Chapter 32 2. Bo Gu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai—the supreme "three-person group"

The secrecy of the "Great Transfer" plan is extremely strict.At first, only Bogu, Zhou Enlai and Li De mastered it. In May, Zhang Wentian and Xiang Ying, members of the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee, and Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang, leaders of the Military Commission, may have known about it. In August, members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Mao Zedong, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi and alternate members Deng Fa and Kai Feng found out.Li Weihan, who is the director of the Central Organization Bureau (Central Organization Director), disclosed it to him individually.

It was not until the beginning of September that they were disclosed to the heads of the main army regiments individually. After Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen finished fighting in Wenfang on September 3, they were ordered to return to Ruijin to stand by. Zhou Enlai, vice chairman of the Military Commission, came to talk to them. Nie Rongzhen recalled: "Comrade Zhou Enlai asked us to have a private conversation, explaining that the central government decided that the Red Army would make a strategic shift and asked us to prepare in secret, but at present we cannot disclose it to the public, nor have we explained the direction of the transfer."

The "three-person group" regards confidentiality work as extremely important. Li De recalled: The most important factor for a successful breakout is keeping secrets.Only by keeping secrets can the success of surprise operations be ensured, which is an indispensable prerequisite for victory.Therefore, the scope of communication about the breakout at that time was limited to members of the Politburo and the Revolutionary Military Council, and others.People, including political leading cadres and some senior cadres, only know the necessary measures that need to be implemented within their purview.However, since the beginning of September, the corps of the Central Red Army have gradually returned to the resting place. At the end of September and beginning of October, after the final decision was made, the regiments were transferred to their standby positions.At the same time, the corresponding communication was carried out to the main cadres, and the middle and grassroots cadres, whether civil affairs cadres or military cadres, did not know the above-mentioned political slogans and the statement about Chiang Kai-shek's attempted large-scale offensive until the end, a week before departure , they know what it means.

In the summer of 1934, in order to prepare for the main force of the Central Red Army to withdraw from the Soviet area and implement a strategic transfer, the Secretariat of the Central Committee decided to form a "three-person group" consisting of Bo Gu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai.Politically Bogu is the master, military is Li De the master, and Zhou Enlai is responsible for supervising the implementation of the military plan. This temporary organization is actually the highest authority that unifies and directs all affairs of the party, government, army, and people in the Soviet area.When the "Trio" meets, they don't need an interpreter.Bogu is proficient in Russian; Li De can speak German, English and Russian; Zhou Enlai is the most fluent in English, followed by French and Japanese.They speak Russian, German, English and Chinese and can talk freely.

Bogu is Qin Bangxian, a native of Wuxi, Jiangsu, who was born in a scholarly family. In 1921, he was admitted to Suzhou Provincial Second Industrial Technical School, where he became enthusiastic and active under the influence of the party's outstanding propagandists Yun Daiying and Xiao Chunu. In 1925, Bogu became one of the leaders of the Suzhou Student Federation.In the May 30th massacre in Shanghai, he was full of enthusiasm and said: "The country is about to perish, so I would rather be born as a Chinese than die as a Chinese ghost." At the denunciation meeting, Bo Gu gave a speech on stage, so emotional that he vomited blood on the spot. The audience was all moved.In the autumn of the same year, Bogu was admitted to Shanghai University.Here, he listened to lectures on Marxism by Qu Qiubai, Yun Daiying, Li Da and others.He studied hard and turned from a democrat to a Marxist.Soon, joined the Communist Party of China. In 1926, Bogu was arrested by warlords.After his release, he was sent to study in the Soviet Union.Since then, a huge turning point in Bogu's revolutionary career began.

Bogu has a great talent for reading.At Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, with his excellent grades, together with Wang Ming, he won the appreciation of the school leader Mif and was highly valued. In May 1930, he returned from the Soviet Union and successively served as the propaganda minister of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and secretary of the Central Bureau. In January 1931, with the support of Mif, the representative of the Communist International, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, he entered the leadership of the Party Central Committee together with Wang Ming.Gu Shunzhang rebelled, General Secretary Xiang Zhongfa was arrested, Wang Ming felt the danger and left Shanghai for Moscow, and Zhou Enlai had already decided to go to the Central Soviet Area.In this way, Bogu was pushed to the pinnacle of power of the Communist Party of China by abnormal historical giants hastily and accidentally, and served as the general secretary of the Party Central Committee.

In May 1945, at the "Seventh National Congress" of the party, Bogu described the situation when he ascended to the position of general secretary: After the destruction of the Shanghai Central Committee, I was appointed by the old Central Political Bureau to be the temporary head of the Central Committee.When I was appointed to this job, I did not feel that I could not lead the whole party. On the contrary, I carried quite a lot of baggage at that time: the hero who opposed Li Lisan was a burden; Li Lisan punished me, and the Fourth Plenary Session canceled my punishment. After doing a period of work, the resolution of the Communist Party International said that our work has made progress, which is another burden.It is said that my leadership team is okay, so can I not lead the party?

