Chapter 7 Chapter 6 Before and After the Shawo Conference

In July 1935, except for some fighting between the Red First Army in the front and the Fifth Army in the rear, most of the Red Army was in a state of rest.According to statistics in Tong Xiaopeng's diary, this month he marched for 9 days and rested for 22 days.For an exhausted army that has been marching for more than 10,000 miles, it is indeed a rare respite. The main task during the rest period is to raise food.The highland barley in the fields has come to the harvest season. On July 18, the General Political Department of the Red Army ordered to harvest the wheat in the Tibetan fields.And make the following provisions:

(1) The troops are only allowed to send people to Fanren's fields to harvest ripe wheat when they cannot obtain food by other means. (2) When harvesting wheat, the chieftains should be harvested first, and only when it is necessary to harvest the wheat of ordinary Fans. (3) When harvesting wheat from ordinary Fan people, the amount harvested, the reason for harvesting wheat, etc. (according to the note issued by the General Administration Office) must be written on a wooden sign with ink and inserted in the field.Fanren can take this wooden sign to get the price back from the Red Army when they come back.

(4) Only harvest ripe wheat and its grain, and it is strictly forbidden to harvest immature wheat and yams. With an order, all the troops moved into action.A busy scene in the fields.Since the superior stipulates that each person has to complete the task of 30 catties, they don't care whose wheat is ripe or not, just harvest it first.For this reason, Minister Lin Boqu specially stipulated: "Three catties of wet wheat are worth one catty." The first stage of grain collection (July 5-August 15), harvesting wheat together with searching, totaled 730,000 catties.This is the best they can do, but for an army of 100,000, it is still a drop in the bucket, not enough to eat for a few days.

Marshal Nie Rongzhen recalled: "In hunger, it would be nice to have some decent food. Vegetables are not even good, but it would be beautiful to eat some pea shoots. I still remember such a thing, the guards made Bring some cowhide cut from a broken drum to cook and eat, and they joked that it tastes like sea cucumbers! When the troops arrived in Maoergai, the food situation eased. Because Maoergai is surrounded by a farming and pastoral area, The land was fertile, there were a lot of barley, broad beans grew very tall, and the Tibetans raised a lot of cattle and sheep. Of course, for so many troops at that time, it was still only a temporary emergency.”

Zong Guozhi, a former soldier of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, recalled: "Maoergai was originally a very small fan area with hundreds of people. The place was small and crowded with countless troops. At that time, preparing dry food was the central emergency work of our entire army. But the There was a great shortage of grain on the ground, and it was the period when the spring crops were not ripe. The task was so arduous and urgent, what should we do? Later, we decided to collect unripe highland barley and wheat ears. Every morning at 8 o'clock, all the troops were dispatched to the wheat field to collect wheat. Ears. We didn’t have any tools, so we had to pick off the ears of wheat with our fingernails, burn the awns with fire, rub out the pitiful grains with our hands, and fry them dry in a pan to make them the only food for marching. The ears of wheat were used for marching, so we didn't dare to eat them at the time, so we had to pick edible wild vegetables to satisfy our hunger. I remember that when my company was serving as a guard in Matang Mountain, I beat a bison. Everyone in the company got a few taels Beef, our class is divided into one square foot, and everyone gathers around a fire to roast and eat. I was 13 years old at the time, and I didn’t eat beef, so I got into an argument with the class leader. (There were many such disputes when collecting dry food.) The instructor called the squad leader and me, explained it, and the problem was solved."

The army has been idle for a long time, and it is inevitable that some disputes will arise.1. There was a dispute over the food issue between the Fourth Front Army, which became the main contradiction at that time.For example, on July 18, due to the transfer of the 1st Red Army Corps, a batch of food stored by the 1st Division in Maoergai was taken over by the 88th Division of the 30th Army.Later, Liu Xiao, director of the Political Department of the First Army Corps, went to ask for food, but was refused.Nie Rongzhen, political commissar of the First Army Corps, immediately sent a telegram to the headquarters to report:

Zhu De and Zhang Guotao took the telegram very seriously.The next day, I immediately called Li Xiannian, political commissar of the 30th Army, and asked him to handle the matter.Telegram instruction: "Wang Xiannian ordered the Political Department of the 88th Division to follow the telegram of the Military Commission's food collection and distribution. In Maoergai, the Political Department of the First Army will temporarily coordinate the inspection and distribution. Others should not be rejected." Time.But before that, Li Xiannian had called Nie Rongzhen at 8 a.m. to explain the misunderstanding.Explain that because each regiment of the 30th Army had only two or three daily rations, there was a dispute with comrades from the First Army.He has criticized his subordinates, and a storm has been resolved in this way.

