Chapter 31 1. At the secretariat meeting in May, Li De proposed the "big transfer" for the first time

Only a year after entering the Central Soviet Area, the "comrades who returned from Moscow" who dominated the Soviet Area began to divide from a "monolithic one". The first to separate from the Wang Ming Group were Zhang Wentian, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, secretary of the Secretariat, and chairman of the People's Committee of the Central Government, and Wang Jiaxiang, an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, vice chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and director of the General Political Department of the Red Army.

From January 15 to 18, 1934, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Party's Sixth Central Committee was held in Ruijin. At the meeting, Bo Gu made a report on "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks", Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) made a report on "The Chinese Soviet Movement and Its Tasks", and Chen Yun made a report on "Workers' Economic Struggle and Trade Union Work in the Kuomintang Areas" Report. It can be said that at this meeting, Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism errors developed to the apex.Bogut said in his report that the fifth struggle against "encirclement and suppression" was "a struggle for the complete victory of the Chinese revolution" and "a question of who will win between the Soviet road and the colonial road."The situation of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war was very serious, but Bogu did not face up to the reality and completely miscalculated the situation.

The meeting decided that Bogu would take overall responsibility for the central government.People are used to call it the general secretary.At the same time, the Secretariat of the Central Committee was established, and Bogu, Luo Fu, Zhou Enlai, and Xiang Ying were appointed as the secretaries of the Secretariat, becoming the highest power core of the CCP. In the central government, Zhang Wentian's status is second only to Bogu. Zhang Wentian, a native of Nanhui, Shanghai, also known as Luo Fu, joined the Communist Party of China in June 1925 and went to Moscow to study at Sun Yat-sen University in October. After graduation, he stayed at the school to teach and participated in the work of the Eastern Department of the Communist International.Zhang Wentian is a talented person.In Moscow, his outstanding achievements and talents were appreciated by the leaders of the Eastern Department of the Communist International and Sun Yat-sen University.After returning to China, Wang Ming quickly gained high regard and was appointed by Wang Ming to enter the temporary center.

In January 1933, when the Provisional Central Committee entered the Soviet area, Zhang Wentian and Bo Gu had disagreements. At that time, the Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army issued the "Declaration of Willingness to Fight Japan with All Armies of the Country under Three Conditions to Oppose Japanese Imperialism's Invasion of North China" on January 17, 1933. The "Declaration" called for: 1. Immediately stop attacking the Soviet area; 2. Immediately guarantee the democratic rights of the people (assembly, association, speech, strike, freedom of the press, etc.); 3. Immediately arm the people and create an armed volunteer army to defend China And strive for the independence, unity and territorial integrity of China.

The chairman of the central government is Mao Zedong, and the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council is Zhu De.The three conditions jointly issued by Zhu Mao, Zhang Wentian thinks are very good and correct.As the Central Propaganda Minister, he believed that the three conditions were both a propaganda slogan and a guideline for action; they were spoken to the soldiers at the bottom and the general public, and to the top officers of the Kuomintang. But Bo Gu disagreed.He told Zhang Wentian in the tone of the interim head of the Central Committee that the three conditions are just a propaganda slogan, only for the soldiers and the masses at the lower level, and it is not true and impossible for the upper-level KMT officers. He also claimed that the united front is just a matter of strategy.Zhang Wentian thinks that Bogu's views are a kind of opportunism.

After Zhang Wentian arrived in the Soviet area, he wrote some articles. His views on economic policy were very similar to those of Mao Zedong.Bogu was displeased after reading it, and wrote an article "On the Soviet Economic Policy" specifically for the central organ publication "Struggle". The point of view was completely transferred from the Soviet Union to refute Zhang Wentian. Regarding the strategy of the Fujian Incident and the 19th Route Army, Bo Gu seemed to have adopted a joking attitude and did not cooperate at all in military operations; Zhang Wentian advocated being cautious and actively cooperating in military affairs.

Although Bogu and Zhang Wentian began to part ways on a series of political principles, they were all "comrades who came back from Moscow" after all, and they were both key members of the interim central government "appointed" by Wang Ming. A dispute arose at a formal meeting. Zhang Wentian later expressed his mentality when getting along with Bogu: "I have never seen Bogu object to any issue of 'left'. On the contrary, his specialty is to misinterpret your opposition to 'left' as right I am usually afraid of him. I am afraid that he will find my "right" and attack me. Therefore, my anti-"left" is often timid. ', quickly turned around and said that he wanted to be anti-rightist. I reflect now that this is mainly because my thoughts have basically not changed, but the fact that his ultra-left attitude destroys the growth of all new ideas is beyond doubt. of."

In fact, Bo Gu started to push Zhang Wentian out a long time ago. After the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic was held immediately.In Bogu's view, party power and military power are very important, and the so-called political power is irrelevant. Those who sit on the "cold bench" are placed in the central government.Mao Zedong was stripped of his military power and given the title of chairman of the central government, which was actually emptied.Zhang Wentian became disobedient, and went to the central government to sit on the "cold bench".

