Chapter 8 Chapter Seven Crossing the Grass

According to the resolution of the Shawo meeting and the plan of the Xiatao campaign, from August 13, 1935, the Red Army began to operate in two ways.The left army went to Aba, and the right army went to Banyou. From the day they separated, the fate of the Left Army appeared to be in trouble.Fearing that the Red Army would march into Qinghai from Aba, Ma Bufang, the leader of the Qinghai Navy, appointed Yang Junzaxi, a local official from Aba, as the commander of the Maisang detachment of the fifth column of the Northwest "bandit suppression" route, and ordered him to organize tribal Tibetans and prepare their own horses and weapons. Stop the Red Army.Yang Jun Tashi has fought the Red Army many times, and Aba is his home, so he will naturally resist desperately.

In mid-August, the 93rd Division of the 31st Army, the vanguard of the Left Route Army, marched from Kangmao Temple to Aba via Longriba.When the 93rd Division arrived 30 miles southwest of Dangge Harima Mountain, it encountered 2,000 Tibetan cavalry led by Yang Jun Tashi.The Red Army was unfavorable in the first battle and was forced to retreat.When the follow-up troops arrived, the firepower was deployed intensively, and the Tibetan cavalry were repelled after a fierce attack.But the Red Army didn't go after them either, and moved to the Four Villages to camp.At this time, the 25th Division of the 9th Army and the 5th Army of the other route set off from Maerkang and Dazang Temple and crossed Mount Ande.The mountains are high and the roads are dangerous. The 9th Army killed more than 30 horses and lost a lot of supplies during the march.They moved on after reuniting with the 93rd Division at Sizhai. On August 19, the 25th Division defeated the Tibetan soldiers and occupied the Chali Monastery.On the same day, Dong Zhentang, commander of the 5th Army, led his troops to explore the way from Chali Temple to Banyou.

Ma Bufang was deeply disturbed when he heard the news of Yang Jun Tashi's defeat, and ordered his main force, the Ma Biao Cavalry Brigade, to rush for reinforcements.However, Yang Jun Tashi was repeatedly attacked by the Red Army and had no intention of fighting.Before Ma's army arrived, he packed up the gold and silver, took his family and some soldiers, burned the official village and fled to Guoluo, Qinghai.The Red Army occupied Aba on August 21. Aba is a place where Tibetans in Northwest Sichuan are more concentrated.The three towns of Upper Aba, Middle Aba and Lower Aba are distributed along the Ruo River and A River, and there are some small village settlements nearby.In the desolate northwestern Sichuan, it is considered a prosperous area.There are no more than a thousand households in a town, and the most spectacular building is the Lama Temple.Zhang Guotao came to Aba and felt good.He recalled: "This is the center of Tibetans in this area, a famous city in the south of the western grassland, known as 'Tibetan Chengdu'. The Grand Lama Temple in Aba is majestic and exquisite. Several smaller lama temples, surrounded by thousands of lama residences and hundreds of shops, form a rectangular city, the size of which is equal to an ordinary county in the inland. Nearby is a flat land, and the calm Dajinchuan flows through it. In the meantime, there is a large area of ​​highland barley fields by the river, and there are even wider beautiful grasslands around. When we arrived here, most of the lamas had already fled, but the food left behind could supply our army for several months."

Chief of the General Staff Liu Bocheng was not in a good mood, he was unwilling to leave the Central Committee and come to Aba.When Zhang Guotao said happily, "Aba is such a wonderful place." He said coldly, "Who is there? Bring all the troops, and there is not enough food for a meal." Later, Marshal Liu Bocheng recalled his mood at that time and said: "If Zhang Guotao had the determination to implement the (Shawo) resolution without reservation, why would he go back to Aba? But he wanted to go back. At that time, Comrade Zhu De was the commander-in-chief and Zhang Guotao was the general political commissar. They all went, so I had to go too. I At that time, I didn’t want to go. Since the resolution was to be implemented, why did I go to that corner? I was prepared to suffer.”

"In this way," Liu Bocheng said, "I will return to Aba with Zhang Guotao. Comrade Liu Shaowen is also with me. He is the secretary-general of the general headquarters and has the telegram code for international communication." After the Shawo meeting, according to the arrangement of the central government, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De bid farewell to Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others who had fought side by side for many years, and brought Liu Bocheng and the staff of the headquarters to the Red Army headquarters of the Left Army to work with Zhang Guotao.Zhu De is a model of discipline, but he does not want to leave the central government from the bottom of his heart.From Zhang Guotao's actions during this period, he has already foreseen that his future work will be very difficult.Mr. Zhu later recalled:

Zhang Guotao, when he was in the Central Soviet Area, generally did not know what kind of person he was.Some old comrades didn't have a good impression of him, but no one said anything bad about him, because he was still a comrade in charge of the party at that time.I also heard that he is an "opportunist", but I don't know to what extent. After the rendezvous of the two rivers, representatives of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the Party and the Soviet government held a meeting there, discussed for several days, and made a decision to continue going north.He did not object to Zhang Guotao in person, but conspired behind his back to oppose this resolution and not implement it.At that time we did not understand that he had always opposed the Central Committee.After he returned from the meeting, he immediately mobilized his subordinates to oppose it.

