Chapter 23 Chapter 22 The Great Influence of the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area

The armed separatists in Jinggang Mountains and the Zhumao Red Army were closely watched and highly valued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China not long after they appeared in the middle of the Luoxiao Mountains.Since the Party and the Red Army in the base areas are located in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces, the Party's organizational relationship has been under the jurisdiction of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee and the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China for a considerable period of time. Giving instructions and giving guidance. The Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee was the first to communicate with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army in Jinggangshan. On November 30, 1927, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, reporting the situation of the peasant army "relocated to Jinggang" to "meet down the mountain to occupy Lianhua and Ninggang counties". On January 19, 1928, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee reported to the Central Committee in the "Resolution on Current Work in Southwest Jiangxi" that "Ninggang Peasant Army Mao Zedong, Yuan Wencai Department and local farmers" "captured" Suichuan County and "The response of the peasant masses in various townships is likely to decline immediately", and put forward the opinion of "strive to create a situation of separatism in the southwest, and become the birthplace of Jiangxi's agrarian revolution". On April 15, 1928, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee reported to the Central Committee in more detail: "The peasant army in the west of Jiangxi is divided into three divisions: Mao Zedong led more than 1,000 troops with more than 500 guns; More than 300 guns; Wang Zuo (non-comrade, the so-called leftist in the past) led more than 300 people and more than 100 guns. After the defeat in Wan'an, the Maoist Department planned to withdraw from Suichuan and join Yuan and Wang's two troops to attack Taihe in order to cut off the reactionary army. On the way home, because the Xiaojiabi Division of the Jingwei Regiment who had not been eliminated in the past stayed in trouble, the plan did not succeed, so it was a plan to go to Jinggangshan." In May 1928, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee reported to the Central Committee several times in a row that "Zhu Mao's Red Army occupied Yongxin and Ninggang" and Jinggangshan joined forces to form the "Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army (that is, Zhu Mao's army)" and Zhu De and Mao Zedong In charge of military commanders, party representatives, etc.The work done by the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee played an important role as a bridge for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to understand and communicate with the Jinggangshan struggle and the situation of Zhu Mao's Red Army.

At that time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was "very pleased" after learning the exact situation of Zhu Mao's Red Army, and on June 4, 1928, it sent the "Letter from the Central Committee to the Front Enemy Committee" to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army.This is an extremely important long letter, and it is also the first instruction letter issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Jinggangshan Front Committee.At the beginning of the letter, he wrote enthusiastically to the "Second Brother Derun" (that is, Zhu De and Mao Zedong) and "comrades from the former committee": "For several months, you have fought thousands of miles to fight against the reactionary forces. I am very pleased to be able to work tirelessly in a tiring life.” “Although the Central Committee sent people to you in the past, they were never able to connect with you because of the relationship of communication, and even the Central Committee and you exchanged views with each other. This time, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee sent your letter to know your current situation, and the central government is very pleased!" Afterwards, the central government analyzed and reported the situation in detail at that time, and summed up the experience and lessons of armed riots in various places. The Front Committee of the Fourth Army issued eight instructions. In summary, the main spirit is:

1. About the tasks of the Fourth Red Army. The Central Committee pointed out: "Your task is to use your military strength to mobilize the broad masses of workers and peasants on the Hunan-Kiangsi or Jiangxi-Guangdong border to carry out the agrarian revolution, causing the situation of separate regimes to spread around and promote the development of the riots in the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and Guangdong. "If you don't pay attention to the penetration of the local area, the foundation of the revolution will never be established; if you don't pay attention to the expansion to the surrounding areas, you will also fail in isolation. This is the general policy of your work."

