Chapter 12 Chapter Eleven Suffering and Glory

Mao Zedong lost four battles in his life, two of which occurred in Sidu Chishui; after the Zunyi meeting, he almost lost his position as the commander-in-chief of the former enemy.Wu Qiwei chased the Red Army all the way, but on October 1, 1949, he stood on the viewing platform of the founding ceremony.The changes in the Red Army's strategic decision-making have been dizzying.There is no truth in every sentence, only seeking truth from facts step by step. On September 10, 1956, Mao Zedong delivered a speech at the second plenary meeting of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China: "I have made mistakes. For example, in wars. Gao Xingwei lost the battle, which was under my command; Nanxiong lost the battle, it was I commanded; I commanded the battle of Tucheng during the Long March, and I commanded the battle of Moutai.”

Of the four defeats cited, two of them occurred between Sidu Chishui. And the Red Army's "Long March Group Songs" sang heroically: "Crossing Chishui four times out of surprise soldiers, Chairman Mao's use of troops is really like a god." What is the relationship between the two defeats and the use of soldiers like gods? The Zunyi Conference determined that the new direction of the Red Army was to cross the river and enter Sichuan. At 24:00 on January 16, the Field Army Command sent a telegram to "make a new arrangement for the transfer to the Chishui area", commanding the corps to move northwest of Zunyi.After that, a similar telegram will be sent every day, three times in a row.

On January 19, the Field Army Command left Zunyi. On January 20, the Field Army Command issued the "Operation Plan for Crossing the River": After crossing the river in the south of Sichuan, it will be transferred to the northwest of Sichuan, and it will cooperate with the Fourth Front Army to carry out a general counteroffensive and strive to redify Sichuan. On January 22, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Military Commission called the Fourth Front Army, informing the Central Red Army of its plan to cross the river to the north, instructing it to "attack to the west of the Jialing River" and cooperate with the First Front Army to go north.

On January 23, Pan Wenhua ordered Guo Xunqi to lead two brigades to march towards Tucheng and hold the Red Army in the east bank of the Chishui River to prevent them from entering Sichuan. The northern Guizhou area suddenly became a huge chessboard. The commanders of both sides dispatched troops and generals, approaching step by step, swords drawn. On January 25, the First Red Army entered Tucheng and advanced towards Chishui City. Chishui City was occupied by the Sichuan army in advance. Tucheng is located in the northwest of Guizhou. It is an important ferry on the east bank of Chishui River and the hub of North Guizhou Avenue. Its east, south and north sides are steep mountains, which is a good area for crossing Chishui to the west.

Chishui City is located at the junction of Sichuan and Guizhou, with large mountains and steep slopes in the southeast, open valleys in the northwest, and roads adjacent to the nearby counties of Sichuan and Guizhou. These two key points, one south and one north, are the places that must be seized according to the "Crossing the River Operation Plan" of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.Between the two points is the vast area where the Central Red Army crossed Chishui westward.Capturing and keeping these two places is the key to realizing the northward crossing of the Yangtze River and the redification of Sichuan.

The Red Army occupied Tucheng before the Sichuan Army and gained a favorable position for crossing to the west.However, the Sichuan Army occupied Chishui City before the Red Army, hindering the Red Army's northward advance.Although both sides had their own gains and losses, the Red Army's battle plan to cross the river to the north was compromised from the very beginning. It is necessary to take a look at the opponent of the Red Army-General Guo Xunqi of the Sichuan Army.The relationship between this person and Sichuan Communist Party members Yang Angong, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and others is extraordinary and they have deep contacts.

Guo Xunqi is from Huayang, Sichuan. His family life was very difficult since he was a child, and he worked as an apprentice in a pharmacy.After serving as a soldier, he was highly valued by Pan Wenhua for his bravery in combat. He was promoted from clerical sergeant to regiment commander. Chen Yi's eldest brother Chen Mengxi had worked as a clerical in Guo Tuan. In 1922, Chen Yi returned from a work-study program in France, went to Wanxian to find his brother, and also met Guo Xunqi, the head of the regiment.Soon after Chen Yi went to Chongqing, Guo also transferred to Chongqing as the commander of the 65th brigade, and the two often communicated.

In August 1925, Wu Yuzhang went to Chongqing and established a temporary provincial party headquarters of the Kuomintang in Lianhuachi led by Communist Party members.Guo Xunqi met Yang Angong, Secretary of the Chongqing Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party of China, Li Xiaoting and others during his participation in the activities, and his thoughts gradually tended to be progressive.At the military conference held in the name of the Kuomintang Provincial Party Headquarters hosted by Yang Angong, he frequently interacted with Liu Bocheng and others who had a long history of friendship.

Pan Wenhua was also aware of these activities of Guo Xunqi, but thought that these friendships were not a serious problem, and tried to accommodate Guo as much as possible. But the relationship between Guo Xunqi and these Communists is a step beyond friendship. At noon on March 30, 1927, Guo Xunqi learned that the Sichuan army was going to destroy the mass meeting scheduled to be held the next day in Chongqing in support of the Nanjing tragedy, and immediately went to tell Yang Angong, Li Xiaoting and others in person.Yang Angong decided that the meeting would remain unchanged and be held as usual.Guo was worried, and rushed to the venue with a few soldiers the next day.Before the meeting, Pan Wenhua sent a messenger to report to Guo: "The division is holding an emergency meeting, please go back quickly, brigade commander!" At the same time, he handed over a note saying "The matter will be returned quickly", and Guo immediately showed the note to Yang Angong and others. , And said to the two soldiers: "You stay here, you must protect Committee Member Yang." That is to say, return to the division headquarters.

Only then did everyone realize the seriousness of the problem, and were about to evacuate the venue when gunshots rang out.The Sichuan army started a bloody massacre of the people present, creating the "March 31" tragedy that shocked the whole country. In the white terror of hunting down the Communists throughout the city, Guo Xunqi placed Xiao Huaqing, Zhou Qinyue and other Communists in his mansion, then dressed them up as soldiers and personally escorted them on board the ship to Wuhan.Chen Yi didn't know that Chongqing was so tight. On April 2, he came from Hechuan to report to Yang Angong to report to work. He saw that there were many guard posts everywhere, strict inspections and difficult actions, so he found Guo Xunqi.Guo stayed with Chen Yi for one night, and the next day disguised Chen Yi as a comprador, bought a boat ticket, got on Guo's sedan chair, and sent his trusted adjutants to escort him on board to Wuhan.Guo also learned that Yang Angong was also in a hurry to go to Wuhan, so he asked his sixth sister Yang Lijun to tell him not to go out for activities.But Yang was eager to go to Wuhan, and was unfortunately arrested and killed after getting on the boat in disguise.