After becoming the temporary head of the central government, I developed my own bad qualities. I am supercilious, look down on anyone, don’t ask anyone for advice, and think that I am better than anyone. If anyone has the idea that Lao Tzu is the first, it is me. people.Developed self-willedness, unwillingness to criticize oneself, unwillingness to listen to criticism from others, and adopting an attitude of covering up mistakes for all mistakes.Also because of this, after the temporary central government arrived in the Soviet area, at this time I just pushed the form. "Please ask other comrades to take the responsibility!" The other comrades said, "You should do it." I am in favor of all the commanders who gave orders wrongly, and this line was wrong in all aspects during this period.I am the main person in charge of all kinds of evil results. There is no "one" here, but the main person in charge.

In the "Three-member Regiment", Li De holds the military command power.Reed has high prestige and power, and his specialty in military affairs is eloquence. He can quote Caesar, Tacitus, Napoleon, Frederick the Great, Clausewitz and Moltke as examples. A string of famous words.He never hesitates in deciding issues.According to people who are familiar with Li De, Li De did not only know about trench warfare and was only in favor of fighting positional warfare.However, Li De did stubbornly oppose Mao Zedong's guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, and indeed opposed the Red Army generals continuing or restoring Mao Zedong's adaptable combat system.

Bogu didn't understand military affairs and was completely superstitious about the expert on barricade warfare of the Comintern, so he handed over the command of the Red Army to a foreigner who couldn't speak Chinese.For a game of Chinese chess, a chess master was invited.Before Li De could figure out the relationship between the chariots, horses and cannons, he rushed into battle.It is not surprising that the "chess game" of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war was passive and defeated everywhere, and even failed in the end, which was irreversible. In the "three-person regiment", Zhou Enlai's scope of responsibility was limited to supervising the implementation of military plans.The political decision-making power is in the hands of Bo Gu, and the military decision-making power is in the hands of Li De. Zhou Enlai is actually only a "chief of the general staff."

