Chapter 69 The bruised euphoria of the first episode

Compared with the affairs of the European Community, when I left office, the whole course of some events in foreign policy was going on at first very much as I hoped.Given the unforeseen precise course of the Gulf War that was being prepared for, the atmosphere seemed odd, even apathetic.But I believe that the actions taken are correct and necessary, and that the West, or as we like to call it from tactical considerations, the "international community," will defeat Saddam Hussein and reverse Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.In addition, the crisis has led to the re-establishment of that all-important "special relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom that I regard as my central role in dealing with the problem.

But of greater long-term importance was the end of the Cold War, or, more accurately but less tactically, he said, the defeat of Soviet communism in that massive war.Indeed, without this ending, the Gulf incident would not have been able to proceed relatively smoothly.My resistance to German unification was unsuccessful.But developments led to the solidarity victory of Solidarity in the Polish elections of June 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of that year, the overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania in December, the same month Wenceslas Havel's election as president of a free Czechoslovakia, non-Communist victory in the Hungarian elections in April 1990 - I see these as what Ronald Reagan and I insisted on throughout the 1980s The practical, well-received results of the policy.I have no doubt that there is enough momentum to keep things going, at least for now.It is not yet clear where he says Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will go.I am well aware of the complex history of these areas, and thus understand that there will certainly be ethnic disputes and possible demands to change borders.We thought, at least as a result of the Helsinki process, that a revived Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could provide a useful diplomatic framework for resolving disputes.However, subsequent events have disappointed us.

I saw firsthand in Ukraine how strong the wave of nationalism against the former Soviet Union was.As I said to Jacques at the beginning of the last Council of Europe I attended.What Delors said, I think it is not for Western Europeans to have an opinion on the future model of the Soviet Union or its successor, but to make a democratic choice about them by the people concerned.I don't believe we can know the future, let alone have the confidence to shape it, but that doesn't make me any less satisfied with the changes that are taking place.Countless subjects of the Soviet Empire and its dependent states, once deprived of basic rights, now live in a free and democratic state.These new democracies, once armed with nuclear weapons, abandoned their aggressive military alliances against the West.These are great achievements in terms of humanity and security.I have no nostalgia, then or since, for the diplomatically simpler but deadly Cold War era.

A weakened, capriciously reforming Soviet Union first needed to increasingly focus on its own massive internal problems, thus allowing conflicts elsewhere to be resolved.In Africa, the end of Soviet-backed subversion meant that South African reformers had a new opportunity to forge agreement on their country's future.In fact, whether in Africa or the Middle East, in Central and South America, in the Indian subcontinent or Indochina, the end of the Soviet Union's long-term strategy of global domination opened the way for progress.Repressed desire for political and economic freedom puts enormous pressure on corrupt, oppressive regimes that no longer have reason to want Moscow's support (or Washington's for that matter) lest they turn to the other side.

An old world order - a bipolar world divided by the Soviet Union and the West and their respective allies - is a thing of the past.But has a new world order been born?It can be seen that there were two very different views at the time.My own view on the issue is this: it is world peace under US power under the guise of UN resolutions.This will require strong U.S. leadership, the unwavering support of its allies, and a clear strategic thinking that distinguishes between genuine threats to Western interests and the international order and local disputes with limited consequences.I still believe that this cautious approach can create a durable international order with limited obligations.Unfortunately, it confuses the idea of ​​a more messianic and therefore less practical world order based on multinational institutions acting together independent of strategic self-interest.Of course, this is a more idealistic view, but, as Macaulay puts it, "an acre of land in Middlesex is worth a utopian duchy."

Even in the days after the Gulf War, when the euphoria about the possibility of a new world order was at its peak, I still felt uneasy myself.I suspect that some people place too much faith in the high profile of international declarations and pay too little attention to the measures to implement them.Oddly enough, in May 1991, when preparing for my first visit to South Africa, I began to read more deeply about the hapless League of Nations.One of the main architects of the League of Nations was South Africa's Jan Smuts.Some of the rhetoric then was as incredible as what I was hearing now.When the League of Nations failed to take action against the dictator and thus cleared the way for World War II, Smuts himself concluded: "Everybody's business ends up being nobody's business. Everyone looks to someone else to take the lead , while the aggressor is now doing bad things undetected." This conclusion strikes me as deeply as the kind of collective security on which some believe post-Cold War stability and freedom rest.

Of course, one could argue that things are different now.After all, Saddam Hussein did not "do something bad and go undetected", although he did "get away with it".But I think it's extremely important to understand why this is possible.Because, contrary to the League of Nations, the United States was convinced that it was destined to be an international superpower, and confident and well-armed countries such as Britain and France also acted to support it, and thus won the Gulf War.However, most commentators and politicians are prepared to draw the exact opposite inference, namely that the United Nations itself should become a supranational power, which should have the authority and financial resources to intervene at will; .If the UN's burning desire to be a world government is encouraged, it can only lead to chaos in the world.But in many ingenious ways, Western left-liberal views, with the naive cooperation of many Conservatives, have had great effect in turning the post-Cold War situation in their favour.