This series of activities of Guo Xunqi was reported to Liu Xiang, and Liu Xiang dismissed his post as brigade commander and promoted him to deputy division commander, preventing him from taking real power. One reason why Liu Xiang didn't push Guo Xunqi to the end was to take care of Pan Wenhua's emotions, and the other reason was that Guo had a relationship with the Communist Party and might be useful in the future. It can be said that Liu Xiang's city is indeed not shallow. The opportunity really came. In January 1935, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Liu Xiang to send three divisions into Guizhou to stop the Red Army.Liu Xiang first sent Liao Ze brigade to Guizhou, but Jiang was dissatisfied and asked Liu to send two more divisions.Liu Xiang decided to send two more brigades into Guizhou, but these two brigades must be able to take active actions to deal with Chiang Kai-shek on the surface, but also secretly preserve themselves and not actively attack the Red Army; Can fight hard to stop it. Liu Xiang chose Guo Xunqi.He believed that Guo was loyal to himself and at the same time sympathetic to the Communist Party; if he was asked to carry out the tasks of "suppressing the Communist Party" and "existing the Communist Party", he could act according to his own circumstances and he could rest assured. In Liu Xiang's private residence in Liziba, Chongqing, Liu Xiang and Guo Xunqi had a secret conversation. Liu Xiang spotted Guo Xunqi.Guo Xunqi, who had been so progressive, spared no effort in resisting the Red Army's entry into Sichuan. On January 20, Guo Xunqi led two brigades to Wenshui, Guizhou, and followed the main force of the Red Army to Liangcun.In Xishui, Guo received a secret telegram from Liu Xiang, informing the Red Army that the main force was pointing to Chishui, and asked him to act quickly to contain the Red Army from entering Sichuan. On January 26, Mao Zedong arrived in Tucheng.Guo Xunqi also followed the Red Army and entered the area east of Tucheng.After studying with Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and Liu Bocheng, Mao Zedong determined to encircle and wipe out the Guo tribe in the Qinggangpo area east of Tucheng. Six days ago, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission pointed out in the "Crossing the River Operation Plan": "If necessary, in the area east of Chishui, conduct a decisive battle with the enemy who is chasing and intercepting." Now, Mao Zedong thought the time was right. On January 27, one of Lin Biao's legions fell into a fierce battle with the Sichuan Army in the south of Chishui City.Li Jukui's first division was surrounded by the Sichuan army on three sides in Huangpidong, and suffered heavy casualties; Chen Guang's second division did not fight well in Fuxingchang.Guo Xunqi followed Dong Zhentang's Fifth Army Corps, and in the afternoon seized Qinggangpo on the east side of Tucheng and the southeast end of Shiqiongzui, cutting off the Fifth Army Corps' connection with the Third Army Corps' Fourth Division. The decisive battle with Guo Bu has not yet begun, and the overall situation has turned bad. On January 28, the Red Army's Third Army Corps and Fifth Army Corps launched a decisive battle with Sichuan Army Guo Xunqi in Dongqinggangpo area of ​​Tucheng as planned, and launched a fierce attack on Guo's Ministry from the north and the south. The three armies are the main attackers.Peng Dehuai personally commanded the forward positions, and repeatedly competed with the Sichuan army for positions. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, and the battles were extremely difficult and intense.Guo Xunqi, who commanded the Sichuan army, did not know that Yang Shangkun, the political commissar of the Red Army's Third Corps, was Yang Angong's younger brother; Yang Shangkun also did not know that the leader of the Sichuan enemy had risked his life to protect his brother. For this battle, for the combat effectiveness of the Sichuan Army, the Red Army commanders at all levels were insufficiently prepared mentally.Before the Long March, when the Sichuan Army’s Tian Songyao’s three-way siege of the Fourth Red Army failed, the Central Bureau’s official newspaper “Struggle” claimed that the Sichuan Army was “completely disintegrated” and “has no fighting power.” A regiment of white guns".The various units of the Sichuan Army "have no fighting spirit, even if they drive to the front line, it is impossible to guarantee that they will not end up sending guns and ammunition", and they extremely despise the Sichuan Army.After the Long March arrived in Guizhou, they believed that the Sichuan army was similar to the vulnerable Guizhou army. It was torn apart, full of contradictions, opium-smoking generally, lax in discipline, and only robbed houses and raped women.Regarding the Sichuan Army’s excellent equipment, emphasis on training, and the establishment of officer teaching regiments or teaching teams at all levels, as well as the fact that Sichuan had more than 470 melee battles from 1912 to 1933, the Liu Xiang Department had almost no combat experience and had quite a lot of combat experience. However, the main leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission did not understand.To go north to Sichuan and "strive for the redification of Sichuan" not only underestimated the quality of the Sichuan army, but also inaccurately reconnaissance the strength of the Sichuan army's participation in the war. Forces blockaded the Yangtze River everywhere along the coast." The combat effectiveness of the Sichuan Army is underestimated, the strength of the Sichuan Army is underestimated, and the quality of the Sichuan Army is also underestimated.Raising the concept of "decisive battle" easily is itself a product of underestimating the enemy. Facts have proved that the Guo Xunqi Department of the Sichuan Army in Qinggangpo did not have 6,000 or 7,000 people in 4 regiments originally estimated by the Red Army, but more than 10,000 people in 6 regiments; it was not "no fighting power", but very strong fighting power.Originally wanted to encircle and annihilate the Guo Department, but Guo Xunqi was not only not wiped out or repelled, but under the cover of superior firepower, he pushed forward step by step to Tucheng, and the situation