The above incidents show that the leaders of the Fourth Red Front Army have the overall situation in mind and know the general situation.However, the leaders of the First Front Army remained quite vigilant against Zhang Guotao and the members of the Fourth Front Army. At that time, Peng Dehuai led the three armies stationed in Heishui territory, also read.He recalled: "Zhang Guotao sent his secretary Huang Chao to come to Yinian and live in my place. He said that the food conditions here are difficult, so he came here to express his condolences. He sent a few catties of beef jerky, a few liters of rice, and two or three hundred yuan in silver. I think this What is it for? Huang went down and asked about the situation of the meeting. I said, the battle has not been fought well, and there is a bit of rightist sentiment. Yes, why did you ask me again? He also said, Chairman Zhang (Guo Tao) knows you very well. I said, I have never met. He also talked about the current strategic policy, "If you want to conquer the north, you must first conquer the south." I He said that it was Kong Ming who consolidated the rear of the Shu Kingdom. He also said how powerful the Majia cavalry in the northwest. Putting all the above together, he knew that his intentions were not good. Internal relations, conspiracy to destroy the unity within the party. It is obvious to regard the national situation as a dark mess. Confuse the evil results caused by Wang Ming's line with the new development of the objective situation, and deny the great victory of the Zunyi Conference to correct Wang Ming's line It is not uncommon to send a little food, but sending two or three hundred yuan in silver has aroused my vigilance. It is a despicable trick of the old warlords."

Nie Rongzhen is also very wary of Chen Changhao.He recalled: "One day, Lin Biao and I had a meeting at the General Headquarters of the Right Route Army and stayed for dinner. We ate a lot of broad beans. The political commissar of the Right Route Army was Chen Changhao, who represented Zhang Guotao. Before it got dark, Chen Changhao said: "Comrade Lin Biao, you can go first, Comrade Rong Zhen, you stay, we still have to talk." After staying, he asked me, what is your attitude towards the Zunyi Conference? What is the attitude of the meeting? I said, I already have an attitude towards the Zunyi meeting, and I have already taken an attitude towards the Huili meeting. To do my job, to mobilize me to come out against Comrade Mao Zedong. Comrade Xu Qianqian was also present during the conversation, but he was on the sidelines, marking on the map, and planning the battle. He did not make a sound, and Chen Changhao was there alone. Talking loudly. Talking about it at ten o’clock in the evening, I said: Comrade Changhao, I’m going back, and I have to march tomorrow. He said: Okay, you can go. I took two guards and led a horse Mule, leave. I don’t dare to ride a mule. I let a guard lead the front. I walk in the middle, and a guard is behind. I have never loaded a pistol with bullets when I am not fighting. This time I loaded the pistol, and asked the guards to put the bullets in the gun. To be honest, I was afraid that Chen Changhao would punish me, and I was also afraid that bad elements hidden among the Tibetans would shoot me coldly. I left It was more than midnight before I found the Legion Headquarters of the First Legion."

The Red Army rested for nearly a month, but the situation is not optimistic.After the failure of the attack on Songpan, the Red Army's plan to go to Shaanxi and Gansu by the main road could not be realized.The enemy estimated the movement of the Red Army and adopted the deployment of blocking the north and pressing south. In late July, the columns of Xue Yue and Wu Qiwei of the Kuomintang Central Army arrived in the Jiangyou and Pingwu areas to take over the defense of Hu Zong's south.Hu Zongnan was in charge of the defense of Songpan and Shangbaozuo, and completed the construction of fortifications and airstrips.The Ministry of Wang Jun and Mao Bingwen stationed in Lintao, Tianshui, Jingning and Huining in Gansu, forming two blockades.The Sichuan army advanced step by step from the south, narrowing the encirclement of the Red Army.Li Jiayu's department occupied Weizhou, Wang Zanxu's department occupied Mao County, and Yang Sen's department occupied Maogong.They attempted to besiege and destroy the Red Army in the area west of the Minjiang River and north of Maogong.

