Chapter 13 Chapter Twelve
During the Long March of the Red Army, Lin Biao was anxious twice, and Chiang Kai-shek was excited three times.All the legions were setting records for the speed of marching, and even Li De fell asleep while walking.Liu Bocheng's 6 small boats allowed the whole army to cross the Jinsha River.The rift in the Huili Conference lasted until the Lushan Conference in 1959.The warrior with a saber on his back, a grenade around his waist, and a chain climbing has become an eternal bronze statue.
On April 29, according to the urgent telegram of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission "Instructions Regarding Our Army's Speedy Crossing of the Jinsha River and Establishing a Soviet Area in Western Sichuan", the Central Red Army took the first army as the left column and the third army as the right column. The Fifth Army Corps formed the central column, and the Third Army marched toward the south bank of the Jinsha River.
Chiang Kai-shek quickly discovered the Red Army's intentions.
Knowing in Guiyang that the Red Army had just arrived in Kunming and then turned to the northwest, Chiang Kai-shek concluded that the Red Army's real intention was to cross the Jinsha River in the north.He immediately ordered Xue Yue to lead all the columns to follow the northern pursuit, and also sent Liu Wenhui to send troops to guard the crossings of the Jinsha River and send the ships to the north bank for strict control. South area.
The Jinsha River is the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. It connects to the Tianhe River, rushes down from the Kunlun Mountains and Hengduan Mountains, and passes through deep mountains and narrow valleys.The river is wide, the current is fast, and the terrain is extremely dangerous.In order to prevent the Red Army from crossing the river, Liu Wenhui of the Sichuan Army captured all the ships to the north bank and controlled the ferry on the north bank.
The intention has been discovered by Jiang.If you can't grasp the ferry, you will have no way to go, and you will be in danger with pursuers behind you.
The Jinsha River became a major danger for the Central Red Army going north.
On May 2, Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, ordered:
The First Corps of the left column crossed the river from the direction of Longjiedu;
The third army of the right column crossed the river from the direction of Hongmendu;
The central column and the Fifth Army crossed the river from the direction of Jiaopingdu.
The army is galloping like lightning.Each legion is creating its own rapid march speed.
The First Army first bluffed towards Kunming, and after completing the feint attack mission, turned around and headed north, and rushed to Longjiedu on May 4.
The three army regiments were divided into two groups, advancing towards the Jinsha River at a speed of 80 kilometers per day and night, and arrived at Hongmendu on May 4.
The central column, led by the chief of the general staff Liu Bocheng, led the third battalion of the cadre regiment as an advance team, marched more than 100 kilometers a day and night, and occupied Jiaopingdu on May 4.
Of the three operations on May 4, only one succeeded.
The First Legion was the first to suffer.The first division and one regiment marched in a hurry to seize the Longjie Ferry, but the ferry had been pulled to the opposite bank by the enemy and burned.There is no equipment for direct bridge building, so I got some door panels, tied them with ropes and put them into the water one by one from the upstream. Because the current was too fast, I couldn't continue to build a third of the river.He crossed the river with a mule pulling the wire. Because of the rush of the river, the mule swam halfway, turned around and came back.
For two full days, no progress.
The First Army Corps first proposed to the Military Commission to cross the river, but they couldn't cross the river themselves.Lin Biao called in a hurry.Li Jukui, the commander of the first division, was about to report, but was interrupted by him, saying, "Don't talk about the situation, just answer me, when will the team be able to cross the river?"
The first division tossed at the ferry for two days without any results. Li Jukui was in a hurry. Seeing that his superiors did not listen to him at all, he immediately became furious. Get up, you will never be able to cross the river!"
The political commissar of the division was so anxious that he pulled the corner of Li Jukui's clothes beside him, but he couldn't do it.
Lin Biao was furious, and cursed his mother on the phone.
Lin Biao, who is quite like a Confucian general, rushed twice during the Long March.One time was to rush across the Xiangjiang River, and sent an urgent telegram to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in the middle of the night that he had to "cross the river at the same time starry night";
Peng Dehuai lost his temper and started to curse. After the Lushan Conference in 1959, it was revealed that almost all the cadres of the three armies had been scolded by Peng Dehuai.Huang Kecheng, Yang Yong, Zhang Aiping, Peng Shaohui, Li Tianyou... are all exceptions. It is difficult to find cadres who have not been scolded by him.
In the war years, the military situation was like fire.Military orders are like mountains.At the moment of victory or defeat, life is at stake.So people can tolerate the commander's anger and curse.
During a certain military emergency, Peng Dehuai and Deng Ping, chief of staff of the regiment, trotted all the way to the front line to command.The guards waved the small triangular red flag to open the way ahead, and a soldier was too tired to sit on the road.Peng Dehuai became anxious and cursed loudly: "You son of a bitch, get up!"
The soldier jumped up, didn't even look at it, and punched Peng Dehuai twice in the chest.
The soldier beat the legion commander, which is not bad!The platoon leader was ordered to tie him up in front of Peng Dehuai, demanding that he be punished strictly.
Peng Dehuai waved his hand: "Who told you to tie it up? It's a small matter, put it back quickly!"
The trembling soldier saluted deeply with tears in his eyes, turned around and chased after the troops.
When the incident happened, some people recalled that it was after the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign against Gao Xingxu, when the three armies chased after Jiang Dingwen and Han Deqin's troops;
Just one of these two battles.
After the battle of Gaoxingxu, the Red Army wiped out Han Deqin's division in the fierce battle of Fangshiling.
In the battle of Nakamura, the Red Army wiped out a brigade.
Is there any record of that soldier?Or has he already shed blood in battle?
Because no one knows the name of that soldier.
In 1929, Lin Biao scolded political workers as "political brats".
This is the second time that Jinshajiang scolded Li Jukui.
The third time was scolding Li Zuopeng in the Northeast. When the Siping retreated in 1946, the radio station failed to be set up after the headquarters retreated to Shulan. Lin Biao, who was thin and thin, overturned the wine and dinner table of Chief of Staff Li Zuopeng.
Cursing father and mother, overturning the wine table, are all big moves.But after 11 years.
It is said that a genius has been born in the world for hundreds of years and in China for thousands of years, but he himself gets angry once in more than ten years and can no longer control it.
The forcible crossing of the Jinsha River and the Siping retreat are both critical moments.Lin Biao, who usually hides his secrets, also lost control of his secret feelings.
When the Longjie Ferry of the First Army Corps was blocked, after the Third Army Corps crossed Peng Xuefeng's Regiment at Hongmendu, the pontoon bridge was washed away by the torrent, making it impossible to cross again.