was critical. The Battle of Tucheng was the first battle after the Zunyi Conference, and success or failure was related to the morale of the whole army.At this critical moment, Zhu De proposed to go to the front line to command operations in person.Mao Zedong took a few puffs of cigarettes, but did not agree.Zhu De took off his hat and said loudly: "As long as the Red Army wins, what a pity for Zhu De! The enemy's guns cannot hit Zhu De!" Zhu De and Liu Bocheng went to the front line.Mao Zedong urgently ordered the Red First Army Corps, which was attacking Chishui City, to rush back for help, and at the same time ordered Chen Geng and Song Renqiong to lead the Military Commission cadres to the front line to launch a charge. The Red Army and the Sichuan Army launched a fierce battle east of Tucheng.Charge and counter charge are intertwined, and danger is everywhere.The Sichuan army attacked all the way to the front of the headquarters of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in Baima Mountain.Even Dong Biwu, Lin Boqu, Deng Yingchao, He Zizhen and other old, weak and lesbian military commission cadres for recuperation did not have time to evacuate and fell into danger.Fortunately, Chen Geng led the Red Army's last veteran military committee cadre group to rush up to the rescue, so that the recuperation company escaped the enemy's fire interception and withdrew from the dangerous situation.Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, also hastily withdrew under the cover of a platoon. The general adverse trend is difficult to contain.The general offensive of the Red Army turned into a counteroffensive of the Sichuan Army.Offensive operations have become back-to-back operations.Huang Kecheng, who was the political commissar of the Fourth Division of the Third Army Corps at the time, recalled: "At that time, Commander Zhang Zongxun had already lived in the health center, and I caught up with illness and was lying on a stretcher to command the troops. It happened that Commander Zhu came to supervise the battle and saw that the troops were exhausted. Commander-in-chief Zhu was very annoyed by the way I looked, and lost his temper with me." Zhu De, the commander-in-chief who has always been known for his generosity, got angry at the commander who was lying on a stretcher and commanding the troops while sick, which shows the tense and critical situation at that time. Reinforcements of the Sichuan Army are still arriving one after another.In view of the unfavorable situation, Mao Zedong and several key members of the Politburo held a meeting on the evening of the 28th, and decided to change the plan to go north from Chishui and cross the Yangtze River from Luzhou to Yibin, and quickly withdraw from Tucheng to fight and cross the Chishui River to the west. Before dawn on January 29, the Red Army stopped fighting and quickly crossed the Chishui River. The crossing of Chishui, which was temporarily decided in an emergency, became the beginning of the Red Army's famous four crossings of Chishui. Crossing Chishui was carried out when the enemy's situation was serious and the battle was defeated.In order to quickly get rid of the chasing enemy, the troops were lightly loaded again.Some bulky materials and machines were thrown into the river.At that time, the Three Army Corps still had the last mountain artillery in the whole army, which was seized before the attack on Changsha in 1930.When they were captured, only Peng Dehuai and a North Korean comrade, Wu Ting, knew how to use cannons. The two of them turned into gunners, aiming, adjusting and firing their own cannons. The Red Army has since had its own artillery. This mountain cannon, which even broke through the blockade of the Xiangjiang River, was also forced to throw it into the Chishui River. This is the second time that the Central Red Army has been forced to pack lightly since the Long March started from the Central Soviet Area. On January 30, Guo Xunqi led his troops into Tucheng.After learning that the main force of the Red Army entered Yunnan and did not go north into Sichuan, Guo stopped his advance on the pretext of resting his troops. Afterwards, according to the orders of Liu Xiang and Pan Wenhua, Guo Xunqi followed the Red Army on a one-day itinerary, from east to west, then from west to east, from Sichuan to Guizhou, and then from Guizhou to Sichuan, followed the Red Army to cross Chishui four times, but did not fight the Red Army again. The Zunyi meeting envisaged the redification of Sichuan, but did not envisage crossing Chishui four times. If the Sichuan army was defeated in Tucheng before crossing Chishui, and the Red Army crossed the Yangtze River from Luzhou to Yibin, there would be no Jinsha River and Dadu River later, and the Red Army would not have to cross snowy mountains and grasslands. There will be no Sidu Chishui. But that's not history. History has always been rumbling forward amidst setbacks. The strategic direction determined at the Zunyi Conference was revised from the very beginning. The correction is not achieved overnight, but can only be done gradually.Tucheng was defeated in the first battle, and only the location of crossing the river was revised.The original plan to cross the Yangtze River from Luzhou to Yibin failed, so they crossed Chishui westward, sought mobile operations in the Gulin and Xuyong areas, and planned to cross the Yangtze River from the upper reaches of Yibin. The location of crossing the river was moved from between Luzhou and Yibin to the upper reaches of Yibin.The idea of ​​the Zunyi Conference to cross the river into Sichuan and establish a base in northwestern Sichuan remained unchanged. But it can't last too long.Because the strategic direction of the Red Army just collided head-on with the combat principles of the Sichuan Army. The principle of combat that Liu Xiang and Pan Wenhua agreed upon at the beginning was: as long as the Red Army did not plan to enter Sichuan or entered Sichuan only as an excuse, it would be able to deal with it in vain, keep its strength, and never cancel it; Control, fight hard to the end, and survive in the end.So when he saw that the Red Army was repeatedly looking for a place to cross the river, and there was a tendency to enter Sichuan to join the Fourth Front