Chapter 68 Chapter 5: A New Beginning

Not only is Maastricht's economic and political aspirations unconvincing, a government that enjoys a small but sufficient majority at work has also been forced to hold almost more than once due to rifts between Conservative MPs on the issue. general election.Since the Maastricht Act became law in the summer of 1993, the rhetoric of Euroscepticism has tried to bridge the divide.The trouble is, falsehoods are not enough.Now we must have an action plan with clearer strategic goals and tactics than Maastricht. To do this, a very important starting point is an honest and objective assessment of our negotiating strengths and weaknesses.We should not have any illusions that in Europe we are "winning the debate".It is very unconvincing to say that you agree with the goals of your partners and then try to change them.In any case, debate is of little importance when decisions are being made in the European Community.When France, Germany, and a sufficient number of other members of the Community still insist on pursuing federalism, it is a waste of words to try to explain the merits of an alternative solution, as things stand.This situation may not last forever.But it is completely unrealistic to think that this comparison will change between then and 1996.

There are also lessons to be learned.Since the UK joined the EEC, we have seen texts interpreted differently than we accept by some European institutions, supported by other European governments.From "closer union" in the Treaty of Rome to the official goal of "Economic and Monetary Union" approved at the European Council in Paris in October 1972 to the "Single European Document" - which was all about promoting the single market. A new majority voting clause was created for the purpose, which the European Commission could use to extend its regulatory powers - and this has been our experience.Vague proclamations which we then thought to have no real meaning were later used to justify the extension of the powers of the community into new spheres of national life.Therefore, in judging whether further rhetorical concessions to federalism could be made in the Maastricht negotiations, we cannot provide any support if these concessions are thereafter exploited or even misinterpreted to some extent. I found excuses for my naivety.Moreover, even without Maastricht, it would have been necessary to revise some aspects of the earlier agreements, even the Treaty of Rome, if this unwelcome momentum was to be resisted.

This is particularly relevant to the activities of the European Court of Justice. In the early 1970s, most of us, myself included, did not think enough about sovereignty when we joined the EEC.Naturally, there is a fundamental intellectual confusion in the use of the phrase "common sovereignty" and, as Noel Malcolm puts it, a failure to "distinguish power from authority". Beyond that, the substance of the European Court of Justice and the relationship that would emerge between English law and Community law was not known at the time.Community law is directly enforced through the courts of the member states. In case of conflict, the courts of the member states must place the community law interpreted by the European Court of Justice above the national law.This is shown in the Faktom case.Spanish fishermen found a legal loophole that allowed them to register their boats in Britain and take advantage of British fishing quotas.They sued the UK in the aforementioned case, thwarting the intent of the Common Fisheries Policy. In 1988, Parliament passed the Merchant Shipping Act, which plugged this loophole.But they later sued the British government, and after taking the case to the European Court of Justice, the British courts had to temporarily suspend and eventually revoke the Merchant Shipping Act.

What makes this legally appearing all the more significant is that the ECJ's interpretation of treaties and Community law is far from being just.It has made no secret of calling itself a force for European integration.It has a better chance of extending the powers of the Community institutions under the Maastricht Treaty.First, it is up to the European Court of Justice to decide on the exceptions the prime minister has made for Britain in a social charter leading to monetary union.Its past attitudes and activities are hardly reassuring. But despite all these difficulties, Britain has far more important negotiating powers, provided we are prepared to use them fully.First and foremost is our trade position and opportunity.Our trade with the Community has always been a deficit.There's nothing wrong with that in itself.But it shows that other European Community members have a clear interest in continuing to trade with us, so do be right with the exaggerated fears that they will try to cut us off from their markets if we don't comply with their wishes.

Furthermore, the relative importance of the European Community in world trade and the UK's opportunities for global trade is declining and will continue to decline.Our politicians should be less concerned with the European market, which has perhaps now achieved the most significant development, and more interested in the new opportunities offered by the Far East, Latin America and NAFTA.Dealing with the enormous volume of British overseas assets - over £1,300 billion in 1993 - gives us insight into the private sector in this area: more than 80% are held in non-EU countries , while the emerging market has maintained a strong growth momentum.The share of our total trade with non-EC countries, particularly with the Pacific Rim, is growing and will continue to grow.