At that time, the reason why he was willing to go north, but not willing to go north, was to compete for official positions.After arriving in Maoergai, he was pessimistic and disappointed.He felt that the revolution had no future, and desperately wanted to go west, to Tibet and Qinghai, to escape the war far away.But he didn't know that the population there was sparse and the geographical conditions were good, but he only wanted to take advantage of it and adopt a method of breaking away from the masses.His most erroneous idea was to think of a remote and backward place to establish a base.The central government completely rejected his opinions, and the central government decided to go north.

The Fourth Front Army led by Zhang Guotao always took individuals as the starting point, so the party organization and military organization were also very weak.In short, everything starts from the individual, and anyone who opposes him will be conquered by him, or driven away, or killed.This opportunistic line and the correct line are incompatible. As a result, the party, government, and army he built were all concentrated in his own hands, and he became a dictator. It seems to be an arrangement of fate. After operating separately from the Central Committee, the life of the Left Army has not been peaceful.The march was blocked everywhere, and internal turmoil continued.

One night in mid-August, the town of Zhuokeji caught fire.Zeng Zhongsheng, chief of staff of the Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee, who was under house arrest by Zhang Guotao, suddenly and mysteriously disappeared. Zeng Zhongsheng, formerly known as Zeng Zhongsheng. He joined the Party in 1925, was born in the fourth phase of Whampoa, and later studied in the Soviet Union. In 1930, he served as the secretary of the special committee and chairman of the Military Commission of the Hubei, Henan, and Anhui Soviet Areas. He was one of the pioneers of the Hubei, Henan, and Anhui Soviet Areas.He has extraordinary talents in military affairs, and is good at proceeding from the actual situation, summing up experience, and defeating the enemy.His whole set of guerrilla warfare theories and tactics, whether it is avoiding the facts and making false claims, attacking the west in a false way, or concentrating superior forces to fight the war of annihilation, coincides with Mao Zedong in many aspects.Under his leadership, the Hubei, Henan and Anhui Red Army quickly developed and expanded.Zeng Zhongsheng himself enjoyed high prestige in the Soviet area.After Zhang Guotao arrived in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, he took advantage of his identity as a representative of the central government to carry out mass killings in Baiqueyuan to eliminate counter-revolutionaries. The purpose was to bring down Zeng Zhongsheng and the cadres in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and establish his and Chen Changhao's status.Although Zeng Zhongsheng was hit repeatedly, he still did not give in and kept fighting with Zhang Guotao.When retreating to the Sichuan-Shaanxi area, Zeng Zhongsheng criticized Zhang Guotao's escape route at the Xiaohekou meeting. Zhang Guotao had to be convinced and appointed Zeng as the chief of staff of the Northwest Military Commission.When he got a foothold in Tongnan Basu District, Zhang Guotao immediately killed and arrested the comrades who supported Zeng Zhongsheng, and Zeng Zhongsheng was also placed under house arrest by Zhang Guotao.In his life as a prisoner, Zeng Zhongsheng wrote day and night with his loyalty to the revolution, and successively completed three books: "Key Points of Fighting the Sichuan Army", "Key Points of Guerrilla Warfare", and "Key Points of Fighting the "Suppressing Red" Army".After Zhang Guotao read it, he had to express his admiration.Instructions: "This book is very valuable, and every cadre of the Red Army should hold a copy." They are widely circulated among the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army as teaching materials.Zeng Zhongsheng himself was guarded by the Security Bureau and has never been free.

Yuan Keke's 1st Independent Division was operating with the Security Bureau at that time. One day in August, he was leading the troops from Malkang to Aba when he met Zeng Chuanliu, director of the Security Bureau.He said to Yuan: "Zeng Zhongsheng ran away and deserted." Yuan Ke Ke felt very strange. He knew that Zeng Zhongsheng had one leg injured and disabled when he was in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and he was still limping when he was the chief of staff of the Northwest Military Commission. How could he run away?He met Ding Wuxuan from the Security Bureau again and asked about Zeng Zhongsheng. Ding Wuxuan faltered and said, "Someone probably helped him escape." When he arrived in Aba, Yuan saw Zhou Chunquan. That old problem, you have to be careful!" Yuan Keke knew that he was talking too much, and he couldn't ask about things that shouldn't be asked.