Army, he began to fight recklessly.From Hengjiang in the west to Gulin in the east, Liu Xiang and Pan Wenhua successively mobilized dozens of regiments to cut off the main roads and passes leading to the south bank of the Yangtze River, and tightly block the Red Army's advancing direction. Only then did the Red Army prepare to enter Sichuan know that the combat effectiveness of the Sichuan Army is by no means weaker than that of Jiang's Central Army.After the Battle of Tucheng, the Sichuan Army was particularly arrogant, and even a regiment dared to come up to challenge the Red Army. On the morning of February 6, when the first division of the first regiment and the second division arrived at Tiantangba, they were surrounded on three sides by a regiment of the Sichuan army chasing after them.After hearing the gunshots, the Fifth Division of the Three Army Corps rushed to support them and encircled the enemy from both wings.More than a thousand people from the follow-up troops of the Three Legions also came to reinforce in the afternoon.After a day of fierce fighting, the enemy's position was repeatedly attacked more than ten times, but the battle could not be resolved.At night, the enemy of the regiment took the opportunity to shift positions.The Red Army discovered that another regiment of the Sichuan Army was already on the way for reinforcements, so they had to withdraw from the battle. Facing the tenacious resistance of the Sichuan army, it was obviously impossible to cross the river from the upper reaches of Yibin into Sichuan. In the early morning of February 6, Zhu De ordered the first and third armies to approach Tashi.The telegram said: "According to the current enemy situation and the difficulty of crossing the Jinsha River and the Dadu River, the Military Commission is considering the possible issue of crossing the river. If it is impossible, our field army should immediately resolve to stay on the Sichuan-Yunnan border to fight and create a new Soviet area." The telegram asked the leaders of the First and Third Army Corps to report their opinions to the Military Commission as soon as possible. The leadership already felt serious difficulties in realizing the original strategic direction.This telegram actually asked the leaders of the first and third armies, whether it is still possible to cross the river and enter Sichuan?If it is impossible, where should the new strategic direction be on the Sichuan-Yunnan border? On February 7th, Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun of the Three Army Corps called back and suggested to the Military Commission to establish a base in Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan. This advice is very timely and very important.It strengthened the determination of Mao Zedong and others to change the original strategic direction of the Zunyi Conference.The Central Revolutionary Military Commission immediately accepted Peng and Yang's suggestion, and decided to suspend the crossing of the river that day, and instead take the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border as the development area, use the victory of the battle to start the situation, and strive for favorable development from the west of Guizhou to the east. The Central Revolutionary Military Commission ordered all the legions to quickly leave Sichuan to pursue the enemy, concentrate in the Tashi area on the border of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, and began to prepare to fight the Yunnan army. So far, Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou have replaced Northwest Sichuan.The strategic direction determined at the Zunyi Conference has basically changed. Many treatises describing crossing Chishui four times ignore the fact that the strategic direction determined at the Zunyi Conference before and after crossing Chishui was forced to change.If it is mentioned, it seems that it will affect the greatness of the Zunyi Conference.Affects the leader's brilliance.Influence the use of troops like gods.It is precisely this avoidance of "good intentions" that sucks out the most vibrant soul of the Communists. Actually there is no God.From leaders to soldiers, the Red Army of Chinese Workers and Peasants is a vivid individual.The most unavoidable thing for people is to make mistakes, and the most precious thing for people is to correct mistakes. It should be said that crossing Chishui taught the leaders of the Red Army a great lesson.It is unwise to mention a counteroffensive or a decisive battle as soon as the Zunyi Conference is over.The enemy fought on the inside and was strong; the Red Army fought on the outside and was seriously short of personnel and equipment;Under such circumstances, it is completely unrealistic to "counterattack" and "decisive battle" at every turn.The thought that if the wrong military leadership is solved and the correct military line is set, then there will be invincibility.The Long March itself was a strategic retreat.In order to preserve its strength and seek development, the Red Army should have done everything possible to avoid a decisive battle with the enemy.What's more, a decisive battle with the Sichuan army was exactly what Chiang Kai-shek couldn't ask for. Chen Yi once told Huang Kecheng during the War of Resistance Against Japan that the greatness of Mao Zedong was that he never missed anything. A great man is never a person who does not make mistakes, but a person who makes mistakes and can quickly correct them in time.Immediately after the defeat in the battle of Tucheng, the plan to go northward and cross the river was abandoned and changed to cross Chishui westward, and when the Gulin and Xuyong areas were blocked, they immediately adopted Peng and Yang's suggestion and changed to the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border. The flexible strategy and tactics of "go away if you can't win" are back.It is here that Mao Zedong is back.What the Red Army invited back was not an infallible god.Rather, a down-to-earth man who is always ready to stick to the truth and always ready to correct the wrong.The greatness and extraordinaryness of the Chinese Communists, and the greatness and extraordinaryness of Mao Zedong as the leader of this party, do not lie in the deified plan or prophecy full of Buddha's