2. About army building. The Central Committee pointed out: "You can officially change into the Red Army", "You must transform your army in accordance with the Central Committee's recent military work resolution, so that the hired army becomes a volunteer army", "you must publicize the mass organization of the Red Guard", "use all Arming the masses with civilian weapons", "defending the regime in the countryside". 3. Regarding the organization of the former committee. Instructions in the letter: "The Central Committee believes that it is necessary to organize the Front Enemy Committee. The list of the Front Enemy Committee is designated as follows: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, a worker comrade, a farmer comrade, and the secretary of the party department where the Front Committee is located, and Mao Zedong as the secretary. "Under the former committee, organize a military committee (at the same time the military committee of the Supreme Soviet), with Zhu De as secretary." The letter also pointed out the relationship between the former committee and the two local provincial committees, that is, "when the former committee was in Jiangxi, it was Under the guidance of the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee, he was under the guidance of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee when he was in Hunan, and had a close relationship with the two provincial Party Committees at the same time.”

4. On the issue of strategy. The central government pointed out in the letter of instruction: "The Soviet regime must accommodate the participation of self-cultivating peasants", "make it centered on workers and poor peasants"; "organize 'farmer labor unions' and promulgate farm labor protection laws by county Soviets"; "increase peasant riots and district the leadership of the workers' consciousness in the township soviets"; "prevent the development of the influence of the peasant petty bourgeoisie"; "advocate to the masses a political platform for each city, which must include the interests of the urban petty bourgeoisie"; "the petty bourgeoisie must be protected". Trade by merchants to maintain the economy and the circulation of necessities between cities and villages as well as between districts and counties"; "In the areas you occupy, you must regularly hold party training classes to train cadres" and so on.

The basic spirit of the letter of instruction from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Front Enemy Committee of the Fourth Red Army is correct and conforms to the reality of the struggle in Jinggangshan.Regrettably, due to traffic barriers, this June instruction letter was not sent to Jinggangshan through the Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Ji'an County Committee until early November.Although the instruction letter arrived a few months late, it still played an important guiding role in the struggle in Jinggangshan.After Mao Zedong and Zhu De received the instruction letter from the Central Committee, they "reorganized" the Front Committee on November 6. Comrade Peasants (Mao Kewen) consisted of five people, with Mao Zedong as secretary".And according to the spirit of the central instruction letter, the "Sixth National Congress" of the Fourth Red Army was held on November 14, summing up the experience of "six months of hard struggle", and established the Military Commission with Zhu De as the secretary.The front committee headed by Mao Zedong governs the military committee and special committee (local party headquarters), leading the struggle for separatism on the border between Hunan and Jiangxi.

In the following period of time, the central government's struggle guidance for Jinggangshan was also inappropriate.For example, the Central Inspector once conveyed that "the Central Committee decided that the Fourth Army should develop as much as possible in western Jiangxi and southern Hunan", separated the Hunan-Guangdong Avenue, and "resolutely opposed the strategy of the 'Fourth Army' going to southern Jiangxi"; in a letter in February 1929 , The central government even "decided that Comrades Zhu and Mao" should leave the army, "come to the central government quickly", etc.Mao Zedong later pointed out clearly and bluntly that "the spirit of the Central Committee's letter in February was not good, and this letter had a bad influence on some comrades in the Fourth Army Party", resulting in "pessimistic arguments." "But since then, the central government's estimates and instructions have been generally correct." Mao Zedong: "A single spark can start a prairie fire."The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China summed up the experience and lessons from the practice of "failure in August" in southern Hunan and marching into southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, and implemented correct guidance.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China not only paid attention to and guided the struggle in Jinggangshan, but also fully affirmed the experience of Zhu Mao’s Red Army, spoke highly of the struggle in Jinggangshan, and introduced and promoted the struggle experience of the Jinggangshan base area to all parts of the country through party documents and party publications. In its instruction letter in June 1928, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China praised Zhu Mao’s Red Army for “moving thousands of miles to fight against the reactionary forces” and “working unremittingly in this hard and tiring life” and “self-defense.” After your army occupied Yongxin and Ninggang, the situation in Jiangxi is even better than before.” “Your troops have repeatedly advanced and retreated in the hub of the three provinces for several months.” “Your position is still in the riot arrangement of the three provinces.” Central position", "therefore you