Chapter 6 Chapter Five Contradictions and Controversies

After the Lianghekou meeting, the First Red Army and the Fourth Front Army began joint operations.On the surface, the honeymoon after the reunion is still going on, but in the leadership of both sides, some inexplicable suspicions and misunderstandings are secretly developing, and they are becoming more and more superficial, confusing the majority of Red Army soldiers and grassroots commanders. No one can tell where the contradiction started.After the first army and the fourth army joined forces, the commanders and fighters were intimate and lived in harmony. It was like two long-lost brothers reunited. They were too late to be happy. How could they plot against each other as soon as they met?

Ouyang Yi, who was then director of the Security Bureau of the Fifth Red Army Corps, recalled the days after the meeting and said: "Our Fifth Red Army Corps and the Ninth Army are stationed next to each other. The two troops often organize parties together, visit and exchange combat experience. Check each other's enforcement of mass discipline, and carry out friendly competitions such as sports activities. The comrades of the 9th Army saw that we were dressed in shabby clothes and were in short supply, so they took the initiative to send us ghee, fried noodles, and hundreds of sets of gray cloth Military uniforms. We also donated some guns and ammunition in return. The kind of close comrade-in-arms friendship is both touching and inspiring, making everyone feel warm."

Deng Xiaoping, then Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, also personally felt the friendship of comrades-in-arms of the Fourth Front Army.While crossing the snow mountain, his horse died.Deng Xiaoping had no choice but to climb over the snow mountain step by step on his own two legs like ordinary soldiers.After joining forces with the Fourth Front Army, he met Fu Zhong, an old comrade-in-arms during his work-study program in France and director of the Political Department of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army.Seeing that Deng Xiaoping didn't even have a horse, Fu Zhong felt very sympathetic, so he generously gave Deng Xiaoping a horse, as well as clothes and food.There are not many of these things, but for Deng Xiaoping, it is a timely help.Deng Xiaoping was deeply moved, and he still couldn't forget it decades later. He said to his children: "After passing the snow mountain, Fu Zhong gave me three treasures: a horse, a fur coat, and a pack of beef jerky. It's a big deal!"

The vast majority of the cadres and soldiers of the Fourth Front Army are simple peasants, they are enthusiastic, forthright, and very brave in battle.However, with a low level of education and a relatively simple mind, they often do some childish and ridiculous things, and are not as mature politically as comrades in the First Army.People in the Fourth Front Army regard the First Army as a big brother in their hearts, and learn from them humbly.Comrade Xu Chang, the former reconnaissance staff officer of the Fourth Red Army, recalled: "The Fourth Army has learned a lot from the First Army. If it is kept secret, it turns out that the Fourth Army has a banner from the bottom to the top. Wherever it is stationed, the banner is inserted at the door. As soon as they take action, pick up and walk. People don’t need to ask which army, which division, or even which company. Another example is the number spectrum and communication. It turned out that the Fourth Front Army used the same ones as the KMT’s. After the rendezvous, these have all been improved. "

After the rendezvous, the commanders of both sides have a common wish: now that the two main forces have joined forces, they should quickly unite to form a unified force, instead of going their own way.After Mao Gong joined forces, Xu Xiangqian suggested that the troops and cadres of the First and Fourth Front Armies should adjust and supplement each other.Liu Ruilong recalled: "After joining forces, Comrade Xu Qianqian saw that the First Army had lost too much manpower and needed to be replenished urgently. He also considered learning from the First Army and proposed to the Central Committee to ask the First Army to transfer several capable cadres to serve in the Fourth Army. The Chief of Staff, the Fourth Front Army transferred organic units to supplement the First Front Army. Zhang Guotao disagreed at first, but this proposal was realized only after Comrade Xu Xiangqian worked and was approved by the Central Committee. The First Front Army sent Chen Bojun, Comrades such as Zhang Zongxun, Li Jukui, and Guo Tianmin played a positive role in the construction of the Fourth Front Army. The troops transferred to the Third Army by the Fourth Front were the 270th Regiment of the 90th Division and the team directly under the 89th Division, a total of more than 2,600 people; the troops transferred to the First Army were 98 The 294th Regiment of the Division has a total of more than 2,000 people and the 32nd Regiment of the 11th Division has more than 1,200 people. Later, these troops incorporated into the First Army played their important role in the battle.”

In the early days of the joint division, the Fourth Front Army provided sincere and real support and assistance to the First Front Army.They respect the First Army.But Zhang Guotao believed that the central government had made a wrong line, so he lost the battle, lost the Soviet area, and fled all the way here.If it wasn't for his help, it would be wiped out soon.Therefore, the central government should listen to him now and let him lead.The respect and curiosity of some cadres of the Red Fourth Front Army towards the First Army gradually faded shortly after the rendezvous.In their view, the army on the one hand is not as great as imagined.This long-distance team was ragged and disheveled.In contrast, the mental outlook of the Fourth Front Army is much stronger.After the rendezvous, the cadres of the Fourth Front Army rarely spoke ill of Zhang Guotao to the First Army.On the contrary, what made Nie Rongzhen extremely unhappy was, "After the two front armies joined forces, there were indeed some people in the one side army who proceeded from an incorrect motive and distortedly told the situation of the front army and the Zunyi meeting in secret. It also made Zhang Guotao feel evil, thinking that the Central Red Army was not united, and he could take advantage of it."Some actions of the central government at that time also intensified the contradictions between the first and fourth front armies. The leader of the 30th Army reported to Zhang Guotao: "The central government once sent some investigators to the 30th Army to investigate the facts. These investigators often exaggerated the shortcomings of the Fourth Front Army, especially when they found a few examples of officers scolding soldiers. They generally refer to the Fourth Front Army. There are strong warlord habits in the Central Committee. Those investigators often use the fact that the general cadres of the Fourth Front Army only know the names of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, etc., but not the names of all Politburo members, and insist that the Fourth Front Army does not respect the Central Committee.” 30th Army The Political Department recorded all the conversations between the central investigators and them and handed them over to Zhang Guotao.On the one hand, various documents of the army were also sent to Zhang Guotao through various channels.Therefore, it is no accident that Zhang Guotao's relationship with the central government deteriorated rapidly, and his desire to be a leader expanded rapidly.And some things that happened at the time and the political climate did create factors in his favour.