In September 1991 I made a speech in New York to the ambassadors to the United Nations, making it clear that I opposed these tendencies.I defend the "new nationalism" that is evident in the Soviet Union and among the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. True internationalism always includes cooperation among nations, that is what the term means.Thus, the name of the United Nations, embodying the highest aspirations of internationalism, reminds us of its true purpose.The starting point for all your considerations is the countries you represent.The purpose you tend to forget is that they should agree on some common goal.But unity of purpose—not unity—is the purpose.

In fact, as I spoke in New York, it was already apparent that the New World Order was not doing well.I am deeply concerned that the West has failed to see the dangers that have arisen in the former Yugoslavia.There, efforts by Slovenia and Croatia to gain freedom from the oppressive poverty of communism were challenged by armed forces.In my view, the right of peoples to self-determination and self-defense (indeed, more broadly, human rights) is central to any just international order, and at least as importantly, it is also central to any stable international order.Anyone who doubts the traditional value of stability in foreign policy should give him a one-way ticket to Mogadishu.But stability should not be used as an excuse to maintain a status quo that is inherently unstable because it suppresses social forces that ultimately cannot be contained.On the three occasions since I left office I have felt compelled to publicly intervene in diplomatic matters (besides Europe), and each time, perhaps significantly, I have felt that, both morally and practically, there should be a change of course.The first time was in April 1991, when some Kurdish women begged me to speak out and help save their compatriots who were bearing the brunt of Saddam Hussein's relentless assault.I was moved by their stories.Parliament was in adjournment at the time, and no ministers met them.I can now be glad that he said - no doubt by coincidence - that at least later action was taken to establish safe havens.

The second was a coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, and some Western leaders were apparently willing to "sit and see" whether the coup leader would succeed, without giving full moral support to those who gathered around Boris Yeltsin in Whitehall, Russia. Resistance, I'm horrified by it.So, as soon as I checked what was going on, I held a press conference outside my office on University Street and continued with a series of interviews. I said it was clear that what happened in Moscow was unconstitutional and that the Russian people should now accept the leadership of the democratically elected leading politician, Boris Yeltsin.In this new and dangerous situation, our own planned defense cuts must not continue now.But I caution against thinking the coup will succeed.The people of the Soviet Union have a greater feel for democracy now, and they will not want to lose it.They should defend democracy as the people of Central and Eastern Europe have done—take to the streets and let the world know what they think.

