Chapter 44 Section 5 Why the Kuomintang-Communist talks broke down

Chiang Kai-shek lost the mainland, blamed the Soviet Union for helping the CCP, blamed the United States for being ungrateful, and blamed Mao Zedong for talking about fighting? In fact, these are all excuses, and war or war is his decision.In the late period of the Anti-Japanese War, he wanted to solve the Communist Party's issue militarily. After the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, under the pressure of China and foreign countries, he had to assume the posture of negotiating peace, but his "peace" was tantamount to asking people to surrender.He thought he could wipe out the CCP in one fell swoop, but he was kicked out of the mainland by the CCP.He suffered the "fruit" of the breakdown of the peace talks, because he first planted the "cause" of the breakdown of the peace talks.

The short-term goal of the United States' China policy during the war was to strengthen China's resistance to the war, at least not to be defeated; the long-range goal was to hope for a strong, united and democratic China after the war. "Democracy" is one of the three major trends that stand side by side with fascism and Marx. The United States is the leader, so democracy can also be synonymous with being pro-American. "Unity" was the only way to resolve the contradictions between the central and local governments at that time, especially between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, to unify and to avoid the so-called "fratricidal conflict" by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes (see Byrnes, Speaking Frankly P. 226), in order to effectively defeat Japan and become a decent modern country. "Strong" means that China is too weak. If it is not strong enough, it will not be enough to fill the power vacuum after Japan's defeat and become a stabilizing force in Asia. Roosevelt gave it in the name of the top four, which can be said to give China a shot in the arm.This was the established policy of Roosevelt, which was inherited by Truman in its entirety.Presidents Luo and Du have successively sent special envoys to China such as Lauchlin Curie, Wilkie, Wallace, Partick Hurley, and George Marshall, all directly and indirectly related to the implementation of this short-distance plan. , remote policy.Even Stilwell, who was accused by Chiang Kai-shek of being "pro-Communist", also pursued this policy.In short-term terms, in order to effectively defeat Japan and reverse the disadvantages of the Chinese battlefield, it is logical for the United States to arm the Eighth Route Army, not to mention that the original plan of the US military to land on the coast of China at that time required the cooperation of all Chinese troops, including the Communist Army.From a distance, from the realistic point of view of Americans, if China wants to be democratic and united, it must first accommodate all parties and factions, including the CCP.Although Americans fully support the Chinese government headed by Chiang Kai-shek, they also don't like Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship.Therefore, although the "pro-communist" Stilwell went to Yan'an at the risk of Chiang Kai-shek's dissatisfaction, the "pro-Chiang" Hurley also went to Yan'an at the risk of Chiang Kai-shek's dissatisfaction.Although Chiang Kai-shek told the Americans about the conspiracy of international communism, the intelligence of the US government confirmed that the relationship between Stalin and Mao Zedong was not close.Burns, Hurley, Stalin and other Soviet leaders had contact with each other, and they also realized the contempt and indifference of the Russian Communist Party to the Maoist Communist Party.At that time, many diplomats in the American embassy in Chongqing believed that Mao Zedong was just a land reformer, which was naive. However, the CCP is not the fifth column of Soviet Russia but an internal force in China, and has won the approval of many democrats. , is an unshakable fact.Since it is a domestic force, from an American point of view, democracy is not enough without unity.More importantly, if the CCP is not united, civil war in China is inevitable.Once the civil war breaks out, the democratic and unified China will be ruined, and it will even cause turmoil in Asia and threaten world peace. It is neither in the interests of the United States, nor is it what Americans like.When Roosevelt’s Vice President Wallace visited Chongqing in 1944, he was full of resentment and poor logic (full of bitter feeling and poor logic) when he heard Chiang Kai-shek’s intention to slander the CCP, and worried that he would become China’s Karen A.F. Kerensky (see Blum ed., The Price of Vision, p. 351) can be said to be unfortunate, and in the end Mao Zedong replaced Chiang Kai-shek just as Lenin replaced Kerensky.Lao Jiang lost his country and hurt the interests of the United States.