Xu Xiangqian recalled: "Since then, we have seen and heard that some phenomena that are not conducive to the unity of the two armies have increased day by day. Some words are ugly. Zhang Guotao spread to the following: 'there is a problem with the central political line', 'the Central Red Army's The central government should be responsible for the losses', 'the military command is not unified', and it is said that they sent people to find comrades in the first army to understand the situation of the Huili meeting and the Zunyi meeting, etc., which were actually anti-central activities. At the same time, Kaifeng , Bogu and the others accused the Four Front Army of withdrawing from Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Tongnanba as "escapeism", "warlordism", "banditism", "political backwardness", and even wrote articles to criticize them publicly. This kind of "Left" approach is similar to how it treated Chairman Mao and the First and Third Armies when he first arrived in the Central Soviet Area. It can only arouse the resentment of the cadres of the Fourth Front Army. Zhang Guotao used the excuse of provoking....In the future, the dogmatists will listen to the accusations against the Red Fourth Front Army a lot, and many cadres have reported to me. Although I educate the cadres not to spread these things to the bottom, to be honest I am not happy to say that. The Fourth Front Army was developed from a guerrilla force of about 300 people in Hubei, Henan and Anhui. It has fought so many tough and vicious battles. It is a party-led team. It is not easy to have more than 10,000 people. Although the troops have shortcomings of one kind or another, they are good in nature and resolutely fought against Chiang Kai-shek. They practiced the agrarian revolution, supported the Third International, listened to the party’s words, and fought against Chiang Kai-shek. The masses of the people are connected by flesh and blood, and they wholeheartedly support joining the Central Red Army. Why are they warlords, bandits, backward, and fleeing?! Don’t look at the mainstream, talk about the Fourth Front Army as a dark group, and treat the two armies There is no benefit in forming an enemy, and I really can't figure it out." Many years later, Xu Shuai was still so annoyed when he recalled it, which shows that the cadres of the Fourth Front Army at that time felt disgusted and angry with some left-leaning opportunist leaders in the Central Committee.

Zhang Guotao returned to the headquarters of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army in Lixian County, and held meetings and talks with cadres in succession, arousing everyone's anger.So he began to encourage the top and bottom to reach out to the central government for power, on the grounds that they wanted to "unify command." On July 1, Zhang Guotao emphasized in his telegram to the Central Committee about the mobilization and deployment of troops for the Maoergai campaign: "Our army should quickly resolve the organizational issue of unified command and oppose right deviation." He implied that if this is not done, It will cause confusion in the mobilization of troops, giving the enemy an opportunity to take advantage of.A few days later, Zhang Guotao proposed to Li Fuchun, a member of the Central Condolences Group and deputy director of the General Political Department of the Red Army, to reorganize and enrich the general headquarters. He recommended Xu Xiangqian as the deputy commander-in-chief of the Red Army and Chen Changhao as the general political commissar.Li Fuchun felt that the matter was of great importance, so he sent a telegram to the leaders of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, and Mao Zedong:

The Central Revolutionary Military Commission remained silent on this and did not reply.A few days later, telegrams from the Fourth Front came in one after another, and the tone became more and more impolite.Mao Zedong later said angrily: "All kinds of sparrows have sent telegrams." This refers to these things. On July 9, at the instruction of Zhang Guotao, leading members of the Sichuan-Shanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China jointly called the Party Central Committee: "Based on the current situation, the Provincial Committee has the following suggestions: In order to unify command, act quickly, and attack the enemy, the general headquarters must be strengthened. Comrade Qianqian will serve as deputy commander-in-chief, Comrade Changhao will serve as chief political commissar, and Comrade Enlai will serve as chief of staff. The Military Commission will have a chairman, with Comrade Zhu De concurrently serving as the chairman, and a standing committee to decide military strategy issues. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee is requested to make a quick decision. And hope Li Fu." A Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee actually made irresponsible remarks to the central government and meddled in the personnel arrangements of the top leadership, apparently Zhang Guotao was the backstage boss.The center remains unresponsive.

On July 16, Chen Changhao came forward.Instead of being so straightforward, he euphemistically called Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, and Xu Xiangqian of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission: "Aba should be taken quickly. Hao hopes to unify the command, boost morale, improve military discipline and party discipline, resolutely oppose the rightist, eliminate counter-revolutionaries, and fight against the rightists. This is a great victory. Everything can be seen on behalf of others. Wei Hao only works resolutely under the leadership of the Central Committee and the Military Commission, but he never dares to ask questions, and he is incapable of taking on other major responsibilities. How? Hope to reply."

