Chapter 8 Judgment of the Enemy's Situation and the Strategic Arrangement of the Eighth Route Army

(September 17, 1937) Zhu Pengren, Lin Nie, He Xiao, Liu Xu[1]: Regarding situation judgment and strategic deployment issues: A. Judging that the enemy's attack on North China is roughly divided into four routes, with a total force of about 150,000 to 200,000 troops.All the way to Shandong, it has not been dispatched yet.Another Jinpu line, about one and a half divisions, is now attacking Machang.Another road leveling the Han line, about one division, is currently not moving north of Zhuozhou.Another route along the Pingsui and Tongpu lines, with about three divisions as the main force[2], took a big detour in an attempt to capture Taiyuan, threaten the Ping-Han line central army and finally smash it, and seize the north of the Yellow River.This posture threatens the backs of Henan and Shandong, and is conducive to the final capture of Shandong and the completion of its attempt to capture the five provinces of North China[3].Its overall strategic policy is to take a right-wing detour.As for the invasion of Shanghai, in addition to destroying the lifeline of China's economy, it will also restrain the main force of the Central Army so as to facilitate its capture of North China.The above is the basic judgment of the first phase of the Japanese invasion plan.

B. The main force of the right wing of the Japanese invaders is divided into three groups, all advancing in a pursuit posture.All the way along the eastern section of Pingsui and the northern section of Tongpu to attack Yanmenguan, it is estimated that there is about one division, and it has not moved after occupying Datong.After Lutian Town occupied Guangling along the way, it attacked Lingqiu and Pingxingguan, and made a detour to the right wing of the Jinsui Army.After occupying Yu County from Zhangjiakou along the way, there was a tendency to attack Laiyuan, and we made a left flank detour to Wei Lihuang's [4] army and Zijingguan army.These two lines of judgment form a combined corps, at least two divisions, with the posture of breaking through the center in the first step to achieve the purpose of detouring to the two wings in the second step.

C. Jiang [5] ordered Wei Lihuang's army to retreat to the Ping-Han line because it was surrounded by the enemy.Yan [6] took Lingqiu as the lifeline of Shanxi, and planned to gather 14 regiments to hold a decisive battle north of Pingxingguan.It is judged that if the decisive battle is won, the enemy's southward advance can be delayed a little, but it will increase its troops and attack fiercely.If the decisive battle fails, the enemy must quickly attack Pingxingguan and Yanmenguan. After the rear reserve corps arrives, the main force will go straight down to Taiyuan, so that the Jinsui Army in the west of Suiyuan, the troops at Wutai in the southern section of the Hengshan Mountains, and the troops in the northern section of Pinghan The army had to retreat on its own, and he could win the above-mentioned places without fighting, and the natural danger of Niangziguan also lost its effect.

Ding, Laiyuan and Lingqiu are the battleground for the enemy.If Fuping, Wutai, and Yuxian do not have a north-south highway, they may not be occupied by the enemy for the time being; if there is a north-south highway, the enemy may send out a branch to cut off the Zhengtai Road in the south.In any case, the Hengshan Mountains must be the strategic center for the enemy to seize the three provinces of Hebei, Chacha, and Shanxi, and dispatch the main force to this center. This has been proved by the occupation of Hunyuan, Yuxian, and Guangling. E. The Fu, Yang, Liu, and Tang [7] armies under the command of Jin and Yan all lost their morale, which prevents us from drawing conclusions that these armies can fundamentally undermine the enemy's strategic plan in their current positions.

At this time, the Red Army is in the nature of a detachment and cannot play a decisive role in a decisive battle.However, if properly deployed, it can play a decisive role in supporting guerrilla warfare in North China (mainly in Shanxi). G. In the past, the plan to establish all the Red Army's guerrilla bases in the Hengshan Mountains is fundamentally inapplicable in the above-mentioned situation between the enemy and ourselves.At this time, if the original plan is implemented according to the original plan, we will all be in the enemy's strategic detour. Even if we withdraw to the Taihang Mountains in the second step, we will be completely passive during the detour (assuming the enemy occupies Taiyuan).