How Zeng Zhongsheng died, many people don't know.I heard from Zhang Guotao that Zeng Zhongsheng wanted to escape, but fell into the river halfway and drowned.The Security Bureau sent people to search everywhere, but no body was found.Xu Yixin didn't believe it. He recalled: "When the first and fourth front armies met, Comrade Zhongsheng said, 'I can't die this time.' This word reached Zhang Guotao's ears, and Zhang was shocked. Because Zhongsheng We all know Zhang Guotao’s situation from the beginning to the end. As soon as he complained to the central government, Zhang Guotao was passive. At that time, Zhang Guotao was preparing to split the party and split the Red Army, so Zhang Guotao heard Zeng Zhongsheng’s words and got rid of him.” Xu Yixin's view is reasonable, Zeng Zhongsheng is Zhang Guotao's most troublesome opponent, Zhang Guotao will not give him a chance to make a comeback.The party historians almost unanimously believe that Zeng Zhongsheng was murdered by Zhang Guotao.An article wrote with certainty: "In June 1935, the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and the First Front Army joined forces in Maogong. After Zeng Zhongsheng learned about it, he directly asked Zhang Guotao to be released and allowed him to report and write letters to the Central Committee. Knowing that Zeng Zhongsheng was illegally imprisoned, he asked to see Zeng Zhongsheng by name. Afraid of revealing the truth, Zhang Guotao withheld Zeng Zhongsheng’s letter to the central government and forbade him to meet with the central leadership. One night in mid-August 1935, in the forest north of Zhuo Keji in Northwest Sichuan , strangled Zeng Zhongsheng to death with a rope, and murdered him to silence him. But they spread rumors that Zeng Zhongsheng colluded with the enemy, fell into the river and drowned. The method was vicious and despicable." The death of Zeng Zhongsheng left some mysteries that cannot be solved so far.Zhang Guotao killed many people, but after the first and fourth front armies joined forces, his actions were supervised by the central government, and he could not cover the sky with one hand and do whatever he wanted as before.Where did Zeng Zhong live and die, but his body has never been found.Zhang Guotao kept this matter secret, and didn't even report it to Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao.So the central government has always believed that Zeng Zhongsheng is still alive. In February 1936, Lin Yuying called Zhang Guotao as a representative of the Communist International, asking him to protect the lives of Zeng Zhongsheng and Liao Chengzhi.Liao Chengzhi is still there. As for Zeng Zhongsheng, Zhang Guotao is unable to explain. In March 1937, the Yan'an Politburo meeting liquidated Zhang Guotao's wrong line and severely investigated his murder.Zhang Guotao strongly denied that he had killed Zeng Zhongsheng, saying: "Zeng Zhongsheng's arrest was wrong, but he did not kill him. I am not politically responsible." People in the Security Bureau of the Fourth Red Front Army also denied any involvement in Zeng Zhongsheng's death.No witnesses who witnessed Zeng Zhongsheng's death have been found.It's a pity that such an outstanding general of the Red Army disappeared without any reason.If it weren't for Zhang Guotao's crackdown and persecution, how could Zeng Zhongsheng have fallen into the state of a prisoner?From this point of view, Zhang Guotao has an inescapable responsibility. Contrary to the left army, the right army is actively preparing to march north.The front headquarters of Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao cooperated harmoniously with the central government. Since the central government called Zhang Guotao on August 15 to ask him to "focus on the north", Zhang Guotao still led the left army to march towards Aba. On August 18, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao called Zhu De and Zhang Guotao again, reporting that they had begun to march northward: "The army on the fourth front is going to the right, and the army on the one hand is going to the left. "Admonish Zhang Guotao, "If Aba has already been occupied by me, most of the left army should not go deep into Aba, but should quickly stick to the right, and advance together quickly, so as not to divide the force."However, no matter who persuaded him, Zhang Guotao decided on Aba and didn't want to go anywhere. Is the main force going to Qinghai via Aba, or going north to Gannan via Banyou to develop eastward?The central government once again faced a choice.Therefore, on August 20, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held another meeting at Maoergesuohua Temple to study and discuss the course of action.Attending the meeting were members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu, Wang Jiaxiang, Chen Changhao, Kai Feng, and Deng Fa, as well as Xu Xiangqian, Li Fuchun, Nie Rongzhen, Li Xiannian, and Lin Biao.Zhu De and Zhang Guotao were in the left army, and Zhou Enlai was seriously ill and did not attend the meeting. At the meeting, Mao Zedong first made a report on the Xiatao campaign plan.He said: According to the policy of creating the Sichuan-Shanxi-Gansu Soviet Area, after arriving in the Xiatao area, our actions have two directions: one to Shaanxi and one to the west (that is, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia).In my opinion, the main force of the Red Army should move east, towards the Shaanxi-Gansu border, and not west of the Yellow River.The reason is that if we go west of the Yellow River, the enemy will build a blockade on the east bank of the Yellow River, confining us to the area west of the Yellow River.Although