The first and third armies, the main force of the Central Red Army, were all blocked by the Jinsha River.
The eyes of the whole army turned to Jiaopingdu in the central column.
Liu Bocheng made great contributions.He led the third battalion of the cadre regiment disguised as the Kuomintang army, occupied the ferry and controlled two ships while defending the enemy without any precautions.After the first batch of troops crossed the river, they found four more boats.Liu Bocheng was overjoyed. On the one hand, he set up the crossing headquarters on the riverside and formulated the "Rules on Crossing the River".The column of the Military Commission can be completed in 5 days.
In the war history of the Red Army of Workers and Peasants of China, there are so many combat telegrams.But there are a few key telegrams that experts in war history will recite word by word.For example, the telegram of Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun on April 13 suggesting entering Yunnan to fight; for example, the telegram of Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen on April 25 suggesting crossing the Jinsha River to the north and entering Sichuan to join the Fourth Army.Liu Bocheng's seemingly calm telegram is also one of them.
"It can cross 10,000 people every day and night." For the Red Army troops whose main force was continuously frustrated at Longjie crossing Hongmendu, this is great news and a great way of life!
Zhu De immediately ordered the whole army to cross the river from Jiaoping.The three armies "must arrive at the river before dawn on the 6th to start crossing, and only finish crossing at night on the 6th"; "7 and 8 are the time for the first and fifth armies to cross the river."
Liu Bocheng did not expect that the whole army would cross the river from him.Fearing that the ferry would be lost, he immediately ordered Song Renqiong to lead the third battalion of the cadre regiment to cross the mountain 20 kilometers to seize Tong'an Town to ensure the safety of the ferry.
The third battalion set off overnight and encountered reinforcements in the north of Tong'an.
The enemy was Liu Wenhui's nephew, Liu Yuantang, commander of the First Chuankang Border Defense Brigade.Hearing that Jiang Fang had made a mistake, he personally led two battalions to come for reinforcements.
The cadre regiment is the elite of the Red Army, and the third battalion is also a political battalion, both military and political.Song Renqiong ordered the charge horn to be blown, and the third battalion crushed the enemy with an unstoppable momentum.
Just a few steps away.
If the enemy occupies Tong'an first and presses down from a high position, the Red Army will not know how much more it will pay.
Victory and defeat are often instantaneous, and military opportunities are never fleeting.Liu Bocheng seized the military opportunities one after another.
On May 5, Zhu De sent a telegram to Lin and Nie:
The column of the Military Commission had already crossed the river at the end of the day, and the Third Army Corps could finish crossing in the morning on the 7th. The Fifth Army Corps served as cover in the south of Jiaoxi and was scheduled to cross the river in the afternoon of the 8th. The enemy might reach Jiaoxi on the evening of the 8th.Regardless of fatigue, our first army must rush to Jiaopingdu on the 7th and finish crossing the river before the evening of the 8th, otherwise there is a danger of being cut off.
The enemy has already surrounded and caught up.If the movement is slow, it will be cut off.The First Army immediately abandoned Longjiedu and marched towards Jiaopingdu. From the evening of the 5th to the early morning of the 6th, they crossed mountains and ridges overnight, crossed rapids 48 times, marched 120 kilometers in a hurry, and finally arrived at Jiaopingdu.
Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai have been standing in a cave in the north of the Yangtze River, waiting for the first army that is in danger of being cut off.
From May 4th to May 9th, except for the Peng Xuefeng Regiment of the Third Army Regiment who crossed the river from Hongmendu, and a field hospital from the First Army Regiment who crossed the river from Luche, the six small boats controlled by Liu Bocheng all crossed the river from Jiaopingdu. Crossed the Jinsha River.
Li De also followed in this thrilling team.
Since breaking through the Wujiang River, Liu Bocheng's series of amazing combat performances have made Li De, who has always been defiant, have to express his admiration.The memoir "China Chronicle" that he wrote later, which attacked the leaders of the Communist Party of China in many places, also praised Liu Bocheng when he talked about this period of history: "Liu Bocheng is from Sichuan. The situation is well understood”; “Liu Bocheng asked the Red Army soldiers in the advance battalion to wear a clear blue and white Kuomintang cap badge, and he himself wore a military uniform of a senior Kuomintang officer”; “Liu crossed the river by boat and negotiated with the enemy commander , so that the enemy sent a few more ships over. In this way, the enemy on the other side was deceived, and our army almost ended the battle without firing a single shot." Jinsha River in the border"; "Liu successfully released several Yi chieftains from the KMT's prison, and with their help the two sides signed an agreement on the peaceful passage of the Red Army and the purchase of grain"; "This is a great victory , making it possible for the Red Army to devote all its attention to the Sichuan garrison".
One Liu Bocheng or "Liu" in one mouthful.
When Li De praised Liu Bocheng over and over again, he forgot that during the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression", he reprimanded Liu Bocheng at the General Staff of the Red Army: "You are not as good as an ordinary staff officer. Bai has studied in the Soviet Union for several years!" Forgot once Going to the General Staff of the Red Army, a few confidential officers were cooking on the side of the road blocking his way, and he kicked the rice cooker over with a flying kick.Liu Bocheng quarreled with him, saying that he was an imperialist act, so Liu Bocheng was dismissed as chief of the general staff.
Li De, who made up his mind when the situation was unknown when commanding the Red Army, now walks through the path opened by Liu Bocheng, and he sighs sincerely.
Liu Wenhui had just received an urgent telegram from Chiang Kai-shek asking him to send heavy troops to guard the crossings of the Jinsha River to intercept the Red Army. His nephew Liu Yuantang lost the crossing.
Crushed soldiers are everywhere.Liu Yuantang was so anxious that he burst into tears.
The war history compiled by Taiwan's "Ministry of National Defense" writes: Although the Communist soldiers have few guns, they are extremely flexible in their actions. They rushed all the way to the west, and the national army could neither intercept nor catch up. The area north of Ding crossed the Jinsha River, and its vanguard troops had reached Huili in Xikang, and the pursuit and suppression army was advancing to the south bank of the Jinsha River.The pursuit and suppression campaign in the Guizhou-Yunnan area ended in Yan.
Xue Yue's pursuit and suppression army arrived at the Jinsha River on May 16, and "it ended in Yan", Wang Jiang sighed.
The Red Army got rid of hundreds of thousands of enemy troops chasing and intercepting, and won the initiative in the strategic shift.
It should be Chiang Kai-shek who lamented why the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army always survived from desperation.
