Chapter 70 Section 2 Conservative Foreign Policy Principles

Bismarck once said that to carry out foreign policy while paying attention to political principles was like holding a twelve-foot pole in his teeth as he walked through a dense forest.This view is supported by some Conservative ideologues who demand that we formulate foreign policy with only the national interest in mind.In fact, the logic of their approach obviously does not stand up to scrutiny.How do we recognize our vital interests?Once recognized, how can we best pursue these benefits?Do they include freedom and democracy in other countries?How do you convince your own citizens or other governments to walk with you on your chosen path?To what extent is an organization of the international order also in the specific interests of states?If so, how much should we sacrifice for it?These questions, and others like them, cannot be answered without reference to certain principles.

In my opinion, the Conservative Party's approach to international affairs should be based on five principles.These principles can be used to varying degrees and in different combinations to meet the challenges we face. The first of these principles is that collective security can be maintained only if it is guaranteed by a great power or by a durable alliance strong enough to thwart the challenges of other great powers.In today's world, this means that the United States must maintain its unique superpower status.This cannot be done without a cost, but US taxpayers cannot be expected to bear that cost alone.Also, it will not be without friction, which Russia and, in due course, China, India, Japan, Brazil, etc., who will become great powers in the future - not to mention highly sensitive Europeans - will resent.But for the sake of peace and stability, this choice has the least harm.

The United States alone cannot sustain this status for long while other countries emerge more as world powers.But this fact does not negate the above argument, although it does modify it.First, there is the time interval.The most economically advanced country does not automatically have a military advantage, especially as it is now, where military technology—in which the U.S. outperforms other countries—is the key, not simply how many resources are devoted to defense.In any case, it is important not to underestimate the economic potential of the United States, as the vast free trade area that includes not only North America but also South America opens up prospects for this potential.

And, if America's burden of world leadership is to continue into the 22nd century, it will need reliable allies—those willing to share, and fully share, the burden.Exactly how this can be done—how to properly share investments in NATO, especially in activities outside NATO confines, and how to use AFTA economically to strengthen its foundations—may be a question of our future The most important topic to be discussed in 10 years.But no matter what form of public institution it takes to share that burden, or how it is shared in the United States and Europe, leading the world will still carry onerous obligations.However, they will also be compensated, especially in the fact that international arrangements and decisions made by global institutions will tend to reflect the interests of the United States and, by extension, the interests of the West.Indeed, democratic voters, especially in the United States, will not be prepared to pay the price unless this is the case.

My second principle is that, when it comes to foreign policy, we should recognize the value of regional balance of power.This is an important qualification related to the first principle of US global role.Preserving the regional balance of power will help reduce the number of interventions that need to be led by the United States.When a country aligns with others for its own benefit to counter and contain a would-be dominant power, a generally beneficial balance of power is created, reducing the temptation for the region's most powerful country to do bad things possibility.Of course, British policy for many years has been to promote this balance of power within Europe.As I have made clear, this still makes sense when a major, unstated policy goal should be to contain German power.

U.S. policy makers generally disagree with the principle of balance of power, partly because the United States itself possesses overwhelming power, and partly because idealism and ideas seem to matter so much that Wilson's adherents see the balance of power as an inability to distinguish right from wrong. .The more common opinion is that the fraudulent race for dominance led to a series of wars, beginning with World War I.A powerful contemporary argument is that in a world where the possession of nuclear weapons makes it unacceptable to have any risk of war, people cannot afford the tensions that balance-of-power operations would create.

These arguments are not without value.But the State Department's approach to world politics for almost fifty years has been to blend the principles of Woodrow Wilson with the realities of regional balances of power, from the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent.Second, this limits competition between states as long as there is one major superpower that can determine the outcome of regional disputes, if need be.The United States is more powerful than any other country in terms of nuclear weapons, which increases its ability to limit these competitions.Only in this case is the balance of power always a force.

As evidence can be presented, in the presence of a very strong United States, the most important areas where the balance of power helps to solve future problems are Asia and the Far East.The hysterical talk that Japan poses a "threat" to the US and European economies fails to take two points into account.We are especially fortunate that for historical reasons, and because Japan is protected by the US nuclear umbrella, it does not want to become a military and economic superpower.There are three major powers in the Asia-Pacific region that have or are about to possess nuclear weapons, namely China, Russia and India.

The exact size and growth rate of China's economy is disputed.But people know that China's potential is enormous, that the industrious Chinese people (and, more broadly, those living abroad) are using it more effectively than ever before, and that China is building up its own defense, while We are weakening our defenses. Russia is preoccupied with its domestic economic and political problems, but it will still strive to remain a Pacific power.Given its nuclear weapons and rich mineral resources, this bear cannot be ruled out.It has spats with China over borders and resources, factors that may still be destabilizing to this day.

India is quite big, and as long as current policies and trends continue, in due course it will become very rich and a significant regional power.This is something the West should welcome and encourage.For example, if there is a sense that the UN Security Council should be enlarged - and there are many arguments for it to continue as it is - India is a strong candidate.Despite its religious and ethnic issues, India is a democracy with established rule of law.In the old paradigm dictated by the Cold War, India was influenced by the Soviet Union.Now, we must not lose sight of what will be the easiest Asian power to deal with.

Therefore, there will be a balance of power between the three nuclear powers and an American protectorate in the Asia-Pacific region. If any one of these countries tries to expand its territory or sphere of influence, it may be opposed by other countries.In addition to providing nuclear security to Japan, the United States can also throw its nuclear and conventional forces at the other end of the scale should any of the major powers in the region appear to be tipping the scales.The United States has become accustomed to taking similar, balancing-of-power actions for smaller Asian states such as South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.This suggests to some of the larger countries that they should not take the risk of bringing the US into their conflict.That adds to why a favorable outcome must now be reached in the U.S.-North Korea dispute over its nuclear program.