On July 18, Chen Changhao pleaded again in the telegram to Zhang Guotao and Xu Xiangqian to Zhu De: "The overall situation should be resolved quickly, and don't wait for the post to arrive. The post firmly advocates the concentration of military leadership, otherwise the enemy will not be able to smoothly destroy the enemy. Please still ask Tao to serve as the Military Commission Chairman, Zhu De served as the enemy's former commander-in-chief, vice-chairman Zhou and chief of staff. After the Central Political Bureau decided on a major policy, it was given to the Military Commission to make arbitrary decisions....Hao has been unable to give instructions for days, and now he is here to report." Under the repeated urging of the leaders of the Red Fourth Front Army, the Central Committee could no longer remain silent.The situation is obvious: the Red Fourth Army has many soldiers, without their cooperation, the Army on the one hand would be helpless.The central government was eager to go north, to get rid of the passive situation of being short of food and clothing and being beaten everywhere in Tibetan areas.However, Zhang Guotao stood still and had to solve the problem of power distribution before he would act. It seems that he will not make concessions.Therefore, Mao Zedong and Zhang Wentian seriously discussed this important issue.Liu Ying, wife of Zhang Wentian, recalled: Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian and other comrades have been discussing how to unite the First and Fourth Front Armies and act in a unified way, and believe that the key lies in Zhang Guotao.Comrade Enlai had a high fever and was still troubled by this matter while he was ill.I heard Chairman Mao and Wen Tian discussing repeatedly, and the talks were very specific.Chairman Mao said: "Zhang Guotao is a powerful faction. He has ambitions. I don't think I can give him a suitable position. It is difficult for the First and Fourth Front Armies to form a single rope." Chairman Mao analyzed that Zhang Guotao wanted to be the chairman of the Military Commission. Commander-in-Chief Zhu is in charge, and he cannot replace him.But he is not reconciled to being only the vice-chairman, on an equal footing with Enlai and Jiaxiang.Wen Tian said to Chairman Mao: "Give him the position of general secretary." Chairman Mao said: "No, he wants to seize military power. If you make him general secretary, he might not be satisfied. It’s troublesome for him to sit on this throne.” After thinking about it, Chairman Mao said: “Let him be the chief political commissar.” Chairman Mao meant to consider his request as much as possible, but he can’t let him arrest all the military power. , Discuss with Enlai, who is the general political commissar, Enlai agrees without caring about his personal status at all. At that time, Peng Dehuai and others did not understand the mystery of Mao Zedong's strategy of "preferring to give up the general political commissar than the general secretary". Later, when the situation changed, Peng Dehuai admired Mao Zedong's foresight: "If the general secretary was given up at that time, he would use the general secretary It is legal to convene a meeting in the name and establish a pseudo-central government. This is a matter of principle.” On July 18, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee in Luhua, Heishui County.Nine members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Zhu De, Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian), Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Bo Gu, Wang Jiaxiang, Kai Feng, and Deng Fa attended the meeting.The meeting had only one topic: to study and solve the problem of unified command and organizational leadership. Zhang Wentian was the first to speak. He proposed that the Central Revolutionary Military Commission should have a commander-in-chief, and Zhu De would concurrently serve as the commander-in-chief.Zhang Guotao served as the general political commissar of the Red Army and the chief of the Military Commission.The Military Commission has a small Military Commission (Military Commission Standing Committee), which used to have four members, but now it has five members. Comrade Chen Changhao joined in, and the main person in charge is still Zhang Guotao.Zhou Enlai was transferred to work on the Standing Committee of the Central Committee. Before Guotao was familiar with him, Enlai temporarily helped with the work.This is the division of labor of the Military Commission.Regarding the General Political Department, Wang Jiaxiang was originally the director, but he was actually Bogu due to illness.It is now decided that Bogu will be the director, and there will be two deputy directors: Fuchun and the Fourth Front Army.Comrades Changhao and Qianqian remained in their original positions, and their powers were expanded, and the front troops were under their command. After Zhang Wentian finished speaking, Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong and others spoke one after another.Zhang Guotao proposed to add personnel to the Central Committee.Mao Zedong said: It is necessary to promote cadres, but it is not necessary for so many people to be concentrated in the central government, and people are also needed at the lower levels.He tactfully rejected Zhang Guotao's request.The participants unanimously agreed with Zhang Wentian's opinion.Finally, Zhang Wentian said: Everyone agrees, very good, Zhang Guotao is the general political commissar, Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao are the commanders of the former enemy troops, and Bo Gu is the director of the General Political Department.Thus ended the first meeting of the distribution of powers. According to the resolution of the meeting, the Military Commission issued a notice to the troops on the same day: On July 21, the Central Military Commission issued an order to make corresponding adjustments to the organizational designations