Chapter 34 4. "Great transfer"?an ambiguous directive from stalin

The "Great Transfer" was no small matter. Although a decision was made at the secretariat meeting in May, it could not be finalized. It required the consent of the Comintern and Stalin's nod.This is organizational discipline and practice.Since the "Second National Congress" of the Communist Party of China made a decision to join the Communist International in 1922, and the Communist Party of China became a branch of the Communist International, all important issues and major decisions must be reported to the Communist International. After the secretariat meeting in May made the decision to withdraw the main force of the Red Army from the Central Soviet Area, it requested a report from the Communist International through the Shanghai Bureau of the Communist Party of China.

The Communist International did not respond quickly to Ruijin's urgent problem, and did not reply for a long time. Li De and Bogu did not dare to rashly carry out the "big transfer" plan without receiving instructions from Moscow.Because of this, when Li De formulated the Red Army's three-month battle plan for May, June, and July, he did not take the issue of "big transfer" into consideration at all. Strategically, he still divided his troops into six routes, trying to "defend the enemy from outside the country's gates." "; the tactics are still "short assaults", fighting "positional warfare" and "fortress warfare"; the slogans put forward are "use all forces to continue to defend the central area to achieve a big victory in the campaign", "develop guerrilla warfare, strengthen auxiliary Direction of activities to seek changes in the strategic situation."

A month later, on June 25, an ambiguous telegram came from Moscow.The Communist International believes that the mobilization of new armed forces has not dried up in the central region; the resistance of the various units of the Red Army and the rear environment are not enough to make us panic.Even when it comes to the withdrawal of the main Red Army in the Soviet area, the only thing is to preserve the living strength and avoid possible blows from the enemy. When discussing the resolutions of the 13th Plenary Session of the International Party and the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, regarding the future of the struggle, the current international situation and the flexible tactics of the Red Army, the first is to preserve the living strength and consolidate and expand itself under the new conditions. Waiting for a broad offensive against imperialism and the Kuomintang.

This telegram actually contains two meanings: you can go, or you don't. This ambiguous instruction caused Bogu and Li De to make mistakes in decision-making.In the 8, 9, and 10-month combat plans, on the one hand, preparations for the "big transfer" were made, but on the other hand, it was still contrary to the strategic policy that should be adopted at that time, and it was proposed to "continue to defend China with all strength." Area", ordered the Red Army to continue to divide troops to guard the pass, and fight the enemy for consumption. Due to the wrong decision-making by Bo Gu and Li De, the Red Army lost several months of opportunity.

Bo Gu and Li De did not make a decisive decision based on the actual situation and seized the opportunity to break out of the encirclement, but were too rigid in the instructions of the Communist International.Therefore, when the Shanghai Bureau of the CCP was destroyed by the Kuomintang secret service in September 1934, and the CCP completely lost the telecommunications connection with Moscow, it immediately appeared disoriented, panicked, and hastily implemented a "big transfer". The Communist International played a positive role in promoting the Chinese revolution, and the Chinese Communist Party was established with the help of the Communist International and the Soviet Party.Because of this, the immature Chinese Communist Party is too superstitious about the Comintern and Stalin, and dogmatically treats the experience of the Soviet Union and the instructions of the Comintern.This is exactly where the tragedy of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese revolution lies.The mistakes in decision-making caused by the remote control command in Moscow, tens of thousands of miles away, taught the Chinese Communists an extremely painful lesson.

In this regard, among the "group of three", Zhou Enlai's emotion can be described as the deepest. Zhou Enlai will not forget the Zhongshan ship incident in March 1926.If the Soviet delegation and the advisers of the Communist International were not so weak at that time and advocated concessions, and adopted Zhang Tailei, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and others' insistence on using force to deal with Chiang Kai-shek, perhaps, that period of history would have to be rewritten, and there might not be a prosperous future. Chiang Kai-shek. In March 1926, the Soviet mission headed by Bubnov arrived in Guangzhou to inspect and guide the Guangdong Revolutionary Movement.

Bruce enjoys a high reputation in the Soviet Union. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, director of the General Political Department of the Soviet Red Army, and a member of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.He was a member of the Group of Five that led to the armed uprising of the October Revolution and the capture of the Winter Palace. During the Soviet Civil War, he led the Red Army to many victories as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council.While in China, he assumed the pseudonym Ivanovsky.There were more than ten members of the mission, including Kubiak, Secretary of the Far East of the CPSU, Lepse, Chairman of the Central Council of All-Soviet Trade Unions, Longva, Commander of the Soviet Red Army, Yegorov, the Soviet military attache in China, and his colleagues. Assistant Trifonov et al.

