Chapter 33 3. "Great transfer", stepping up preparations in a hurry

Among the "group of three", Zhou Enlai was responsible for the specific matters of the "big transfer".He made preparations from five aspects. Organizational preparation: In order to meet the needs of marching and combat during the strategic transfer of the main Red Army, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission ordered each legion to set up a rear department in September and October 1934. The teaching team, the supplementary team, and the repair shop are all included." "These rear service agencies are led by the Legion Command. Among the cadres of the Legion, a rear minister is appointed to uniformly command the work of the rear agencies and manage them during their transfer and configuration."

The order stipulates in detail: 1. The rear subordinates of the Three Army Corps should have "corporation hospitals including four hospitals...a total of seven hospitals, which can accommodate a total of 3,500 people"; "one central station and three small stations"; " Three hundred and sixty members of the Legion Transport Team. There should be a total of 1,380 fuzi in the entire army"; "two supplementary regiments (incorporated on October 1), with a total of 2,800 new fighters" ; "Ten workers in a medium workshop" etc. The order required: "The Legion's rear organs should be organized on October 1."

The order issued by Chairman Zhu De and Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission finally emphasized: "This order is completely secret and is limited to the head of the army. The head of the army should issue individual orders based on this order and implement them separately." Soldiers' preparation: In the summer and autumn of 1934, the Central Soviet Area launched another campaign to vigorously expand the Red Army. From May to September, nearly 100,000 Red Army recruits were recruited. On May 18, 1934, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued a declaration "arm up and go to the Red Army", calling on young people to actively join the Red Army.

On September 4, on the eve of the "Great Transfer", the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an emergency mobilization order to expand the Red Army, and announced the establishment of three independent divisions, the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd, forming the Red Eighth Army.Legion Commander Zhou Kun, Political Commissar Huang Su, Chief of Staff Zhang Yunyi, and Political Department Director Luo Ronghuan. Material preparation: In order to ensure the "big transfer" of the Red Army, the rear rushed to make ammunition and clothing, raised food and grass, rushed to make straw sandals, and prepared a large amount of military supplies.

Ye Jizhuang was the head and political commissar of the General Supply Department of the Red Army at the time. He recalled: In the few months before the Long March...in particular, the arsenal was sorted out, bombs were made (50,000 per month), and bullets were remade (up to 50,000 per month). 700,000 grains), repairing mortar shells (a total of 3,000 pieces), etc., ensured that the ammunition in the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and the Long March were fully replenished, which became an unprecedented achievement in the history of the Red Army's arsenal. On August 9, "Red China" reported: "Fujian successfully completed the grain borrowing campaign, and completed more than 75,000 loads", "All central agencies called for the collection of 200,000 pairs of straw sandals to condolences to the Red Army. Completed 100,000 pairs before September 15 .”

In the spring and summer of 1934, Mao Zemin, the governor of the Central Bank, and Wu Jieqing, Mao Zedong's guard, retrieved more than one million silver dollars buried in the cave in 1932 from the mountains near Ruijin, and moved them back to Ruijin.On the eve of the Long March, these silver dollars were distributed to the legions. Military preparations: In May 1934, Zhou Enlai sent Cheng Zihua to Hubei, Henan and Anhui to lead the Red 25th Army to break through and transfer. In August, Ren Bishi, Wang Zhen, Xiao Ke, and Wang Shoudao led the Sixth Red Army to leave the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area and moved to the west of Hunan and Hubei to join forces with He Long and Guan Xiangying's Second Red Army.

In September, Xun Huaizhou and Su Yu led the Seventh Red Army Corps northward to Northeast Jiangxi to join Fang Zhimin. These military plans were all in line with the strategic shift of the Red Front Army, and thus became the prelude to the Long March. At the same time, military arrangements were also made for the struggle in the Central Soviet Area after the transfer of the main force of the Red Army. On May 17, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order to redefine the Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong-Jiangxi, and southern Jiangxi military regions and their sub-regions, clarifying that their current tasks are divided into two aspects: one is to create and expand guerrilla areas far away from the enemy, and start guerrilla warfare. Contain and attract the enemy's high-level forces in one's own direction... Second, establish a strong combat zone on the enemy's rear flanks and partial fronts.In the newly established Southern Jiangxi Military Region, Xiang Ying served as the chairman of the Military and Political Committee and the commander of the military region to guide the party and government work.

