Chapter 71 Section 3 Nation, nation-state and nationalism

The third principle is that nationhood, nation-state and nationalism are the best basis for maintaining a stable international system.On the surface, this is a contradiction in terms.Didn't nationalism break the peace in Europe in both world wars?In fact, the answer is "no" in the most important sense.The instability of multi-ethnic empires was the backdrop for World War I, while secular beliefs like Nazism, which crossed ethnic lines, were at the root of World War II.In both wars, only strong, nation-states were able to resist and defeat aggression. But, in any case, it is unreasonable to think that a world without nations - and therefore without national loyalties, frictions and institutions - is desirable, since such a world is clearly unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future. world.Politics, as Conservatives have learned, is about making the most of the world as it exists, rather than dreaming up unrealistic blueprints for the impossible.True, alien-hating prejudice can lead to concentration camps, torture and ethnic cleansing.But such evils are generally the result of repressed and distorted nationalism, and there is no reason why we should not be proud of our country.If other people are proud of their country why should we be against it.The Mafia is based on the family institution, but that doesn't mean the family is a harmful institution.

Of course, for Conservatives, the nation (like the family) also has deep and positive social values.The traditions and symbolism surrounding it can encourage individuals with conflicting interests to cooperate with each other and sacrifice for the common good.Nationality provides us with the most important psychological support against disorienting storms—a quality that gives meaning to our continued existence.A man who belittles his nationality is thus like a man who has abandoned his family background, or (as G. K. Chesterton famously said) a man who has abandoned his religion.Such a person is a potential danger to society, for he is an easy prey to every immature thought or strong emotion that comes his way.

It is true that some nationalisms are unpleasant, even dangerous, because some peoples have committed historical crimes.It was doubtful, even then, whether a nation which had consciously abandoned its own past was a more reliable neighbor than one which was always thinking of its past.A more mature answer is to discover those noble events and themes in a nation's history, so as to build a more decent and open sense of nation on this basis.Otherwise, only those irrational revolutionaries should shoulder the national cause. Artificial states accommodate different peoples with different languages ​​and traditions, and even they try to glorify the strength of nationality reluctantly by forming a national identity.Such attempts were made in the USSR and Yugoslavia.Now the European Union is trying to do the same.Ambitious undertakings of this kind are unfeasible, and generally go bankrupt in the heat of emotion and mutual animosity.But their artificiality encouraged theorists to extremes of theoretical chauvinism, alternating cruelty and absurdity, from Stalin's en masse exiles to the preaching of a European version of Dallas.

It is therefore a mistake to believe that efforts to piece together large, multi-ethnic and multicultural states by every possible means are conducive to stability.And diplomats are still trying to do that.Of course, it is quite possible for several distinct peoples to live in one country for various reasons—security, economic resources, geography, or lack of other options.Forming a liberal political and economic system is the best way to persuade them to do so, as the particularly decentralized power of Swiss institutions demonstrates.But in artificial states—whether based on an ideology (such as the Soviet Union) or on the basis of diplomatic convenience and fear of greedy neighbors (such as Yugoslavia)—it is likely to rely on the concentration of power and using the military to piece these countries together.But again, as the cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have shown, this only increases the national fanaticism and the desire for national independence of the various peoples.

Democracy is the political system most suitable for nation-states.If democracy is to be truly effective, it needs a common language, which nation-states can provide.Furthermore, once democracy is established in a multi-ethnic country, it increases the drive for national self-determination.This helps explain why most multinational countries are not democratic, or, if they are, why they are chronically plagued by linguistic and cultural disputes, such as Canada and Belgium.Likewise, free trade means that political boundaries need not be exactly the same as economic ones.Thus, we can combine political decentralization with economies of scale.As Adam Smith pointed out 200 years ago: "If all countries practiced the free system of free export and free import, the different countries divided into one continent have hitherto been like different provinces in one great empire. "

Two main specific arguments have been advanced against the nation-state as the basis of the international political system.The first is that the concept of "nation" has little or no meaning outside Europe because it is itself rooted in a long and particular European history and is a product of that history.This argument has some weight.For example, in the Middle or Far East or Africa, or even in North or South America, the understanding of nationality is obviously somewhat different from that in Europe.In some cases, religion, race, or multiculturalism" (as Sebir Huntington thought) all form and shape certain identities. Also, nations emerge slowly, as in India. They too disintegrate and perish.