of the First and Fourth Fronts and the appointment and dismissal of cadres.The command is as follows: On the same day, the Military Commission also issued the "Decision on the Deployment of the Army in the Songpan Campaign", announcing: "Ren Xuqian is the commander-in-chief of the front enemy, Chen Changhao is the political commissar, and all combat troops in the front are under his command. Headquarters." With this substantial adjustment, Zhang Guotao gained command of the Red Army.Front operations were also commanded by the Red Fourth Front Army, with the Red Front Army relegated to a secondary position.The central government made great concessions, especially Zhou Enlai, who, in order to take the overall situation into consideration, gave up the seat of the General Political Commissar of the Red Army to Zhang Guotao, and he was only left with the name of vice chairman of the Military Commission.Zhang Guotao had the upper hand, so he should be satisfied.But Zhang Guotao is not finished, he still has to settle the political line account with the central government.Under Zhang Guotao's instruction, taking Kaifeng's article criticizing the "Northwest Federal Government" as a breakthrough point, on July 8, the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China called the Central Committee to counterattack Kaifeng's article. This is really "using the way of the person to treat the person's body".Although the Zunyi Conference resolved the issue of the military line, Mao Zedong temporarily shelved the issue of the political line in order to save the Central Red Army and did not criticize Wang Ming's "left" opportunist line.Now the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee of the Red Fourth Front has instead labeled Kaifeng a lot of "rightist", "failure", and "subjective" labels, and they want to fight against him.For the first time, Kai Feng fell silent in the face of the large number of Fourth Front Army cadres.In fact, Zhang Guotao wants the central government to admit that his line is completely wrong, and that only Zhang Guotao is the only correct one. Seeing that the central government gave Zhang Guotao a seat and adjusted the leadership of the Red Army, he was not satisfied, so he wanted to solve the problem of political line. On July 21 and 22, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was convened in Luhua to discuss the work of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army and evaluate the struggle in the previous period.Those present at the meeting were: Zhang Guotao, Xu Xiangqian, Chen Changhao, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Bogu, Deng Fa, Kaifeng, Li Fuchun, and Liu Bocheng. The meeting on the 21st was reported by the person in charge of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army.Zhang Guotao, Xu Xiangqian, and Chen Changhao made speeches one after another, reporting the military and political work of the Red Fourth Front Army since the fourth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign in the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Soviet Areas.They fully affirmed the heroic struggle of the Red Fourth Front Army in the establishment of the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Tongnan Basu areas, and also talked about the reasons and lessons for withdrawing from these soviet areas.Xu Xiangqian pointed out: The advantage of the Fourth Red Army is that it has many workers and peasants and is loyal to the party.Obeying orders and listening to commands has good discipline; fighting bravely, cadres at all levels are decentralized in battle, command is at the front, the movement of troops is fast and agile, and they are good at night battles.Pay attention to military training in peacetime, and sum up experience after the war.The disadvantages are the low level of education, insufficient military theory and strategic and tactical literacy, and weak staff work.Chen Changhao reported on the political work of the Fourth Front Army.After the report, Xu and Chen returned to the front line to direct the battle and did not attend the meeting the next day. Discussion on the 22nd.Zhu De affirmed in his speech that after Zhang Guotao arrived in Hubei, Henan and Anhui, "it was right to mobilize the masses and expand the Red Army by more than ten times."The disadvantage is that there is something wrong with the campaign plan, and many battles have been fought, but the masses have not been well armed to contain the enemy.It is right to devote all our attention to the development of the Red Army, but not enough work in the localities.He said: The Fourth Front Army of the Red Army has a foundation to turn into a steel Red Army. It is sure to strengthen its tactical literacy and improve its communication and communication. Kaifeng criticized in his speech: The Fourth Front Army should not have withdrawn from the Tongnanba Soviet Area, the Central Soviet Area had to withdraw, and Tongnanba had won the battle and withdrew under smooth conditions.Abandoning the soviet area arbitrarily should be considered. Zhou Enlai's speech compared the situation in the Central Soviet Area and the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Soviet Areas.He said that the Central Soviet Area withdrew due to strategic and tactical mistakes, and Hubei, Henan, and Anhui were completely different, and it was not caused by a complete defensive war like the Central Soviet Area.The exit from Hubei, Henan and Anhui was not well prepared in advance, and the mobilization of the masses was not enough, and some neglected the enemy.It is not possible to draw such a conclusion: that the anti-encirclement and suppression campaign must not be successful, and must withdraw from the Soviet area.It is right to go to Tongnanba, overcome fatigue and establish a base.On the one hand, the army marched long distances, and some showed right deviations. After the Zunyi Conference, the military