light, but in its practice. Indomitable, indomitable practice. That is the most vigorous and freshest soul of the Communists. This was a time when the Red Army nervously chose to gain a foothold. On February 7, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission determined that the new development direction was the border areas of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou.The Qian army basically collapsed, but the cutting-edge Sichuan army and Yunnan army are approaching here.Whether it can stand at the turn of the three provinces is not sure. On February 9, the Politburo Tashi meeting.At the meeting, Mao Zedong proposed that while the enemy's attention and main force were concentrated in southern Sichuan, they would return to the east and cross the Chishui River to attack the relatively empty northern Guizhou. On February 10, the Central Red Army carried out Tashi reorganization.In addition to the cadre regiment, the whole army was organized into 16 regiments.Except for the First Legion, which still retains the division system, all other legions will cancel the division organization.The new organization is 6 regiments in the first army and two divisions; 4 regiments in the third army; 3 regiments in each of the fifth and ninth armies. This streamlining and downsizing is ready for the next big advance and retreat.The Red Army is like a strong man who will not fall down, tightly wrapping his leggings, tightening his shoelaces, and ready to challenge the enemy with swift steps. On the same day, the Sundu Column of the Dian Army and the Pan Wenhua Division of the Sichuan Army pressed on Tashi from the north and the south.The Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to quickly separate from the Sichuan Army and the Dian Army to flank the enemy and cross Chishui, and change the combat targets to the Guizhou Army and the Xue Yue Department of the Central Army. Although there was no intentional explanation, it was only 3 days after the establishment of base areas in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou border areas. According to the situation of the enemy and ourselves, the action pointer has been biased towards northern Guizhou. On February 15, the Red Army Field Army Command issued the "Action Plan for Crossing the Chishui River Second". On the 16th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the "Notice to All Red Commanders and Soldiers", stating: "The Red Army must frequently transfer combat areas, sometimes to the east, sometimes to the west, sometimes to take the main road, sometimes to take the small road, sometimes to take the old road, and sometimes to take the old road. Take a new path, and the only purpose is to win the battle under favorable conditions." From February 18th to 21st, the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River for the second time. Every crossing of Chishui four times is an opportunity, not a goal. Because of the implementation of flexible and maneuverable strategies and tactics, the fighters that appeared in front of them were quickly captured. Among the fighters crossing Chishui for the second time, lurks the biggest victory since the Red Army's Long March. On February 24, Lin Biao led an army to capture Tongzi.The next day, the Three Army Corps marched towards Tongzi.The Qianwei Red Thirteenth Regiment captured several prisoners of the Guizhou Army, and learned that there were only 3 regiments of the Guizhou Army's Bai Huizhang Division in Loushanguan, and a brigade of Du Zhaohua's Division was in the Black Temple nearly 3 kilometers south of Loushanguan.Peng Xuefeng, head of the 13th Red Regiment, immediately reported to Peng Dehuai. At 14:00 on the 25th, Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun reported the above situation to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and proposed to annihilate the enemy with swift action. At 20 o'clock, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen of the First Army also called Zhu De, suggesting that the main force should be used to destroy the Guizhou enemy in the south of Loushan Pass. The leaders of the two main armies agreed, which made the Central Revolutionary Military Commission's determination come to an end. At 23:00 on the 25th, 9 hours after receiving the telegrams from Peng and Yang and 3 hours from the telegrams from Lin and Nie, Zhu De sent a telegram to Peng, Yang, Lin, and Nie: the first and third armies and cadre regiments were under the command of Peng and Yang. On the 26th, we should attack the enemies of Loushanguan and Heishimiao in a detour, resolutely eliminate them, and take advantage of the victory to capture Zunyi, so as to open the key to the redification of northern Guizhou. At 24:00, Zhu De sent another telegram to Peng, Yang, Lin, and Nie: agreeing that Peng and Yang would call and deploy at 14:00 on the 25th, and the entire army would be under the command of Peng and Yang. Peng Dehuai's basic deployment is: the three armies are the main frontal attack.The first army group turned around to the enemy of the Black Temple, and the fifth army group delayed the Sichuan enemy from the direction of Tongzi to aid them. The Thirteenth Red Regiment rushed to Loushan Pass.Wei Jie, the commander of the avant-garde reconnaissance company, and the soldiers of the pistol platoon put on the Kuomintang uniforms and rushed to Loushan Pass in one go.As soon as the thirteenth regiment occupied the pass, the Qian army launched a counterattack.Peng Dehuai ordered the Red Twelve Regiment to attack from the front and forcefully suppress the enemy. Zhong Chibing, the political commissar of the 12th Regiment, had his leg broken. Without narcotics, he gritted his teeth and sawed off a leg.The army thought that he could no longer act with the army, and asked him to stay in the local area with part of the money.Zhong Chibing, who had only one leg left, resolutely refused. Someone persuaded him to pull out his pistol and desperately, so he had to be carried away on a stretcher.Soon, miraculously, he was able to roll up and down on the horse's back with one leg. Kong Quan, Chief of Staff of the Twelfth Regiment (Kong Xianquan in other words) was also seriously injured in the battle.Later, he was carried into the Roman Catholic Church in Zunyi City on