Chapter 9 On the Implementation of the Independent Mountain Guerrilla Warfare Policy

(September 21, 1937) Comrade Dehuai[1]: Yan Xishan [2] is currently in the contradiction of not being able to answer the people of Shanxi unless there is a war, and that he is not sure if there is a war. This kind of contradiction cannot be resolved by him.You estimate that his determination to give up Pingxing Pass and attempt a decisive battle at Shahe is shaken, and this estimate is completely correct.His subordinates have no determination at all, and his army has lost its combat effectiveness. Maybe a decisive battle will be forced in the Yanmen Pass, Pingxing Pass, and Shahe area.Individual comrades do not seem to have a deep understanding of this objective and inevitable trend, and are seduced by the temporary situation.If this point of view remains unchanged, the Red Army is bound to fall into a situation similar to Yan Xishan, being passive, coping, beaten, and defeated by the enemy one by one.Today the Red Army does not play any decisive role in the issue of decisive battles, but has a special game of its own, in which it can definitely play a decisive role, and this is truly independent mountain guerrilla warfare (not mobile warfare).In order to carry out such a policy, it is necessary to strategically have strong troops on the enemy's flank, and it is necessary to focus on creating base areas to mobilize the masses, and it is necessary to disperse our forces instead of focusing on concentrated fighting.You cannot do mass work if you concentrate on fighting, and you cannot concentrate on fighting if you do mass work. The two cannot be carried out simultaneously.However, the only way to decisively defeat the enemy and aid the friendly forces is to do mass work in a dispersed manner. Concentrated fighting is currently fruitless.The current situation is fundamentally different from the civil wars of the past, and we cannot recall the taste of the past, but must continue to do so in the present.I completely agree with your point of view in your 18th telegram that "even though the enemy has penetrated deep into Shanxi, they are still surrounded by our guerrilla warfare on all sides".Please stick to this point of view, think about the big picture from a distance, give in-depth explanations to individual comrades' inappropriate views, and make the strategic policy consistent.Comrade Lin Biao[3] called and fully agreed with my judgment and deployment on the 17th. He only wanted to use Chen Brigade[4] to concentrate his cameras on the enemy and not disperse them for the time being.This kind of temporary concentration of a brigade is of course possible, but when there is no opportunity to take advantage of it for a long time, it is still advisable to turn the focus to mass work at an appropriate time.It is also possible for Wang Zhen[5] to lead a regiment to Wutai temporarily, but please note that it is still advisable to transfer to Northwest Shanxi at the right time.Judging from the situation, even if Lin led Chen Brigade to win one or two battles, they would have to turn to Wutai soon.Please consider it carefully.

Mao Zedong twenty one Printed from transcripts kept at the Central Archives. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Dehuai, that is, Peng Dehuai, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army at that time. [2] Yan Xishan was then the commander-in-chief of the Second Theater of the Kuomintang Army. [3] Lin Biao, then commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army. [4] Chen Brigade refers to the 343rd Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army where Chen Guang was the brigade commander. [5] Wang Zhen (1908-1993), born in Liuyang, Hunan.At that time, he was the deputy brigade commander of the 359th Brigade of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army.