Only by understanding the U.S. policy toward China can we understand why Chiang Kai-shek's Hu Zongnan army surrounded northern Shaanxi, raised troops for eight years, and moved from time to time.When Japan announced its surrender, although the friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party became more intense, it was still impossible to immediately use troops to directly attack the liberated areas. That is to say, because Chiang Kai-shek did not dare to risk the disobedience of the United States, he suddenly launched a civil war.War-weary and anti-war public opinion in China is still secondary in Chiang Kai-shek's mind.

In fact, the instigator of the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was originally an American.During the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a strategy of blockade, defense and even attack on the liberated areas, and would not take the initiative to negotiate peace with the Communist Party.However, in view of Chiang Kai-shek's poor performance in the war against Japan, Roosevelt was eager to strengthen his combat capabilities, so he thought of integrating the armed forces of the Communist Army.In addition, some American journalists broke through the blockade and visited Yan'an. They had a good impression of it. They thought it was very beautiful, and it was in sharp contrast with Chongqing's sluggishness.On July 21, 1942, Roosevelt sent his representative Curie to Chongqing, stayed for 16 days, talked with Chiang 14 times, talked about the issue of "preventing the Communist Party but not resisting Japan", and urged Chiang to "be as lenient as possible to the Communist Party." . (See "Preliminary Draft of President Chiang Kai-shek's First Draft" Volume 5 (Part 1), p. 2014) After the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt sent Vice President Henry Wallace to China, and the task also included persuading Chiang and the CCP to negotiation.From June 21 to 24, 1944, Wallace had four long talks with Chiang.Jiang emphasized that the Chinese Communist Party was more "communist" and worse than the Russian Communist Party. While trying to sow discord, he had no choice but to allow the US military delegation to visit Yan'an. (Blum ed., The Price of Vision: the Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, p. 332-333, 351-352) This delegation of ten or twenty people is the so-called "Dixie group" ( Dixie Mission), or "Military Observer's Mission" (Military Observer's Mission), was a breakthrough in US-Mao relations that Chiang Kai-shek did not want to see.Jiang did not want to see it, because if the US-Mauritius military cooperation progresses, Jiang will not be able to monopolize US aid, which will further strengthen the strength of the Communist Army.In fact, many officials in China at that time, including Stilwell, advocated political and military assistance to Yan'an to resist Japan.

Soon Roosevelt sent Hurley to Chongqing as the president's representative in August.He was a military man, a native of Oklahoma, confident and innocent.Although he has a clear understanding of the US policy toward China, he has only a half-knowledge of China's situation.He was warmly received by the Chiang couple and had a good impression of Chiang. Under the policy of the U.S. government supporting Chiang Kai-shek's government, he actively helped Chiang unite to resist Japan and help Chiang establish an effective government with military and political unity.In other words, he is willing to put the bet entirely on Jiang's side.Even so, he still needs to continue the dialogue between the United States and Mao, and resolve the contradictions between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.On November 7, 1944, as acting ambassador to China, he flew to Yan'an in person to promote the unification of the military forces of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.Mao Zedong replied that for unity and unity, the CCP must first share the American aid. Hurley believed that a united national government could distribute the American aid, and believed that Chiang Kai-shek would accept this proposal.At Hearst's request, Zhou Enlai returned to Chongqing for further discussions.This is tantamount to forcing the Kuomintang and the Communist Party into talks by Hurley.But Chiang Kai-shek was only willing to "recognize the open status of the Communist Party", that is, to reorganize the Communist Army into the national army, "completely under the unified command of the Military Commission", and absolutely refused to agree to the coalition government. In fact, he still wanted the CCP to surrender. The five-point consensus reached in Yan'an was very different.Zhou Enlai sent a letter to Hurley, reiterating his