a stretcher, where he lived with Hu Yaobang, director of the Thirteenth Regiment Club, who was injured in his hip.Half a century later, Hu Yaobang still clearly remembered that Kong Quan, who was in unbearable pain, shouted "Kill! Kill! Kill!" all night, making everyone sleepless all night. Kong Quan was left there and served as the curator of the Zunyi Memorial Hall after liberation.Hu Yaobang later served as the general secretary of the Communist Party of China.Zhong Chibing was awarded the rank of lieutenant general in 1955.Wei Jie, the commander of the Vanguard Reconnaissance Company, was also awarded the rank of lieutenant general in 1955. On February 26, the first and third armies occupied Loushan Pass. The army was defeated like a mountain.The remnants of the enemy fled to Zunyi one after another, and the Zunyi defenders were extremely flustered. The Red Army took advantage of the victory to attack Zunyi and occupied Zunyi again on the morning of the 28th. The Three Army Corps sacrificed the chief of staff Deng Ping for this.At that time, Zhang Aiping, the political commissar of the 11th regiment, was standing on a mound to observe the topography of the old city of Zunyi, when Deng Ping, chief of staff of the regiment, came.There was only one mound, so Zhang Aiping got down and asked Deng Ping to stand on it.Deng Ping stood up and was assigning tasks to Zhang Aiping, when she suddenly tilted her head and leaned on Zhang Aiping, Zhang Aiping was covered in blood and she didn't know what happened.Later, it was discovered that Deng Ping had died, so she quickly called Peng Dehuai.Peng Dehuai cursed on the phone before he heard it clearly: "You all go to the front line for me, you all sacrifice!" He was afraid that Deng Ping would die, but he did not expect Deng Ping to die. Zhang Aiping later became the Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of China.Yang Shangkun said that it was Deng Ping who died for Zhang Aiping. In July 1966, Peng Dehuai, who was relegated to the third-line Construction Committee as the third deputy director, took a car to the Zunyi battlefield after attending the "Liupanshui Coal Planning Conference" in Guizhou Province.At that time, the sky was drizzling, and Peng Dehuai didn't feel his clothes getting wet. He pointed to a place and told the people around him that Deng Ping died there 31 years ago.Thinking of the sacrificed comrades, thinking about the passing of time and the ups and downs, Peng Dehuai said emotionally: "It is really a joy in the world for a man of seven feet to shed all his blood!" History will always remember Peng Dehuai's achievements. The original Zunyi battle was still only aimed at the weaker Guizhou enemy.In this little-anticipated battle, due to the timely grasp of the opportunity by the frontline commanders Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao of the Red Army, especially Peng Dehuai who unified the command of the first and third armies to expand the results of the battle, the battle quickly developed from encircling and annihilating the two brigades of the Guizhou Army to chasing and annihilating the Kuomintang. The large-scale battle of the two divisions of the Central Army; thus opened the biggest battle in the Red Army's Long March - the Battle of Zunyi. The Red Army suddenly moved eastward to seize Loushan Pass, and Chiang Kai-shek was greatly shaken.He judged that this was most likely a strategic move by the Red Army, and he wanted to continue driving eastward and move closer to the Second and Sixth Red Army.Therefore, Wu Qiwei's 93rd and 59th divisions of the first column, which were closest to each other, were urgently ordered to quickly reinforce Zunyi. Time is one step late.When Wu Qiwei's troops arrived in the southern area of ​​Zunyi City, the Red Army had already reoccupied Zunyi. The Red Army resolutely and quickly conquered Loushan Pass and Zunyi, which made the Wu Qiwei Department of the Kuomintang Central Army who came to reinforce it passive. The Fourth Army led by Wu Qiwei began to chase the Red Army from Jiangxi.But it was always a see-off pursuit. Not only did he not fight the Red Army along the way, he didn't even see the shadow of the Red Army's stragglers. This time he played a sleight of hand. In Zhongzhuangpu not far from Zunyi, he met Wang Jialie who escaped from Zunyi.There was only one pistol platoon left beside Wang Jialie.When Wu Qiwei heard that the main force of the Red Army was attacking Zunyi, he refused to advance.Wang Jialie came looking for reinforcements, he wished other soldiers would help him regain Zunyi, so he kept urging Wu Qiwei again and again.Wu was restless and in a dilemma, so he ordered a personal staff officer to conduct reconnaissance, and gave a hint before leaving.So the reconnaissance report said: Zunyi has been occupied by the Red Army. Wang Jialie left in dismay, and Wu Qiwei deployed his troops to defend against the Red Army. Wu's subordinates were eager to try.At the meeting of division and regimental leaders, everyone believed that the equipment of the national army was far superior to that of the Red Army, and that the main force of the Red Army was passing through Zunyi. As long as an attack was launched, the Red Army would withdraw, so they unanimously advocated fighting. Compared with Wu Qiwei's understanding of the Communists, their understanding of the Communists is almost as high as the sky. Wu is a graduate of the sixth batch of Baoding. He fought side by side with the famous Communist Party member Jiang Xianyun during the Northern Expedition. It can be said that blood flowed together. In May 1927, the Northern Expeditionary Army launched an attack on the main force of the Feng Army in Linying, Henan.Wu Qiwei's thirty-fourth regiment was in charge of the frontal attack, and Jiang Xianyun's regiment was in charge of the right wing, and the battle was unprecedentedly tragic.Feng Jun desperately resisted relying on strong fortifications.The Wu and Jiang regiments who charged bravely suffered heavy casualties.Jiang Xianyun was seriously injured and died, and Wu Qiwei was also hit by shrapnel in the leg.Thanks to Cai Tingkai's Tenth Division for reinforcements, Feng's army retreated in embarrassment. Wu Qiwei, who shed blood with the Communists, also participated in the