Also, some investment into the UK will undoubtedly continue because we are within the European Community, but there will also be increasing investment outside of Europe because of the inflexibility of EU regulations and the high social costs.Because of tradition, but also because of London's preeminent position as an international financial center, Britain is naturally a global rather than a continental European trading power.However, we reserve the right to reduce our industrial costs if we are to compete successfully in the new global marketplace.This is not to say that we are going to quarrel easily with our European neighbors.But it does show that we should stop thinking as if America's economic prospects depend primarily on proving that we are "good Europeans".

Second, it is also important to recognize the non-economic power that the UK has, because it gives us special weight in European negotiations.Despite the current chill in US-British government relations, this "special relationship" remains an important fundamental reality, based on our shared experiences, traditions, and sentiments.My own experience of Anglo-American relations in the run-up to the Gulf War has convinced me that, whatever the estimates of officials in the US State Department and the British Foreign Office, we all know that the US can only rely on A few reputable countries with a global vision and a willingness to uphold the international order.This refers mainly to ourselves and the French.The French, although they performed well in the Gulf War, were generally skeptical of the cause led by the United States.The Anglo-American relationship itself is naturally bound up with the unquestionable predominance of English as the language of the 21st century.Strategically, therefore, the astute statesmen of the Continent have reason to wish to maintain a mutually satisfactory, or at least tolerable, relationship with us.

Finally, our partners should not think that we always want to sign a deal in the end.While we'd rather be cooperative, the truth is, we should also be fully prepared for someone to be very uncooperative.We must be prepared to use our veto power, and to use resolutely all non-cooperative means available to us under existing treaties, should attempts be made to force us further toward federalism, or if our demands to amend existing arrangements to our disadvantage are ignored. channel.We have reached the moment when the cloak of Gaullistism may well fit on the shoulders of the Anglo-Saxons.

At a series of European councils, also the last one I attended in Rome in October 1990, years of fighting for British interests taught me not to believe that achieving results in 1996 was an easy matter, let alone Needless to say it was an easy job.Prior to this, there will be pressure from all sides and in various ways. In September 1994, the German Christian Democratic Union proposed to establish a "core force" of European countries dedicated to currency union, which indicated that the process of détente had already begun.Although, as I'm about to suggest, the notion of a "two-tier" Europe certainly shouldn't be jettisoned.In complex negotiations, it will be important to combine tactics with assertiveness to achieve the best outcome for the UK.But even at this stage, it is important to detail what that outcome will be.

All but a handful of staunch European federalists recognize that Britain's entry into the EEC has both advantages and disadvantages.At the time, when the frontiers of communism slanted across central Europe, strategic considerations were not without weight, but as the name of the European Economic Community suggests, the pros and cons were largely economic.On the one hand, we have unrestricted access to a large Western European market.We envision this market expanding when our economy grows) and internal free trade policies prevail.But the other side of the ledger is that we will be a large net contributor to the Community budget, as reflected in the disproportionate cost of the Common Agricultural Policy.We know that France's propensity for subsidies and protection will push the EEC in the wrong direction.But at the time we had no fear that these tendencies could be restrained and perhaps changed.More seriously, he said, we did not foresee that, due to the ambition of the European Commission, it would lead to centralized decision-making. The laws of the kingdom pose such a challenge.How can British interests be restored?