this area is large, except for the grasslands, the desert is very small, and the population is small, so we will have difficulties.If we want to break the enemy's blockade, we must occupy the upper and middle reaches of the Tao River. Mao Zedong analyzed the reasons why he could not go west: In terms of economic conditions, the climate in the northwest is cold and supplies are difficult; in terms of ethnic conditions, there are very few Han people in the northwest, and most of them are Muslims.If we go there now, the Muslims will be forced to rebel.We cannot expand the Red Army there, so we have to go east.He emphasized: The current battle of Xiatao is greatly related to future operations. Mao Zedong finally said: In which area is our base area more consolidated?I think it should be based on the Tao River Basin.This area is backed by grasslands, so it is difficult for Sichuan warlords to come; Qinghai Hui people are also unlikely to attack us.At the same time, there is a retreat to the west. We should send a detachment to the west, to the Hexi Corridor, and to Xinjiang. Chen Changhao expressed his full agreement with Mao Zedong's report.Then I talked about three points: One is to create a rear base to avoid wandering around without a rear.Our experience in Tongnanba has no basis, and the masses dare not join the Red Army.With base areas, the masses joined the army in large numbers.Therefore, we must have the determination to create base areas before we can expand the Red Army and create Soviet areas. The second is to occupy the Minzhou area. The third is the cooperation with the left army.We must now concentrate our strength to move forward. Therefore, if the left army cannot cooperate well with us, it will be difficult for us to advance to Minzhou.Therefore, the Left Route Army must move closer to us and ask him to come to our aid, but we cannot aid him. Chen Changhao finally said: In my opinion, the right army must be concentrated together.The two armies of the Fourth Front Army and the two armies of the First Front Army must not be dispersed.It is necessary to gather action and concentrate our forces on the direction of the decisive battle. Wang Jiaxiang, Kaifeng, and Lin Biao spoke unanimously in agreement with Mao Zedong's report.Xu Xiangqian also expressed his support for the central government's decision. He added: We should resolutely advance from the right bank of the Tao River and break through from the direction of Minzhou to the east.If you can't go, then attack east from the left bank of the river.The strategic direction is of course to go east. Mao Zedong was very pleased with the unanimity of everyone's opinions, and he emphasized two points in his final conclusion: 1. Go north to the Taohe River Basin, and then resolutely develop eastward. 2. The left army should quickly approach the right army and go north together. The meeting passed the "Supplementary Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Concerning the Current Strategic Guidelines" drafted by Mao Zedong.The resolution of the Maoergai meeting made some adjustments to the resolution of the Lianghekou meeting.The current main task of the Red Army is to "quickly occupy the Tao River Basin (mainly the east bank of the Tao River) centered on Minzhou, and based on this area, attack eastward in order to obtain the vast areas of Shaanxi and Gansu, and continue to advance the Chinese Soviet movement. A powerful pillar and base for development". The "Decision" emphasizes: "The current campaign should strive to control the Taohe River, first of all its east bank area, and smash the enemy's Lanzhou and Songpan blockade plans, so as to be in a favorable maneuvering position and facilitate the continued victory over the enemy. Gather the maximum Focusing the main force on the main direction, fighting resolutely and resolutely, and maneuvering flexibly and skillfully are the guarantees of victory in this battle." The "Decision" also stated: "The Politburo believes that it is inappropriate and extremely unfavorable to send our main force westward across the Yellow River and into Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. reject and think that it is necessary to send a detachment to this area to operate).” The reason is that “the Han Red Army’s total and long-term penetration into this area will inevitably cause misunderstandings, suspicions, and even hostile attitudes among these ethnic groups... This is in the grain Under the condition of difficult supplies, it is easier to sharpen." "This action is objectively in line with the requirements of the enemy. The enemy is oppressing us to the unfavorable areas with all his strength, and he can build overlapping blockades and fortresses along the Yellow River to prevent our future development to China's headquarters and cut us off from other Soviet areas. Contact with the Red Army and the national revolutionary movement." "Natural and material conditions are unfavorable. If the Red Army is in command of this area for a long time, it will encounter great difficulties." In view of the above reasons, "The Politburo believes that this policy is currently adopted It is wrong and a dangerous policy of retreat. The political source of this policy is the right opportunism that fears the enemy and exaggerates the enemy's strength and loses confidence in one's own strength and victory." The Maoergai meeting seemed to be a working meeting to study the actions of the Red Army, but if we carefully explore the decisions of the meeting, we can understand Mao Zedong's strategy and good intentions. This meeting only discussed the issue of how to proceed, which completely changed