After crossing the Jinsha River, the Red Army entered an easy place to go, but came to a difficult place to write about.
Because of that conference.
When writing about the Long March of the Red Army, everyone writes more about the Zunyi Meeting, and everyone writes less about the Huili Meeting.
The former is a wide river, which can be galloped vertically and horizontally without excessive sublimation; the latter is a section of rapids and dangerous shoals, every word and sentence must be carefully considered, and the ship will capsize immediately if you don't pay attention.
Therefore, I tend to adopt the most unified and frugal explanation: the Huili meeting originated from a letter from Lin Biao.This letter is purely Lin Biao's personal emotions and behavior.
If we let individuals bear the burden of history whenever we encounter difficulties, can the things left by our predecessors continue?
After the Red Army crossed the Jinsha River and entered the vicinity of Huili City, in order to ensure a short-term rest for the main force, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided that Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun would command the Red Army and cadres to besiege Huili City.
Huili, on the north bank of the Jinsha River, is an important transportation hub for Yunnan and Sichuan, and has an important strategic position.The enemy defending this place is Liu Yuantang who lost the defense of Jiaopingdu.
Huili City Wall is strong.Liu Yuantang, who had wiped away his tears, led his brigade, keeping his will strong.In order to prevent the Red Army from approaching the city wall, they did not hesitate to burn down the houses in the east and west gates.Chiang Kai-shek sent a plane to inspect the sky over Huili, issued a warrant to promote Liu Yuantang to the rank of lieutenant general, and rewarded him with 10,000 yuan in banknotes, which made him very angry.
On the 9th, the Red Army and the cadre regiment were unable to attack;
On the evening of the 10th, the attack was still unsuccessful;
On the 12th, the tunnel blasting was unsuccessful;
On the evening of the 14th, the Third Army of the Red Army launched a general attack, and a gap was blown in the northwest corner of the city. Liu Yuantang organized people to block the attack desperately, but the Red Army failed to break through, so the explosion in the northeast corner of the city was discovered again. A lot of water made the blasting unsuccessful.
At the time when Liu Yuantang and the Red Army fought most intensely, on May 12, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting in the iron factory near Huili County, known as the Huili meeting in history.
To this day, there are still many things in this meeting that need to be considered repeatedly, need to be avoided, and need to rack their brains to find appropriate words and sentences that are suitable for everyone.
The Zunyi Conference gave birth to the victory of the Chinese revolution, and the Huili Conference gave birth to it, but it cannot be said that they are all victories.
The meeting was proposed by Mao Zedong, in order to unify the understanding of the new strategic policy implemented since the Zunyi meeting and to study the next military action.
The reason for a unified understanding is because of differences.
The immediate cause was Lin Biao.
The focus is on the understanding of the battle of crossing Chishui four times.
Mao Zedong said that crossing Chishui four times was a proud stroke in his life.
The proud pen is also a later one. "Long March Group Songs" sang "Crossing Chishui four times to send out amazing soldiers" and "Chairman Mao used soldiers like a god", all after the revolution was completed and Mao Zedong's prestige was in full swing.
At that time, he almost lost his leadership due to Sidu Chishui.Moreover, the perpetrator was actually Lin Biao, whom Mao Zedong trusted most.
Crossing Chishui four times is great in the eyes of future generations, but greatness has always been at the price of suffering.For a few months, the Central Red Army moved east and west, south and north, striding forward and retreating without direction; from the establishment of the northern Guizhou base, to the northwestern Sichuan base and the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border base, the bases predicted several times were not completed. .The redification of Sichuan and the redification of Guizhou have not been realized.Every day is not crossing the river, climbing mountains, taking new roads, taking old roads, wrong roads, and turning back; marching for a long time, without rest along the way, all feel extremely tired.
Li De was also deeply impressed by that part of the march.He recalled: "If we were sleeping in a village or a yard during the day and a bomb fell nearby, I wouldn't wake up at all. Even if the shell exploded next to it, I would just roll over and go back to sleep. On a plain, I really fell asleep while walking, but the road had already turned, but I went all the way to the nearby creek, and I woke up only when the icy water hit me."
If Li De, who maintains special treatment, is like this, the fatigue level of ordinary Red Army cadres and soldiers can be imagined.
Chiang Kai-shek described the Red Army's actions as "erratic", but he didn't know how much the Red Army paid for it.
Extreme fatigue leads to massive attrition.The sick and exhausted far outnumbered the dead and wounded in battle.
The Battle of Xiangjiang sharply reduced the Red Army's 86,000 men from Jiangxi to more than 40,000, and more than half of them were injured.
Although thousands of recruits were recruited in the Tashi and Zunyi areas during the four crossings of Chishui, by the time they crossed the Jinsha River, the total number of the Red Army had been reduced to more than 20,000, which was reduced by half.
The central government's strategic intentions are not very clear, and it has been unable to find a strategic foothold for a long time. There are general complaints and complaints among the troops. A considerable number of people feel that if this continues, the troops will be dragged down if they are not defeated.
The mood of the troops is affecting the mood of the commander, and the mood of the commander is affecting the mood of the decision-making circle.
From the telegram sent by Lin and Nie to the Military Commission on April 25, there are three "responses" in one sentence: "the original strategy should be changed immediately", "we should quickly get out of this unfavorable situation", "we should cross the Jinsha River into Sichuan via Dongchuan" ; When Peng and Yang sent a telegram on April 26, "Because our army's actions missed the good opportunity to win Pingyi and Panxian counties, the strategy has fallen into an unfavorable area" and demanded "to resolve all urgent incidents", the anxiety of the frontline commanders has become obvious. visible.
Before Lin Biao crossed the Jinsha River, he was already full of complaints.He said that the Red Army had to take a bowstring and take shortcuts, otherwise the troops would be dragged down.After passing Jinsha, he entered the Huili area. As soon as he arrived at the camp, he called Peng Dehuai.
Nie Rongzhen recalled that Lin Biao said on the phone: "The current leadership is no longer possible, you should come out and command. If this continues, we will fail. We obey your leadership, you give orders, and we will follow you."
Peng Dehuai recalled that Lin Biao said on the phone: "Although Chiang Kai-shek and Long Yun's pursuers got rid of it for the time being, their pursuit will not stop. If Chiang Kai-shek reinforces the Sichuan Army and works together to block the Dadu River, if there are pursuers behind, our army can only Turning around in this long and narrow area is very unfavorable. I think it is up to you to command, hurry northward!"
Nie Rongzhen said that Lin Biao's request was rejected by Peng Dehuai.