proposal to abolish the one-party dictatorship and establish a democratic coalition government.Chiang Kai-shek responded by organizing a "wartime cabinet" to accommodate the CCP.Hurley turned to support Chiang's proposition, making Chiang's "political offensive" succeed. (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", pages 473, 476, 485) In short, Hearst agreed with the kind of alliance where the CCP handed over its force and then invited the Communist Party to serve as an official in Chiang Kai-shek's government Government, that is a reasonable solution. (See Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 313-318) Cal. David D. Barnett, the head of the US military observation mission in Yan'an, once said to Mao Zedong: "You have to listen to Hurley. If so, send a few people to serve as officials in the Kuomintang government." Mao replied:

It is not easy to be an official with tied hands and feet, and we will not do it.To do it, you have to let go of your hands and feet, and do it freely. This is to establish a coalition government on the basis of democracy.He (Paul Ruide) said: "It's not good if you don't do it." I asked: "Why is it not good?" He said: "First, the Americans will scold you; second, the Americans must support Chiang Kai-shek." I said : "You are full of bread and sleep, you want to scold people, and you want to support Chiang Kai-shek's waist. This is your American business, and I will not interfere. Now we have millet and rifles, and you have bread and cannons. You love to support Chiang Kai-shek’s back will support him, and he can support it for as long as he wants. But one thing to remember is, who owns China? China is by no means Chiang Kai-shek’s, China belongs to the Chinese people. One day you will not be able to support it? Choose” ( "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" Volume Four, page 1031)

Mao Zedong spoke very loudly, fully showing that it was impossible for him to participate in the coalition government as an official. However, Hurley did not expect that Chiang Kai-shek would not even be willing to be an official coalition government, let alone the September 1944 National Political Council. On the one hand, the request for the abolition of one-party dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic coalition government has been put forward.We can see that although the Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated throughout the Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Communist Party was still illegal, and the Communist Party participated in the National Political Council in the name of a "cultural organization." It can be seen that Chiang has always adopted a negative attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party.Unless the CCP is willing to deny it, neither "use" nor "coalition" can be truly implemented.

When Hurley arrived in Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell had already had a very unpleasant dispute.After Stilwell showed Roosevelt's letter of condemnation to Chiang, he blamed history for his wrongdoing, which helped Chiang Kai-shek's "use barbarians to control barbarians" and helped "control" Stilwell.Shortly after Stilwell left China, the US ambassador to China, Goss, also resigned, and Hurley succeeded him in November 1944.Ambassador Hurley then became Chiang Kai-shek's escort. In May 1945, when the Kuomintang held the Sixth National Congress, Hurley had even more optimistic fantasies, thinking that Chiang would take the road of democracy and that the CCP could be forced to cooperate (Buhite, Hurley and American Foreign Policy, p. 214), but they did not know that Chiang made a political report at the meeting, expressly stating that he wanted to "eliminate the Communist Party" (the original document is now in the file of the Central Party Committee of the Kuomintang in the Second Archives in Nanjing), rather than cooperation. The controlled National Assembly ignored the claims of the coalition government of all parties and echoed Chiang’s demand that the CCP hand over the army and local government.In April 1945, Ambassador He issued a statement in Washington, D.C., strongly supporting Chiang Kai-shek's government and cheering for Chiang's National Assembly; accusing the CCP of being a separatist and refusing to join the coalition government.Hurley thought that if Chiang's National Assembly was successfully convened, China would be democratically unified.As a result, he supported Chiang's anti-communist stance, offended Mao Zedong, and was accused by Mao of singing an anti-communist double reed with Chiang and encouraging Chiang to fight the civil war.The CCP also refused to participate in the political participation meeting held in July.