In November 1931, when the "One Soviet Union Congress" was held, Mao Zedong could be said to have "monopolized" the regime: the chairman of the central government and the chairman of the Central People's Committee shouldered the two posts.Now the "Second Soviet Union", Mao Zedong's power has been divided.According to Bogu's opinion, the central government decided that Mao Zedong would continue to serve as the chairman of the central government, but the chairman of the People's Committee should be handed over to Zhang Wentian.The power of the chairman of the People's Committee is like that of the "Prime Minister", and he is in charge of 21 ministries, commissions, bureaus, etc., including foreign affairs, military affairs, labor, land, finance, and national economy.

Bogu's move can be described as "killing two birds with one stone": assigning Zhang Wentian as the chairman of the People's Committee can not only push Zhang Wentian out of the central government; at the same time, he can push Mao Zedong out of the central government. However, Bogu never imagined that Zhang Wentian was sent to work in the central government. Instead of having a "power struggle" conflict with Mao Zedong, on the contrary, Zhang Wentian completely sided with Mao Zedong.Later, he actually formed a "three-person group" with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang to sing against the "three-person group" of Bogu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai.

The central government is located in Shazhouba, Ruijin. As the chairman of the central government, Mao Zedong lived here for a long time.After Zhang Wentian took office, he moved from the resident of the central government to the resident of the central government, and lived next door to Mao Zedong. Before entering the Central Soviet Area, Zhang Wentian knew that there was a Mao Zedong who would lead troops to fight and expand the rural base from Jinggangshan to Ruijin.Constrained by historical limitations, Zhang Wentian is equally unlikely to transcend the barriers of the "city center" ideology. Like Li Lisan in the past and Wang Ming and Bogu now, he believes that Mao Zedong's old methods and old experience are striving for the first victory in one province and several provinces. When the climax is about to come, it is already outdated, unable to adapt to the new situation, incompatible with the party's offensive line, and is a manifestation of right opportunism. In the year after he entered the Central Soviet Area, Zhang Wentian did not have much direct contact with Mao Zedong at work, but he heard from many people that Mao Zedong was knowledgeable and experienced in all aspects.Although Bogu once said that Mao Zedong was difficult to deal with, Zhang Wentian believed that as long as he was a decent person, insisted on the truth, and was magnanimous, he would be able to get along well with Mao Zedong.When Zhang Wentian first came to the central government, he was called a "guest". Although Mao Zedong was five or six years older than him, he still visited him first. Zhang Wentian was very modest. When Mao Zedong came to see him, he said, "I'm new here and I don't know the situation. I have to learn more from you in government work." Mao Zedong called Zhang Wentian's pen name "Simei". Zhang Wentian felt very friendly and changed the name "Chairman Mao" to "Brother Run". After some friendly greetings, Mao Zedong turned the topic to government work and said: "I like to run around and learn about some situations, such as the production and living problems of the masses, the problem of salt, the problem of rice, the house The problem of clothing, the problem of having children. I think that if these problems among the masses are solved, they will definitely support us and regard the revolution as their own business.” After this conversation, Mao Zedong talked with Zhang Wentian several times, and gave him a detailed introduction to all aspects of the Soviet area.After Zhang Wentian listened carefully to Mao Zedong's several conversations, he found that Mao Zedong was a persuasive leader with extraordinary views on some issues, especially he was very familiar with the conditions in the base areas.These are not in the book.He thought to himself that Mao Zedong must have done a lot of specific and practical work in the base areas, otherwise, he would not have mastered so many materials, so he developed a good impression of Mao Zedong. Because Mao Zedong was in a position of being excluded and sitting on the bench, some leaders in the central government discriminated against him and looked sideways at him.Luo Fu was different. Because of his work contact and the two of them tended to agree on some issues, he did not think that Mao Zedong was wrong in everything. On the contrary, he believed that Mao Zedong had some opinions that were superior to others.Therefore, when the People's Committee meets, Mao Zedong is often invited to participate and guide, and Mao Zedong's opinions are respected.For example, the economic work in the base areas was originally in charge of the People's Committee. When someone asked him for instructions, he also instructed that Mao Zedong should also be asked for instructions, because Mao Zedong had been in charge of this work in the past and was very experienced. Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong worked together in the government for a period of time. Through mutual contact, they achieved mutual understanding. Some views and practices gradually approached, and they did not completely follow Bogu's intention. Since the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, as a "civilian official", Zhang Wentian has never been to the front line. He has learned about the battle ahead from telegrams, battle reports, and meetings.The cruel and fierce war made Zhang Wentian, a scholar, have to be interested in military issues.During the days of getting along with Mao Zedong, he accepted a lot of Mao Zedong's military thinking. In Mao Zedong's humble house, there were no tomes of theoretical works of the Soviet Military Academy; Mao Zedong talked about military affairs and war, unlike Li De, who talked about Caesar in ancient Rome and Napoleon in France.Mao Zedong's bedside, it is easy to touch a copy of "Water Margin", "Three Kingdoms" or "Sun Tzu's Art of War".Mao Zedong could tell the story of "surrounding Wei and saving Zhao" vividly, and he could blurt out: "Soldiers are deceitful." And work on it." "Attack the unpreparedness, catch the unawares."  … At the meeting of the Central Secretariat held in May 1934, the contradictions among the "comrades who returned from Moscow" finally broke out.Zhang Wentian publicly accused Bo Gu and Li De of personally commanding the Guangchang Campaign as desperateism. Since this secretariat meeting was mainly to summarize the Guangchang Campaign, Li De attended the meeting as a military adviser and planner of the Guangchang Campaign.When recalling this first public confrontation, he wrote: Luo Fu has no military experience, but he is more familiar with military works; he blindly accepts Mao’s arguments, but his expressive ability is better than Mao’s, so it is easy to gain an audience , in particular, he avoided the nationalist tone that Mao always carried in his speeches.There was a fierce conflict between Luo Fu and Bogu because of the Battle of Guangchang.Luo Fu said that under the conditions of unfavorable terrain conditions and the ratio of troops, there should be no combat at all.Bogu retorted, saying that Lov had adopted the attitude Plekhanov adopted towards Lenin after the Moscow uprising in 1905, when Plekhanov had a typical Menshevik saying: "People should never take up arms." Remind Luo Fu that the resolution on the Battle of Guangchang was unanimously passed by the Politburo and the Military Commission, and Luo Fu and Mao also agreed. Faced with the unexpected dispute between Bo and Luo, Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying and others did not express their opinions. In this meeting, Bogu and Zhang Wentian were arguing endlessly with each other, without giving in, and ended a scene where they parted on bad terms. But Bogu's trust in Li De has not diminished in the slightest. Shortly after this secretariat meeting, Li De was entrusted by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to formulate a three-month quarterly plan for military measures and combat operations from May to July 1934. This plan required: the main force to be ready to break through the blockade; independent troops to fight deep behind enemy lines; partly give up direct resistance on the front line in order to facilitate more flexible operations in the Soviet area. This plan also includes: food reserves, winter clothing, new arsenals, strengthening armed mobilization and reorganization of troops, etc.Finally, a strategic and tactical directive was drafted, which was communicated to the military's senior leaders over the summer. In the military plan from May to July, the "Great Transfer" has been proposed, which is the initial intention of the Long March. The issue of the "Great Transfer" was discussed at the second secretariat meeting in late May.The meeting approved the military plan from May to July, and at the same time decided to withdraw the main force of the Red Army from the Central Soviet Area and seek outside operations.In Li De's own words: "It is meaningless to seek a decisive battle in the Soviet area at this moment." At the beginning of the decisive battle, Li De and Bo Gu completely rejected Mao Zedong's guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare, and put forward the so-called new military principles, that is, fighting fortress warfare, positional warfare, and short assaults, in an attempt to "defend the enemy from outside the country." It has only been half a year since then. The Red Army was retreating steadily, and the Soviet area was shrinking day by day. The rhetoric at the beginning seemed like a dream come true. However, Bo Gu and Li De did not sum up experience and lessons from a series of failures and find out the reasons subjectively. On the contrary, they believed that the main reason for the failures was that the enemy was too powerful and the material conditions in the Soviet area were not good.But the facts are: From the perspective of the comparison of forces, in the first anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, the enemy had 100,000 troops and the Red Army had less than 40,000, and the enemy's strength was 2.5:1; Still less than 40,000, the ratio was 6:1; the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign had 300,000 enemy troops and more than 30,000 Red Army troops, and the ratio was 10:1; More than 40,000; it was 8:1; in the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", there were 500,000 enemy troops and more than 40,000 Red Army troops (not counting local armed forces), which was also 10:1. The Nineteenth Route Army fought against Chiang in Fujian, and the Guangdong warlord Chen Jitang declared freedom of movement and threatened Chiang.During the first to fourth campaigns against "encirclement and suppression", there were no such favorable conditions. Under the slogan of all for the victory of the front line, the central government led the rear to do everything possible to support the front line and the Red Army, basically guaranteeing the supply of materials, food and soldiers at the front. It can be seen from this that Li De and Bogu's excuses for themselves are difficult to justify, and the real reason for the failure of the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" is self-evident. At the meeting of the secretariat in late May, the "big transfer" proposed by Li De was not as far away as "25,000 miles" later. It was just an attempt to join the 2nd and 6th armies in western Hunan due to the failure of the internal battle, and to seek for a place without fortresses. It's just outside battles. In fact, Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai and others proposed to seek outside-line operations in areas without fortresses as early as the beginning of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression".Back and forth, more than once, but they were all rejected by Bogu.