Peng Dehuai said that he replied at the time, "How can I direct the northward advance? This is a matter for the central government."
Lin Biao put down the phone and wrote a letter to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.After writing the letter, Nie Rongzhen was asked to sign it, but Nie refused, so Lin Biao signed his name and sent the letter up.
Many people know Lin Biao's love of thinking.He also had another, less conspicuous trait: a love of letters.What I think about, I like to write it down.He rarely talks on weekdays, and his combat orders have always been concise.But when writing a letter, no expense was spared, and there are not many short ones.
The issues involved in Lin Biao's letters are generally relatively serious, and the opinions are often quite sharp.If you are correct, you will feel that his eyes are sharp; if you are wrong, you will feel that he is mean.
Several such letters were embedded in history during his lifetime.
On the day of the Baisha meeting on June 8, 1929, Lin Biao learned that Mao Zedong asked to resign as the former secretary of the party committee, and immediately wrote an urgent letter to Mao Zedong: There are actually a few comrades in the Fourth Army whose leadership desires are very high, and their vanity is extremely developed.These comrades also have a relatively high status among the masses.Therefore, they use various feudal forms to form an invisible combination (clique), which specializes in bragging and attacking other comrades.This kind of phenomenon destroys the unity of the party and is not conducive to the revolution. However, many party members have not been able to see this wrong phenomenon and correct it. Comrades of desire, this is a deplorable phenomenon.
...
This was Lin Biao's first and crucial support for Mao Zedong.He disapproved of Mao Zedong leaving the Front Committee and hoped that he would be determined to stay and fight.But the letter used very excessive and hurtful language to Zhu De.
Lin Biao handed the letter to Jiang Hua, secretary-general of the Political Department of the Fourth Red Army.Jiang Hua served as the secretary of the former committee during the Jinggangshan period and has been working beside Mao Zedong. He immediately sent the letter to Mao Zedong.
According to Jiang Hua's recollection, Mao Zedong didn't sleep that night.
The main force of the Fourth Red Army is the 28th Regiment.To master the Fourth Red Army, you must master the 28th Regiment.But this unit was a team of the Nanchang Uprising, not the Autumn Harvest Uprising. It had only been one year since I went to Jinggangshan, and Mao Zedong still couldn't fully grasp this team.The letter from Lin Biao, head of the 28th Regiment, must have been the word "huge" for encouraging Mao Zedong in difficulties.
Mao Zedong, who hadn't slept all night, later wrote back a long and sincere letter to Lin Biao: Comrade Lin Biao: 1. Your letter moved me a lot. Because of your brave advance, my courage has also risen. I will definitely share with you. You and all comrades who seek to advance the unity of the party and the revolution, fight against all harmful ideas, habits, and systems. ...
Since ideological divisions and struggles in the party have already arisen, I will never fail to achieve the goal of victory because of my departure. Therefore, the latter paragraph of your letter is overwhelmed.Naturally, I can only put forward my opinions on my work. I decided to be in the party headquarters. I can still fight with everyone for a day without leaving for a day!
Salute to C!
Mao Zedong
Xinquan on June 14
The letter is very long.Mao Zedong wrote 8,000 words in one breath, expressing all the joys, sorrows, sorrows and joys since the establishment of the Fourth Red Army, and expressing his heart to Lin Biao.
The relationship between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao was extraordinary. In 1936, he talked to Snow in northern Shaanxi about the important role of the three disciplines and the eight attentions in the construction of the Red Army.The three major disciplines are: obey orders in action; do not take anything from workers and peasants;The eight points of attention begin with six items: 1. Put on the door panels; 2. Bale and lay grass; 3. Speak kindly;Later, two more items were added: do not search the pockets of prisoners; avoid women in the bath.
At this point, Mao Zedong paused and added: "The last two were added by Lin Biao."
It is no ordinary person who can add two of the basic provisions formulated by Mao Zedong.The harmonious relationship between Mao and Lin can be seen.
Lin Biao could have added a third clause.
During the reorganization of the Fourth Red Army in Donggu in February 1929, Lin Biao felt that lesbians were cumbersome and troublesome, and he did not want them to stay in the army, so he informed all lesbians to be removed from the Red Army; if anyone did not quit, he would be arrested and shot.At that time, Lin Biao was the head of the 28th Regiment and the commander of the newly formed first column. He had some authority, and some people agreed with Lin Biao's opinion.When the female comrades heard this, they were very frightened. Many of them did not dare to march with the troops, so they had to detour and follow the troops far away.
However, Lin Biao dared not touch He Zizhen, Zeng Zhi and other lesbians who worked in the Women's Section of the Workers' and Peasants Revolutionary Committee, the predecessor of the Political Department of the Fourth Army.If you don't dare to move, you have no authority. The so-called "shooting" is just talking.There are also many people in the army who support lesbians, help them speak, and give them courage.In the end, Lin Biao's simplistic opinion was ignored.
After Mao Zedong wrote a reply letter to Lin Biao in Xinquan, the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army held a meeting in Xiaochi to study the combat plan for three attacks on Longyan, and notified Tan Zhenlin, but Mao Zedong, who was the party representative of the Fourth Army, was not informed.Tan Zhenlin suggested that Mao Zedong also go. Mao Zedong said that there was no notice, so how could he participate.
Not only was Mao Zedong unable to attend the Military Commission meeting, he also lost the former secretary of the Communist Party Committee at the "Seventh National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army a few days later.Four or five people including He Zizhen and Jiang Hua left the army to go to Jiaoyang in western Fujian with 30 yuan banknotes issued by the special committee in western Fujian.Before the people left, Jiang Hua's horse was taken away. Jiang Hua said, "At that time, our group really looked a bit dingy."
That was the most difficult moment when Mao Zedong lost his leadership.
It was at that moment that Lin Biao firmly defended and supported Mao Zedong.
The second time Mao Zedong wrote to him.Lin Biao said in Jinggangshan, "Eating pumpkins every day, can you win the world?"
This letter made Lin Biao regret it all his life.During the War of Liberation, I commanded operations on the Northeast battlefield. As soon as I heard that Yan'an was going to publish Mao Zedong's anthology, I immediately called to ask for the letter to be included. Don't write his name. If the "Cultural Revolution" is determined to be the successor, I am afraid that it will not be safe, so I must find someone to write a paragraph "If you are strong and firmly believe in Marxism-Leninism, you will doubt that a single spark will start a prairie fire."
Then just deal with the letter.Nie Rongzhen did not sign, but signed by himself, and sent it up immediately after signing.