In Guangzhou, Zhang Tailei said to Bubnov: "The rightists are now ready to take action. Not long ago they tried to create a split between the Fourth Army and the First Army. The current situation is similar to that on the eve of the murder of Liao Zhongkai. Everywhere It's all rumors and leaflets." But Zhang Tailei's warning did not arouse the attention and vigilance of the Soviet mission and Soviet advisers. A few days later, Chiang Kai-shek created the "Zhongshan Ship Incident". On March 18, Chiang Kai-shek instructed his minions to convey an order to Li Zhilong, acting director of the Navy Bureau and director of the Political Department, in the name of the provincial office of the Whampoa Military Academy, ordering Li Zhilong to transfer the Zhongshan ship to Huangpu for standby.

However, after the Zhongshan ship arrived in Huangpu, Chiang Kai-shek categorically denied that he had dispatched the order, and instructed his party members to spread rumors that the Zhongshan ship was acting without authorization, and that the Communist Party was plotting riots, overthrowing the Nationalist government, and establishing a worker-peasant regime. On March 20, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the army, declared martial law, cut off the traffic inside and outside Guangzhou, searched the Zhongshan ship, surrounded the residences of the Provincial and Hong Kong Strike Committee and the Soviet Advisory Group, arrested Li Zhilong and many others, and detained the Whampoa Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Committee. Communists in the First Army.This was a conspiracy created by Chiang Kai-shek and other Kuomintang New Rightists who opposed the Communist Party and competed with the proletariat for leadership. It was an important step in Chiang Kai-shek's conspiracy to seize the supreme leadership of the Kuomintang and the National Revolutionary Army.

After the Zhongshan ship incident, the Bubnov mission was placed under house arrest.Chiang Kai-shek sent troops to Dongshan to encircle the headquarters of the Advisory Group, and set up a guard post near the advisor's residence.An interpreter of the Soviet Advisory Group in China recalled: At that time, a group of soldiers stood in the small garden in front of the headquarters of the Advisory Group, and the disarmed guards stood dejectedly at the side, and one of the childish soldiers almost cried. Not only that, Chiang Kai-shek even posted a post in front of Bubnov's door, although Chiang knew that Bubnov held an important position in the Soviet Union.