the situation in which the Central Committee of the Shawo Conference and Zhang Guotao accused each other and entangled each other on the past history and line issues.Mao Zedong understood that the dispute with Zhang Guotao could not be resolved overnight.As a result of the debate, firstly, the contradictions within the Red Army were exacerbated, and secondly, precious time was lost.So many Red Army troops spent two months in this desolate place, food was running out, and the route to the north was about to be blocked by the Kuomintang troops. Any further delay would be tantamount to suicide.Therefore, Mao Zedong once again used the strategy of the Zunyi Conference to put aside political issues and old historical accounts, and concentrate on solving the problem of leaving. Only going north will there be a way out.This method really worked, and Chen Changhao readily accepted Mao Zedong's opinion. Second, Mao Zedong wanted to gain the initiative in leadership.After the left and right armies acted separately, the Red Army command organization was actually divided into two: the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was at one end, and the Red Army General Headquarters was at the other end.It stands to reason that the central government is in charge of policies and routes, and the general headquarters is in charge of specific commands.But Zhang Guotao obviously has a different heart with the central government, he has his own plans, otherwise what would he do in Aba?Of course, Mao Zedong would not wait for Zhang Guotao to manipulate him. The purpose of Mao Ergai's meeting was to formulate an action plan and let Zhang Guotao implement it in the name of the central government's decision.Let the left army approach the right army, not the other way around. Again, the "Decision" severely criticized and denied the intention to lead the Red Army to Qinghai and other remote western areas.These words were obviously a warning to Zhang Guotao.The Left Route Army went to Aba. If they went north to Shaanxi and Gansu, it would be a detour to go to Aba. It is the shortest way to go to Qinghai from Aba.Mao Zedong was extremely worried that Zhang Guotao would bring tens of thousands of Red Army troops to Qinghai, so he put his words up front in the "Decision". The Xia Tao campaign has a set goal, where should we go north?The Songpan road was blocked by Hu Zongnan, and the Red Army had to march north, passing through the Songpan grassland to Banyou and Brazil.Hu Zongnan learned from the Tibetan chieftain: the grassland is a magical swamp, even birds cannot fly over it.If the Red Army walks on the grass, it will kill itself.Therefore, the north side of the grassland is not fortified.However, the Red Army is going to walk through this deserted wilderness. Songpan Grassland is located in today's Songpan and Ruoergai counties in Sichuan Province.Its scope roughly includes the south of Lierlang Mountain (north of today’s Ruoergai County), west of Langjialing (now Songpan West), and north of Zhazhen Liangzi (south of today’s Hongyuan County), with a length and width of 600 li and an area of ​​about 15,000 square kilometers, with an altitude of more than 3,500 meters.The terrain is flat and endless.The Baihe River (that is, the Gaqu River) and the Heihe River (the Moqu River) flow into the Yellow River from south to north. The natural river course twists and turns, and the water flow is slow.The aquatic plants are intertwined and form meadows, covering the swamps.The climate of the grassland is harsh, the annual average temperature is below zero degrees Celsius, and the average temperature in summer is 10 degrees Celsius, and the temperature difference is large.Sometimes the sky is clear and the sun is scorching; sometimes there are lightning and thunder, rain and snow.Except for herdsmen grazing in the fringe in summer, few people venture into the depths of the grassland.Half a century later, the American writer Salisbury visited the Long March Road and came to Ruoergai, where he personally experienced the ever-changing weather on the grassland.He wrote: Fifty years later, in June 1984, the grass is still the same.At night, the ground was covered with silver frost, and the temperature was minus six to seven degrees Celsius. At dawn, the weather was still good, and the bright red sun came out of the horizon to shine on the grass. However, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the sky suddenly darkened and dark clouds gathered. A drizzle began to fall, and everything became hazy and gray in the mist.Then the heavy rain and the strong wind poured down, and it was raining and snowing again in an instant.Not long after, the road, grassland and mountains were covered by the flying goose feather snow, and the caravans on the way hid in the leeward place, and the groups of yaks and sheep turned into slowly moving snowdrifts.The heavy snow has weakened after more than two hours.Again a strong wind blew over the desert, and the sun in the wind became pale, dim, and trembling.The wind did not stop, and it began to rain again.In the second half of the day, the sky showed a clear blue, the sun was shining, and the snow melted, which made people feel a hint of spring; but when the sun's brilliance sank to the other side of the Yellow River, the spring disappeared in the frost. Today, this piece of land has been rehabilitated, and ditches have been dug everywhere to drain water. The appearance of the grassland is not what it used to be.White sheep and black yaks can be seen everywhere on the green grassland. Groups of tourists come to Songpan and Hongyuan to indulge in the beautiful scenery.But Mao Zedong