Hurley's stance of supporting and supporting Chiang also triggered fierce debates within the US Embassy in Chongqing. Embassy staff such as Xie Weisi believed that Hurley's actions would make the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party inevitable and violated US policy.They even think that China's hope lies in Yan'an, not Chongqing.If you want military aid in Yan'an, you can just tell Jiang, and there is no need to negotiate with him.Putting all bets on Jiang Zhi's side, He Yi dances with the zombies.Hurley angrily denounced these people as pro-communist and anti-Chiang, and even gave them red hats. (See Esherick ed.? Xun Lost Chance in China, P. 333-363) The debate between the ambassador and the staff of the embassy depends more on politics than eloquence, and Roosevelt is dying and dying, so he naturally sided with the ambassador. He died of illness in the middle of the year, and the policy of the United States was positioned above "supporting Chiang Kai-shek", and the intention of military aid to the CCP was completely dispelled. (See Buhite, Hurley and American Foreign Policy pp. 193-194)

Hurley obtained a clearer guarantee from Stalin that he would not support the CCP. The international communist leader even told the Americans that the CCP in Yan’an was not a real Communist Party (this point was probably influenced by Wang Ming) and that Mao Zedong might seize power.Even if Jiang wants to eat Yan'an, he doesn't care, and even more appreciates that Jiang is a "selfless patriot".Obviously fully agreeing with the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek, Hurley said to President Truman who just took office: "Stalin unconditionally agrees with the U.S. policy toward China." ) He returned to Chongqing on April 24, convinced that with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the CCP could be forced to submit and unified under the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek.However, Mao Zedong delivered a speech at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China on June 11, titled "The Foolish Old Man Moves Mountains", in which he openly opposed the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang and anti-communism (see "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" Volume III, pages 1001-1004 for the full text). , does not submit.Chiang Kai-shek was honest and blunt, and on July 21, he instructed Hu Zongnan to launch an attack on Chunhua County in the border regions of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia, stationed in Yetai Mountain, and threatened Yan'an.The CCP's "Xinhua Daily" aggressively exposed the matter and attacked Chongqing to start a civil war.After all, the United States did not want to see a civil war, let alone a serious military conflict between the KMT and the Communist Party before Japan surrendered. General Wedemeyer ordered the US military personnel to be stationed at the borders of the KMT and the Communist Party to stop it. (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", pages 527 and 528)

On August 10, there was news that Japan was about to surrender unconditionally. However, at this time, the Japanese army still occupied a large amount of Chinese land from the northeast to Guangdong, and the problem of receiving and disarming immediately occurred.The main force of Chiang Kai-shek's lineage is located in the southwest. In terms of geographical location, the Communist Army has the advantage of receiving the lost land.In the name of the commander-in-chief, Jiang ordered the Communist Army to "garrison and stand by" and not to "act without authorization."Chiang's intentions are certainly understandable, but ordering an anti-Japanese army not to attack when the enemy is about to surrender, not to disarm the enemy, and not to accept the enemy's surrender is bound to be unreasonable and unreasonable.In the name of Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighteenth Army, Mao Zedong sent two telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek, pointing out that the order to "garrison and stand by" was against the interests of the country and the nation, benefited the enemy, and was difficult to follow. (See "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" Volume Four, p. 1087) However, on the issue of acceptance, due to the fact that the traitor Zhou Fohai became the commander-in-chief of Chiang Kai-shek's Shanghai Operation Corps (see Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 53 1") to recruit more than 300,000 puppet troops (see Wang Fumin's "Detailed Biography of Chiang Kai-shek", pages 230 to 232), the cooperation of Neiji Okamura, and the assistance of the U.S. military and the provision of sea and air transportation services , Jiang's disadvantages turned into advantages.Mao Zedong was aware of this situation, and as early as August 13th, in the name of a commentator of Xinhua News Agency, he published the article "Chiang Kai-shek is instigating a civil war", announcing to "our compatriots all over the country and the people of the world: the Chongqing Command cannot represent the Chinese people and China's real anti-Japanese forces." Army" and asked the anti-Japanese troops in the Liberated Areas to directly send representatives "to participate in the acceptance of Japan's