Zhou Enlai was one of the proven leaders of the CCP.His life is inseparable from the difficult and tortuous course that the Chinese Communist Party went through in exploring and leading the Chinese revolution. It can be said to be a microcosm of this course, and the Second Civil Revolutionary War is the best embodiment of this point.The party's own immature characteristics during this period were also manifested in Zhou Enlai.As one of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he personally experienced three "Left" errors that occurred within the party. Zhou Enlai began to participate in the core leadership of the CPC Central Committee when Qu Qiubai's "Left" blind activism was formed, that is, after the enlarged meeting in November. Qu Qiubai's "Left" blind activism was the first of three "Left" mistakes made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the practice of guiding the Chinese revolution during the Second Civil Revolutionary War. At the critical moment, it occurred in the process of resolutely correcting and ending Chen Duxiu's right-leaning capitulationism, implementing the general policy of the Agrarian Revolution and armed resistance to the Kuomintang reactionaries.In this sense, it is an overcorrection of history, and it is a detour taken by the party while implementing correct strategic changes in order to save the Chinese revolution. At that time, Zhou Enlai did not participate in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Instead, he devoted himself to leading the Nanchang Uprising and fired the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries.On the eve of the enlarged meeting in November, he was ordered to attend the meeting, and was attacked by punitiveism at the meeting. The Nanchang Uprising Front Enemy Committee headed by him was warned and punished.It was only because Zhou Enlai's talent in the revolution, especially in leading the Nanchang Uprising, was recognized by the party that he was co-opted as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and began to participate in the core leadership work of the Central Committee. After the formation of "Left" blind activism, Zhou Enlai, who had participated in the core leadership of the CPC Central Committee, was responsible for it.The "Resolution on China's Status Quo and the Tasks of the Communist Party of China", which embodies the main thesis of "Left" blind activism, was unanimously passed at the enlarged meeting in November. As a participant of the meeting, Zhou Enlai raised his hand. "Left" leaning putschism was carried out everywhere as the guiding principle of the whole party after the enlarged meeting in November.This point can also be seen from the resolutions and circulars drafted by Zhou Enlai for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and instruction letters to some provincial party committees during this period.In terms of understanding some major issues of the Chinese revolution, Zhou Enlai was basically at the same level of understanding as the vast majority of people in the party. On the issue of the nature of the revolution, Zhou Enlai agreed with the slogan of "uninterrupted revolution" put forward by the enlarged meeting in November. In assessing the revolutionary situation, Zhou Enlai also accepted the term "constantly rising". If Zhou Enlai was unable to clarify abstract theoretical issues such as the nature of the revolution and the revolutionary situation for a while, then the "current general strategy" of staging national armed riots that has led to serious consequences in practice, especially some of them that have gone too far Zhou Enlai was aware of this practice from the very beginning, and he stopped and corrected it in actual work.When Zhou Enlai criticized the avant-garde tendency in the Communist Youth League, he pointed out: Most of the Youth League advocates experimentation and thinks failure is okay. This is also a desperate mistake. In the instruction letter to some provincial party committees drafted by Zhou Enlai for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he made a clear definition of riot, pointing out: "The term riot must be used when the mass struggle develops to the highest point, to overthrow the ruling class by armed means to seize In the sense of political power." "The mobilization of riots can only be produced in the continuous struggle of the workers and peasants, and the time of riots also depends on the environmental conditions, the degree of struggle, the revolutionary mood, and the strength of the organization." If "struggle Before they get up, the riots will be decided first, either they misunderstand the riots, or they are playing with the riots." It was the failure of the Guangzhou Uprising that prompted the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, including Zhou Enlai, to revise the policy of carrying out armed riots in the overall situation and began to implement changes.This change is prominently manifested in the treatment of the Wuhan riots.This is the result of deepening understanding in practice. At a meeting of the Politburo discussing the Hubei Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League's accusation against Luo Yinong and the Yangtze River Bureau for stopping the riots in Wuhan, Zhou Enlai criticized the Hubei Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League for recklessly staging riots regardless of subjective and objective conditions. Whether there is any opinion that there is no riot, it can be seen that their views on riots are not mature." Later, Zhou Enlai and others decided to stop the planned general riots at the New Year's Eve of the two lakes, and redeployed the riots in the two lakes. Zhou Enlai's understanding and suppression of "Left" putschism prepared the ideological foundation for our party to correct "Left" putschism later.This is the internal reason why the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was able to quickly accept the criticism of the Communist International after the "Resolution on the China Question" passed by the Executive Committee of the Communist International was conveyed to China, and basically ended the "Left" putschism. After the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, under the direct intervention of the Communist International, Wang Ming and others began to seize the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China under the banner of "opposing the Li San line" and "opposing conciliationism".Zhou Enlai, Qu Qiubai and others severely criticized this illegal organizational activity against the central government, and to the extent possible, resisted the Communist International's practice of supporting Wang Ming to come to power. On November 18, 1930, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee discussed the letter from the Communist International.Regarding the activities of Wang Ming and others, Zhou Enlai pointed out in particular: "Comrades who have already known the international letter must convene a meeting to ask them to do work from the standpoint of consolidating the party and helping the leadership of the central government. Going the way of splitting the party." Later, Zhou Enlai repeatedly named and criticized Wang Ming, Bogu and others for their illegal organizational activities against the central government and their mistakes in refusing to organize assignments at the Politburo meetings and central staff meetings, pointing out that they jointly wrote a letter to the central government, " The center does not recognize the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee", "the opposition to the third line has not been exposed", "they regard this as an urgent task, and they can simply give up the central task".Exposing many "left" views in the dispute with Li Lisan that Wang Ming used as capital, "is as wrong as Comrade Lisan." He emphasized: "Political opinions can be expressed, but they must not hinder work." Super-organized activities of comrades with small organizational tendencies". At the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on December 9, Zhou Enlai insisted on following the original organizational decision and asked Wang Ming to go to the Central Soviet Area to receive practical work training. However, the Li San line had seriously damaged the prestige of the central leadership, and Zhou Enlai's efforts had been unable to reverse the whole situation.What's more serious is that many comrades in the party who opposed the "Three Lines" out of anger were also involved in the wave of opposition