bear a very heavy responsibility for the future of the riots in the three provinces". On November 28, 1928, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee also mentioned in its report to the Communist International that "the agrarian revolution in several counties in western Jiangxi affected by Zhu Mao on the Hunan-Jiangxi border has indeed penetrated into the masses", thus making the Jinggangshan struggle international. affected.In an article published in early 1929, the Party Central Committee's "Red Flag" praised "the peasant guerrillas led by Zhu Mao were able to run amok in Hunan, Hubei, Fujian, and Guangdong with the demands of armed resistance representing all revolutionary people. This kind of heroic struggle, whether it results in victory or defeat this time, it will have very serious significance in the history of Chinese revolution.”On April 13 of the same year, "Red Flag" published another signed article "Zhu Mao's Red Army and the Development of Peasant Riots in Fujian and Jiangxi", commenting on the struggle in Jinggangshan: "The armed workers and peasants on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, under the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong It has been more than a year now since we fought the Kuomintang army and the armed forces of the landlords and gentry who slaughtered the workers and peasants. Because of the support of the workers and peasants in Hunan, Jiangxi, and the toiling masses, the Red Army not only was not wiped out by the reactionary army, but continued to grow, and the struggle in the countryside was expanding day by day, making the reactionary governments of Hunan, Jiangxi and Guangdong in a hurry." Published on July 1, 1929 The Bolshevik, another publication of the Party Central Committee, published a signed article, claiming: "The Red Army scattered everywhere is the vanguard of the rural armed struggle. The most famous is naturally the Red Army led by Zhu Mao. The Kuomintang newspapers have declared the victory of its "encirclement and suppression" countless times. But the facts are the facts, and Zhu Mao's Red Army is still developing day by day."

It is especially worth mentioning that Zhou Enlai, who was in charge of the military work of the Central Committee at that time, fully affirmed and highly praised the struggle experience of Zhu Mao's Red Army and the Jinggangshan base area.On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhou Enlai stated in the "Instruction Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army" on September 28, 1929: "The struggle of the Fourth Army of the Red Army over the past two years" has had a great influence on the political situation in the country. , which proves the weakness of the ruling class in the countryside and the existence and development of revolutionary forces. We cannot deny the great significance of the Red Army and the Fourth Army. If we continue to work hard, it will inevitably become one of the driving forces for the national revolutionary upsurge , there is no doubt about it.”At the same time, he pointed out brilliantly: "First there was the rural Red Army, and then there was the urban regime. This is the characteristic of the Chinese revolution, which is the product of China's economic foundation. If someone doubts the existence of the Red Army, he does not understand the reality of the Chinese revolution." Zhou Enlai From the "great significance" of the struggle between Zhu Mao's Red Army and Jinggang Mountains, we can see the "power of the national revolutionary upsurge", see the "characteristics of the Chinese revolution", and see the development of the Chinese revolution "first there was the rural Red Army, and then there was urban power." the way.This important judgment made by Zhou Enlai on behalf of the Central Committee is the sublimation of the whole party's understanding of the Jinggangshan struggle.At the same time, in the inaugural issue of the Central Military Commission's "Military Newsletter" (January 15, 1930), Zhou Enlai also published a comprehensive and detailed introduction to the situation of Zhu Mao's Red Army and Jinggangshan struggle experience written by Chen Yi on September 1, 1929. "Report on the History and Condition of the Zhu Mao Army".The Military Commission publication issued an editor's note for this, and spoke highly of Zhu Mao's Red Army's experience in fighting Jinggangshan.The editor's note of the Central "Military Newsletter" said: "This is a report that is very valuable to us. After we read this report, the 'monster' of the Zhumao Red Army can be seen at a glance. Judging from their history in several periods, it is very clear. I understand how hard they have struggled in the past two years. When they were so miserable that they could not warm their clothes and hunger enough, they did not change their spirit of forging ahead. Today, "800,000 armed workers and peasants support" (see Mao Zedong's letter ) solid foundation! There are many valuable experiences that deserve the attention of each of our comrades, such as their organization, their tactics, their methods of raising funds and supplies, their relationship with the masses, and their internal military and political training. , their principles for dealing with supply and expenditure in the army (economic equality between officers and soldiers, absolute openness of expenditure)... are all 'unconventional' in China, and have never been seen or heard before." The spirit of "struggle" and "going forward bravely", praised Zhu Mao's Red Army for "has a lot of valuable experience", "is unique in China", and is "worthy of the attention of every one of our comrades".This provided publicity and guidance for the dissemination and promotion of the experience of Zhu Mao's Red Army and Jinggangshan struggle in various base areas across the country.