didn't have such a leisurely mood back then. He summoned Yang Chengwu, the political commissar of the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division of the Red First Army, and ordered the 4th Regiment to be the vanguard to wade out a path in the grass. On August 18, 1935, the 264th and 265th regiments of the Red 30th Army, the vanguard of the Right Route Army, led by Ye Jianying, chief of staff of the former enemy general headquarters, first embarked on a grassland march and marched towards Banyou.On their left flank, the 4th Regiment of the 1st Red Army set out from Maoergai on the 21st and took another route into the grass.The column of the Central Military Commission and the former enemy general headquarters moved with the large force of the First Army, and Zhou Enlai, who was ill, walked with the Third Army at the end. Crossing the grass has always been called the most difficult experience in the history of the Red Army's Long March. Some books and memoirs describe that crossing the grass is like a death march. "The Long March of the Red Army in Sichuan" wrote: The grassland in August, for the Red Army commanders and fighters who have just set foot on this land, is really a special scene: the pasture is rich and the flowers are blooming, but along with the progress is the cruel torture of nature and the threat of death.There is no way to follow here, and the troops can only march slowly on the meadow under the guidance of Tibetan guides.The soft meadow, with the movement of the soldiers' footsteps, made a chirping sound.A little carelessness, trampling through the meadow, the whole person fell into the swamp, unable to be rescued, and drowned in a short while.After the troops entered the grassland, it rained almost every day. The rain not only drenched the clothes of the soldiers, but also flooded the route of the troops.In some areas, the water is knee-deep for dozens of miles, making it difficult for guides to find the traces left by past nomads.As a result, some soldiers deviated from the marching route, got stuck in the mud, and were swallowed by the swamp.August is also the season when hailstorms are fierce on the grass. Sometimes the soldiers can't even find a place to hide in the face of overwhelming hailstorms.On the vast grassland, apart from the occasional shallow hills several meters or tens of meters high, there is not a single taller tree, which often makes people confused. Sometimes the troops marched hard for several hours, but still returned to the original place. land. Re-reading the records of those who witnessed it today, the actual situation is not all like this.Generally speaking, the situation of the leading troops is better than that of the follow-up troops.Some of the troops marching separately chose easier routes.The records of the Red First Army are the most complete. They basically marched along the border between the grassland and the forest, and did not go deep into the hinterland of the grassland.Let's take a look at the record of Wei Guoqing, head of the First Red Army Corps: In the 33rd issue of "Yi Jing" magazine published in Shanghai in May 1937, an article "The Red Army's Twenty-five Thousand Miles to the West" was published by Pastor Dong Jianwu under the pseudonym "Yougu", which introduced the Red Army's Long March for the first time in the Kuomintang ruled area go through.The "List of Places and Mileage Passed by the First Army Corps of the Red Army's Westward Introduction" quoted later in the article records the situation of the grassland in more detail: In his Long March diary, Tong Xiaopeng of the First Army Corps recorded in detail how they crossed the grassland, which is excerpted below: August 23: The grassland that was planned for a long time ago is going to start moving towards it today. Everyone really wants to get there as soon as possible and taste what the grassland is like. After breakfast, we set out in military uniform. We diverged from Thonghalong Road 20 miles away, and we still went up the river, and we still saw high mountains and forests along the way. If you want to cross the grass and make trouble on purpose?Because it rained and the weather was very cold, and some comrades did not have rain gear to resist, a few of them froze to death by the roadside due to their frailty. Walk about seventy miles to Lazitang, where we set up tents and camp by the river. August 24th: I started to enter the grassland, gradually disappeared the forest, and the ground gradually opened up. Although there are mountains on both sides, they are relatively low, and the mountains are covered with grass instead of other things. The road is full of green grass. If it weren't for the guide to lead the way, it is true that I can't even find the direction. The most annoying thing is that it is still raining, and the whole body is soaked, and the road is full of cement, which makes it difficult to walk. I didn't see any woods along the way, and when I finally saw the woods, I started camping (the watershed, about seventy miles).The forest was where the vanguard troops were stationed, so there are old sheds made of branches. I was allocated an old shed, and although the oilcloth did not leak, the ground was wet and uneven, and the shed was small and too low. It can't be transferred, but it is still a high-quality product in this environment. Because there is no pot and stove, I have to eat dry food by myself. Everyone uses their own porcelain pots as copper pots to boil water and cook porridge, and let me do whatever I want, which is a bit interesting. August 25th: Continue to set off after breakfast. This road is indeed pure grassland. The mountain