Xin. Based on the above situation and judgment, strategically deploy in a mobile position, that is, deploy on the enemy's flanks, restrain the enemy's attack on Taiyuan and continue southward, and assist the Jinsui Army so that it does not lose too much strength. In order to truly carry out independent mountain guerrilla warfare In order to widely mobilize the masses, organize the volunteer army, create guerrilla bases, support guerrilla warfare in North China, and for the sake of expanding the Red Army itself, we plan to change the original deployment and adopt the following strategic deployment: (1) Our Second Front Army[8] should gather in Taiyuan Xin County to the north is on standby, ready to transfer to the Guancen Mountains area in Northwest Shanxi with Yan Zhi's consent. (2) Our Fourth Front Army [9] will enter the Luliang Mountains for activities after the diplomatic issue [10] is resolved, or at an appropriate time. (3) Our army on the one hand [11] is currently entering the southern section of the Hengshan Mountains in a consciously passive posture. If the enemy advances southward and the friendly army fails to repel them, it is prepared to gradually move southward according to the situation. In the Taihang and Taiyue mountains in southeast Shanxi. (4) Headquarters moved into the vicinity of Taiyuan, and an appropriate location was determined according to the situation.

Ren, what do you think? Please consider calling back. Mao Zedong afternoon of the seventeenth Printed from transcripts kept at the Central Archives. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ note [1] Zhu Pengren refers to Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ren Bishi, who were respectively the commander-in-chief, deputy commander-in-chief and director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army at that time.Lin Nie refers to Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, who were respectively the commander and deputy commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time.He Xiao, referring to He Long and Xiao Ke, who were respectively the commander and deputy commander of the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army at that time.Liu refers to Liu Bocheng, who was then the commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army.Xu, refers to Xu Xiangqian (1901-1990), a native of Wutai, Shanxi, who was then the deputy commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army.

[2] At that time, the main force of the Japanese army to attack North China was the six divisions that went south along the Ping-Han Railway and detoured from the Fuyang River to the Ping-Han Railway.The Japanese troops advancing westward and south along the Pingsui Railway and Tongpu Railway were not the main force. [3] The five provinces of North China refer to the five provinces of Hebei, Chahar (now part of Hebei and Shanxi provinces), Suiyuan (now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), Shandong, and Shanxi in North China at that time. [4] Wei Lihuang (1897-1960), a native of Hefei, Anhui.At that time, he was the commander-in-chief of the 14th Army of the Kuomintang Army.

[5] Jiang refers to Chiang Kai-shek. [6] Yan, refers to Yan Xishan, who was then the commander-in-chief of the Second Theater of the Kuomintang Army. [7] Fu, referring to Fu Zuoyi (1895-1974), a native of Linyi, Shanxi, was the commander-in-chief of the Seventh Army of the Kuomintang Army and the commander of the Thirty-fifth Army at that time.Yang, refers to Yang Aiyuan (1888-1959), a native of Wutai, Shanxi, who was then the commander of the 34th Army of the Kuomintang Army.Liu, refers to Liu Maoen (1894-1981), a native of Gong County, Henan Province, who was then the commander of the 13th Army Corps and the 15th Army of the Kuomintang Army.Tang, refers to Tang Enbo (1900-1954), a native of Wuyi, Zhejiang Province, who was then the commander-in-chief of the Seventh Army of the Kuomintang Army and the commander of the Thirteenth Army.

[8] Refers to the 120th Division of the Eighth Route Army. [9] Refers to the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army. [10] Refers to the fact that during the KMT-CCP ​​negotiations, the Chinese Communist Party requested the KMT to publish the "Communist Party Central Committee Announces the Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation Declaration", recognizing the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party.At that time, the party once referred to negotiations with the Kuomintang as a diplomatic issue. [11] Refers to the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.