Facing the increasingly serious situation, the central leaders are very anxious.The Songpan plan was unsuccessful, and a new way out must be sought as soon as possible.Mao Zedong wished he could go north quickly and leave this place. On August 3, under the auspices of Zhu De, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission drew up the "Xiatao Battle Plan".The gist of it is: "Due to poor pre-estimation, counter-reaction obstacles and food shortages, our Songpan campaign lost time. Now we have changed to capture Aba, quickly march northward to the Xiahe River Basin, assault the right side of the enemy's encirclement line, and press eastward. The enemy, in order to eliminate the main force of Chiang Kai-shek's enemy in the Tao River Basin, and form a situation that develops in the vast area of ​​southern Gansu." Its military deployment is: the 1st Army, the 3rd Army of the Red Front Army, and the 4th Army and 30th Army of the Red Fourth Front Army Form the right army, directly led by the central government, gather around Maoergai, and march towards Banyou and Brazil; the Red Army's Fifth Army, 32nd Army (formerly the Ninth Army) and the Red Fourth Army's 9th Army, The 31st Army and the 33rd Army formed the Left Army, led by Commander-in-Chief Zhu De and General Political Commissar Zhang Guotao, assembled around Matang and Zhuo Keji, and marched towards the Aba area. Once the new plan was drawn up, it should have been implemented quickly.But Zhang Guotao is not in a hurry, he still needs to clarify the political line with the central government.He wrote in his memoirs: "The central organization and military leadership immediately moved northward to Maoergai, but the northward route has not yet been identified, and it will take some time. So I advocated using Maoergai's stay for a few days to clarify Disagreement within the party. The main points of my suggestion are: convene a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to review the overall work of the party and current military issues. The Politburo will convene a meeting of senior cadres from the two armies to unify their will and select some new people to participate in the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and The work of the Central Committee. Sure enough, the Politburo had to hold regular meetings. This was the only official meeting of the Central Politburo after we joined forces, and the CCP later called it the Maoergai meeting.” After many years, Zhang Guotao's memory is obviously not accurate.The Lianghekou and Luhua meetings are both Politburo meetings.The reason why he put special emphasis on this meeting is because he is preparing for a showdown with the Central Committee—to let the leading cadres of the Fourth Front Army enter the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and share power with the current Central Committee. After learning of Zhang Guotao's suggestion, the Central Committee did not hesitate and immediately issued a meeting notice: From August 4th to 6th, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in Shawo Village in Maoergainan.History calls this meeting the "Shawo Meeting".Attending the meeting were Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao, Chen Changhao, Liu Bocheng, Fu Zhong, Kaifeng, Deng Fa, and Bogu.The meeting had two agenda items: a resolution to discuss the situation and tasks after the rendezvous of the First and Fourth Front Armies; and resolution of organizational issues. Before the meeting even started, there was a tense atmosphere.Shawo is the defense area of ​​Chen Xilian, the 12th Division of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. Zhang Guotao recalled: "There are mountains on all sides, dense forests on the mountains, and a small village of Tibetans in the ravine, forming a world of its own." When Zhang Wentian welcomed Zhang Guotao into the village for a meeting, Zhang Guotao They found that they "passed several sentry posts along the way, and the sentries used special passwords, which seemed to be heavily guarded. At that time, the central government set up another central column headquarters to protect the security of the central government. That night, the whole village was surrounded by dense guards, as if facing an enemy."Who is the central defense against?The defense is Zhang Guotao.Because the central government already knew that the purpose of Zhang Guotao's meeting was to seek power. In Mao Zedong's words, Zhang Guotao wanted to hold a "supervising army meeting" to oppress the central government by relying on more people and more guns.Zhang Guotao also knew in his heart that this was a new round of competition. After the meeting started, Zhang Wentian took out the draft resolution prepared in advance to report the first question.The main content is the political situation and tasks after the first and fourth front armies meet, emphasizing the creation of Shaanxi-Gansu base areas and strengthening the unity between the first and fourth front armies.After the report, everyone discusses. Mao Zedong spoke first.Regarding the creation of base areas in Shaanxi and Gansu, he said: Northwest China is the weakest link of the ruling class, the weakest part of imperialism, and the place where ethnic minorities are concentrated.Because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, it can get help politically and materially.We should be prepared, especially when we arrive in Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, and send a detachment to Xinjiang.We are basically on our own, with international help.Our difficulties are the sparse