is not high, but it is full of grass. It is really impossible to find even a small stick.Most of the road was at Pingba in the mountains, and at the end we climbed some small hills and traveled about 60 miles to Houhe for camping. Although this place has a place name, it is equal to zero. It is just a piece of grassy foothills.Although there is a large lawn at the foot of the mountain, because there is an irregular small river in the middle, the left and right bays turn east and west, and this land is occupied.We had to live at the foot of the mountain, and because there were no trees, everyone used the wooden sticks they brought to prop up.An oilcloth or blanket would be good too.Just because there is no firewood, everyone celebrates the "Cold Food Festival".The water in this small river is poisonous and red in color, and if you eat too much, you will get a stomachache. August 26th: After traveling for about 20 miles, we arrived at a very large flat dam, which was joined by a very large road on the right. It is said that the right-hand army came from Halong. Probably camped here last night.The road here is long and dry, and when you look at the plains, you can see tens of thousands of soldiers crawling on the road.After walking for more than 20 miles, turn right, and there is such a large grassland again, and then go about 20 miles, that is, camping at the foot of the mountain.I crossed the river five or six times on the way, which was quite annoying. The last time the water was so fast and deep, I was almost knocked down by the water, and I was quite shocked. There is no firewood here, and the comrades all went back to the river for three or four miles to collect firewood, so there was no "Cold Food Festival" at night. August 27: According to the map, Banyou can be reached by walking five days on the grassland. This place is still grassland without food, but there are more than 100 cattle houses.Everyone was very happy today, and they kept their eyes straight as they walked, wishing that the cattle house would be revealed in front of them.But the investigation was inaccurate. After walking for about seventy miles, it was almost dark and there was still no cow house. I only saw some continuous small forests by the river in the mountains, and some traces of the camping of the troops in front--fires, sheds, and finally Before arriving, we had to camp in the woods by the river, so everyone was disappointed today.It is abominable that it is still raining!Because the weather is very cold and the feet are wet all day long, it is really sad. August 28: Everyone said with certainty: "I will reach Banyou today anyway." Walking along the way, I still kept my eyes straight ahead, wishing that it was right in front of me, and walked about 20 miles along the side of the mountain into Pingba.Well, everyone was very happy when they saw the fire smoke flying around the mountain in front of them. They all guessed that Ban You must be in front, otherwise why would there be such a big cloud of fire smoke?No matter how strides forward, it proved even more that Ban You, who had been looking forward to it for a few days, had indeed arrived. During the rest, I heard the comrades who walked ahead say that there is a big village twenty-five miles to the right, and it is not a grassland.Everyone was overjoyed after hearing it!Unexpectedly, the grass passed so easily.After walking another fifteen miles, the lawn is over. At this time, there are indeed two worlds: looking back, there is a big lawn in the back, and all there are more than a hundred cattle houses scattered on display, covered with a cloud of green grass. Smoke, the road is so rotten that you can't even pull up your straw sandals when walking on it; this side is a mountain pit, and there are forests growing on the mountain. The road is big and dry, and it is really vigorous to walk on!I really didn't expect that my life in the grass would end suddenly without knowing it. After walking for more than 20 miles, I saw wheat fields, vegetable gardens, and wooden houses that I had never seen before in the grassland, all of which appeared in my eyes. I arrived in Brazil, so I set up camp. From Tong Xiaopeng's diary, one can read a kind of revolutionary heroism and optimism. In their eyes, any difficulty can be overcome.The authenticity of the diary is beyond doubt. When the First Army Corps was about to walk out of the grassland, Nie Rongzhen, the political commissar of the Army Corps, sent a telegram on the 26th to Peng Dehuai and Li Fuchun, the heads of the Third Army Corps in the rear guard, and Zhou Enlai, who followed them due to illness: Xiao Feng, Secretary of the Party Branch of the First Army Corps, was in charge of the work of the containment team. According to his marching diary, some people had already eaten their food just two days after entering the grassland.By the fourth day, most of the units had run out of food and had to survive by digging wild vegetables and cooking leather belts.Xiao Feng reported to the political commissar Nie Rongzhen: In the past four days, according to the statistics of 14 units, 250 people were left behind and 120 people died.Nie instructed: If there is no food, pull up wild vegetables to eat, and throw away the burden if it cannot be carried.Despite this, the death toll continued to increase.After walking out of the grassland, Nie Rongzhen received a telegram from Zhou Enlai on September 4 saying: "According to the statistics of the three armies' accommodation and the burial of martyrs' corpses along the way, more than 400 of the first army were left behind and sacrificed." They were instructed to "pay special