The first step, which requires nothing more than a minimum consultation or negotiation with our European partners, should not be postponed.It is not a good idea to say that whether we are ready to ditch the pound and join the single European currency is a matter of the future.Any time such a decision is made it would (at least in theory "irrevocably") prevent the UK government from controlling key aspects of its economic policy, thus taking away the heart of democracy.Affirming he said this far-reaching decision should not be considered without a referendum.It would be better if the government declared its opposition to the single currency now, as it would reassure the public that we differ in principle from the federalist goals of most other European governments.Likewise, it should also be shown that there is no question of sterling returning to the exchange rate mechanism or to any successor regime.Making such statements now can make the rest of the community take us more seriously, and can more compel other governments to reveal their true intentions to their constituents.There would also be endless benefits for officials to restore support for the Conservative Party. It is also necessary to clarify our attitude towards the project of a "two-tiered" Europe.According to this plan, its core group has an economic and monetary union, a high degree of social control and a common foreign, security and defense policy.The immediate British reaction to the plan was opposition were it not for sometimes confused and even contradictory reasons.Some commentators see the move toward a federal Europe whose agenda is governed by a Franco-German axis as even more unacceptable.Others oppose it because they want the UK to be part of that "core power", for example in defense matters.But a further sacrifice of our independence would do us no good, in fact quite the opposite, in European relations, both internally and externally.Bringing our defense decision-making powers under European control, sure, he said, is not going to work.The appropriate international mechanism—indeed, its only viable military institution—is NATO. But this new situation also presents us with an opportunity.It is necessary to make it clear that if we allow changes to the existing treaty framework to allow proposed developments to continue, our interests must be served.If someone tries to build up this "core force" without respecting our basic views and interests, then we have every reason to use all means at our disposal to stop and disrupt it.An absolutely essential requirement is to ensure that "core power" countries do not impose their own unresolved priorities on other members, such as the functioning of the single market.In this market, their interests are ultimately at odds with ours.We agree with the changes sought by those countries, and the asking price may further include a classified assessment of some of the provisions of the existing treaty, because these provisions are not good for us, and by the way, for other member states. An obvious priority concerns the treatment of Britain's financial contributions to the European Union.It would be desirable to admit the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where agriculture is still very important, as full members, but in any case, once this becomes a reality, it is difficult to see how the current CAP can continue.The Common Agricultural Policy not only consumes financial resources, but also makes food prices much higher than the general international level, so it also increases labor costs and enterprise costs.What could be openly debated is what, if anything, should replace it in favor of British agriculture.Likewise, another objective that should be revised is the so-called "solidarity fund".Maastricht expects that the above-mentioned policies will cause fiscal and financial difficulties to countries with weaker economies, and the "solidarity fund" will be used to compensate. Second, we should try to reverse the growing protectionism of the European Community, which has almost taken the GATT round off course and greatly reduced its chances of functioning, costing Britain wealth and jobs.Unfortunately, due to the Community's social policies and the lack of flexibility in the labor market, protectionist sentiments are likely to grow along with costs, preventing European industry from effectively competing.However, as the predominance has shifted from Europe to the United States, it has become more difficult than before for the European Union to continue to enforce this type of protectionism.Professor Patrick Messerling nicely explains this: Until recently, U.S. trade policy based on the GATT Code of Conduct offered few other significant alternatives. …But in the next few decades, this situation will be reversed.The US -- as the South American countries opened their borders and fueled their economic growth -- will enjoy the relief that regional opportunities can provide.In contrast, the EU has greatly exhausted its capacity and is unlikely to significantly expand regional trade for a long time to come.The European Union - whose neighbors to the south and east do not believe in the benefits of free trade, or cannot bring much benefit to the EU because of its size - will be in the same position as the United States was in the 1950s and 1960s status. There is only one path left for the EU, which must move GATT from the periphery of its trade policy to its center. If this does not happen – and worse, if, as I have pointed out, the EC moves further towards protectionism – the UK will suffer the most.That's why it's very important that we try to make special arrangements between the European Community and NAFTA. What we need here is an organization like NAFTA that would merge the emerging market democracies of Central and Eastern Europe with the European Union itself.This would have some important economic and political benefits.First, it would give Britain and other European countries smooth access to the rapidly expanding markets of the Americas. All the same arguments that justified our entry into the EEC in the early 1970s and the single market in the mid- and late 1980s - that is, expanding trade opportunities - apply here.Second, with Americans in the tradition of free enterprise and open trade, we will make the Continent less emphatic on subsidies and protection in the new transatlantic trade framework - to Britain's advantage.In such a group, we