Public opinion preparation: From July to September 1934, the Central Red Army carried out in-depth ideological mobilization with the basic slogan of "going north to resist Japan". On July 4, the Party Central Committee's "Decision on Commemorating "August 1st" in the Soviet Area required improving the fighting spirit of the troops and strengthening the political and military training of the troops.Every red soldier must deeply understand that the period when the Red Army of Workers and Peasants will fight directly with Japanese imperialism is getting closer.

On July 8, Bo Gu pointed out in his speech in Ruijin: "At the current stage, we can no longer be satisfied with declarations and agreements. The time has come. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has already needed and can allocate part of its strength to directly resist Japanese imperialism. The central government and the Revolutionary Military Council have already made corresponding decisions in this regard." The Northward Anti-Japanese Advance Team composed of the Red Seventh Army issued the "Declaration for the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Northward to Anti-Japanese War" on July 15, solemnly declaring: "As long as the armed forces attacking the Soviet area accept our three conditions, then our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army The main force can be dispatched after the advance team, and unite with the armed forces of all China to fight against Japan.”

The Central Soviet Area commemorated the August 1st Army Day, highlighting the center of "the Red Army going north to resist Japan".The central government and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission ordered that "the Northward Anti-Japanese Declaration and the Anti-Japanese Oath be announced to all troops and conveyed to every soldier." On August 1, a military parade ceremony was held in Ruijin. Zhu De, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, personally led the Red Army to take the anti-Japanese oath.Mao Zedong declared in his speech: "The Soviet government and the Revolutionary Military Council have ordered the National Red Army to be ready to set off with the advance team at any time."