anti-Chiang later. In the spring of 1929, the Jianggui War broke out, and Jiang transferred the Fourth Division to fight against the Gui Army. At that time, Wu Qiwei was the commander of the 12th Brigade of the Fourth Division.After the disintegration of the Guangxi Army, Jiang sent an urgent message to the Fourth Division to move to Longhai Road, not only specifying the departure time, but also specifying the marching route, and specially ordered Cao Wanshun's newly formed First Division to take over the defense.Miao Peinan, Wu Qiwei and other generals of the Fourth Division believed that Jiang had set a trap and wanted to hand over the weapons of the Fourth Division, and determined to resist. In September, after the troops were concentrated in Zhijiang, they sent a telegram to oppose Chiang. The Anti-Chiang Fourth Army marched from southwestern Hunan in an attempt to recapture Guangdong, but was defeated once by Chen Jitang, twice by Jiang Guangnai, and three times by Cai Tingkai.It can be said to be defeated again and again, and only two or three out of ten troops are left. In the melee of the new warlords, Wu Qiwei, who opposed Chiang with a military power struggle, was beaten to the ground. In desperation, he contacted Chen Cheng through his fellow villager Luo Zhuoying. Through Chen Cheng, he still took refuge in Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek ordered him to go to the Jiangxi front to fight the Red Army.He had to obey the orders of the man who had telegraphed his disapproval, and then aimed his gun at the Communists who had fought alongside him. He participated in the fourth and fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaigns against the Central Soviet Area, served as column commander both times, and was included in the main sequence of "encirclement and suppression" campaigns commanded by Chen Cheng.After the Red Army left Jiangxi, it was ordered to lead its troops to participate in the "pursuit and suppression". No matter how hard he struggles, history always gives such a small choice to a person like Wu Qiwei. Just when Wu Qiwei deliberately delayed to deal with Wang Jialie, the Red Army really occupied Zunyi City. Wu Qiwei avoided confrontation with the main force of the Red Army, but the main force of the Red Army had already identified him.The Central Revolutionary Military Commission is determined to take advantage of the opportunity of its lone army to advance aggressively, and concentrate all its efforts to wipe out it south of Zunyi. At the beginning of the battle, Han Hanying, the commander of the 59th Division of the Wu Department, saw that the terrain on the right wing was not good for him, and suggested to Wu to occupy Laoyashan and Honghuagang not far in front. A fierce battle unfolded around Laoya Mountain, the main peak on the right side of Honghuagang, and both sides fought with all their might.Because Chiang Kai-shek issued a death order, Wu Qiwei also gave his life to fight this battle well. General Zhang Zongxun, who later became the deputy chief of the general staff and head of the general logistics department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was the head of the tenth regiment of the third army regiment defending the main peak of Laoya Mountain.The Tenth Regiment is the main force of the Three Army Regiments. Under the repeated impact of the enemy's superior forces, firepower, and regardless of casualties, the regiment suffered heavy losses.Zhang Zongxun was injured, Chief of Staff Zhong Weijian died, and Han Hanying's troops captured the main peak at about 15:00. The loss of the main peak of Laoya Mountain not only condescended to threaten the Honghuagang position of the 11th Regiment, but also directly threatened the safety of Zunyi City.In the case of continuous operations and heavy losses, the three armies were unable to mobilize counterattack forces at that time. Zunyi City is in danger of being lost, and the battle situation is at stake. But the enemy occupying the main peak of Laoya Mountain suddenly turned to defense inexplicably. It turned out that Lin Biao's 1st Corps had already attacked the enemy from the Shuishiba area, and stabbed straight into the enemy headquarters in Zhongzhuangpu like a sharp knife. This is the key to the battle of Zunyi.One knife is the heart of the enemy. Wu Qiwei put all his strength into it, and there were not many troops left around the column headquarters.Lin Biao's move made him really miserable, so he left his troops and fled in embarrassment with a few people around him. The enemy occupying the main peak had a condescending look and saw very clearly, and found that their headquarters had slipped away suddenly. It was not a good idea, so they did not dare to make a big move, so they had to stick to it. It is said to be persistent, but the heart has long been weak.In the evening, it was overwhelmed by the counterattack of the first part of the three army regiments and the cadre regiment. The troops who had lost their commanders were almost a flock of sheep, and rushed towards Wujiang along the way they came. Wu Qiwei was the first to flee to the riverside, and immediately contacted Nan'an, asking Ou Zhen to lead 90 divisions to come quickly for support.The 90th Division was originally organized by Wu Qiwei's Fourth Army, but Xue Yue stayed in Guiyang this time, and he just came up when he got the news that the front line was tight. Wu Qiwei asked Ou Zhen to lead the troops across the river.Ou Zhen believed that the army on the north bank was defeated like a mountain, and it was too dangerous to cross the river for reinforcements to fight against the water, so he flatly refused.He believed that the Ninety Division could only occupy a position on the south bank to cover and contain the defeated soldiers. Wu Qiwei saw that the situation on the north bank was unmanageable, and the old subordinates on the south bank were disobedient, and all thoughts were lost. He fell to the ground and cried loudly, saying, I'm not crossing the river, so I just die here. Chief of Staff Wu Deze hurriedly summoned a few guards to help Wu Qiwei cross the south bank of the river. When Xiang Yu saw that none of the eight thousand children had returned, and had no face to see Jiangdong's elders, he killed himself in