Chapter 10 Opinions on launching guerrilla warfare in Shanxi

(September 23, 1937) Comrade Xuefeng[1] also told Zhou, Zhu Pengren, Lin Nie, He Xiao, Liu Xuzhang[2]: Qiaodian [3] is noted.As for Mr. Yan's proposal, if under unfavorable circumstances, the two armies should unite and use guerrilla warfare to resolutely resist the Japanese attack, I completely agree with it.But with the following comments: A. Guerrilla warfare should be mainly carried out on the enemy's flanks and rear. In Shanxi, it should be divided into four areas: Northwest Shanxi, Northeast Shanxi, Southeast Shanxi, and Southwest Shanxi. It is not appropriate to adopt a posture of enveloping and attacking the enemy entering the central city and main roads. Concentrating in one area of ​​the Wutai Mountains, it is difficult to gain a foothold in one area.

B. The Wutai Mountains should be turned into one of the important guerrilla areas. It is advisable to step up preparations now. Both sides can send people to inspect and plan everything without delay. C. At the same time, full attention should be paid to the Guancen Mountains area in northwestern Shanxi and its deployment and preparations, because the enemy will first occupy the Shenchi and Ningwu areas in this area, coordinate with the occupation of the Hengshan Mountains in the east, and take the advantage of condescending, and then attack Taiyuan. Although the Ding, Taihang, and Taiyue Mountains in southeastern Shanxi and the Luliangshan Mountains in southwestern Shanxi are still far away from the enemy, appropriate deployment must be made at this time, such as the preparation and relocation of certain necessary materials.It is inappropriate to concentrate resources in one place in Wutai.

E. In guerrilla warfare, apart from military deployment, the most important thing is to rely closely on the broad masses of the people in the countryside. Only in this way can final victory be won. 1. The above-mentioned arrangements and plans do not interfere with the current plan to strive for a decisive decisive battle with the main force along the Great Wall. Geng. We admire and thank Mr. Yan for his sincere cooperation and discussion of command. Xin. The above opinions on guerrilla warfare are expected to be provided to Mr. Yan for consideration. Mao Zedong noon on the 23rd Printed from transcripts kept at the Central Archives.

-------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Xuefeng, also known as Peng Xuefeng, was the Chief of Staff of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and Director of the Shanxi Office at that time. [2] Zhou refers to Zhou Enlai.Zhu, refers to Zhu De.Peng, referring to Peng Dehuai, was the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army at the time.Ren refers to Ren Bishi, who was then the director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army.Lin Nie refers to Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, who were respectively the commander and political commissar of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time.He Xiao, referring to He Long and Xiao Ke, who were respectively the commander and deputy commander of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time.Liu Xuzhang refers to Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, and Zhang Hao (Lin Yuying), who were respectively the division commander, deputy division commander and political commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time.

[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Peng Xuefeng to Mao Zedong on September 18, 1937.The telegram reported his secret talks with Yan Xishan, commander of the Second Theater of the Kuomintang Army, on the 16th. It mentioned Yan Xishan's suggestion: In the event of an unfavorable situation where the Jinpu Road, Pinghan Road, and the Jin Army were defeated, the Eighth Route Army would join forces. A group army of the Jinsui Army established a base in the Wutai Mountains to deal with the Japanese army.