By the next morning, the situation had begun to become clear.Developments are confirming my optimism that the coup will not succeed.There were reports of large protest rallies in Leningrad and Moscow.I thought it would be worth a try to have a direct phone call with Mr. Gorbachev.He has stepped down for "health reasons", according to the coup leader.I was not much surprised when the Soviet ambassador told me that it was impossible to talk.I had assumed that telephone contact might have been cut off by the KGB—though at this point I quickly learned that I had overestimated the coup leader's capabilities.Later that day, Lord Bethel, a Conservative member of the European Parliament and a leading expert on Russia, contacted my office to say that he and Mrs. Salina Stara Voitova, Mrs. Yeltsin's adviser, were visiting London. together.I immediately asked them to come and brief me.I talked about how I couldn't get in touch with President Gorbachev.Then Madame Stara Vojtova asked if I would like to speak to Yeltsin.She rummaged through her handbag, then gave me his direct phone number for his office in Parliament House.I didn't get through the first couple of times, then to my surprise the call got through. Mr. Yeltsin and I talked for a while, with Lord Bethel as interpreter.Clearly, the outlook for a besieged Whitehall is grim, but Mr Yeltsin and his supporters are in high spirits.He asked me if I could chair a committee of doctors to investigate Mr Gorbachev's alleged ill health - much like a typical Soviet diplomatic malady.Of course, I agree.For the rest of the day, I worked with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Health to try to come up with an appropriate list of some prominent doctors.Fortunately, there was no need to do this, as the coup was rapidly unraveling by this time. According to US government "sources", the newspapers have duly condemned me for calling on the Russians to take to the streets to stop the coup and for our politicians to stop reducing Western armaments.But I am not sorry.Democracy must be won by struggle and, if necessary, sacrificed for democracy.Indeed, three brave young men died for democracy.Today, Russians still remember their sacrifice. However, the point of view where I disagree most with Western foreign policy establishments is on Bosnia.It seems sad to me that, like others who are tirelessly willing to follow developments - I often get briefings from British experts and others in the region - I see that Serbia is fighting for the invasion of Bosnia preparations for war.The Western reaction to the earlier invasion of Croatia was weak and unprincipled, thus making the war all but inevitable.In fact, it was with the acquiescence of the West that the Yugoslav army was able to withdraw its armored units from Croatia to Bosnia. In August 1992, while I was writing the first volume of my memoirs with my advisers in Switzerland, I learned that the Vice President of Bosnia, Aijap Garnik, wanted to see me.After sneaking out of Sarajevo, he desperately sought aid for Bosnia abroad. Due to the shortage of daily necessities in Sarajevo, I prepared a rich afternoon tea for our meeting.To my surprise, he refused to eat anything while he gave me a thorough introduction to the political and military situation.But when I went into the study to call the Foreign Office to arrange an interview for him, my colleague again asked him to eat.So he wolfed down several sandwiches.He later explained to them that since he had been in the bunker for months with nothing to eat, he thought it must be inelegant to eat in my presence. What he told me confirmed everything I had heard and read.So I made a decision at the time that I had a moral responsibility to act.I'm going to use my best initiative as much as I can, but I'm focusing on the US, as after many fruitless conversations with the Foreign Office I've lost all hope of the UK being able to listen to me hope.I have argued in the New York Times and on American TV that we are becoming accomplices if we do nothing.I am trying to awaken the conscience of the West.But I also touched on some exact examples. It has been argued that there is nothing the West can do unless we are prepared to risk a long-term embroilment in a Vietnam- or Lebanon-style conflict, in which case Western casualties could be high.This argument is part alarmist, part excuse for inaction.There is a big difference between launching an all-out offensive from land, as in Desert Storm, and stopping the arms embargo to Bosnia, supplying arms to the Bosnian army, and directly striking military targets and communications systems. Even if the West walks around and does nothing, we cannot expect others to do the same.This has become increasingly worrying in Turkey and the Muslim world.The massacre of more Muslims in Bosnia is not only appalling in its own right, but also threatens to widen the conflict. Serbia doesn't have the strong foreign backers that the USSR had in the past.It has been encouraged by the West's inaction so far.A clear statement by the West that it would not use force did the same, while a clear warning of military action would force Serbia to consider stopping its aggression.Serbia should be given an ultimatum to comply with certain Western demands: Suspension of economic support for Serbia's war against Bosnia, monitored by international observers on the Serbia-Bosnia border. Belgrade recognizes the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and renounces its territorial claims. Serbia and Bosnia guarantee access for humanitarian teams. Signing of the Bosnian Demilitarization Agreement within the framework of a broader agreement on the demilitarization of the entire region. Pledge to cooperate to bring refugees back to Bosnia. If these demands (which should have deadlines attached to them) are not met, military retaliation should be carried out, ranging from bombing bridges over the Drina River connecting Bosnia to Serbia, military convoys, artillery positions around Sarajevo and Gorazde, military Warehouses and other facilities useful in the war. It should also be stated that this is not a war against the Serbian people, even though facilities in Serbia that play an important role in the war may be attacked... Serbia will not obey these unless it is forced to do so.Only when their resistance is likely to fail will a more democratic and peace-loving leadership emerge.Sitting on the sidelines until the conflict drains everything is not only disgraceful, but also has a high cost: refugees, terrorism, getting other countries involved in the Balkan wars, and other, worse things. For a short time, this argument looked as if it would prevail.I believe there has been some reevaluation of strategy within the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon.The military and foreign policy establishments at the time were fully awake, but there were only a number of reasons why a massive ground force intervention (which I never suggested) was too risky, why an arms embargo on Bosnia had to be Going on (it does render the victim defenseless), and why air strikes won't work (maybe true for the matter, but if using air strikes as a means of supporting a well-armed Bosnian army would change the military balance of power, their claims are not true). Since the summer of 1992, some action has been taken in the direction I advocate, but too little is too late.Under absurd constraints, only limited air strikes were carried out, and all against the backdrop of protests against the reluctance of the UN and NATO to take further action.Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia was somewhat possible thanks to US pressure - but not until moderate Muslim leaders were forced to lean dangerously close to Islamic states like Iran without help from the West. The possibility arises.Especially in August 1992, Russia was not involved in this dispute, and now the Russian government has become an important player in this fatal gamble, and it is raising the stakes in the direction I fear.Finally, British troops in Bosnia and other national troops in the UN peacekeeping force are in vulnerable positions, and if the West does finally get serious, they may well become hostages to the Serbs.The ignominious defeat in Bosnia not only damaged our credibility and moral standing, it deepened the worst rift in NATO since the Suez Crisis. It is important, however, to see the Bosnian debacle as a symptom, not just a cause.Throughout this period of ebb and flow of the notion of a "new world order," many discussions of international affairs were hardly realistic.Foreign policy thinkers still wrestle with these debates: whether "history" is "over" (according to Hegel); The generalization of liberal democracy has become the last form of government." In contrast to Mr. Fukuyama's theory is the prediction later made by Samuel Huntington that international politics will henceforth be dominated by "The Clash of Civilizations," with the world shaped by the interaction of seven or eight major cultures... ( In this world) the major conflicts of the future will be on the wrong lines of culture that separate these cultures from each other. " The contrast between these ambitious visions of the intellectual on the one hand and the hesitation of the practitioner on the other highlights a sense of unreality.It is increasingly clear that the end of the Cold War—just two years between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the official Soviet funeral—has left politicians in the West astray.Not only must some security systems - first of all NATO - and defense strategies have to be rethought, it seems that the entire validity, purpose and direction of foreign policy is itself at issue.