These public opinions actually made the ideological preparation for the main force of the Red Army to leave the Central Soviet Area. The major transfer of the main Red Army, the question of who goes and who stays is the most complicated and sensitive.With "besieged from all sides", who wants to stay? Bo Gu has the final say on who will leave and who will stay among the senior party cadres. Li Weihan wrote in his recollections: Before the Long March, the fate of cadres was not determined by the organizational bureau.Cadres under the management of the provincial party committee shall report to the central government at the decision of the provincial party committee; Party central organs, government, military, Communist Youth League, Federation of Trade Unions, etc.Those who decide to leave will be formed by the Organization Bureau.The party secretary of the central government is Luo Fu, the chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions is Liu Shaoqi, and the party secretary is Chen Yun.The lists of these units are determined by them respectively.The decision to keep troops in the army is made by the General Political Department. For example, Deng Xiaoping's Long March with the army was decided by the General Political Department.I was in charge of the people from the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area.The Central Bureau consists of the Organization Bureau, the Secretariat, and the Propaganda Department.The Organization Bureau also manages women's work.The secretary-general of the Central Bureau was Wang Shoudao. At that time, Deng Yingchao was in charge of the confidential work, and Li Jianzhen was also in charge of the confidential work. All three of them were with the army on the Long March. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee decided to leave a leading body, called the Central Sub-bureau, to persevere in the struggle.Members include Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, Qu Qiubai and other comrades, and Xiang Ying is in charge.Regarding retention issues.I did not participate in the opinion, nor did I ask questions. It was discussed and decided by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.But I am directly responsible for four people, they are Mao Zebao, Zhou Yili, Chen Zhengren, and He Chang. Mao Zehou worked in the Organization Bureau, and I asked Bo Gu if he should be allowed to leave.Bogu disagreed, so I didn't take him away.Later Mao Zemao died in the battle to defend the Soviet area.I have long felt guilty for the unfortunate sacrifice of Comrade Mao Zedong.Xie Weijun was also working in the organization bureau, so I took him away. Zhou Yili used to be the director of the General Political Department of the Red Front Army, and was sent by Li Lisan when he led the work of the Central Committee.He advocated attacking Changsha and big cities, but later Mao Zedong persuaded him to give up his plan to attack Changsha and big cities.I knew him when I was in Hunan, and he was very familiar. When I arrived in the Central Soviet Area in 1933, he was recuperating from illness and had no job.During the Long March, Bogu decided to keep him, and I agreed. Chen Zhengren, formerly the chairman of the Soviet government of Jiangxi Province, I did not know him and had no working relationship with him.When I arrived in the Soviet area, he was recuperating from his illness. During the Long March, he was also left behind by Bo Gu, He Chang. I knew him very well.He was the secretary of the Northern Bureau when he was on the Lisan line, but he was dismissed at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee.He was wounded before the Long March, and he came to my place and asked to go with the army.I asked Bogu, and Bogu disagreed.Later he sacrificed. The above-mentioned four comrades were all recuperating from illness at the time and had no jobs, so they were under the management of the Organization Bureau.They can stay, or they can be taken away. Patients can travel on stretchers.If they should not stay and are kept, I will bear some responsibility.Although Bo Gu disagreed with them leaving, I was the head of the organization bureau and had a certain right to speak. I could argue, but I didn't. Gu Bai, the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee decided to keep him.I have never dealt with Gu Bo, but I once opposed Deng (Xiaoping), Mao (Zehou), Xie (Weijun), and Gu (Bo) in Jiangxi, and I was also responsible.Cooper stayed in the Soviet area and later died. It was decided by Bogu and the others that He Shuheng stayed, and I did not participate in it. In addition to my management of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, I was also in charge of the Central Party School. I was in charge of the cadres transferred from here, and I took them all away.During the Long March, the head of the Central Propaganda Department was Pan Hannian, and I took away both the head and the deputy head of the department. The question of whether or not to leave senior CCP cadres was decided in this way. According to the plan of the "three-person group", the "big transfer" is scheduled to be implemented at the end of October and early November.Since Chiang Kai-shek had discovered that the Red Army had the intention to transfer, he ordered all armies to intensify their attacks, and the frontline battle situation took a turn for the worse.As a result, the "Great Transfer" was advanced by nearly a month. Chiang Kai-shek learned that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the main force of the Red Army would break out of the Central Soviet Area after destroying the Shanghai Bureau of the Communist Party of China.Li De recalled this way: Li Zhusheng and Sheng Zhongliang, the leaders of the Shanghai Bureau at that time, had to be shot or betrayed. They chose the latter path and took refuge in the Kuomintang secret police.They confessed everything they were familiar with or knew, which led to the arrest of many leading cadres in the white area, the destruction of central and local party organizations, and the loss of many important documents. This is probably how Chiang Kai-shek knew our intention to break out of the siege. Fortunately, it was only a general outline, because the specific details, especially the breakout route and date, had not been finalized at that time, so he did not inform the Shanghai Bureau.In many cases, Chiang Kai-shek actually had some information about our basic decision.First, as I mentioned above, after the Sixth and Seventh Army Corps began to break through in August and September, the Kuomintang strengthened the fortification in the blockade area in the rear.Second, Chen Jitang suddenly submitted a truce statement.Third, we learn from deciphered telegrams that Chiang Kai-shek directed that the date of a new major offensive be advanced by one month. In the last few days of September, Chiang Kai-shek's main attacking forces did move simultaneously.Due to our excellent reconnaissance work, the leadership of the party and the army can make corresponding changes to the plan in time. After the Battle of Guangchang, the attack speed of Jiang's army did not dare to "drive straight into it", and continued to advance gradually. However, when it was learned that the Red Army was about to break through, all armies marched together and went straight to Ruijin, the heart of the Central Soviet Area. Li De formulated the Red Army's three-month battle plan for August, September, and October, still ordering the Red Army to resist across the board and divide troops to guard, but the successive defeats ahead made him panic. Lin Biao, Xun Huaizhou, and Luo Binghui's Red 1st, 7th, and 9th Army Corps fought against the enemy's Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo 2nd Route Army's six divisions in Jianning, Fujian Province for a week. They were unable to contend and lost Jianning City. Peng Dehuai's Red Army Corps fought against the four divisions of the enemy's Liu Heding Ninth Column and Yong'an lost, and Yong'an City fell. The Chen Jitang Department of the enemy's South Route Army occupied the Junmenling Fortress in Huichang. The fourth column of the enemy Li Yannian occupied Liancheng, Fujian. The Sixth Route Army of the enemy Xue Yue and Wu Qiwei occupied Longgang, Yongfeng, Jiangxi. In the Gaohunao and Wanniantingyi battles in August, Peng Dehuai, Dong Zhentang's Red Third and Fifth Army Corps seemed to have fought another "Guangchang Battle".The Red Army used rifles, machine guns, grenades and broadswords to block the attack of nearly 80,000 people from five divisions of the tenth and third columns of Tang Enbo and Fan Songfu.Under the indiscriminate bombardment of planes and cannons, the Red Army fought bloody battles with the enemy and defeated the enemy many times in group charges. Although thousands of enemies were killed, the Red Army also paid a heavy price, with 2,300 casualties, including six cadres. More than a hundred people.In the end, all positions south of Guangchang were lost. On October 6, Shicheng fell. On October 14, Xingguo County fell. Only small areas such as Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Ningdu, and Changting remained in the Central Soviet Area. Human and material resources were on the verge of exhaustion, and the situation of the Central Red Army was very critical. Breakthrough,—there is only one way left, and there is no delay.