leadership was changed, and corrections have been made, but attention must still be paid.Zhou criticized the regime building of the Fourth Front Army, saying: The established federal government does not have many ethnic minorities, and the federation does not have an East-West alliance.Regarding propaganda and agitation, Zhou Enlai believed that it was a bit more than the truth.Such as the estimation of the enemy's strength, it is said that the enemy is "remnant".Some slogan formulations are problematic, such as "Down with Songpan, go straight to Chengdu Bazi".Another example is to say that the 100,000 Central Red Army is too exaggerated and disappointing.In terms of organizational work, Zhou suggested that it should be scientific, organized, and planned, which is more beneficial to the relationship between superiors and subordinates. Mao Zedong said in his speech: Starting from Hubei, Henan and Anhui, under the leadership of Guotao, there is generally no problem.In the past, when we were not very close to the central government, some self-proclaimed representatives of the central government criticized there, so some comrades thought that there might be a problem with the line.See it today and think the route is right.The expansion and consolidation of the Red Army, the development and consolidation of the two soviet areas, the cooperation with the central soviet area, and countless defeats of the enemy have all proved that the line is correct.Regarding the work of the Red Fourth Front Army, Mao concluded that the general line was correct and other individual issues were incorrect. Zhang Wentian said: Regarding the issue of Tongnanba, making it a Soviet area, the general line is correct.Abandoning Thong Namba is a serious mistake, and there is no reason to give up.We failed to defeat the enemy several times in the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Soviet areas, because we were not prepared to fight and did not fight well, so it was right to withdraw at that time.But Tongnanba repelled Liu Xiang, and it was wrong to abandon the Soviet area after victory.Regarding ethnic issues, Zhang said: I do not quite agree with Kaifeng's last draft (referring to the draft ethnic policy attached to the article criticizing the Northwest Federal Government).The basic question asked is agreed.The federal government is wrong in terms of organization and procedures. We should focus on self-determination. The federation is for free association. Why should we adopt a federation?It cannot be admitted that the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee said that the federation is correct in organization and theory, which is wrong. Finally, Zhang Wentian emphasized the issue of base areas.He said: There are quite a lot of people in the Tongnanba area, and the place is quite large, but it has been abandoned now.Not being forced out by the enemy, but giving up in a winning situation.If the central government has a telegram to give up, it does not need to give up. We will not give up the Soviet area because of the telegram.The reason is that there was no in-depth work to strengthen the party and local armed forces, and the in-depth agrarian revolution relied entirely on the support of the Red Army.The lessons of Nanba taught us to establish new base areas, and we must be determined to send good cadres to establish political power and completely solve the land problem.Establishing and consolidating revolutionary base areas is of great significance to the development of the revolution. Before the end of the meeting, Zhang Guotao made a supplementary speech to replace the conclusion of the meeting.He admitted that the failure of the fourth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign in the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Soviet areas was due to the underestimation of the strength of Chiang Kai-shek's army and the lack of resoluteness in fighting.At that time, the main consideration was to preserve the Red Army, and insufficient attention was paid to the role of the guerrillas.After Zhang Guotao finished speaking, the meeting was adjourned.The two-day meeting did not result in a written resolution. The meeting was an informal confrontation.The tone of the central leaders' speeches was inconsistent.Zhu De, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Fa all focused on affirmation and offered some opinions in good faith.Kaifeng's words were harsh and very critical. Is Kaifeng's criticism justified?What exactly happened when the Red Fourth Front Army withdrew from the Tongnan Basu District?There are various complicated reasons for this, and it is necessary to review the combat history of the Red Fourth Front Army. Tongjiang, Nanjiang, and Bazhong are located at the southern foot of Daba Mountain and Micang Mountain. There are many mountains and rivers, and there are many dangerous peaks. There are only rugged paths winding through the dense virgin forest.Here is sparsely populated, closed and backward, and belongs to the backcountry, which forms a strong contrast with the richness of the Sichuan Basin.However, there are similarities with Jinggang Mountain and Dabie Mountain: it is located in a remote place, and the rule of warlords is relatively weak;The Red Fourth Front Army traveled thousands of miles westward from Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and was able to settle down and take root here, which is directly related to the above conditions. After the Red Fourth Front Army arrived in Tongjiang in 1933, Xu Xiangqian built his headquarters in the county seat.He described the local situation and said: "Tongjiang County is not big, with about a thousand households. It faces mountains on three sides and water on one side, and is surrounded by a fairly strong city wall. There are shops on both sides of the main street, selling daily necessities, mountain goods and local products. , meals and snacks, etc. There are