population, lack of material conditions, and poor climate, but all of them can be overcome.Therefore, we must make every effort to realize the strategic policy of establishing a base area in the northwest, first in Gansu.With a general direction, after our meeting, we will lead the national revolution here and place the Party Central Committee here. Mao Zedong also talked about the relationship between the First and Fourth Front Armies.He said: Our first task is to make the First and Fourth Front Army like brothers.Some bad phenomena are unavoidable. In the past, when Zhu De and I met in Jinggangshan, there were many troubles. These experiences are still useful today.The combination of the two armies at once requires a period of patient work, and the differences can be overcome.The two armies must understand each other and treat each other with sincerity. Zhu De said in a speech: After the main forces of the two Red Army joined forces, the strength has increased, and the creation of the Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu and Soviet areas is sure.To improve self-confidence, overcome all kinds of difficulties to defeat the enemy.Regarding the First and Fourth Front Armies, one cannot lightly say who is good and who is bad. The existing shortcomings can be improved. Zhang Guotao said in a speech: On the one hand, the army should check its own shortcomings and mistakes, and the same is true on the fourth front. This is the attitude of the Bolsheviks, and all kinds of problems can be solved.As far as I can see, there are no serious problems in this regard, but from the perspective of self-criticism, some problems have not been noticed.On the one hand, the army has a glorious history. After withdrawing from the central revolutionary base area, it fought a cover war and suffered a lot of losses.This lesson is worth studying.The Fourth Front Army fought many victories along the way, developed the Soviet area, and fought bravely.The Western Expedition of the Fourth Front Army is mobile warfare, so how can it be called escape?Does withdrawing from Tongnamba underestimate the base areas?These formulations are wrong.When you go to a minority area, you must organize a government, whether it is called a federation or not.The work on ethnic minorities led by the Northwest Special Committee is correct in principle. Zhang Guotao said in a strong tone: No matter which army, there must be emotions of failure, fatigue, and lax discipline. If the Political Department takes these things lightly, it will affect the rectification.It is not a matter of explaining to the person in charge that we should promptly rectify.The Fourth Front cannot estimate its backwardness, it is a Bolshevik army led by workers and peasants.Regarding discipline, what is the difference between the discipline of the party and the army?We do not agree with corporal punishment, but there is beating and scolding, the nature must be clarified, otherwise discipline will be relaxed.Comrades in the Politburo have a better understanding of the First Front Army, and there may be some incompatibility with the Fourth Front Army, but it cannot be said that the Fourth Front Army cadres are anti-Party.These comrades are the pillars of the party and should be absorbed into the work of the central government. Chen Changhao cooperated with Zhang Guotao's speech and said: Everyone is standing on the party's standpoint. Regarding the party's leadership, one should not say who is anti-party, so that the subordinates will suspect that it is not good for work.No one in the Fourth Front Army said that the party's line was incorrect. Only I had a personal conversation with Chairman Mao and said that before the Zunyi meeting, it was a pure defense, and after the Zunyi meeting, it was a decisive battle. I thought that only offense was right.After talking with comrades later, I have no doubts now.Some of the cadres below judge the army on the one hand based on their own experience, but I can guarantee that they have no anti-party thinking, and they only criticize the army on the one hand (for example, lax discipline).It is estimated that the army on the one hand, good ones should be pointed out.The main danger is right deviation and irresponsible cadres.Should be rectified specifically.When the Fourth Front Army arrived in Tongnanba, Chairman Zhang said that he would establish a base area and resolutely fight the enemy.Out of Tongnanba is due to the strategic decision to develop westward, which is related to the enemy's situation and the instructions of the Central Military Commission.Subjectively, we do not want to give up Tongnamba, and there is nothing wrong with quitting Tongnamba. Zhou Enlai: With the current changes in the strength of the enemy and ourselves, our strength has increased.We can rely on this power to destroy the enemy and establish Soviet areas.Believe in your own strength.On the question of the line, our whole line is correct.We are on the offensive politically, sometimes on the defensive strategically, and now we are entering the counter-offensive.I think we can all see clearly the valuation of the Fourth Front Army.There have been valuations for Hubei, Henan and Anhui, but no conclusions have been made for Tongnanba.Regarding the army on the one hand, although Guotao and Changhao's estimates were a bit too much, the starting point is to rectify our troops, but we should pay attention to the impact on the lower levels.Guo Tao said that all problems should be resolved in principle, which is correct.Now our highest principle is to win the battle, only in this way