When Mao Zedong lost his leadership, he firmly defended and supported Mao Zedong.Why did Mao Zedong, who had gone through untold hardships and hardships after gaining the leadership right after the Zunyi Conference, suddenly stand up against it and recommend Peng Dehuai?
Lin Biao never forgot the two defeats Mao Zedong commanded during this period.The defeat of Tucheng before crossing Chishui was a great loss, and the redification of Sichuan was in vain; the defeat of Luban before crossing Chishui three times, the Red Army could only leave Guizhou, and it was impossible to redify Guizhou.
What particularly bothered Lin Biao was Mao Zedong's denial of his drumming new battle.
Lin Biao had a strong sense of personal self-esteem and self-respect.Nie Rongzhen recalled that he kept a small book with him, and it was densely filled with the previous battles he had commanded and the numbers of enemies wiped out, captured, and captured in the battles.This is Lin Biao's lifeblood.Talking about these figures, his face immediately glowed, and he could read along the pages of the small book with high spirits; his usual posture of having nothing to say and being serious disappeared.The subordinates said: "The commander of the legion is alive again."
But during the four crossings of Chishui, his notebook was basically blank.Peng Dehuai unified command of the first and third armies to achieve the Zunyi victory.Lin Biao also wanted to unify the command of the first and third armies to achieve a great victory.But the new battle of playing drums was denied by Mao Zedong.Mao Zedong asked him to unify the command of the Luban battle of the first and third armies, which was another losing battle.
For the rest, there are endless retreats, diversions, back roads, bow back roads, and saddle roads.
Lin Biao would not write these things down in a small notebook.
These defeats were etched in his mind.
After the Zunyi Conference, he crossed Chishui and wanted to turn Sichuan into red, and underestimated the Sichuan warlords’ determination to defend Sichuan; after crossing Chishui and Zunyi, he wanted to turn Guizhou into redness, and underestimated Chiang Kai-shek’s ambition to win Guizhou. In Lin Biao’s eyes, these were undoubtedly Mao Zedong’s ideas lose.Peng Dehuai commanded the first and third armies, and won the biggest victory since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in one battle.Moreover, when Peng Dehuai was in command, he basically gnawed hard bones such as attacking and defending by himself, and he always let Lin Biao eat good meat such as detours and outflanking, which avoid the front and have cheap speed. Lin Biao also admired Peng Dehuai for this.In addition, two days before the Luban battle, Peng Dehuai proposed that there was no possibility of breaking Zhou Hunyuan, and suggested leaving the battlefield. On April 13, he suggested to the Military Commission to enter Yunnan, and his opinions were very critical.
So Lin Biao didn't think about it any more, and proposed that Peng Dehuai should come out to take command.
Lin Biao was by no means alone in feeling this way.He called and wrote letters. Li Zhuoran, political commissar of the Fifth Army Corps, Zuo Quan, chief of staff of the First Army Corps, Zhu Rui, director of the Political Department, and Luo Ruiqing, director of the Security Bureau, were all present, and no one dissuaded him.
Just as Lin Biao doubted how long the red flag could last during the Jinggangshan period represented a common sentiment, so doubting Mao Zedong's command after crossing Chishui four times was also a common sentiment.
On April 26th, Peng and Yang of the Red Army sent a report to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission: "Because our army missed the good opportunity to win Pingyi and Panxian, the strategy has fallen into a disadvantageous area"; suggested that "tomorrow we should continue to advance to the northwest to cross the Donghongjiang, strive for a few days of rest, and resolve all urgent matters."Among them, the phrase "resolve all urgent matters" seems to be suspected of reviewing the leadership.
The original text of Lin Biao's letter has not been disclosed yet.The memories of the parties involved inevitably have some subjective color.For example: requesting the replacement of military leaders; wanting Zhu and Mao to step down, mainly Mao Zedong;
Lin Biao, whose mind is spinning so fast, doesn't seem to be so straightforward.
The quotes in "Peng Dehuai's Autobiography" are more credible.Peng Dehuai recalled that Lin Biaoxin's general idea was as follows: Mao (Zedong), Zhu (De), and Zhou (Enlai) accompanied the army to preside over the grand plan, and asked Peng Dehuai to command the former enemy, and quickly march north to join the Red Fourth Front Army.
It is credible because it fits Lin Biao's character.No matter how loud the complaints are, when it comes to the issue of command power, the words are still said in a roundabout way.At first glance, Mao Zedong was not alone.Two months ago, Mao Zedong proposed to resign during the debate on the new battle of drumming, and there was also an arrangement for Peng Dehuai to temporarily act as the commander-in-chief of the former enemy.Therefore, Lin Biao's proposal was not completely groundless, nor was it very abrupt.
This widespread dissatisfaction had already aroused Mao Zedong's vigilance.But the time for a solution is not yet ripe.
If he is immature, Mao Zedong will not act.
Therefore, there was an instruction to the front-line commanders on April 25: "The Central Committee believes that your opinions on the Central Committee and the Military Commission will never hinder our internal unity and guarantee the resolute implementation of the Military Commission's orders"; With the courageous maneuvering and the firmness of the Bolsheviks, lead all the red commanders and fighters to fight the enemy bravely, and correct all incorrect tendencies in the troops to complete the sacred tasks given to you by the Central Committee and the Military Commission.”
Stop at the point, do not make a forced solution.
At the beginning of 1929, the Fourth Red Army, which broke away from the base area, was in circles in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, and it was difficult for more than 3,000 people to eat.Many cadres demanded that the troops be divided into activities, and the front committee should hold a meeting to make a decision.Mao Zedong saw that the division of troops at a meeting might become the majority opinion, so he suppressed it and refused to discuss it, and ignored the increased dissatisfaction caused by it.Practice has proved that Mao Zedong was right.If the troops are divided, there will be no subsequent victory in Dabaidi.
After crossing Chishui four times, Mao Zedong faced this situation again.
Successfully crossing the Jinsha River left the chasing enemy far behind, with a distance of one week.The strategic policy of crossing the river to the north that has been pursued since the Zunyi Conference has been realized.Mao Zedong felt that the time was ripe to solve the problem.
It was at this time that Lin Biao wrote.Mao Zedong saw that Lin Biao, whom Mao Zedong had always trusted and was good at annihilating the enemy in motion, also came out to criticize the command, which showed that the problem was quite serious and had to be resolved.
Lin Biao's letter became a catalyst.Mao Zedong immediately proposed to Zhang Wentian to convene an enlarged meeting of the Politburo.
Zhang Wentian agreed with Mao Zedong's suggestion.