a lot of white fungus, and a piece of Guangyang can buy a lot. The troops don’t know that it is a high-grade nutritional product, so they buy it and cook it in a pot and eat it as porridge. Salt, cloth, and medicine are extremely short. They are wooden structures, most of which are in disrepair and dilapidated. The most eye-catching buildings are a spacious Confucian temple and a strong Catholic church. The headquarters of the front army and the Northwest Military Commission are temporarily located in these two buildings." He saw that the people here "are astonishingly impoverished. Regardless of the county town or the village, what we see are mostly men, women and children who are 'sweetened'. Girls aged 17 or 18 don’t wear pants, and wear a piece of brown to cover their body. Moreover, opium is rampant here, and most of the men are heavy smokers, skinny and out of shape.” When the Fourth Red Army first arrived in Tongnanba, they did a great job.Attack the local tyrants, divide the fields, and expand the Red Army.Not only are young men vying to be the first, but young women are also actively participating in the Red Army.The actual situation at that time was that there were too many local men who were heavy smokers, and it was a very difficult job to concentrate on quitting smoking addiction first when recruiting troops.The local women are strong, hard-working, and they are the main force no matter in the field or in the family.So the Red Army recruited many young women to form a women's regiment.They are mainly responsible for field service and rear chores, and they have played a great role. Standing at Tongnanba, the Red Army first repelled the siege of Sichuan warlord Tian Songyao.Afterwards, the Red Fourth Front Army began to attack outwards, expanding the Sichuan-Shaanxi base.Successively defeated the Sichuan army troops of Yang Sen and Liu Cunhou, developed the base area from three counties to eight counties, expanded the scope of activities to 22 counties, the Red Army grew to more than 80,000 people, and the red flag swept Daba Mountain.The victory of the Red Army made the warlords in Sichuan terrified, and they finally joined hands to fight the Red Army to the death for their own territory and interests. In October 1933, Liu Xiang, the leader of the Sichuan warlords, gathered various warlord forces, organized 120 regiments with more than 200,000 troops, and launched a six-way siege on the Sichuan-Shanxi Soviet Area.This contest lasted for ten months and was the largest and most brutal battle in the history of the Red Fourth Front Army. In July 1934, eighty regiments of the Sichuan Army attacked Wanyuan, an important town in northern Sichuan, in an attempt to cut off the communication line between Sichuan and Shaanxi and push the Red Army out of northern Sichuan.This is a life-and-death battle. Under the command of Xu Shiyou and Chen Haisong, the 4th Army and 9th Army of the Red Fourth Front Army started a thrilling battle to defend Wanyuan.When Xu Xiangqian inspected the front line, he saw: "The army is really red-eyed. It has to deal with the enemy's charge more than five or six times a day. From dawn to dark, the swords were cut and the bayonets were bent. The corpses of the enemies in front of the battle There are piles of them, and the smell is unbearable. This is a bloody battle that is related to the life and death of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Revolutionary Base Area, and you can't do it without desperate efforts!" Xu Xiangqian excitedly praised the Red Army soldiers and said: "The army is really tenacious. First, they are not afraid of hardships, and second, they are not afraid of death. Not only To defeat the offensive of the superior enemy, you have to endure other difficult tests: during the day, the scorching sun, gunpowder smoke, and flames of war bake the position like a steamer. The fortifications flew around, biting people's faces and bodies with pimples, and itching unbearably. During heavy rain, muddy water filled the trenches, and the commanders and fighters stood in waist-deep water. Rotten feet spread like a plague, and many people's legs and feet Festered, red and swollen, it was difficult to move, and there was a lack of medical treatment. They continued to fight and did not go to the line of fire. The enemy's corpses were piled up in disorder and densely piled up at the front of the position. If there was no time to deal with them, they would rot and smell in two or three days, making people sick and vomiting. Food supply No, commanders and soldiers rely on digging potatoes and wild vegetables to satisfy their hunger. All of these cannot scare our steel warriors." Many years later, when General Xu Shiyou recalled the Wanyuan defense battle, he was still filled with emotion.He said: "The war to defend Wanyuan was a big one, it was fought very badly, and it lasted for a long time, for four and a half months. The people in this area are very pitiful, and too many died. Within thirty miles All the common people died of the plague. I went to see it later, and they all died in bed. Adults and children are all dead. The smell of dead bodies is worse than anything else. .We also suffered a lot of casualties, and our division suffered seven to eight thousand casualties. Every time we attack, the enemy loses seven to eight thousand corpses. Our casualties are generally two to one; want more." The "six-way siege" of Liu Xiang and other Sichuan warlords was finally smashed by the Red Army.But shortly thereafter, the Fourth Red Army withdrew from the Sichuan-Shaanxi base area and moved west of the Jialing River.Why do you have to leave after winning the battle?Of course there is a reason.Xu Xiangqian said: "The ten-month anti-six-way siege ended with the victory of our army and the defeat of the enemy, but the vitality of the Sichuan-Shaanxi base area was seriously damaged. In front of us, there are ruins and difficulties. The