are less likely to be a lone voice on the issue of free markets.Third, closer economic ties between Europe and the United States would help strengthen NATO, whose raison d'être was already in doubt after the end of the Cold War.A NAFTA would allow the United States to continue its commitment to European defense while reassuring European states concerned about German dominance.In the end, the new free trade area will be the most powerful, but also the freest bloc in GATT.In this way, we can insist on making the world move towards free trade rather than protectionism.Britain is in a strong position to defend the practice on both sides of the Atlantic.In addition, it would bring many benefits to our special interests and our status as an outward-looking open trading nation traditionally committed to strong ties with the United States. Finally, we cannot continue to ignore the erosion of our parliamentary sovereignty as we plan our way to 1996.As Lord Denning MP said: To the horror of us all, European law is not just the sea that swells English harbours.Now it's like a tsunami, breaking down our seawalls and flooding our fields and homes in the interior. Now there is a need to consider how exactly the UK's constitution - the ultimate matter of life and death - can be protected from this "tsunami".Affirmed he said, it could only be done by relying on the express exercise of the independent autonomy of Parliament.Furthermore, the sooner the initiative is taken back from the ECJ to clarify UK judicial thinking, the better.There are sufficient reasons to amend the 1972 "European Communities Act", so that Parliament can finally override all Community laws, clearly indicating that the express regulations passed by Parliament have higher effectiveness than Community laws. Britain will not be alone in the Community in maintaining the ultimate supremacy of domestic law.Germany, for example, does not recognize the supremacy of community law over its constitution, as the Federal Constitutional Court has clearly stated in the matter of the Maastricht Treaty.Likewise, France maintains the ultimate supremacy of its constitution.Its administrative courts have established principles and procedures that can limit the specific application of Community law if French interests so require. We should also have rules in England to deal with occasional disputes (as in Faktom's case) between Community law and English Parliament law, and to establish a procedure The inadvertent conflict of the laws of the Community should, if necessary, be suspended by orders in council rather than by the courts, in order to check the tendency of court decisions and judicial thought to narrow the scope of parliamentary sovereignty.There should be a reserved list of protected matters that only Parliament can legislate, including our constitutional rights of mediation and plea.Finally, we should have a right of reservation, exercisable by Order in Council, enabling us to finally prevent specific Community laws and decisions from coming into force in the United Kingdom.It is thought that we would use these powers seldom, but their very existence restrains encroachment from Europe.But the debate about how, rather than whether, these actions should be taken is long overdue. It is impossible to predict in advance exactly where this negotiation process will end.Will the UK sit in the outer row in the membership of the Community, will we have a similar partnership agreement that the EFTA countries and later the EEA countries have enjoyed for many years, or will the European Union follow the It is possible for the new treaty to become a series of bilateral or multilateral agreements between states like "variable geometric figures". In any case, the important thing is not the form but the content.What is clear is that there has been a perception--indeed, a perception that predates Maastricht--that the aims and foreseeable interests of the members of the Community are quite different from each other.Recognizing this clearly, and formulating our 1996 strategy accordingly, are essential to success. I do not believe this approach is inconsistent with the long-term interests of other European countries.If the European Union is allowed to continue on its current path, it will fail at every level.It would exclude the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe by imposing conditions that they would not have accepted if they wanted to join the union.It would leave southern European countries increasingly weak and dependent on handouts from German taxpayers.In the wider world, it can become a protectionist and destabilizing force. If the Franco-German bloc is determined to set about rebuilding a modern Carolingian dynasty, that is their choice.The result will almost certainly be harrowing and unforgettable.In a world of reawakened nationalism, it is hard to imagine the French ever accepting the country's status as a satellite of Germany.Likewise, it is difficult to imagine German taxpayers subsidizing more recessionary regions abroad and providing housing, sanitation and other benefits to immigrants forced to come to Germany by their livelihoods, all while losing the guarantee provided by the Deutsche mark .And this is happening against a backdrop of a dwindling share of world trade and wealth as Europe loses investment and jobs.At some point, voters in these countries will rise up against the policies that have plunged them into economic chaos, rule by alienated bureaucrats, and loss of their independence. Britain alone has limited power to prevent these unwelcome developments.But it would not be inappropriate to cite Little Pitt's wish here to mean that Britain "has saved itself by its own efforts and will ... save Europe by its example".At the same time, the best service that men who are committed to the ideals I set forth in Bruges—states of freely cooperating peoples, loving free enterprise and welcoming free trade—can do is to bring together the Politicians, jurists, economists, writers, and commentators all came together to renew a movement for transatlantic cooperation that included greater Europe and the Americas.As I said at the end of my speech in Bruges: Let us have a Europe that is fully functioning in the wider world, that looks outwards rather than inwards, that preserves that Atlantic community - that includes Europe on both sides of the Atlantic - that is our The noblest legacy and the greatest strength.