Although it is an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, there are strict restrictions on the level of expansion.There were not many participants: Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang from the three-person military leadership group, Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen from the First Army Corps, Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun from the Third Army Corps, a total of 8 people.
The requirements are very strict, and the person who notifies must attend the meeting.Peng Dehuai was commanding the attack on Huili City and was withdrawn from the front line; Yang Shangkun was sick and had a high fever and could not ask for leave, so he was carried to the venue on a stretcher.
The venue is shabby.Fearing that enemy planes would attack, a thatched shed was temporarily set up on a hillside depression outside Huili City called Iron Factory as the meeting place.The head of the legion made a floor bunk in the grass shed.
There are two transmission materials: one is a letter from Lin Biao of the First Army Corps, and the other is a telegram from Liu Shaoqi and Yang Shangkun of the Third Army Corps.
The meeting was tense.
Zhang Wentian chaired the meeting and made a report.The outline of the report has been agreed with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang before the meeting.In his report, he severely criticized Lin Biao's suspicion and wavering of Mao Zedong's military command as a manifestation of right deviation.
Mao Zedong took over to speak.Zhang Wentian pointed his finger at Lin Biao, but Mao Zedong pointed his finger at Peng Dehuai.At first the participants were not aware of it.
Mao Zedong said, we crossed Chishui several times and mobilized the enemy. Although the journey was hard, we finally crossed the Jinsha River successfully and escaped the enemy's encirclement and interception. The day is just around the corner.But now there are some people who go a little further, have opinions, complain, and even write letters to the Central Committee demanding a change of leadership. This is a sign of wavering and right opportunism.
Everyone thought he was talking about Lin Biao.
Before noon, Peng Dehuai spoke.Huili City was defeated several times, and he was anxious, so he talked about military operations.As soon as he said that crossing the Jinsha River and entering the Huili area was a great victory, his speech was interrupted by Mao Zedong.
Mao Zedong said loudly, Comrade Peng Dehuai, you are dissatisfied with the loss of the Central Soviet Area, and waver in difficulties. This is a right deviation; the letter written by Lin Biao was instigated by you; The central government reported that you don't sign; Yang Shangkun is Peng Dehuai's tail, what kind of political commissar.
The words were very heavy and came out of nowhere, and the participants were all shocked.
Peng Dehuai was also unprepared.He entered the venue only to see Lin Biao's letter copied on carbon paper.After reading the letter, I didn't mind, thinking that the command of the former enemy was the command of the battlefield.1. The three armies have long formed this relationship in battle: sometimes the first red army commanded the third red army, and sometimes the third red army commanded the first red army, and sometimes cooperated automatically; I didn't expect how many mysteries there were.