After the incident, the Bubnov mission neither protested nor planned to fight back. At the same time, the Communists in Guangzhou took the opposite action from the Soviet mission. Zhou Enlai was then the director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy and the deputy party representative of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army.After the Zhongshan ship incident, he questioned Chiang Kai-shek.Chen Yannian and Nie Rongzhen, secretary of the Guangdong and Guangxi District Party Committee, held a meeting in the Guangdong District Party Committee and advocated a counterattack against Jiang. They believed that from the perspective of power balance, it was not good for Jiang and it was possible to counterattack and win.At Li Fuchun's home, Zhou Enlai also had discussions with Mao Zedong and others, and everyone advocated a counterattack. After this proposition was put forward, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet advisers did not adopt it, but advocated compromise and concessions, so that Chiang Kai-shek's military position was further consolidated. On the morning of March 22, the Soviet Consulate in Guangzhou sent someone to meet Chiang Kai-shek and asked Chiang Kai-shek whether this was a question about people or Russia?Jiang cunningly replied: "Treat people not Russia." He hoped that Borodin would return quickly. On the same day, the Central Political Committee of the Kuomintang held a meeting. Chiang Kai-shek proposed to replace the head of the Soviet military advisory group Kisanka and advisers Rogachev and Razgon, and asked Galen to return to his post. Faced with Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary behavior of creating the Zhongshan ship incident and the unreasonable request to replace the Soviet adviser, Bubnov repeatedly compromised and retreated, and even defended Chiang Kai-shek's Zhongshan ship incident. Bubnov admitted on the one hand: "The Guangzhou incident on the 20th, the Whampoa army surrounded the strike union and the Russian residence in Dongshan in a short period of time, and arrested Li Zhilong and more than 50 other people are all incidents." On the other hand, he said: " But there are only these facts, Zhou Enlai and Deng Zhongxia have not been arrested, they are still in Guangzhou, and there is no murder." In his view, Chiang Kai-shek did not seem to have any malicious intentions, but Sun Wenism learned to constantly sow discord and create troubles.He said: "Chiang Kai-shek said: His move this time is only to prevent the occurrence of rebellion, and he himself is not anti-Russian or anti-communist." Borodin was not in Canton when the incident happened.After the incident, Bao left Beijing, detoured Zhangjiakou, Ulaanbaatar, and Vladivostok, and arrived in Guangzhou on April 29 by sea. As soon as Borodin arrived in Guangzhou, he held talks with Chiang Kai-shek based on the advice provided by Bubnov, and implemented a policy of compromise and concessions without principle. Until October 1927, Borodin still firmly believed: "It would be a big mistake to split with the centrists of the Kuomintang at that time." "If the Chinese Communist Party does not make concessions, it means the termination of cooperation with the Kuomintang, and the power of the revolution will be limited to one province." Through the Zhongshan ship incident, Chiang Kai-shek not only attacked the Communist Party, but also attacked the revolutionary leftists who adhered to Sun Yat-sen's three major policies, and forced away Wang Jingwei, the chairman of the National Government who had conflicts with him, thus controlling Guangdong. The mistakes made by the Soviet delegation brought disaster to the Chinese revolution. Zhou Enlai also remembered that at the end of July 1927, at the critical moment when the Nanchang Uprising broke out, Stalin sent another telegram. Zhang Guotao, the representative of the Central Committee who went to Nanchang from Hankou to prevent Zhou Enlai from holding the Nanchang Uprising under the order of the Communist International, recalled: Because of the mobilization of Rominaz, the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China held a secret meeting in a house in Hankou at 4 pm on the 26th. .Attending the meeting were two members of the Central Standing Committee, Qu Qiubai and I, two members of the Central Committee Li Weihan and Zhang Tailei, Rominaz and another international representative of the Communist Party of China, Russian advisers Galen and Fan Ke, and two translators. In his speech, Rominaz first said that there is currently no funds available for the Nanchang riots, and that Moscow has sent a telegram prohibiting Russian advisers from participating in the Nanchang riots under any circumstances.In addition to these two unsatisfactory things, he further reported the reply of the Communist International, which said: If this riot has no hope of success, it is best not to start it, and all the Communists in Zhang Fakui's department can withdraw and send them to the peasants . Rominaz, the practical lad, also learned some bureaucratic tricks.He said: "It seems that these two incidents and the international telegram cannot be notified to the comrades at the front by letters. We have to send a competent comrade to inform them in person." He looked at me and asked if he could send me there. I saw the situation clearly, and immediately replied: "Since this task is to deliver a letter, there is no need to send me there." After hearing this, Rominaz seemed a little dejected and said: "This is indeed a telegram to stop the riot in Nanchang. It is a serious instruction. It was a telegram decided by Stalin himself, signed by Bukharin." Zhang Guotao rushed to Nanchang on the 30th with the order of the Communist International to prevent the uprising. That night, there was a very fierce quarrel in the front committee over whether to uprising. Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan, Tan Pingshan and others resolutely opposed the order of the Communist International and advocated an immediate uprising. Tan Pingshan said angrily: Bind Zhang Guotao, the "imperial envoy" who opposed the uprising. Zhou Enlai finally protested by resigning angrily, saying: "The task given to us by the international representative and the central government is to ask me to preside over this operation. Now the order given to you is the same. I can't be responsible. I will return to Hankou immediately to report to the central government." Thanks to Zhou Enlai and all members of the former committee, the Nanchang Uprising was not stopped and finally broke out at 2 am on August 1. A gunshot from the city of Nanchang announced the birth of a communist army and sent a signal that the communists were armed to resist Chiang Kai-shek's mutiny and revolution! The success of the Nanchang Uprising was completely beyond the expectations of the Comintern and Stalin, and they lost face because of it. Zhang Guotao later wrote: In the circle of the Communist Party, no one can say that the Nanchang riot should not be held, let alone mention what has been prevented.Both the Comintern and its agents felt that it was disrespectful to stop the Nanchang riots, and if it was publicized among the various branches of the Comintern, it would cause a lot of controversy.So they don't want to bring it up again. Zhou Enlai defied the "imperial decree" and resolutely did something completely contrary to the wishes of the Communist International and Stalin.Together with the Nanchang Uprising, his famous name has been recorded in the glorious history... Today, seven years later, the "625 Directive" issued by the Comintern is exactly the same as the "Directive" issued on the eve of the Nanchang Uprising, which put the CCP leaders in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province in a dilemma.However, the tragedy of history always has a curtain call. The "625 Directive" also became the last directive of the Communist International received by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China dominated by dogmatists.The communication between the CCP and the Communist International was interrupted, and it was not restored until 1936.But at that time, the decision-making power of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was no longer in the hands of Wang Ming and Bo Gu, and the fate of the Chinese revolution was in the hands of Mao Zedong, a Marxist representing China.