However, in our time, there is a common feature on every continent, that is, when countries are artificially lumped together for diplomatic convenience, or when a people is divided into several countries according to ideology. , this practice of ignoring national characteristics has met with failure.In Europe, Yugoslavia was doomed, and even Czechoslovakia, where national tensions were not high, has now disintegrated peacefully.In Africa, the Central African Federation is composed of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.In grouping Sudan together, the ethnic and religious differences between the Arabs and Nubians who make up the majority in the north and the Nile Valley peoples and Bantus in the south are ignored.Nigeria is made up of three tribes, the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba.Every tribe is divided by disputes.In the Middle East, there have been attempts to create a united Arab state based on Arab nationalism, but it has always been unsuccessful because socialism, not Islam, is primarily at work.In the Far East, the division of Vietnam was ultimately unsustainable, and the same may well be true of North Korea.By contrast, on each continent, the states that best fit national identities—and thus were able to mobilize those identities—may prove to be the most successful.This is the case from Britain and France in Western Europe, to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in Central and Eastern Europe, to Egypt and Iran in the Middle East, and to Japan in the Far East.This is not to say that a sense of national identity necessarily guarantees peace, prosperity, and stability, but without it, the nation faces far more serious and possibly fatal difficulties.

The second, and perhaps the most frequently used, specific argument against the nation-state and nationalism as the basis of our international political system is the issue of minority rights.But in arguing for nation-states, I am not saying that it is possible or even advisable to guarantee that borders exactly coincide with ethnic dividing lines, and certainly not imply that minorities or other groups should migrate from one area to another area.Make the lives of politicians a little simpler.In a well-governed, wealthy country, where individual rights—if appropriate—and local self-government are respected, there is no reason for minorities to be oppressed or have destabilizing effects.International codes of conduct and institutions like the Council of Europe can ensure this.

Western politicians tend to believe that the experience of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union proves that nationalism is inherently dangerous.But closer inspection shows the opposite to be the case.The situation in Yugoslavia was not the rule but the exception.Hungary, for example, has learned to accept the loss of territory 70 years ago, except for a few ultranationalists, resulting in 2 million Hungarians living in Romania, 600,000 in Slovakia, 400,000 in Yugoslavia, and 200,000 in Ukraine.Understandably, Hungarians insist that their compatriots abroad should be treated fairly.However, they have a sufficiently mature democracy to understand that the principle of "all Hungarians in one country" can lead to disaster.

Likewise, while some in Russia would like to use for their own purposes the 25 million Russians living outside Russia in countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, so far this has been rhetoric rather than reality.While minorities in Russia do face some problems, most of them don't seem to feel that they are much threatened to destroy the countries they are now in.In fact, they also voted for independence from the Soviet Union in many cases. How much does the break-up of the Chechen Republic and the ensuing crisis call into question the principle of national identity as the firm foundation of a stable order?The Chechens certainly have good reasons for demanding self-determination; they are a people with their own language and religion, and have long fought for independence since being forced into the Russian Empire in the last century.Some argue that the West should ignore or even support the brutal military campaign against Chechnya in order to keep Russia as a whole, and that Yeltsin's image in the Kremlin has already been greatly damaged.It should not be up to us to decide what Russia will look like.In the end, some countries cannot be pieced together by force, and conditions must be created for national and regional ethnic minorities to make them willing to stay in these countries.When the West ignores incidents such as human rights abuses and violations of (CSCE) international treaties, we hurt rather than help Russia's democratic strength.As for the tired Russian entity, there are certainly no clean democratic solutions to some of the problems that afflict it.But its peoples are entitled to respect — even if some Chechens are accused of involvement in criminal activity.If Chechnya ultimately wants to go its own way, and Russia stands in the way of doing so, it will gain nothing for itself.

Of course, like Chechnya, the history of past struggles shapes the present.My point is not to say that all nationalisms are good, much less that they all make people feel safe.But the accusation of nationalism has been a lot, and some problems should be attributed to other aspects.Moreover, the history of various ultranationalisms is at least as intertwined with good and bad as the history of various nationalisms themselves, and their potential is far more dangerous.