As for Lin Biao, seeing that his letter was used as a meeting material, he felt that the situation was not good.Now that Mao Zedong was so angry, he hastened to defend himself, saying that he was writing to the central government because he was always on the go, and he was bored; before he finished speaking, Mao Zedong interrupted him by saying, "You are a baby, what do you know?" .
Also freed him.
Mao Zedong still had some words that he did not say at the meeting.The reason why he took Lin Biao's letter very seriously was because he suspected that Lin Biao had Peng Dehuai behind him, and Peng Dehuai had Zhang Wentian behind him.
In fact, Peng Dehuai didn't know anything about Lin Biao's letter. At the Lushan Conference in 1959, Mao Zedong’s old story was brought up again. Lin Biao, who was urgently summoned to Lushan to criticize Peng, came out and explained: the Huili Conference wrote to the Central Committee, asking Mao, Zhu, and Zhou to leave their military leadership positions, and Peng Dehuai commanded the battle. Peng Dehuai discussed it, but it has nothing to do with Peng Dehuai.
As for the telegram between Liu and Yang, after Liu Shaoqi finished writing it, Peng Dehuai felt that he had a different opinion, so he did not sign it and sent it in the names of Liu and Yang.The unaware letters were said to be at his instigation, and the known telegrams felt inappropriate and were not signed, which became an intentional concealment of the situation from the central government.彭德怀后来说：“当时听了也有些难过，但大敌当前，追敌又迫在金沙江了，心想人的误会总是有的，以为林彪的信，是出于好意，想把事情办好吧。我既没有同林彪谈过话，而同刘少奇的谈话内容也是完全正当的，我就没有申明，等他们将来自己去申明。我采取了事久自然明的态度。”
作为会议主持者，张闻天在会上代表中央批评下面，本身没有受到明显的批评。但当时毛泽东已经听信了个别人的汇报，认为张闻天煽动林、彭反对三人团，要林、彭代替三人团指挥，张闻天到三军团去是与彭德怀勾结等等。会理会议上从毛泽东话语里也听得出来，他怀疑张闻天参与其事，是与彭德怀结合在一起的。
彭德怀觉得难过，张闻天感到委屈。大敌当前，团结要紧，两人在会上会下都没有争辩。
不但未申辩，彭德怀在发言中批评了林彪，更批评了自己。
他说，由于在平桥、鲁班场战斗中没有打好，给部队增加了许多困难，觉得这样下去不行，因而也引起对新领导的某些怀疑，这是不对的。今后应当团结一致，坚决地拥护新领导，在新领导指挥下继续北上，争取早日与四方面军靠近。
一口一个“新领导”，对粗犷的彭德怀来说，也实在不易。别人对毛泽东早改称“主席”了，他还一口一个“老毛”、“老毛”的，用很大劲才改正过来；对以毛泽东为首的新三人团称“新领导”，他真是费劲不小了。
对林彪给中央写信，他只说了一句：事先我不知道，更不是我鼓动他写的。便不再过多解释了。
长征路上，大敌当前，团结对敌压倒一切，维护中央权威十分重要。虽然毛泽东的一些批评与实际情况不符，但被批评者都没有过多申辩。
周恩来、朱德发言，也称赞毛泽东的指挥，支持毛泽东的意见。
会议开了两三天。最后由会议主持者张闻天代表中央作结论，批评反对机动作战、怀疑军事领导的思想，肯定毛泽东的军事指挥，维护遵义会议确立的政治领导和军事领导的团结，克服右倾思想。
会议决定红军立即北上，同四方面军会合。
对会理会议怎么看，争论并不多。在统一红军作战思想、克服存在的消极情绪、确定新的前进方向这些积极意义说完之后，人们都小心翼翼回避党内高级领导人因会理会议产生的裂痕。
但裂痕是无法回避的。
彭德怀说，此事24年内毛泽东提了4次。1959年庐山会议毛泽东第四次提此事时，林彪站出来申明，信是他自己决定写的，与彭无关，一桩公案才终于了清。这件事成为彭德怀在自己被彻底打倒的庐山会议上，唯一可聊以自慰的事。
彭德怀后来总结道：“从现在的经验教训来看，还是应当谈清楚的好，以免积累算总账，同时也可避免挑拨者利用。”
对张闻天的误解，毛泽东到延安整风才完全挑明。1941年六七月小型谈话会上说一次，1943年9月的政治局会议上又说一次。张闻天只有认真对待了。他利用许多同志在延安的机会搞了一些调查，最后在《1943年延安整风笔记》中作澄清说：“现在大致可以判明，说我曾经煽动林、彭反对三人团的话，是×××同志的造谣！（林、彭同志关于此事有正式声明）”
这份《1943年延安整风笔记》是张闻天的检讨。在长达五万多字的自我剖析中，辩诬文字只有屈指可数的几处。会理会议便是其中之一。可见其裂痕影响至深。
简单看中共党史，很多人都不理解为什么在四渡赤水毛泽东这神来之笔后，他最信任的林彪会跳出来写这样一封信。为什么要开这么一个会理会议。
关键是不了解、不领悟红军当时的严重困境。这段时期内，从来不发火的朱德也两次发火；从来不叫困难的周恩来也说“相当艰难困苦的一个时期”；从来不骂人的林彪也破口骂人；这种情况下，上上下下从指挥员到战斗员中有想法，有情绪，丝毫没有什么奇怪。不反映出来，反倒是不正常的了。
林彪继续用写信这种方式表达自己的意见。
中央红军长征到达陕北后，在对战略方向的认识上他同毛泽东发生了分歧。1935年12月中旬，政治局召开瓦窑堡会议前，征求各军团领导干部对战略问题的意见。林彪借机又写了一信。信中称开辟陕南比巩固和扩大陕北更重要，更有意义。他还开列了一个长长的名单，要求将红一方面军的主要干部尽数调出，由他率领南下。
这封信当即受到毛泽东的批评。
1928年春天，南昌起义部队刚刚到井冈山，一次毛泽东路过，正逢一个年轻指挥员给部队讲话：“不管这个军阀还是那个土匪，只要有枪，就有地盘，就有一块天下。我们红军也有枪，也能坐天下！”毛泽东一下怔住了，问朱德这个娃娃是谁？朱德告之：二十八团一营营长林彪。毛泽东自此记住了这个浓眉大眼的指挥员。林彪那种一针见血的语言，给毛泽东留下了深刻印象。
然后就是那些信。林彪写信以大胆著称。很多时候因火药味太浓、政治委员不敢签名而且劝林彪不要这样写，他照样不管不顾，大笔一挥签上自己的名字，以个人名义送上去。这种时候人们会发现，“行事桩桩少对人言”对林彪来说，连个影子都看不到。
看不到不等于不存在，而是被艰苦激烈的斗争抑制了。在毛泽东最困难的时候，他写过支持毛泽东领导的信。在毛泽东渡过难关顺利掌权的时候，他又写过反对毛泽东领导的信。各种各样的信加在一起，总体看带来的好处不多，惹出的麻烦却不少。