war is over. Finally, I returned from the front line to the rear. What I saw along the way was a scene of disaster brought about by the destruction of the war. Good fields have been desolate for a long time, ten houses are half destroyed, new graves are everywhere, and mourning is everywhere. It is shocking! The source of the Red Army soldiers has arrived The situation is exhausted. There is a shortage of supplies, and it is difficult to supply. The salt wells in the south and Tongjiang have been completely destroyed by the enemy, and it is difficult to recover in the short term. The enemy's economic blockade is getting worse day by day. The urgent needs of salt, food, clothing, medicine, etc. in the base area cannot be solved .As the hunger became more and more serious, infectious diseases such as typhoid fever and dysentery spread rampantly, killing many people. The order in the base area was not as good as before, and people who fled, robbed, and became bandits happened frequently. With the arrival of the last spring famine, it is almost impossible for a large army like the Red Fourth Front Army to persevere. War is not only a military struggle on the battlefield, but also requires strong human and financial resources to back it up.It is common sense that troops cannot be replenished without people, and wars cannot be fought without food.The deep mountains and old forests in the Tongnanba area are suitable for the Red Army to defend against danger militarily.But once it is under economic blockade, it shows a vulnerable side.However, the abandonment of the Tongnan Basu area and the encirclement and suppression by the enemy were external causes, while Zhang Guotao's "left" policy was the internal cause of the collapse of the base area. Zhang Guotao still continued his "left" policy in Tongnan Basu District.To fight against counter-revolutionaries, those who follow me will prosper, those who oppose me will perish, and innocent people will be killed indiscriminately.He re-accounted for the Xiaohekou meeting, placed Zeng Zhongsheng under house arrest, and killed Kuang Jixun, commander of the 4th Red Army, and Yu Dusan, Shu Yuzhang, division and regiment-level cadres, and other comrades, setting off another wave of counter-revolutionaries. Xu Yixin recalled his experience of being arrested in the Sichuan-Shanxi Soviet Area and said: "I was arrested on August 1st in 1933. On the day of 'August 1st', I inspected in the rear, and two divisions came in front. I still inspected the commander-in-chief. Zhang Guotao , Chen Changhao was in the rear, Comrade Xu Xiangqian was not there. They inspected the troops, and I rested after the parade. At night, I sent someone to say that the General Political Commissar was invited, but as soon as the invitation was invited, he was invited to the Security Bureau. Chen Changhao was serious there Said: Do you know that you made a mistake? In addition, Zeng Zhongsheng and Zhang Qinqiu were invited today, but you cannot meet each other. However, Zhang Qinqiu’s mistake was lighter than yours. She did not arrest her, and she has already admitted her mistake. The three of you oppose Zhang Guotao. The most important thing, but it's not too late, as long as you admit your mistake, I can promise to let you out immediately. Later, I cried a lot, lost my temper, and asked Chen Changhao, "It's unreasonable, why did you send me to the security bureau? The bureau deals with counter-revolutionaries. Chen Changhao said: Not all of them are counter-revolutionaries, and you can squat if you make mistakes. He also said: Your mistakes are not simple, you are serious right opportunism! In the middle of the night, send me to a unit When I came out of the room, four people followed. A few days later, Zeng Chuanliu (the director of the Security Bureau) asked me to write materials, and I wrote down my opinions on Zhang Guotao. As for the right deviation, I don’t know where the right is. I was assigned to give lectures at the Security Bureau and ask about cases. As a result, I found that many of the prisoners were my comrades. They had well-founded evidence, names and surnames, and those with connections were all sent by the provincial committees of southern Shaanxi and Sichuan. There are also some farmers in Sichuan, who avenged their private revenge, not all counter-revolutionaries. At that time, the case was tried to extract confessions. I saw this situation and suggested to investigate the situation clearly, but there was no result. Afterwards, I mustered up the courage, I wrote a letter to Zhang Guotao, saying that the suppression of counterrevolutionaries cannot be done like this, and that if this continues in the future, peasant riots will result. Judging from the situation of the Security Bureau, the local government suppressed counterrevolutionaries indiscriminately and killed people randomly, and many people in the army who should not be suppressed were suppressed. Less than three days after 'Tiao Chen' went up, Zhang Guotao came, trained me for an hour, slapped the table and said: You and Zeng Zhongsheng are not satisfied with me and oppose me, who doesn't know? I am lenient to you, Zhang Qinqiu repents , I will be more lenient to her. I asked Chen Changhao to talk to you. I hope you will perform well in the Security Bureau and check your mistakes. You have been assigned work, told you to give lectures, and ask prisoners. You don’t trust worker and peasant cadres in asking prisoners. You made your own decisions and became one with the counter-revolutionaries. You have not changed in the Security Bureau, and you are still stubbornly resisting. You have reached the point of no return! After that, I was sent to the place where Zhu Guang and Li Chenglin lived together to be punished. We carved stone seals and wrote things in that place for two years, until the second and fourth front armies joined up and went north, and then I was released." Xu