In the adjacent areas around the Jinggangshan base area, there are such revolutionary base areas as Donggu, southern Jiangxi, western Fujian, Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi.These base areas are closely related to the Jinggangshan struggle, and were the earliest and most deeply influenced by Zhu Mao's Red Army. 1. The impact on the Donggu base area. Since the establishment of the Donggu base area, it has formed a corner with the Jinggangshan base area. At that time, there was a saying among the masses that "there is Jinggangshan on the top and Donggu mountain on the bottom". Chen Yi called it "East Jinggang", and Mao Zedong called it "Li Wenlin style". "Base. On February 20, 1929, the Fourth Red Army led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De joined forces with the Second and Fourth Red Regiments led by Li Wenlin in Luokeng, Donggu.Mao Zedong appreciated the achievements of the Donggu base area very much, saying that the Fourth Red Army was the "Iron Army" and the Second and Fourth Red Regiments were the "Steel Army". "Zhu Mao", but "Zhu Mao" is beating more and more, and now you have become "Zhu Mao".After the meeting, the Fourth Red Army left a group of experienced cadres such as Mao Zetan to strengthen the work in the Donggu base area, and there were more than 300 Red Army wounded and sick.After staying and relocating these cadres and wounded and sick, they brought with them the fine traditions of the Fourth Red Army and the rich experience of Jinggangshan, and made them deeply rooted.While introducing the experience of Jinggangshan to Donggu, Mao Zedong also highly praised the experience of the secret separatist regime in the Donggu base area, and wrote to the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Special Committee in the name of the previous committee, asking them to learn from Donggu's experience and implement a change in strategy.The Donggu base area has developed rapidly since the two armies joined forces and exchanged experience, and soon became the barrier of the Jinggangshan base area and the cornerstone of the central base area.

2. The impact on the southern Jiangxi base area. The southern Jiangxi base area was opened up by Zhu Mao's Red Army after it penetrated into southern Jiangxi, and was directly influenced by the struggle experience of the Fourth Red Army and the Jinggangshan base area. On March 20, 1929, at the meeting of the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army held in Tingzhou, Mao Zedong decided: "With the scope of more than 20 counties in southern Jiangxi and western Fujian, with guerrilla tactics, from mobilizing the masses to publicizing the separatism of the Soviet regime, From this, the separatist area is connected with the separatist area on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi." "This plan must be established, and no matter what, it cannot be abandoned, because this is the basis for progress."According to this decision, the Fourth Red Army divided its forces in southern Jiangxi, and quickly established the red political power in the three counties of Yudu, Xingguo, and Ningdu, laying a solid foundation for the revolutionary base in southern Jiangxi. In March 1930, the Southwest Jiangxi Soviet Government was established, closely linking the two base areas of West Jiangxi and South Jiangxi, which had long been connected, and the party organization was also placed under the unified leadership of the Front Committee and the Southwest Jiangxi Special Committee.After the struggles in the border areas of Hunan and Jiangxi and the base areas in southern Jiangxi merged into a whole, the struggle experiences of the Red Army and the base areas were extensively exchanged and systematically summarized, and the experience of Jinggangshan blossomed and borne fruit in southern Jiangxi. 3. The impact on the base area in western Fujian. As early as December 6, 1928, the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China instructed the Special Committee of Western Fujian to learn from Zhu Mao's Red Army's good method of "snowballing" to develop the Red Army and the red area. There are more than ten thousand guns." On August 7, 1929, the Fujian Provincial Party Committee further emphasized in its letter of instruction to the West Fujian Special Committee to transfer to the county committees: "The Fourth Army has a lot of experience in Hunan and Jiangxi in the past, and we can use it." November 13, 1929 , The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also sent a letter to the Fujian Provincial