to the Third Plenary Session set off by Wang Ming and others, and demanded the reorganization of the Central Committee. In order to eliminate the differences within the party, Zhou Enlai tried his best to persuade and explain everywhere, but it still didn't help. Moreover, many people's attacks were more and more focused on Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai, the hosts of the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee. The party is caught in an unprecedented crisis facing a severe split. Zhou Enlai saw this.In the face of all kinds of misunderstandings about him and the sewage poured on him in the inner-party struggle, he did not make any excuses, did not care about personal honor, disgrace or reputation, but endured the humiliation and tried his best to maintain the unity of the party.This mood, in his own words, is "to take care of the overall situation and to bear with each other for the party". It was under the dominance of this thought that during the period before and after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, he acted almost weakly, not only taking responsibility for the "conciliationist mistakes" made by the Third Plenary Session, but even for all kinds of malicious slander. Respond with patience and silence.He tried his best to persuade comrades in the party who have different opinions not to act impulsively, but to change their attitudes and unite under the leadership of the Central Committee to avoid splitting the party and help the party through this difficult period. After Mif, the representative of the Communist International, came to China in mid-December 1930, Zhou Enlai and Qu Qiubai proposed to withdraw from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Regarding the fact that the Comintern's support for Wang Ming's coming to power at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee meant that the party had fallen into a more harmful overall "Left" error, Zhou Enlai could not go beyond the limitations of historical conditions. This conclusion is drawn politically before the full consequences are fully exposed. This limitation in understanding, the constraints of the party's organizational principles, and the abnormal situation in party life constituted the basic reasons why Zhou Enlai accepted and implemented Wang Ming's "left" dogmatism after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee.It should be said that this kind of personal mistake is more of a tragedy caused by history to the entire party. Before the Chinese Communist Party has formed its own leader and a mature leadership core, it is unable to get rid of the over-reliance on the Communist International due to historical reasons. an inevitable consequence of a situation. It should be noted that Zhou Enlai was often passive and forced to implement the "Left" errors. , to resist and remedy in actual work as much as possible.This constituted a distinctive feature of Zhou Enlai during this period and even in his entire political career. Regarding the mistakes of Wang Ming's line, Zhou Enlai had a deeper understanding after entering the Central Soviet Area.He can also be called the "imperial envoy" from the Shanghai Central Committee. However, after Zhou Enlai became the supreme head of the Central Soviet Area—the Secretary of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, he did not carry out the anti-rightist struggle as he did in other places. Anti-counterfeiting expansion.for.Therefore, he was repeatedly reprimanded and criticized by the Shanghai Provisional Central Committee. In terms of military affairs, Zhou Enlai even agreed with Mao Zedong's set of military principles, and he often quarreled with the central government, so there was the Ningdu Conference, the brilliant victory of the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, and the opposition to the "two There was the suggestion of hitting people with fists, the opinion of supporting the 19th Route Army that contradicted Bogu and Li De, and a series of telegrams that disagreed with the method of positional warfare and fortress warfare and advocated mobile warfare... Because of this, Zhou Enlai was transferred back to Ruijin at the beginning of 1934, lost his military power, and was instead responsible for some technical organizational work. Because of this, the preparations for the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee and the convening of the "Second Soviet University" were not well known. The reason why Zhou Enlai was elected as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and secretary of the Secretariat at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee was that Zhou Enlai possessed organizational skills that no one could replace in the party.This point is just like the reason why Zhou Enlai was elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee was because of what Wang Ming said "for the convenience of practical work".This situation can also be seen from the internal division of labor in the "Three-member Regiment" established to prepare for the Long March: Bogu was in charge of politics, Li De was in charge of military affairs, and Zhou Enlai was responsible for supervising the implementation of the military plan. Since the establishment of the "three-person regiment", the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission have practically no decision-making power on major political and military issues.From this time until the Long March, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission never met again. Members of the Central Political Bureau and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission were excluded, and everything was decided by the "three-person group". The "Great Transfer", such a major issue, can only be finalized by the "three-person group". The "three-person group" only held two meetings, one in Li De's "independent house" and one in the Central Bureau's resident.At that time, it was decided that the main force would march westward, leaving Xiang Ying and others to form the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, leading the Red Army with 16,000 people, and staying in the central base to persist in the struggle.When researching the list of retained personnel, military cadres solicited Zhou Enlai's opinion, and other parties only told him a number. Li Weihan recalled: All the preparations for the Long March, regardless of central, local, military, or non-military, were carried out in secret. Only a few leaders knew about it. I only knew about individual links, and the masses generally did not know about it. .Although I was the director of the Central Organization Bureau at the time, I didn't know the specific plan for the transfer of the Red Army at all.They did not tell me about the military situation of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression".As far as I know, before the Long March, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee did not discuss this major strategic issue related to the success or failure of the revolution. Between July and August of 1934, Bogu called me and pointed to the map and told me that the Central Red Army was about to move to Hongjiang in western Hunan to establish a new base.You go to the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee and the Guangdong-Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee to convey this spirit, make the provincial Party committees prepare for the transfer, submit a list of the ones to be taken away and those left behind, and report to the Organization Bureau of the Central Committee.He also said that because of the establishment of a new Soviet area, a group of outstanding local cadres had to be selected and taken away, and the provincial party committee had to propose a list.After listening to Bogu's words, I knew that the Red Army was about to move.According to Bogu's instructions, I went to the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee and the Guangdong-Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee to convey the message.At that time, the secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee was Li Fuchun, and the secretary of the Guangdong-Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee was Liu Xiao. The reason why the Politburo "did not discuss" such an important issue as the "Great Transfer" was because the Secretariat had called to report to the Comintern after the meeting in May, but the Comintern had not responded for a long time. Nevertheless, Zhou Enlai started the initial preparations.