attention to improving supplies. ,Physical recovery". There are only five or six days to cross the grass, so how could so many people die?The main problem is hunger due to lack of food.The most fundamental reason is that the more than a month-long dispute between the central government and Zhang Guotao prevented the entire Red Army from moving, and exhausted the already small amount of food in this area. Even if they did not leave, people would still starve to death.As described in "The Long March of the Red Army in Sichuan": Before crossing the grassland, the troops carried out food collection work, and each person was required to prepare ten to fifteen catties of dry food for ten days.However, the products in this area are not abundant, and many troops are far from meeting the requirements, and some even only raised dry food for two days.Less than half of the itinerary, some units stopped cooking.The grassland is desolate and uninhabited, so there is no way to replenish food along the way.Due to the continuous rainfall, the water flooded and flooded the meadows, and even wild vegetables could not be found in many places.A lot of stagnant water in the grassland is not only undrinkable due to the corrosion of old and decayed grass, but if the wound is infected, it will swell quickly, and in severe cases, people will be disabled.Sometimes by accident, the dry food fell into the poisonous water, that is, it was inedible.Some soldiers could not bear the suffering of hunger and thirst, and accidentally drank poisonous water and ate poisonous wild vegetables, thus paying their precious lives.Sometimes, although there are streams and small rivers, because there is no firewood to light the fire, even boiling water cannot be drunk.On the one hand, it was a difficult march, but on the other hand, they were suffering from hunger and thirst. The physique of the commanders and soldiers was weakening day by day, and many soldiers suddenly fell down while walking, and could not get up again. The climate of the plateau is the second fatal reason.On the plateau at an altitude of 3,500 meters, lack of oxygen makes it difficult for healthy people to move, and their physical strength is extremely exhausted.The Red Army's long-distance march lacked supplies, and their physique was already extremely weak. The lack of food on the grasslands was a great threat to their lives.The climate on the plateau is changeable, and the temperature difference between day and night is large. When the Red Army arrived here from the south, they had nothing to keep out the cold except the single clothes on their bodies.It was rainy during the day in August on the grassland, and at night, a strong cold wind mixed with snowflakes hit the Red Army soldiers sleeping on the high ground.The Red Army's uniform is weak, there is no enough food inside, no clothing to keep out the cold outside, and the hunger and cold are severe.Every morning, the bivouac lay the stiff corpses of Red Army soldiers covered in frost and snow. Despite the hardships, most Red Army soldiers showed a strong revolutionary will and determination to overcome all difficulties during the grassland march.From the memoirs of the old Red Army, they help each other, encourage each other, and write touching stories in the face of the test of life and death, which makes people awe-inspiring today.但是红军过草地时非战斗减员之多，实在是出人意料之外。反思起来，除了上述的主要原因，还有其他多种因素。 美国作家索尔兹伯里夫妇在长征路采访后认为：由于当年红军急于北上，事先并没有很好地侦察草地行军的路线，藏族向导的能力和可靠性也是令人怀疑的。“这些向导从大平原一看，就简单地沿着一条直线往前走。”红一军团的路线看来是比较好的，但是其他部队可能走了不少沼泽路和绕弯的路，造成了不应有的损失。 老红军戴正启在接受索尔兹伯里的采访时告诉他，在无人区行军，会造成一些人精神的崩溃，失去了信心。他说：“草地上渺无人烟，没有人，一个也没有。你要了解我们中国人的习性，我们从来没有这样的生活经历：看不到人的影子，听不到人的声音，也没有可以谈话的人。没有人从这条路上走过，没有房屋，只有我们自己。就好像我们是地球上最后一批人。”他认为，这就是人们死亡的重要原因。 还要提到的是，在因掉队而减员的人中，有一部分是脱离红军逃跑的人。这在长征的全过程中都存在着。逃兵多数是长征途中招募来的农民，他们的革命觉悟远不及江西出来的老战士。行军中也没有机会进行政治教育，到了最艰苦的时刻，这些人就熬不住了。胡宗南在松潘，就收容了一些这样的人。据原国民党第二师补充旅参谋主任李炳藻回忆，他收容过一个红军师长的勤务员，此人“身穿很完整的布军服，图囊内装军用地图一张。该图系用毛笔绘制，图的内容系川、甘、青三省边区部分，图上所绘的山川、道路、河流、村庄的名称，在国民党军军用地图上均没有记载。看了这份地图，对松潘以西草地情形了如指掌，在军事上有很大价值”。李炳藻如获至宝，立即将逃兵和地图转送胡宗南。另外，中共中央毛儿盖会议决定的行动计划，9月初一、四方面军的分裂，国民党方面都很快就得到了消息，当时的“国民政府军事委员会委员长行营参谋团”主任贺国光致蒋介石的报告，叙述得相当准确。这样的情报也是红军的逃兵提供的。1984年索尔兹伯里夫妇在草地采访时，夏洛特·索尔兹伯里就曾对一个前红军战士的自述表示怀疑。据那个人说，他在1936年负伤，先坐担架，然后被编入收容伤病员和掉队的收容队。过草地时他是被人抬过来的。他说当时曾下令将所有的伤病员留下来，他就同其他一百多名战士一道留下来了。问到当时他们是否有钱，是否有人帮助他们，他不置可否。夏洛特认为：“我们都感觉他一定是个脱离队伍的人，当时这种人相当不少。” 经过四五天的行军，红军各部陆续到达草地北端的班佑、巴西、阿西等地。今天看来，这些地方都是小村庄，上百户藏民在红军到来前都跑光了，小小的圆锥体房子像南方的稻禾堆，由细树枝编成的架子，顶上覆盖毡子，四周的墙壁都是用牛屎抹起来的。红军都叫它们“牛屎房子”。生火用的不是柴禾，而是牛屎抹成的干饼饼。经历了草地露营的痛苦，红军住进牛屎房子感觉像是宫殿，躺在地上兴高采烈地抽烟、聊天。 徐向前到巴西之后，未及休息便出发观察敌情。在班佑的东北三十里是上包座，位于松潘通往甘南的大道上。包座背靠群山，山上是茂盛的原始森林。山下左有求吉寺，右有大戒寺。包座河水流湍急，在寺前流过。胡宗南部一个团分别驻守在两个喇嘛寺内。上包座南数十里是下包座，也有国民党军驻守，与上包座守敌呼应。徐向前带着参谋来到距大戒寺、求吉寺几百米的森林中观察敌情，在地图上标注了敌军的火力点。 8月24日，胡宗南接到前方守军电报，说红军占领了班佑，大吃一惊。原来认为鸟也飞不过的草地，红军竟然过来了！他立即命令在漳腊的49师师长伍诚仁迅速向上包座进军，一定要把红军堵住。49师原属蔡廷锴的十九路军，“福建事变”失败后被蒋介石惩罚性地调到这里。接到命令，伍诚仁于27日率部出发，企图在包座河一线阻挡红军北上。 徐向前获悉49师前来，决心抢在前头拿下上包座，再回过头来消灭49师。看到一方面军的一军团行军疲劳，减员较大，三军团还未上来，他在向毛泽东汇报时，主动提出由红四方面军来打这一仗。一军团作后备队保护中央。毛泽东非常高兴，立即同意。徐向前的部署是：程世才、李先念的30军主攻，以89师264团进攻大戒寺守敌；88师和89师的另外两个团埋伏在上包座西北森林中伏击49师。许世友、王建安的4军助攻；以一部打求吉寺之敌，配合30军行动。 8月29日，264团向上包座守敌发起进攻，很快占领了山头阵地，残敌逃进大戒寺。30日下午，49师先头部队到了大戒寺以南。为了诱敌深入，264团边打边撤，敌人急于前进，根本没发现埋伏在原始森林里的红军主力。31日下午，敌人全部进入红军包围圈内，程世才、李先念发出进攻命令。红军从山上的森林中冲下来，六七里长的战线上杀声震天。49师被红军分割成三块，首尾不能相顾。激烈的战斗一直进行了八个小时，伍诚仁见大势已去，跳河逃跑。红军猛追敌军后勤部队，缴获了几百头牦牛和大批粮食。49师被基本解决，红军歼敌4000余人，俘虏800余人，缴获枪支1500。大戒寺守敌乘夜放火逃跑，红军冲进寺内奋力灭火，有的战士跳到粮仓里，一面灭火，一面抓着烧焦的麦粒大口吞嚼，真是饿坏了！这一战红四方面军也付出了相当大的牺牲，红4军10师攻打下包座的求吉寺，敌军依据坚固的寺院顽固抵抗，由于没有重武器，红军多次进攻都没成功。师长王友钧在战斗中不幸中弹牺牲，年仅24岁。最后，红军放弃了对求吉寺的攻击，撤出战斗。 包座之战是红军在川西北地区与国民党军打的最大的一仗，这一战打通了红军北上的道路，也打出了红四方面军的威风。在草地行军的饥饿疲劳情况下，还能打这样的大仗，确实了不起。伍诚仁逃回去即被蒋介石撤职，胡宗南领教了红军的厉害，轻易不敢来犯。红军和中央的安全有了保障。现在就等着张国焘、朱德率左路军前来会合，共同北上了。