在井冈山第一次见林彪时，毛泽东问朱德：这个娃娃是谁？在会理会议斥责林彪时，毛泽东说：你是个娃娃，懂得什么？
林彪已经不是娃娃了。
张闻天在《1943年延安整风笔记》中，对会理会议评价说：会理会议基本上是正确的，同当时干部中离心倾向及一些动摇情绪作斗争是必要的。但我以为斗争方式还是过火的。因为这些同志的错误，实质上不过是个别的错误，只要加以适当的批评与解释，错误就会改正的，不必用机会主义的大帽子去压他们。
这个会议的裂痕延续久远。
我们总结自己的历史，辉煌是财富，教训也是财富。甚至是更值得珍惜的财富。
我们怕教训影响辉煌，我们便失掉了很多珍贵的财富。
红军长征期间，蒋介石兴奋过三次。
第一次是从红军突围西征、他腾出手来精心布置的“湘江追堵”。当此战役最紧张的时刻，蒋介石在南昌行营搓手摩拳，捏着一封封电报，对照钉在四壁的地图，核实各路大军到达位置，一分分削减红军实力。最后认为红军牺牲很大，但地方实力派追堵不完全尽力，意犹未尽。
第二次是在红军鲁班场战斗失利，三渡赤水到四渡赤水之间。他判断红军此时举棋不定，是因大政方针未定，已无处立足。于是调集川、滇、黔、湘军及中央军，在川南黔北一带大修碉堡，以为用江西的老办法，在川黔边一举围歼红军。
第三次便是红军抢渡金沙江、大渡河期间。
当时红一军团前锋直指昆明。当时滇军主力全部调入川黔，昆明城只有一些团防及警卫部队，龙云十分恐慌。蒋通过空军侦察发现红军在昆明附近又调头北上，与幕僚研究后，判定红军是声东击西，真正企图是强渡金沙江无疑。便令增援昆明的薛岳调头向北，在电令中有“同仇敌忾，灭此朝食”之语。
5月中旬红军攻打会理城期间，蒋介石飞到昆明，在五华山龙云布置的房子里一住就是二十多天，布置大渡河会战。此时薛岳一部已渡过金沙江，蒋又电令刘湘以川军二十军全部及二十一军一部归杨森指挥，火速进至大渡河北岸防堵；令刘文辉部6个旅堵截红军，掩护薛岳部北进；令刘文辉二十四军主力布防大渡河北岸严密封锁，并让杨森、刘文辉到汉源指挥。
蒋在电令中特别强调：大渡河是太平天国石达开大军覆灭之地，今共军人此汉彝杂处、一线中通、江河阻隔、地形险峻、给养困难的绝地，必步石达开覆辙，希各军师鼓励所部建立殊勋。
红军再一次陷入危险局面。
红军过金沙江后曾将追敌甩掉一周之遥，取得战略转移中具有决定意义的胜利。
但从来没有不包含时间因素的胜利。在时间的消耗中，胜利也会变为不利。
3月31日红军南渡乌江跳出敌人的包围圈，曾把蒋介石几十万追兵甩在身后。但在滇东，敌人又围了上来。
5月9日渡过金沙江又远远甩下了敌人，但在会理地区耽搁太久。从9日到14日夜，以整整6天时间强攻会理城。待15日决定放弃对会理的围攻挥师北进时，时间优势基本耗光。再不抓紧时间抢渡大渡河，就真的要成为石达开第二了。
说不清是第几次，红军又陷入了危机。
一次次脱离险区，又一次次面临险境。
大渡河是岷江的一大支流，上源名大金川，出青海南部，流入西康省（今四川省西部）后同小金川汇合，经过泸定桥至安顺场，折而向东流至乐山入岷江。河面宽200米，流速每秒4米，河水沿着十分险要的石壁向下奔泻，数十里路也不易找到一个渡口，大部队通过极为困难。蒋介石就想凭借大渡河天险，布置重兵南攻北堵，一举消灭红军，让红军成为“石达开第二”。
红军把希望放在了安顺场。
21日，红军到达冕宁县泸沽地域后，即兵分两路。主力部队向安顺场进发，红一军团二师五团向大树堡方向进击，以钳制和吸引富林（今汉源）一带敌人。
先遣司令刘伯承率红一师走在最前面。
在向安顺场进发的路上，刘伯承骑着马，喃喃自语了一路：“有船我就有办法！有船我就有办法！”
警卫员说昨夜梦里他翻来覆去也是这句话。
在金沙江就是凭手中掌握的6只船，硬是化险为夷，把中央红军全部渡了过去。
如果安顺场没有船怎么办？
不光刘伯承，很多人想都不敢想。
5月24日夜，红一军团一师一团一营占领安顺场渡口。还好，搞到一条船。
根据渡金沙江的经验，刘伯承寄希望于对岸。
红一军团一师一团一营组织的强渡开始了。以二连长熊尚林为首的17名勇士登上了第一船。船在猛烈火力掩护下向对岸进发时，刘伯承、聂荣臻禁不住都走出了工事，紧紧盯住那条关系千军万马命运的小船。军团政治部组织部长萧华亲自吹起了冲锋号。
强渡成功了，但对岸再没有发现船。
渡金沙江总共搞到6条船：皎平渡先控制了两条，首批部队过江后又找到4条。刘伯承曾兴奋地向军委报告“每日夜能渡一万人”。
大渡河却仅有一条船。一船最多坐40人。往返一次一个多小时。每日夜顶多也只能渡过五六百人。
靠这条船，一船一船摆渡。全军渡河要一个多月。
杨得志的红一团26日上午10点渡河完毕时，追敌薛岳纵队已经进抵西昌以北的礼州，杨森的第二十军先头部队已达金口河，离安顺场只有几天的路程了。
焦虑万分的刘伯承发出了两个“千方百计”命令：工兵连要千方百计地架桥；各部队要千方百计地找船。
两个“千方百计”一个也没有实现。
工兵连用8根二号铁丝缉缆，只系上3个竹排，放入水中即被激流冲断。
沿河两岸也再没有发现一条船。
消息报来，刘伯承只对自己说了一句：“看来架桥不可能了……”便再也无语。
这位首先突破乌江、首先突破金沙江的军中之神，在大渡河陷入了深深的困境。
夺取安顺场前，聂荣臻曾问主攻营营长：“孙继先，你知道石达开吗？”
孙继先回答：“管他十达开九达开，我们一定能过河！”
刘伯承接着说：“我们会不会成为石达开，这就看你们的了。”
孙继先营以坚决的行动完成了任务。
但成为石达开的可能性依然还在。
渡金沙江时，红军本是分三路过江。刘伯承在船到手之后，方知道全军都要集中到皎平渡过江。这回却大不一样。行动之初，全军就预定要从安顺场渡过。先遣司令刘伯承深知责任重大。渡河成败关系全军的命运。红军会不会成为石达开第二，现在军委就盯着他刘伯承了。
军情十万火急。蒋军的飞机在空中撒传单：前有大渡河，后有金沙江，朱毛红军插翅难逃。
5月26日中午，毛泽东、朱德、周恩来来到安顺场。
刘伯承急着向军委领导汇报，毛泽东却一边喝着缴获来的米酒，一边若无其事地谈笑风生。
他问刘伯承：“诸葛亮七擒七纵才使孟获心服，你怎么一下子就说服了小叶丹呢？”刘伯承心里正为大渡河着急，回答说，主要是严格执行了党的民族政策。
毛泽东又问：“你跟小叶丹结拜真的跪在地上起誓吗？”刘伯承答，确是如此，彝人最重义气，看诚心诚意，才信任我们。
毛泽东不容刘伯承插进别的话，再问：“那彝人下跪是先跪左腿呢，还是先跪右腿呢？”这下刘伯承被问住了。
越是危险境地越要扯轻松事，是毛泽东一贯的风格。
1929年4月，脱离了井冈山的红四军在赣南立足未稳，前途未卜，毛泽东一次在河边突然问陈毅、谭震林、江华：鱼在水中睡不睡觉啊？一下把众人问住了。
解放战争在陈南庄遭空袭，敌机都到头顶上了，江青钻了防空洞，其他领导同志也进去了，警卫员把他从床上拉起来，他先想到的不是进洞，是抽一支烟。
毛泽东就是毛泽东。即使面临生死存亡，也颇有一股拿得起来、抛得开去的气概。一股偏不信邪、偏不从命的气概。共产党人赞此为领袖气概，国民党人骂此为帝王气概。赞也好，骂也好，毛泽东就是如此。不如此，便也不是毛泽东了。
泰山崩于前而色不变，不是不知道泰山会崩于前。与刘伯承说笑归说笑，最坏的准备却在谈笑风生中做好了。
全军集中安顺场渡江已不可能，决定将一军团分为两半：一师和干部团在安顺场渡河，编为右纵队，由刘伯承、聂荣臻指挥，沿大渡河左岸前进；二师和五军团编为左纵队，由林彪指挥，循大渡河右岸前进；两路纵队沿大渡河夹岸突进，火速抢占泸定桥。大队红军随左纵队前进，从泸定桥过河。
谈话之间，红军的过河地点作出了迅速改变。
若泸定桥也不能过河呢？
毛泽东用并非轻松的口吻说道：“假如两路不能会合，被分割了，刘、聂就率部队单独走，到四川去搞个局面。”
在此严峻时刻，众人皆无异议。
刘伯承、聂荣臻二人，正是遵义会议建议渡江入川、建立川西北根据地的人。当时三万红军想从川南渡江尚不可得，现在以红一师单独“到四川去搞个局面”，谈何容易！大家又都明白这是完全无法之时的办法！
毛泽东后来写道：大渡桥横铁索寒。
5月底的铁索寒到什么程度？恐怕今日即使你到已经列入国家文物保护重点的泸定铁桥上去亲手摸一摸，也体会不出来。
这就是为什么我们后来那么