can we maintain unity. Also speaking at the meeting were Liu Bocheng, Fu Zhong, Bo Gu, Kai Feng, and Deng Fa.The meeting was concluded by Zhang Wentian, and everyone passed the draft resolution in principle.The first agenda item is over. Rereading the minutes of the Shawo meeting today, it is not difficult for us to understand the subtle and complicated feelings of the participants.Both parties knew that there was a huge difference and estrangement between them, but neither of them was willing or dared to put it on the table to argue for right and wrong. The words are half-swallowed and evasive. The resolution of the Shawo meeting drafted by Zhang Wentian, "The Central Committee's Resolution on the Political Situation and Tasks after the First and Fourth Front Army Convergence" is full of words.If we study the text of the resolution carefully, we can see the differences between the leaders of the Central Committee and the Fourth Front Army and the basic positions expressed by the two sides. The resolution pointed out: The basic task after the reunion of the first and fourth front armies is to "create the Soviet base areas in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu." "To completely break the encirclement and blockade of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and to wipe out a large number of the enemy's vital forces is the prerequisite for creating this base area." For this reason, it is necessary to strengthen the party's leadership in the Red Army and maintain the prestige of the party center.After the rendezvous of the First and Fourth Front Armies, individual comrades in the Red Army thought that the Central Soviet Area had become a guerrilla area, that the First Front Army was downsizing, and that the Party had made some mistakes and weaknesses in its work. The political line is not correct, this kind of opinion is completely wrong.... The enlarged meeting of the Zunyi Politburo corrected the mistakes made by the Party Central Committee in the military, and since then it has undoubtedly been completely correct in terms of military leadership. Therefore, on the one hand, the military After the Zunyi Conference, many great victories were achieved, and the strategic policy planned by the central government was completed."In response to Zhang Guotao's accusations against the central line, the resolution explained: "Misunderstanding some of the party's mistakes as all mistakes, and misinterpreting some of the party's weaknesses in actual work as mistakes in the line have no effect on the unprecedented greatness achieved by the party. It is not correct not to give due estimates to the cause. Therefore, for this misunderstanding, the party must give timely explanations and corrections, so that all party members and red commanders and fighters can unite around the party center as one person. This is the key to future victory. protection." The resolution emphasized strengthening the unity of the First and Fourth Front Armies: "Currently some individual problems within the First and Fourth Front Armies are mainly due to insufficient mutual understanding and lack of correct assessment of the First and Fourth Front Armies." The resolution affirmed that "the Fourth Front Army The leadership of the party is correct in the basic line, and it has implemented the line of the International and the Central Committee after the Fourth Plenary Session. Because of this, it has created a strong and strong Red Fourth Front Army, which has won many great victories in wars. , created the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Tongnan Bachi Districts. The Fourth Front Army is brave and good at fighting, not afraid of difficulties, hardworking, obedient to orders, and observance of discipline. It should be learned. But the Fourth Front Army should never be complacent with this, and should develop its own specialties. It should absorb all the rich experience of the First Army in strategy and tactics and in the construction of the Red Army, so as to make greater progress and become an iron army. The Red Army of Workers and Peasants". "Every comrade in the First and Fourth Front Armies must understand that the First and Fourth Front Armies are part of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and are all led by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Among us there is only class friendship and mutual assistance without differences and antagonisms. Only in this way , the unity of the First and Fourth Front Armies is solid and permanent. Only then can they melt together as one to destroy class enemies.” In this resolution, the central leaders made great concessions to Zhang Guotao.I said a lot of words to praise the Fourth Front Army, but I took back all the words that accused the Fourth Front Army of giving up Tongnanba.He also acknowledged the failures and setbacks of the First Army, and conducted limited self-criticism.But on major issues of principle, the gaps and differences between the two sides have not been eliminated. First of all, is the political line of the central government correct or wrong? The "Resolution" affirms that the political line of the central government is correct, and believes that the mistakes are only partial and individual.But Zhang Guotao believed that the central government's line was wrong.He said in his memoirs: "I may not rashly affirm that the political line of the Central Committee is correct or wrong, but the Soviet movement did not win, but failed, which is an obvious fact. Now all the Soviet areas are lost. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, and we retreated to the Tibetan areas. These failures cannot be denied. As for the reason for the setbacks of the Soviet movement, it cannot be said that the enemy's aircraft and artillery are powerful, nor can it be regarded as just our military miscalculation. , I think the main reason is that this movement is out of date and has not been accepted by the masses. The Zunyi Conference affirmed that the central political line was correct, but said that the military line was wrong. Regarding Zhang Guotao's opinion, Zhang Wentian, Bogu, Kaifeng and others firmly opposed it.But Mao Zedong's mood was complicated.Mao Zedong hated Wang Ming and Bogu's left-leaning opportunist line and leadership. However, before the Zunyi Conference, the Central Red Army was facing a critical moment of life and death. Mao Zedong's strategy was to first take the leadership from Bogu to save the Central Red Army.The urgency of the situation and the urgency of the war left everyone no time to discuss the political line in detail, but to solve the military problem first and solve the leadership problem.Later, Zhou Enlai gave a speech at a meeting within the party, explaining the inside story of the Zunyi meeting: "Chairman Mao's method is to adopt gradual corrections, first solve the problem from the military line, and criticize the mistakes in the operations since the five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns: at first it was adventurism, then conservatism, and then escapeism. This way it is easy to persuade People. Other issues will not be debated for the time being. For example, the 'Left' leaning land policy and economic policy, the expansion of counter-revolutionaries, and the attack on big cities. Don't talk about those things. First solve the military line, which is easy to understand. Many people accept it at once. Yes. If it was said at the time that the whole issue was a matter of line, many people would have kept it for the time being, which would have hindered the progress of the party. This is Chairman Mao’s dialectical materialism. To resolve contradictions, first solve the main contradiction, and then let it go later.” "In fact, the secondary contradictions were resolved, and the organizational line was barely resolved. At that time, it was difficult for Bogu to continue to lead, and no one would be convinced if he continued to lead. Originally, Chairman Mao's leadership was taken for granted, and there was no problem. Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) at that time He proposed to change the leader, but he said that Bo Gu couldn’t do it. I remember very clearly that Chairman Mao asked me to tell Luo Fu to change the leader now. We said at the time, of course it is Chairman Mao, listen to Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao said: No, Luo Fu should be allowed to do it for a period of time. Chairman Mao insisted on letting Luo Fu do it. People always want to help. After persuading everyone, let Luo Fu do it at that time....The chairman always adopts such methods to educate people, Make everyone wake up gradually. Therefore, the organizational line has not been completely resolved. However, this is more natural, and it is easier to concentrate forces to win and reduce resistance. As for the political line, it was not mentioned at the time.” Zhang Wentian talked about the Zunyi Conference during the rectification movement in Yan'an: "The Zunyi Conference has the significance of decisive transformation in the history of our party. Without the Zunyi Conference, the Red Army would be dispersed under the leadership of Li De and Bo Gu, and the leadership of the Party Central Committee and a large number of cadres would suffer. A serious loss. The Zunyi Conference saved the party and the Red Army at an emergency. This is the first. Second, the Zunyi Conference changed the leadership and actually started the establishment of the Central Committee with Comrade Mao Zedong as the leadership center. Third, the Zunyi Conference Overcoming "Left" opportunism, first of all, in the leadership of the Revolutionary War. Fourth, the dogmatic sects began to split in politics and organization. The merits of this meeting, of course, belong to Comrade Mao Zedong, and I am only a supporting role." "However, because the Zunyi Conference did not point out the mistakes of the central government's political line in the past, but affirmed its correctness, I rarely reflected on my own set of mistakes in the past. This was the only way Comrade Mao Zedong could do at that time. Otherwise, our federation would become impossible, and thus the Zunyi Conference would not be able to win. For the interests of the party and the revolution, and this interest is above all else. Comrade Mao Zedong made a concession in principle at that time, admitting that an incorrect line was correct , which was completely necessary and correct at the time. This example can be seen as a demonstration of inner-party struggle.” Both Zhou Enlai's and Zhang Wentian's speeches admitted that the Zunyi Conference only partially resolved the mistakes of leftist opportunism.At this meeting, although Mao Zedong occupied a place in the top leadership of the Central Committee, there were still considerable forces on the leftist line. They were supported by Wang Ming and the Communist International in Moscow.It was not until the Yan'an rectification movement in 1943 that Mao Zedong unified the thinking of the whole party to the correct line. Secondly, is the revolutionary situation a high tide or a low tide?Is it a successful attack or a retreat? The "Resolution" repeatedly emphasized that after the first and fourth front armies joined together, the power of the revolution was greatly enhanced.The enemy's strength is "absolutely weakened" and "the rule of the Kuomintang is weakening and collapsing."Zhang Guotao thought it was bragging.After splitting with the Central Committee, he criticized Zhang Wentian, Bogu, etc. in a speech of the Red Fourth Front Army: "They are used to bragging, saying that the enemy has failed and the enemy has weakened, and even after leaving the Central Soviet Area, they kept saying that we were victorious. Without any scientific Marxist analysis, what is this self-deception? But Lenin once told us that such politicians are useless. When they should take advantage of the opportunity to rest and tidy up, they lose the confidence to defeat the enemy. And continue to escape." Zhang Guotao said contemptuously: "The difference between us and the opportunists is that we are prepared to carry out the revolutionary war in the most difficult and difficult environment and strive for the victory of the revolution. Go to restaurants, come to the revolution only when there are cigarettes to smoke.” Zhang Guotao believed that the revolutionary situation at that time was undoubtedly at a low ebb.He later expounded his views in a speech in the Fourth Army.He said: "What is the connection between the Chinese Soviet movement and the new upsurge of the national revolution? What impact did the failure to smash the five 'encirclement and suppression' have on the Chinese Soviet movement? Now we can say with certainty that the five battles were the main force of the enemy and The scene of the brutal decisive battle of our main Red Army. As a result, the main Red Army withdrew from the Central Soviet Area. At that time, the Red Fourth Front Army on the left wing, and the Second and Sixth Armies on the right wing continued to win victories, but they could not decide everything and could not compensate for the losses of the main Red Army. As a result, the main force of the Red Army had to withdraw from the Central Soviet Area. This was a key point in marking the time. We did not crush the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns." In a considerable sense, the Soviet movement suffered some setbacks. Quite a stagnation and decline." "After the main force of the Red Army withdrew from the Central Soviet Area, after eight months of long-distance marching and the rendezvous of the First and Fourth Front Armies, until now the new upsurge of the national revolution is coming. Can we say that the Chinese Soviet movement has achieved great success during this period? Development? Comrades, if we analyze it with a cool head and scientific Marxism, we can’t make such an overestimation today. We need to have a correct understanding, we have achieved some development, but we have not yet Some decisive developments; we have made some developments which do not yet enable us to engage the enemy in decisive battles." "On the other hand, can we say that the Soviet movement in China continues to decline and has no future? No! It is absolutely impossible to say that. In fact, it is not the case. On the contrary, it has achieved some development, and the Soviet movement is in line with the In the process of combining the new national revolutionary climax. During the five campaigns, the Soviet movement suffered some blows and fell a little bit, but now it is in the middle of the two climaxes, and the new Soviet movement’s climax will inevitably come soon.” Mao Zedong half-approved and half-opposed Zhang Guotao's assertions.There is no doubt that the Long March was a manifestation of the low ebb of the Chinese revolution.But this retreat should not be regarded as absolute, otherwise it will lose confidence in the future of the revolution.The Long March is a strategic transfer, moving to a suitable new area and then developing.At the Yan'an Politburo meeting in March 1937, Mao Zedong criticized Zhang Guotao's "between two climaxes" theory, pointing out that this was Zhang Guotao's guiding ideology to retreat to remote areas of ethnic minorities, and it was the wrong route to lead the Fourth Front Army to failure. .However, after Zhang Guotao defected, during the rectification movement in Yan'an in 1943, Mao Zedong re-evaluated the Shawo Resolution and Zhang Guotao's views: "It is estimated that the Soviet movement was in retreat. Looking at the past situation today, the situation at that time was indeed that the enemy forced me to retreat, but The situation is shifting. In essence, it can also be said that it is a retreat of the region, retreating to a new position to create a new Soviet area, organizing new forces to support the revolution, and meeting the new revolutionary struggle situation. Of course, it does not mean that the overall situation is retreat, because the overall situation Nor is the general development of the offensive. If it is considered that the overall situation is low and retreating, then it will cancel its own existence. This does not conform to reality, and it does not understand the characteristics of China's revolutionary struggle." In the conflict between Zhang Guotao and Zhang Wentian, Bogu and others, we can neither be sure which side is completely right, nor can we say which side is completely wrong.Mao Zedong's views were different from theirs, which created a complicated situation in the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.Kaifeng, Bogu and others insisted that defeat was victory and retreat was offensive, which is of course not