Party Committee, asking them to "pay special attention to Zhu Mao's experience in many wars and their actions."During the three times when Mao Zedong and Zhu De led the Fourth Red Army into Fujian, the experience of the Fourth Red Army and the Jinggangshan base area was directly spread, deepened and developed in western Fujian.For example, the West Fujian Land Law presided over by the "1st National Congress" of the Western Fujian Party fully absorbed some of the practices and experiences of the "Jinggangshan Land Law" and implemented the policy principles of the Party's Sixth National Congress on land issues. There are new developments based on the experience of the Western Land Struggle.Since the party and the Red Army in western Fujian absorbed the rich experience of the struggles of Zhu Mao's Red Army and the Jinggangshan base area, breakthroughs were made in the armed struggle and the construction of red areas and base areas in western Fujian. 4. The impact on the Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi base areas. Long before the Pingjiang Uprising, Peng Dehuai, the main founder of the Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi base areas, had the wish to use the Jinggang flag as a "model".In a "secret poem" to Huang Gonglue, he wrote: "Only Runzhi's workers and peasants leapt to the Jinggang banner. I want to follow it as an example, or follow a lake or a mountain." When the Pingjiang Uprising broke out, Peng Dehuai In the uprising platform, it was proposed: "Create a new Soviet area on the border of Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi, and seek to integrate with the area where the Fourth Red Army is active." In October 1928, Peng Dehuai, who was the commander of the Fifth Red Army, was in Hunan. A meeting of the Hubei-Jiangxi Border Special Committee clearly stated: "The revolutionary banner of Jinggangshan" "is the guiding light for the Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi border regions and other revolutionary base areas. Only under its guidance can we have a bright future." .On December 10 of that year, Peng Dehuai personally led more than 800 people from the fourth and fifth columns of the Fifth Red Army to Ninggang New City, where they joined Zhu Mao's Red Army and participated in the struggle in Jinggangshan.Later, due to changes in the battle situation, the Fifth Red Army moved back and forth between the two base areas on the Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi borders, so that the experience of Jinggangshan and the tradition of Zhu Mao’s Red Army could be promoted and spread in the Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi bases, and promoted this. development of a region. The majestic rise of the Jinggangshan base area not only aroused repercussions in the adjacent base areas, but also had a wide-ranging impact on some remote base areas and guerrilla areas across the country. 1. The impact on the Hubei, Henan and Anhui base areas. In May 1929, the Special Committee of the Northeast Hubei Province put forward the "method of learning from Jinggangshan in Jiangxi" to establish a revolutionary base.In the "Report to the Central Committee on the Struggle in the Huang, Ma, and Guang Border Areas", it was written: "The Red Army's military plan is to try its best to open up the road from the east of Macheng, Shangcheng, and Luotian to Ying (mountain) and Huotian in Anhui Province. In the area of ​​the Dabie Mountains in the (mountain) boundary, we plan to station in the north when there is no way out in the military. We also learn the method of Jinggang Mountain in Jiangxi (the emphasis number is added by the quoter). Wushengguan is a horizontal line between the border mountains of Hubei and Henan." The Special Committee of Northeast Hubei learned from the experience of the Jinggangshan military separatist regime and implemented "concentrated operations", "dispersed guerrillas", "when the enemy advances, we retreat", "when the enemy retreats, we pursue " and "running in circles" guerrilla tactics successfully established the Dabie Mountains military base. 2. The impact on the western Hunan and Hubei base areas. He Long and the Western Hunan and Hubei Front Committee drafted for the Central Committee on March 17, 1929, "In the Zhu Mao army, the party organization is based on a company, and each company establishes a branch. Committee, Youth League Committee and other organizations" and "this experience can be used as a reference for you", when the army established the party, it accepted the experience of