Yixin was lucky. At that time, the 12th Division of the 4th Red Army was the focus of the eradication of counter-revolutionaries. Beginning with the division commander Kuang Jixun, they were cleaned up layer by layer.General Zhang Renchu, who worked in the Security Bureau, recalled: "The 12th Division was the most serious in Sichuan and Shaanxi. Since Kuang Jixun, many people have been arrested. Han Jizu was the director of the Political Department of the 12th Division (from a haircut background), and the cadres who killed There are quite a few. The cadres above the 12th Division were Xu Shiyou, the head of the 34th Regiment, Yu Tianyun, the head of the 36th Regiment, and the head of the 35th Regiment. Kuang was the first to be arrested and sent from Tongjiang to the location of the 10th Division. I heard that it was Zhang Guotao who asked him to become the commander of the Fourth Army, and he was actually killed in this way. The killing was very secret, the reason is unknown, it must be that he opposed Zhang Guotao." Zhang Guotao expanded the scope of anti-revolutionaries in the Tongnanba area to reach local party organizations and the general public.Xu Yixin recalled: "Our policy is to divide the land and clothes by the local tyrants. It is 'Left' for the landlords, and almost all of them are kicked out. Later, the rich peasants were also swept out, and the middle peasants were also taken away. This is a 'Left' policy. These are in line with the Su反结合起来，搞得中农也不满意，说几句怪话，就抓起来当反革命。所以通南巴肃反继承了鄂豫皖肃反的'左'的政策，在部队里，干部中，只要对张国焘有意见，就抓起来。在地方也是这样，除地、富外，有些干部也抓起来当反革命肃了。后来在苏区蹲不下去，恐怕就是这样。我当时在保卫局看到一份报告，大概是县保卫局送来的报告，一个县一杀就是几千，没有口供，只是很简单的名单，说杀多少，一个个圈起来，送上来叫保卫局审查。一个县就有杀人的权力，有的乡开公审大会就杀了。所以乱杀人、乱抓人、乱用刑，造成了人民的不满。” 徐向前元帅也证实：“张国焘在川陕根据地，推行的还是王明那一套，许多东西是'左'的。如对地方政策，只要当过保长的，多要杀掉。认定是地主、富农的，也要杀掉。其实，有些保长是穷人，大家推举他出来干这份差事的。有些地主、富农虽有剥削，但民愤不大，可以改造，不同于罪大恶极的土豪劣绅。不问青红皂白，把他们通通杀掉。只能扩大敌对势力，吓跑中立者，孤立自己。土地改革、经济政策也'左'，地主不分田，富农分坏田；侵犯中农利益，甚至将一些中农划成地富成份，无条件地剥夺，使他们失去了生产积极性；把小经纪人当资本家打倒，搞得根据地商业凋敝，连日用生活物资都很难买到。俘虏政策上，要兵不要官，放兵不放官，尤其是对营以上被俘军官，杀掉不少，增强了敌军的对抗、报复心理。这些'左'的政策和在鄂豫皖时期差不多。” 据当年老红军回忆，“左”的政策到了荒唐可笑的地步。打土豪拿来的法币、茶叶都当成反动的东西烧掉了。后来到了松理茂地区，许多战士不服水土，拉肚子，才后悔不该烧掉茶叶。“左”的政策把川陕根据地搞得民穷财尽，要粮没粮，要衣没衣。农村开个会，参加者大多是妇女，男的都当红军去了。当时扩大红军，贫下中农出身的年轻人都参加了红军。如果你看到年轻人没当红军的，那就是地主富农出身的。这样的结果就是待不下去，只好放弃川陕根据地，再次转移。 张国焘的“左”还表现在他对川陕地方党组织和游击队的打击迫害。张国焘生性多疑，对川陕党的同志根本不信任。当时活跃在川东地区的是王维舟同志领导的川东游击军。1933年10月，王维舟率领部队与红四方面军会合，奉命改编为红33军。以王维舟为军长，原达县中心县委书记杨克明为政委，四方面军来的罗南辉为副军长。但是会合的欢庆刚过去不久，张国焘就以其当地人多，社会关系复杂为借口，在33军内部大搞肃反和清洗。王维舟回忆说：“最不幸和最令我痛心疾首的，是经过党多年培养出来的三百余青年革命干部，遭受了无辜的杀害。这些同志几年来在地下艰苦的环境中，与敌人进行了殊死的斗争，未遭反动派杀害，却在自己内部，在叛徒张国焘'左'倾路线的毒手下牺牲了。游击军和红四方面军刚会合，张国焘派人在宣汉双河场以开会名义杀害了地下党的干部百余名。在巴中县，张国焘把我们33军的两个师长（98师、99师）蒋群林、冉南轩从前线调去，也被暗中杀害。又在宣汉属之清溪乡三弯崖，于点验时杀了三个团的团级干部（其罪状是他们过去当过保甲长）。又在黄中铺前线正当同敌人在激烈战斗中（当时我在虹口养病），把正在火线上指挥作战的军政委杨克明同志撤职调离前方，又将排级干部以上五十余人都调到后方，大部分被杀害了。未被害的只有少数几个人。” 张国焘对川东地方革命同志的屠杀和连根拔的政策，被人们称之为“拔萝卜”，引起了党内强烈的义愤。在后来延安清算张国焘错误的政治局扩大会议上，朱德痛心地说：“对于肃反，错误是很严重的。四川同志谈：红军不来，我们还发展了一些党员；红军来了，把我们杀光了。同志们带武装来，不慢待罢了，我们总不该要他们的命！把这些革命同志当反革命，是罪恶。有些地方把整个地方肃光。” 张国焘把川陕根据地当作他的独立王国，不仅对地方同志不信任，甚至对中央派来的干部也随便怀疑打击。党中央把廖承志同志从上海调到川陕根据地参加领导工作，任省总工会秘书长和红四方面军政治部秘书长。1934年10月，廖承志参加川陕根据地第四次党代表大会时，张国焘借口有人提出廖承志的父亲廖仲恺是国民党中央执行委员，母亲何香凝是国民党中央妇女部长，就把廖承志关起来审查。老共产党员谁不知道廖仲恺、何香凝是孙中山先生的亲密战友、中国共产党人尊敬的朋友。这居然成为关押廖承志同志的理由，还有比这更荒唐的事情吗？廖承志因为能写会画，宣传工作上有一技之长，才没被杀掉，以犯人的身份参加了长征。与廖承志命运相同的还有中央派来的朱光、四川省委书记罗世文等同志。 在对敌斗争上，张国焘更是以极“左”的面目处理战略和政策等问题。在他眼里，敌人就是敌人，没有任何区别。他不会利用军阀阵营的内部矛盾来分化瓦解、各个击破敌人，更不知统一战线为何物。其实，当时无论是国民党军队各派系还是四川军阀内部，都存在大大小小的矛盾和利益冲突，他们一开始也并未想要和红军死拼。1933年红四方面军离开鄂豫皖向川陕地区转移时，陕西的西北军杨虎城、孙蔚如与蒋介石有矛盾。在西北军内的地下党员劝杨、孙与共产党合作，共同对付蒋介石。于是孙蔚如派人来联系谈判。红军派徐以新前往汉中，孙热情款待，与红军约定：以巴山为界。你不过来，我不过去。大家一起对付胡宗南。协议达成后，孙蔚如很高兴，给红军提供了不少方便。例如给红军送去无线电通讯器材、四川省地图，为红军在汉中建立交通站运送物资。孙蔚如的合作，使红军免除了后顾之忧，可以集中兵力对付四川军阀的进攻。但是1935年2月，红四方面军准备西渡嘉陵江，与中央红军会合时，为了出其不意，红军突然攻击陕南的宁强、阳平关。尽管徐向前说这次战役是有节制的，“不过是虚晃一枪罢了”。但是红军战士们打起来却是真刀真枪，一家伙干掉孙蔚如六个团，叫孙吃了大亏。直到解放后，做了民主人士的孙蔚如还对此耿耿于怀，向周恩来总理告状。说张国焘不守信用，打了他。周总理说：张国焘的事，当时我们也管不了。陈昌浩回忆此事，也承认陕南这一仗从军事上说是达到了迷惑敌人的目的，在政治上的影响是好是坏，值得研究。 四川军阀更非铁板一块，他们之间的矛盾错综复杂。军阀信奉的第一原则是：只要你不侵犯我的地盘，一切都好商量。对蒋介石，他们是不相信的，很怕蒋把他们一个个收拾掉。因此，红军入川后，杨森、刘存厚、刘湘都派人来联系过，希望与红军和睦相处。陈昌浩回忆，1933年9月，张国焘对他说杨森派人来谈判，叫他去一趟。张对陈说：杨森要保存实力打刘湘，他想利用我们。我们也要利用他打刘湘，利用矛盾是第一。这时，张国焘的头脑倒是很清醒的。 陈昌浩奉命来到巴中县境内的一个小村镇，这里是红军与杨森的川军对阵的地方。黄昏时，杨森的代表夏炯应约来到。They talked all night.夏炯三杯酒下肚，就骂起了老蒋。他说：蒋把你们（红军）整走，还不是要整我们。夏还提出要和红军平分四川，成都、重庆等好地方归他们，川北归红军。陈昌浩乘夏炯谈得起劲，便向他了解了许多刘存厚、刘湘方面的军事情报，夏炯有问必答，毫无保留。 陈昌浩说：“正谈的高兴时，夏的一个团长派人送来一份电报，字不多纸不大。夏炯把电报还拿给我看，这份电报是用夏给我们的密码本译出的。一般说在敌我谈判中，这样的电报是应对对方保守秘密的，他给我看是有一定诚意的。到天将破晓，会谈才圆满结束。当天我就赶到巴中，我回来后和张研究，张国焘一下就变了，态度很冷。感到我的估计太乐观了，他要趁我们和杨森正在谈判期间不及防备的情况下打杨森，来一个声东击西。我提出这样做会树敌过多，在统一战线上失策，使各小军阀不相信我们。这也会影响到和孙蔚如的关系，应该利用敌人的矛盾中立某些敌人等道理和张国焘争。张说，军事上的胜利是主要的胜利，我们胜利了他们就相信我们了。我执行了他的决定。后来我们打下了营山，杨森还不相信他前方部队的电报，及至弄清了我们确实向他进攻了之后，非常气愤（解放后陈锡联同志当重庆市长时，邓锡侯还向他谈过这个问题，邓也有意见）。后经证明，杨森供给我们的情报大多是真实的。后来打刘湘前或是打刘湘时，杨森还派人来过。我们打得很苦的时候，杨始终没有打我巴州。” 无论出于何种动机，杨森当时对红军是有过帮助的。他把川军通讯密码交给了红军，使刘湘军队的一举一动都为红军总部所掌握，在反六路围攻战斗中发挥了重大作用。底下的红军战士当然不了解其中奥秘，他们把张主席当成活神仙，张说敌人几时到哪里，果然敌人到那时就来了。但是张国焘用政客手段对待杨森，究竟是聪明还是愚蠢？从四川军阀后来齐心协力进攻川陕苏区，与红军死拼，就足以说明问题了。 陈昌浩当时是忠实追随张国焘的，明知不对也坚决执行。但是红军中有头脑清醒的干部，例如总部的参谋主任舒玉章同志就反对张国焘的错误政策。徐向前回忆：“打完杨森，发生过一场争论。我们的参谋主任舒玉章，与陈昌浩吵起来了。舒玉章不同意打杨森，认为红军和人家的代表谈判过，无论如何不该进攻人家。争来争去，陈昌浩的意思无非是说，我们消灭了杨森那么多部队，缴了那么多枪，取得了那么大的胜利，不对吗？舒玉章说，不管你们怎么说，我们和人家代表说的是互不侵犯，你们打杨森，犯了错误，是'立三路线'，官司打到中央去，我也保留意见。这下陈昌浩可炸了，拍着桌子说，你是个'日本特务'，在这里搞煽动，反政治委员！下令：'马上给我把他捆起来！'结果硬是把舒玉章关进了班房。政治委员决定一切，能随便抓人、杀人，搬的是苏联那一套，害死人哪！后来听说是以'反革命'的罪名，把舒玉章杀掉了。这是个好同志，死得冤枉，令人惋惜。” 张国焘在通南巴苏区，对内对外都是在执行王明的左倾机会主义路线，不过两三年时间，把苏区搞得民穷财尽，又受到四川军阀的多方围攻。尽管取得了一些胜利，也无力再坚持下去了。当红四方面军向嘉陵江以西转移时，收到中央来电。张国焘决定放弃通南巴苏区，到川西北去。这时，他的左倾达到了偏执狂的地步。他下令“坚壁清野”，所过之处无论村庄城镇，房子统统烧光。当时的红4军政委王建安回忆：“突围时我在后边掩护，烧了不少房子。因张国焘说一方面军有三十万人，与一方面军会合就是胜利，要把房子都烧掉。敌人来了让他们没地方住，睡不好，赶不上我们。我担任后卫，烧了一些，不忍心，又留了一些。” 张国焘的这种野蛮行为，是完全地损害人民群众的利益，不要苏区，断绝后路的行为。广大红军战士对烧老百姓的房子是极不赞成的，这样做的结果不仅失掉了民心，也伤了红军战士的心。原四方面军干部柯常青悔恨地说：“过岷江我负责烧的茂州，过江后把桥撤掉，红军家属、孩子、地方干部都隔在江对岸，我的爱人也在那次被扔掉了。” 由此可见，红四方面军退出通南巴苏区，虽然是为了与中央红军会合而进行的转移。但张国焘在政治上残酷斗争，无情打击自己的干部；在军事上搞阵地防御，与敌人拼消耗，其结果是早晚要被迫退出苏区根据地。而张国焘认为：四方面军是为了与中央会合才放弃通南巴的，责任在中央。芦花会议在没有决议的情况下结束了，中央领导人与张国焘之间不但没有统一认识，统一思想，反而矛盾更加激化。张国焘依仗人多枪多，向中央争夺权力的行动日趋升级。