-shek stop the civil war and unite in the resistance against Japan. [23] Chen Jitang (1890-1954), a native of Fangcheng, Guangdong (now part of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region).On May 28, 1936, Li Zongren and other generals from Guangdong and Guangxi issued a telegram, expressing their opposition to Japan's increase of troops in North China and demanding a declaration of war against Japan. [24] Miyaha, that is, Jose Miyaha, was the commander of Madrid city defense during the Spanish Civil War.On March 5, 1939, together with Casado and Bestello, they launched a military coup against the Republic.On the 28th, surrendered to the rebels led by Franco supported by German and Italian fascists. [25] Hacha, that is, Emil Hacha, President of Czechoslovakia.In October 1938, under the pressure of international imperialism, the Munich Agreement was accepted, gradually bringing Czechoslovakia under the control of Hitler's Germany.In March 1939, the Czech region was forced to be changed to the "Bohemia and Moravia Reserve" and included in the German territory. [26]佛朗哥（一八九二一九七五），曾任西班牙陆军参谋长。一九三六年七月在德意法西斯支持下发动武装叛乱。一九三九年四月夺取政权，建立法西斯统治。 [27]指中国共产党第七次全国代表大会。一九三七年，中共中央成立了由二十五人组成的“七大”准备委员会。同年十二月十三日，中共中央政治局作出了《关于召集七次全国代表大会的决议》，准备“在最近时期内召集党的第七次全国代表大会”。一九三八年九月至十一月召开的中共六届六中全会，讨论了“七大”的主要议事日程，并正式通过了《关于召集第七次全国代表大会的决议》，要求“加紧完成准备召集七次全国代表大会的一切必要工作”。由于战争和交通等原因，大会迟迟未能召开，直到抗日战争胜利前夕，才于一九四五年四月二十三日至六月十一日召开。 [28]指一九三八年二月二十七日至三月一日在延安召开的中共中央政治局会议。