surrender by the four major allies." (See "Mao Zedong Selected Works" Volume Four, p. 1037) When Chiang Kai-shek's spokesman called Zhu De and the Communist Army "enemies of the people," Mao retorted, "When you mention an enemy of the people, everyone knows who you are referring to." "He betrayed Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles and the Great Revolution of 1927. He pushed the Chinese people into the bloody civil war of ten years, which led to the aggression of Japanese imperialism", "Victory came, he called the People's Army The garrison was on standby, and he asked the traitors to maintain law and order so that he could return to Nanjing in a staggering manner." (See the same book, page 1047) Mao gave back the hat of "enemy of the people" and put it on Chiang Kai-shek's head. After the long-term "friction" between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the crisis of a full-scale civil war broke out before and after Japan announced its surrender. . Emperor Showa of Japan broadcast to the world on August 15, 1945, officially announcing his unconditional surrender, and the whole country celebrated the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. However, Chiang Kai-shek's mood was very complicated, with mixed worries and joys, and even more worries than joys.On that day, it was broadcast to the whole country and the world, that is to say, "love the enemy" as an excuse to write off the suffering and cruelty that the Japanese invaders inflicted on the Chinese soldiers and civilians. Heavier than anti-Japanese.He lamented in his diary on September 9 of the same year: Huh? Although the Anti-Japanese War was won, the revolution was not successful; the policy of the Third International was not defeated, and the Communist bandits were not cleared, so the revolution could not succeed. Next), page 2671) If he can do whatever he wants, he will launch a full-scale attack on the besieged liberated areas against Zhu De's order to "garrison and stand by", wipe out the "communist bandits" he hates in one fell swoop, and complete his "revolution". He personally told his scholar consultant Lattimore that "the post-war CCP issue must be resolved by force" (Lattimore, China Hemoirs, p. 139). Naturally, he had no intention of organizing any coalition government, but the domestic and international circumstances at that time would never allow it. He blatantly launched civil war immediately, but he already had favorable conditions for a peaceful offensive.The attitude of the United States to support Chiang has become very clear, the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty has been negotiated, and Stalin has publicly ridiculed Chiang for suppressing Mao.Yan'an was under siege domestically and was even more isolated internationally.Since everyone wants to make peace, He Mo launched a peaceful offensive, and under favorable circumstances, forced the other party to make peace on my terms.The day before the Japanese emperor announced his surrender, at the urging of Hurley, who believed that the alliance between Chongqing and Moscow would surely force Mao Zedong to come to peace (Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 404), Jiang Nai personally sent an urgent telegram to Yan'an, Mao Zedong was asked to "come to accompany the capital recently to discuss together. It is related to the country's major plans, so please don't be stingy."At that time, there was a dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party over the issue of "garrison on standby", so Mao replied that he would consider meeting with Jiang after expressing his opinion on the matter.So Jiang telegraphed Mao again on the 20th, presuming that "garrison on standby" was a regulation of the Allied Army Headquarters, saying that "it is inconvenient to use Commander-in-Chief Zhu's telegram to destroy my common commitment to the Allied Forces."Then he urged the driver urgently, saying that "the Xingjing has not been sent out for a long time, and I am not without apology", and said: "The war is coming to an end, and the internal strife is not allowed to continue. Work hard and engage in construction. How to reap the fruits of the War of Resistance with the merits of the founding of the country depends very much on the kindness of your husband, and come together to make a big plan." The implication is that if you don't come, wouldn't you be indifferent to the country's hardships and sympathy for the people's suffering carry on.What kind of pressure is this? Xuan Mao then replied on the 22nd, saying that Zhou Enlai was first sent to make contact.Jiang was afraid that Mao would evade, so he telegraphed Mao three times the day after receiving this telegram, saying that Mrs. Zhou was very pleased to come to Yugu, "But at present, all important issues need to be discussed with Mr. Huiran is coming together", and "we have prepared the plane to welcome you" to make further urging, and the telegrams are all published in the newspapers, so that everyone can watch, urging the oncoming menace, like the tide of Qiantang, one wave is higher than the other, and it is difficult to resist.Mao could only send an urgent telegram to Chongqing on the 24th, expressing his "extreme willingness to meet with Mr. to discuss the grand plan of peaceful nation