the Jinggangshan base area and the Zhumao Red Army. The company generally established party branches, and the army established political organs. The party's leadership over the army was strengthened, political work in the army was strengthened, and the struggle in the western Hunan and Hubei base areas entered a new period of development.On June 15th of that year, the Central Committee introduced "the tactical experience of Zhu Mao's several years of war" to the front committee of Hunan and Hubei, such as "dividing troops to mobilize the masses, concentrating to deal with the enemy" and "Sixteen Characters" and other guerrilla tactics. Tactics, in this regard, the Western Hunan and Hubei Front Committee has made good use and new creations in leading the military struggles of the military and civilians in the base areas. 3. The impact on the Zuojiang base area. Mo Wenhua recalled in his article "The Birth of the Seventh Red Army" that shortly after the victory of the Baise Uprising, Deng Xiaoping put forward the slogans of "learning from Zhu Mao's Red Army" and "converging Zhu Mao's Red Army". The struggle experience of the Jinggangshan armed separatist regime.In an instruction letter to the Seventh Red Army on March 2, 1930, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China expressed its appreciation for the Seventh Red Army's "ability to use the experience of Zhu Mao's Red Army" and expressed the opinion that "the Central Committee agrees with your current establishment". In February 1931, Deng Xiaoping, Li Mingrui, Zhang Yunyi and others led the Seventh Red Army from Guangxi to the Jiangxi Soviet Area.In July of the same year, after meeting with Zhu Mao's Red Army in southern Jiangxi, it was incorporated into the Third Red Army and participated in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" war in the central revolutionary base area. The experience of the two armies was directly integrated and exchanged. 4. The impact on the Dongjiang base area. In May and October 1929, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent two letters to the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, informing them that "it is necessary to be determined to fight and expand the scope of armed struggle. This is the correct way to support Zhu Mao"; , instructing the Dongjiang Special Committee and the Hailufeng Local Party Headquarters to link up with the guerrilla activities of Zhu Mao’s Red Army and the work of benefactors.”According to the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Guangdong Provincial Committee, the Dongjiang Special Committee let go to mobilize the masses and actively carry out armed struggle. In late October 1929, it got in touch with the first part of Zhu Dehong's Fourth Army who attacked Dongjiang. Dongjiang guerrilla base. 4. The impact on the Shaanxi-Gansu base area. When Xi Zhongxun wrote an article in memory of Liu Zhidan, he mentioned that in early 1931, the party organizations and leaders in the Shaanxi-Gansu region, after receiving documents such as the "Report of the Jinggangshan Front Committee to the Central Committee" reprinted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, realized that they must "be like Comrade Mao Zedong, Relying on the Jinggang Mountains, we will carry out armed separatism, establish base areas, and gradually develop and expand guerrilla areas. Even if a serious situation comes, we still have a place to stand and room for maneuver. The most fundamental thing now is to have base areas.”Under the influence of Zhu Mao's Red Army and the experience of Jinggangshan, they vigorously carried out the struggle of armed separatist regimes, and finally established the Shaanxi-Gansu Revolutionary Base Centered on Zhaojin. The struggle experience of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base, like a spring breeze after the severe cold, blows to some revolutionary bases under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, making these bases more vigorous and vigorous under the white rule.Of course, the influence among the various base areas is also complementary.When the struggle experience in the Jinggangshan base area was spread and promoted to other places, the experience in some areas also had a certain influence on the struggle in Jinggangshan.Because of this, Mao Zedong was able to summarize and generalize the base area models such as the Zhu Mao style, Fang Zhimin style, He Long style, and Li Wenlin style, and explore the common characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolutionary road.