Wujiang. Wu Qiwei led two divisions in Wujiang, brought back a regiment, and cried a lot by the river. But Wu Qiwei is not Xiang Yu, he is not Xiang Yu, and this Wujiang River is not the Wujiang River that Xiang Yu committed suicide in the past.After being helped across the river crying, he became very calm and sober.Seeing that the Red Army was in a hurry to pursue the soldiers, they approached the river bank without waiting for the rest of the troops to cross the river, so he ordered the safety cables of the pontoon bridge to be cut, and even the defeated soldiers that Ou Zhenyuan was going to take in were not taken in. More than a thousand officers and soldiers were left on the north bank and became prisoners of the Red Army. Later, Wu Qiwei reported to Chiang Kai-shek that the pontoon bridge was broken because of the soldiers rushing to cross. Talking with people inside, it was said that cutting down the pontoon bridge was a strategic move.Otherwise, the Red Army will cross the Wujiang River in the south, and Guiyang will be alone, and the overall situation will be affected. Even though he was running and crying, Wu Qiwei was a person who took care of the overall situation. The Zunyi Battle of crossing Chishui two times completely exceeded the scale originally imagined.Within 5 days, the Red Army captured Tongzi, seized Loushan Pass, and occupied Zunyi City. In particular, it wiped out most of the 93rd Division and a part of the 59th Division of Wu Qiwei's Department of the Central Army, defeated 8 regiments of the Guizhou Army, and killed and wounded 2 enemy troops. More than 1,400 people, about 3,000 enemies were captured, and more than 2,000 guns were handed over. This is indeed the biggest victory of the Central Red Army since the Long March. "Peng Dehuai's Self-Report" said: "In the counterattack of Wu Qiwei's army, the first and third armies completely cooperated automatically to defeat the enemy." 两个主力军团之所以能够“自动配合”，首先是中革军委的放权。 一渡赤水前土城战役打败后，毛泽东等中革军委领导人对前线指挥员的意见极为重视。包括确定红军转移方向等战略问题，也多次征求林、聂、彭、杨等前线指挥员意见。为适应形势，改变指挥方式，二渡赤水后作出“全军统归彭、杨指挥”决定，使部队迅速捕捉战机，终于打了一场红军脱离根据地被围追堵截一万余里以来最大的胜仗，也是第五次反“围剿”以来一年半时间内，红军唯一一次扬眉吐气的胜仗。 两个主力军团能够“自动配合”，还出自彭德怀的敢于战斗。 彭、林两人皆先后向中革军委提出了攻击娄山关黔敌的建议。彭德怀意在以迅速动作歼灭娄山关守军柏辉章部三个团和娄山关以南的杜肇华旅，林彪意只在攻歼娄山关南的杜旅，对娄山关之敌则要求晚一天行动。说是使部队有喘息之机，核心还是没有把握。他不愿打无把握之仗。比较起来，面对严重的敌情，彭德怀勇克咽喉要地娄山关，直取黔北重镇遵义，其敢打必胜之精神，的确有力能拔山之慨。 这一仗是在敌情极其严重的情况下打的。二渡赤水后，红军后尾有川军潘文华部、滇军孙渡部的紧逼压迫，前方有黔军王家烈部和中央军薛岳部的迎头堵击，机动回旋的余地已经不是很大。再加上红军有土城新败，川滇边境又无法立足，今天看起来，颇有几分“走投无路”的感觉。如此形势下，敢于积极向军委请战求歼黔敌，而且面对国民党中央军的增援敢于坚决顶住不退，为一军团侧翼迂回包抄赢得了战机和时间，彭德怀横刀立马之大勇，林彪也要自叹不如。 两个主力军团的“自动配合”，同样也包括林彪的善战。 林彪作战，极善于捕捉时机。时机不到，他会谨慎得让人觉得胆小。时机一到，也会大胆得叫人咋舌。 彭德怀的三军团与敌反复争夺老鸦山、打得不可开交时，林彪在遵义城东山包上一言不发地用望远镜观战。一军团隐蔽集结在这一带丘陵地区待命出击，敌人全然不知晓。 待吴奇伟全部力量重心都压向老鸦山前三军团阵地，山谷突然响起一片号声，一军团之一师、二师像两只猛虎，迎着公路排山倒海般冲杀下去。 战局转折十分突然，已经得手的吴奇伟部竟然突然失手。公路上运动的敌人最先掉头往后跑，敌军整个阵线发生动摇。 林彪眼看面前形势，从参谋的包里拿出一个本子，撕下一张纸，又把这张纸对折撕成两半，分别在上面用红蓝铅笔标出追击方向，并在上端写了一个很大的“追”宇，分头传达两个师的指挥员。红军排山倒海的追击开始了。 林彪命令：二师向南追，以乌江为界；一师向西追，沿鸭溪、白腊坎方向猛打猛扫。部队回问：追多深？答：可以追出100里。 就像川戏中的绝活“变脸”，小心谨慎的林彪，一抹脸就变成了颇有几分狂气的林彪。 黄克诚当时是防守老鸦山主峰的三军团十团政委。半个世纪后他回亿说：在山底下我见到红一军团军团长林彪。我对林彪说：“好险啊！”林彪不以为然地说：“你们当初守卫在山头上就是了，不应该去追击。”我说：“敌人已逼近遵义城，不将敌人赶跑怎么得了！”林彪若无其事地说：“当敌军正在向你们进攻的时候，红一军团的部队已向敌军侧后包抄过去，我军已化险为夷；陈赓到了你那里时，敌军的败局已定。”说话之间，果然敌军已全线崩溃。林彪当即派一支部队去追击溃退之敌。我基于前次追击吃亏的教训，建议林彪多派些部队追击。林彪说，全线溃败之敌，已无斗志，我有少量精干部队追歼即可解决问题，无须动用大部队。 说彭德怀敢于战斗，不是说他就不善于战斗。数十年摧枯拉朽的沙场宿将，岂能仅靠匹夫之勇。同样说林彪善于战斗，不是说他就不敢于战斗。 人都有自己的特点。但红军将领中，唯彭德怀、林彪置于一起时，特点反差最大。二人原有的特点，皆被对方的特点衬托得更为鲜明。 二人皆率领红军的主力军团。把握特点，便相得益彰。 这便是毛泽东的拿手好戏了。 被打垮的吴奇伟部，并非一触即溃的乌合之众。林彪也许并不知道，在这支被他“猛打猛扫”的部队里，他还任过见习排长。 吴奇伟的第四军，就是当年颇富盛名的北伐劲旅“铁军”残留下来的部队。吴奇伟与林彪当年同为铁军第十二师的人。吴奇伟久经沙场，为十二师三十四团团长；林彪从黄埔新近毕业，刚分来任十二师独立团见习排长。一个粤军前辈，一个黄埔后劲，皆在河南临颖战场对张作霖的奉军奋勇作战。 虽是铁军，到底也有共产党、国民党之分。共产党人叶挺率铁军一部举行南昌起义，国民党人吴奇伟、李汉魂率铁军另一部镇压南昌起义。铁军四分五裂。随之而来的新军阀混战中，更是九死一生。打剩下的最后一点儿老底由吴奇伟统辖，编成五十九、九十两个师，参加“围剿”与追击红军。 增援王家烈时薛岳留了一个心眼。他将欧震的九十师留在贵阳，让完全是黄埔系组成的直辖九十三师唐云山部随吴奇伟北上。 林彪给他老部队的礼物是侧面迂回、正面猛追。五十九、九十三这两个师，据说参加第五次“围剿”以来从未败过。这回被红一军团追得全军溃乱，建制崩溃，丧魂落魄。即便逃过江的部队，重武器和伙夫担子行军锅灶也一律丢光。 二渡赤水的遵义城一战，吴奇伟的部队起码一半是被林彪追垮的。 可惜欧震没有渡江北上，失去了一个与历史邂逅的机会。欧震也是铁军中人。当年随叶挺参加南昌起义，南下在广东汤坑与粤军陈济棠和薛岳激战时，薛岳部已被击败，师部也被包围，关键时刻起义军营长欧震阵前倒戈，使薛岳得喘息之机，遂与赶来增援的邓龙光部向叶挺展开猛烈反攻。 南昌起义主力在汤坑战败，欧震也从叶挺部下投到薛岳门下。 当欧震拒绝服从吴奇伟的命令率九十师过江时，也许感觉到了从遵义漫山遍野追杀过来的红军部队，就是自己当初背叛了的起义军火种。 与薛岳一起长追红军的吴奇伟，自在乌江边上大哭一场后，便再未与共产党的军队打过大仗。解放战争中他任过徐州绥靖公署副主任，但很快借口到南京汤山养病，辞掉了这个职务。 蒋介石却一直记得他。尤其在蒋年龄越来越大、心腹将领一个接一个连遭败绩的时候，他越来越回想起对红军围追堵截的那些年代，以及参加围堵的那些将领。1948年1月，国民党政府授予吴奇伟二等云麾勋章。8月，国共即将开展战略决战之机，蒋介石委任吴奇伟为华北“剿总”副总司令。华北“剿总”附近的解放军领导人，多是吴奇伟当年的老对手。蒋介石希望他与傅作义一道，在这个战略区稳住华北的聂荣臻，堵住东北的林彪，为摇摇欲坠的蒋家王朝再做一次顶门柱。 吴奇伟却心力交瘁了。当年跟在红军后面走了一两万里尚无可奈何，现在阻止共军的南下更无可能。他北上很短时间，就南返广州，不想再去卖命了。 人民解放军突破长江天险后不到一个月，他便与几个粤籍将领在粤东发表《我们的宣言》，宣布脱离国民党，投向人民。 吴奇伟到北京参加了中国人民政治协商会议第一届全体会议，还受到毛泽东主席和朱德总司令的设宴欢迎。这位当年率部对红军穷追不舍的国民党将领，1949年10月1日站在北京的观礼台上，庆祝中华人民共和国诞生。 毛泽东1956年在八大预备会议上讲自己打过的4次败仗，第四次“茅台那次打仗”，即指三渡赤水前的鲁班场战斗。 这场战斗的影响远比今人想象的大。战前毛泽东差一点儿丢掉前敌总指挥职务，遵义会议成果几乎成为泡影。四渡赤水后又有林彪写信要求改换指挥。 鲁班场是毛泽东的街亭。 说鲁班场战斗，必须谈林彪的打鼓新场战斗。 谈林彪的打鼓新场战斗，必须谈中革军委于遵义大捷后确定的战略方针。 谈中革军委新确立的战略方针，必须看蒋介石的实际部署和设想。 真是一个连环套。 indeed so.如果你想解开历史之谜，必须解开这些连环。 解开它们，你便得到了历史。 红军遵义大捷以前，先有蒋军的“土城大捷”。 2月2日，蒋介石以国民政府委员长身份，“悬赏购缉共军首领朱德、毛泽东、徐向前、彭德怀、林彪、董振堂、周恩来、张国焘”。蒋介石自己也记不清他是多少次悬赏捉拿这些人了。他对这些人的头颅兴趣极大，但对这些人头颅中所想，却几乎一无所知。 也不是一点儿不知道。红军二渡赤水的当天2月18日，薛岳就从滇军得报：红军放弃入滇计划折向黔北。两天之后，投降的红一军团二师供给部出纳员何彬说，红一军团正在向东急进，其余各军团也在后跟进。作战要求是打倒王家烈，消灭周浑元。 薛岳连忙调动军队，重新部署，却为时已晚。 但薛岳还是及时地搞到了毛泽东上台的消息。 一渡赤水前，三军团向土城前进途中宿营时，担任掩护的五师突遭黔敌袭击，部队颇有损失，五师十四团政委田丰被俘。敌人从他那里得到了遵义会议的情况：“红军内部的井冈山派与苏俄派在遵义斗争非常厉害，井冈山派主张硬干，坚决反击国民党军；苏俄派则空谈理论避重就轻，斗争结果是毛泽东的井冈山派胜利。” 薛岳得此重要情报，大受震动。他立即把田丰召到贵阳面谈，一面将毛泽东上台的消息上报蒋介石，一面通令各部队。 对薛岳2月初报上来毛泽东重新上台的消息，蒋介石半信半疑。一直到嫡系中央军在遵义大败所展示的红军用兵风格中，他才确定毛泽东的确上台了。 对手之间是最知根知底的。 1934年12月10日开幕的国民党四届五中全会上，因为对中央苏区的全面占领和湘江一带的堵截，蒋介石好不风光。国民党中执委、中监委115人出席会议，希望国军在蒋介石率领下“再接再厉”，将红军“根本歼灭”。 三个多月过去了，不但没有“根本歼灭”，反而让红军一口气吃掉了五六千人，垮掉了十几个团。他拍电报骂薛岳，说这是“国军追击以来的奇耻大辱”。 蒋介石明白，这一失败恰恰证明了薛岳给他的情报的正确。 3月2日，蒋介石带着陈诚亲自飞往重庆。到重庆后第二天，便发出一道公开命令和一封私人信函。 公开命令给各部队首领：“凡我驻川、黔各军，概由本委员长统一指挥，如无本委员长命令，不得擅自进退，务期共同一致完成使命。” 私人信函则写给薛岳：“毛既已当权，今后对共军作战，务加谨慎从事，处处立于不败之地；勤修碉堡，稳扎稳打，以对付飘忽无定的流寇，至为重要。” 同时还把红军作战已改为飘忽无定、要分外慎重的信空投给了吴奇伟。 从抵贵阳之日起，蒋介石便如同战场指挥官，实际代替了薛岳的指挥。 接函的薛岳倒也多了几分安慰：对毛泽东用兵有所畏忌的，绝非他薛岳一人。 失败使蒋介石再一次清醒了。 清醒归清醒，对红军的战略方向，却依然判断不清。 红军下一步到底往哪里走，对国民党来说，一直是个谜。 对红军走向的猜测与判断，成了国民党高级将领的一道智力竞技题。 刘湘最担心红军入川，便认为红军必然入川。朱德、刘伯承都是四川人，与川军有关系，尤以刘伯承对泸州一带了若指掌，所以红军在这一带徐图渡江与张国焘、徐向前会师的可能性极大，而回湘图与贺龙会合的可能性极小。 薛岳与刘湘相反。他最害怕红军久留贵州，便认为红军在贵州久据的可能性最小。他率10万大军入黔后，已经把贵州看做自己的地盘。红军二渡赤水时，他刚刚就任掌握全省军权的贵州绥靖主任，觉得红军入滇入川均有可能，唯独贵州不比江西，山穷水恶，久据不易；若再东