convincing.However, Zhang Guotao made a pessimistic estimate of the future of the revolution, which could not improve the morale of the Red Army and lead the revolution to victory.Mao Zedong was very practical. He knew that with the current strength of the Red Army, it could not fight recklessly with the Kuomintang.If we continue to follow the "left" strategy, the Red Army will be ruined completely.But the revolution must continue, and following Zhang Guotao's advice, there is no future for living in this desolate minority area for a long time.Therefore, in his resolution and two speeches, he firmly stated that he must go north to open up the Shaanxi-Gansu base area in the northwest, and send a force to Xinjiang or Ningxia to open up the international route, and rely on the Soviet Union to persist in the revolution.When Mao Zedong revised the draft resolution after the meeting, he once said to Liu Bocheng, chief of the general staff: "I always think that this base area should be east of the Yellow River, not west of the Yellow River, so that it can be integrated with the masses." This is an outstanding foresight. Decades later, Marshal Liu Bocheng recalled: Practice is the criterion for testing truth. Chairman Mao said: Materialism is thorough, thorough, and thorough, and it is to lead the masses in struggle.He said: "I would like to raise a question: The Chinese Communist Party is necessary to exist. If you don't do good things for the masses and lead the masses in struggle, then there is no need for it to exist." The chairman came up with this idea. The leaders of the central government all understood that the reason why Zhang Guotao repeatedly entangled in the issue of political line was to establish his authority within the party.In particular, he is currently in a dominant position with many people and many guns, which makes the central government even more worried.Although both sides sang in their resolutions to strengthen the fraternal unity of the First and Fourth Front Armies, the estrangement and contradictions have become deeper and deeper, becoming the confrontation between the two mountains.When the Shawo meeting discussed the second topic—organizational issues, a contest of power distribution could not be avoided. The person who presided over the meeting came up with a plan prepared in advance, announcing that this meeting would absorb cadres from the Fourth Front Army to participate in the work of the central government.Proposed by the Politburo: By-election of three members of the Central Committee: Xu Xiangqian, Chen Changhao, Zhou Chunquan. By-election of three alternate members of the Central Committee: He Wei, Li Xiannian, and Fu Zhong. There are two by-elections for the Political Bureau of the Central Committee: Chen Changhao is a member of the Politburo, and Zhou Chunquan is an alternate member of the Politburo. Zhang Guotao immediately said: "In the resolute promotion of worker and peasant cadres, we can mention a few more people." Mao Zedong said: "The cadres of the Fourth Front Army have many good cadres, but we are very cautious in only mentioning these comrades. Originally, the Politburo could not decide on the members of the Central Committee, but now it is doing so under special circumstances. Other cadres can be recruited. To work in various military and political leading organs." Zhang Guotao said firmly: "It was originally proposed that all nine comrades (of the Fourth Front Army) should go to the Politburo in order to promote workers and peasants cadres and learn leadership work." Mao Zedong tactfully rejected his request, saying: "Comrade Guotao's opinion is very good, and it can be absorbed by the central government and other departments in the future." 张国焘不好再闹，中央对方案又作了调整，陈昌浩和周纯全均为中央政治局委员。 毛泽东又提议：恢复红一方面军司令部，由周恩来同志负责（因为周将红军总政委让给了张国焘）。四方面军不变，红军仍然分成两个方面军。对红军指挥机关又作了若干调整，经大家一致通过，红军指挥机构和负责人的情况如下： 中国工农红军革命军事委员会 主席朱德 副主席张国焘周恩来王稼祥 中国工农红军总司令部 总司令朱德 总政治委员张国焘 总参谋长刘伯承 总政治部主任陈昌浩 副主任杨尚昆周纯全 红军前敌总指挥部 总指挥徐向前 政治委员陈昌浩 参谋长叶剑英 副参谋长李特 政治部主任陈昌浩（兼） 副主任傅钟 工农红军第一方面军 司令员兼政委周恩来 参谋长周昆 政治部主任朱瑞 副主任罗荣桓 工农红军第四方面军 总指挥徐向前 副总指挥王树声 政治委员陈昌浩 参谋长倪志亮 副参谋长王宏坤 政治部主任李卓然 副主任傅钟曾传六 张国焘终于摊牌了。他要求将四方面军中九名干部提拔为政治局委员，当时连他本人在内，中央政治局共有八名政治局委员，两名政治局候补委员。如果按张国焘的意志办，四方面军一下有了十名政治局委员，在中央政治局自然形成多数，中共中央就是张国焘的天下了。面对张国焘咄咄逼人的进攻，毛泽东等委婉而坚决地拒绝了他的要求，作了部分的妥协。在中央政治局内张国焘的人虽然还是少数，但在红军指挥机构里四方面军占了明显优势。总政治委员是张国焘的，红军作战指挥，他有决定之权。前敌指挥部是徐、陈的，打仗要靠他们。总之，中共中央已经对张国焘作了最大限度的让步，就是为了团结他。因为眼下中央要靠红四方面军强大的力量打开北上之路。周恩来在会上对张国焘半开玩笑半认真地说：“一方面军从江西拖出来，确实拖瘦了；象王稼祥同志一样，骨瘦如柴。你（张国焘）胖胖的，还要你帮助帮助，这是兄弟之情。” 好累人的沙窝会议终于结束了，张国焘怒气未消地和陈昌浩一路走一路说。陈昌浩激动地问张国焘：“为什么中央这样顽强的抹煞四方面军一般同志的意见？如果你进一步明确宣布中央政治路线完全错误，中央领导破产，将会发生什么后果？如果这样做，是不是会逼使中央让步？”张国焘还下不了这样的决心，和中央决裂，毕竟不是随便干得的事。 在四方面军总部，徐向前正焦急地等着他们回来。他看到“张国焘满肚子不高兴，脸色阴沉，不愿说话。陈昌浩向我发牢骚，说中央听不进国焘的意见，会上吵的很凶。我对张国焘、陈昌浩说：现在不是吵架的时候，这里没有吃的，得赶紧走。我们在前面打仗，找块有粮食吃的地方，你们再吵好不好呀！当时的确到了闹粮荒的地步，我心里急得很。部队天天吃野菜、黄麻，把嘴都吃肿了。供应中央领导机关的粮食，眼看快要吃完。周恩来同志患疟疾，病得起不了床，我去看望他时，带去几斤牛肉，算是头等补养品。我想，这么困难的情况下，要命第一。我一再催促张国焘、陈昌浩早走，原因就在这里”。 在徐向前等人的催促下，张国焘总算答应走了。他也认为毛儿盖地域狭小，不宜久留。但他打算和中央分开，免得在一起吵个没完。毛泽东等也十分赞同。按照夏洮战役计划，红军部署又作了一些调整。8月12日，在中央和前敌总指挥部的领导下，右路军的红一、三军团、4军、30军、军委纵队、红军大学陆续开始行动，向班佑、巴西地区进发。 左路军在红军总司令部率领下，红五军团、9军、31军、32军（原红九军团）、33军及军委纵队一部，本应在卓克基一带集结，向阿坝地区前进。可是张国焘迟迟未动。据他说是因为地形道路不熟，总参谋部刘伯承派出侦察部队，费了几天力气才画出比较准确的行军路线图。出发前，张国焘又担心后方安全，打算分兵回击抚边之敌。8月15日，中央急电张国焘：“不论从地形、气候、敌情、粮食任何方面计算，均须即以主力从班佑向夏河急进，左路军及一方面军全部应即日开始行动。……一、四方面军主力均宜走右路，左路阿坝只出一部，掩护后方前进，5军、32军速开毛（儿盖）。目前应专力北向，万不宜抽兵回击抚边、理番之敌。” 8月19日，张国焘、朱德率左路军开始行动。董振堂的五军团为先头部队，由查理寺探路向班佑前进。大部队和红军总部依次向阿坝进发，没有一支部队来向右路军靠拢。张国焘致电徐向前、陈昌浩：“阿坝仍须取得，一是财粮策源，必要时可助右路；二是可多辟北进路；三是后方根据。……大金川、大藏寺有三、四条平行路向阿坝北进，人粮甚多，比芦花、毛儿盖好多了。” 毛泽东看了张国焘的来电，心里突然闪过一阵忧虑：他的五、九军团都跟张国焘走了，还能再回来吗？早知要分开，当时为什么不叫五、九军团迅速向毛儿盖集中，共同北上呢？