building." (For the telegrams, see "Chongqing Negotiation Materials", pages 4-8) Jiang's urgent invitation was an ingenious tactic to show that he wanted to take Mao into the army, and whether he came or not, he thought he was right.If he does not come, Jiang can say that Mao has no sincerity in peacefully building the country, and not only can he not be blamed for the civil war, but he can also impose this responsibility on the other party.If it comes, Jiang can use his master's advantage and favorable situation to force Mao to accept the peace conditions he set; if he does not accept it, he will use force. The Yan'an side took this move, and it was indeed heavy, and the pressure came from all directions.However, the Chiang family has many criminal records of imprisoning political opponents, such as Li Jishen, Hu Hanmin, Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, etc., and it is not uncommon to use spies to assassinate them.Although Hurley, the US envoy, is willing to provide a security guarantee, but there are many nights and dreams, and there is no way to prevent it. If something happens, there is nothing to do if it is an accident.However, no matter how high the risk is, Mao must do it, otherwise the male and female will have lost a move, which is definitely not what Mao Zedong is willing to do, so it is not surprising that Mao accepted Jiang's request.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China asked Wedemeyer to send a US plane to pick him up, accompanied by Hurley, in case of accidents, and decided that Liu Shaoqi would preside over the grand plan while Mao was out. Mao Zedong flew from Yan'an to Chongqing on the afternoon of August 28, 1945, accompanied by Hurley, Zhang Zhizhong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Ruofei.Chiang Kai-shek held a welcome banquet at the Lin Yuan Mansion that night, and then wrote in his diary on August 28: At the noon meeting, Mao Zedong was determined to treat Mao Zedong's policy after he was called to Chongqing. Politics and military affairs should be resolved as a whole. (Volume 5 (Part 2) of "Preliminary Draft of President Chiang Kai-shek's Chief Compilation", page 2655) At noon before Mao came to Chongqing, Jiang Cai had a meeting to discuss the policy, and only then did he hold his feet before the matter, and there was no new plan.Treating each other sincerely requires "determination", which shows that sincerity is not easy to come by.The so-called political and military settlement is still his consistent statement that the military and government orders are unified, that is, the CCP is required to hand over the army and political power.Therefore, the so-called tolerance of political requirements is nothing more than giving the CCP a legal status and allowing it to serve as an official in Chiang's government.Chiang's conditions for peace were more clearly seen in his diary on August 29. He listed three: 1. The question of reorganizing the government should not be discussed outside of the legal system of the current government.2. There should be no staged or partial solutions, and all problems must be solved as a whole at the moment.3. It comes down to the unity of government orders and military orders, and all problems must be centered on this. (Previously cited book, page 2656) Another coalition government is not considered at all. Jiang's desire to force peace is like Sima Zhao's heart, and everyone knows it. Mao Zedong lived in Chongqing for more than 40 days, Jiang Mao met with him for a short time, and had five formal discussions.At the welcome dinner, Chiang Kai-shek was dressed in a military uniform with dazzling medals on his chest, as if to show Mao that he was the supreme commander.When the Chiangs entertained the Soviet ambassador Petrov with a tea party, they invited Mao to accompany them; they also invited Mao to have lunch with the American ambassador, as if to show Mao that he had the support of the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.Chiang's use of power to intimidate Mao was obviously ineffective. Mao Zedong, who wore a homespun Chinese tunic suit (that is, the Lenin suit, later also known as the Mao suit), never gave in, which made Jiang "deeply stimulated."Before leaving on October 10, Mao asked to stay in Linyuan and have breakfast together the next morning, but the conversation was not speculative.After Mao left, Jiang finished a week of walking in the forest garden. After reviewing the official documents, he "sighed that the Communist Party cannot be with the same group? Election" (op. cit., p. 2688) Under the bottom line of "unifying military orders and government orders", Chiang Kai-shek would never allow the existence of the Liberated Areas and the Eighth Route Army, nor would he agree to restart the stove and organize a coalition government to complete the unification of military orders and government orders.Under the circumstances, it is impossible for the peace talks to yield any feasible results.Mao Zedong's agreement to downsize some troops and withdraw from some liberated areas was just a sign of sincerity, which was far from Jiang's request.The "October 10th Agreement" signed after the KMT-CCP ​​peace talks in Chongqing can be seen at a glance by anyone with a discerning eye, but it is just a window dressing, and the fundamental problem has not been solved. Tang Zong revealed in his diary that Chiang Kai-shek said that Mao Zedong wanted to take advantage of Japan's surrender to occupy North China, but the negotiations in Chongqing failed. (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", page 591) In fact, during the peace talks, the U.S. military dispatched marines to help Chiang occupy North China.As far as Jiang is concerned, the real gain of this peace talk is to achieve the purpose of delaying the troops, so that Jiang's army can gain precious time to transport troops to North China by the US sea and air.However, "Mao" Weng lost his "soil", but gained a lot in the united front.Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and his entourage arrived in Chongqing as distinguished guests and stayed for nearly seven weeks. They mingled with people from all walks of life. "The scenery of the northern country is covered with ice for thousands of miles, and snow drifts for thousands of miles", the extraordinary momentum has attracted many scholars. During the peace talks in Chongqing, Chiang Kai-shek had secretly distributed the original "Bandit Suppression Handbook" that had been drawn up in Jiangxi, preparing to launch a military offensive.At the same time, Zhang Zhizhong was instructed to telegraph Hu Zongnan, saying: "The current negotiation with the traitor party is to spy on its requirements and goals, so as to delay the time and ease the international attention, so that the national army can seize the opportunity to quickly recover the central city of the occupied area, and then use the advantageous superior military Negotiate with the traitor party according to the situation, and if they cannot yield under the principle of the unity of military orders and government orders, they will be wiped out with bandits." ("The Communist Party Delegation Sends a Telegram to the Central Committee Concerning Zhang Zhizhong's Secret Instructions to Hu Zongnan") Coincidentally, "Double Ten Two days before the signing of the Agreement, a Kuomintang transport plane lost its way and landed in the common area at the foot of the Taihang Mountains. It seized a secret document numbered 3251 from Jiang Zhiyan Xishan, with two copies of the "Bandit Suppression Handbook", which leaked the "Suppression of Bandits". "Bandits" (see Ye Yonglie's "Mao Jiang's Struggle for Hegemony", p. 428), after the signing of the "Double Ten Agreement", Jiang secretly ordered all the troops to fight hard, hoping to use the strength of hungry tigers to attack sheep to complete the war. The task of unifying military orders and government orders, the undeclared civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has actually broken out, but progress has been sluggish, and it is not as easy as Chiang imagined. After the CCP surrendered to Japan, although it knew that both the United States and the Soviet Union supported Chiang Kai-shek, they still refused to make peace and continued to resist toughly.Not eating the soft ones, and not eating the hard ones, not only surprised Jiang, but also surprised the Americans. They even mistakenly believed that Stalin and Mao Zedong had a tacit understanding.In fact, Stalin was very willing to help Chiang after he got the benefits of Mongolia, but he was suspicious of the US military in China.Since Si was indifferent to Mao, Mao himself did not have to buy Si's account.For a while, Mao Zedong, who looked down on Emperor Qin and Han Wu, confronted Chiang Kai-shek, Stalin, and Truman at the same time. The U.S. military in China who supported Chiang Kai-shek, bystanders, soon saw that Chiang's army could not quickly deal with the Communist army, and feared being involved in the Chinese civil war.What's more, the CCP has protested against the U.S. aid to Chiang, and the Soviet Union also demanded that the U.S. withdraw its troops from China. Based on the principle of China's reunification, Truman decided that reunification by force was either impossible or too costly, so he had to return to the agenda of peaceful reunification.To achieve peaceful reunification, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party must return to the negotiating table.The United States had to play the role of arbitrator again.Ambassador Hurley's pro-Chiang anti-communist stance was too obvious, and he had a very unpleasant relationship with the State Department on anti-communist issues, so he resigned in November 1945 and returned to the United States.Truman then ordered Marshall to go to China as the president's representative to mediate the dispute between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.At that time, Marshall's status in the United States was second only to President Truman, and his prestige was even higher.The United States sent such a heavyweight to act as a mediator, which shows that it attaches great importance to the issue of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and is eager to maintain the US policy toward China. Marshall flew to Chongqing at the end of 1945, bringing not only Marshall's personal reputation, but also "carrot and stick" (carrot and stick) - if you are obedient, do not fight civil war, and build peace, the United States will provide A large amount of economic and military aid; if it is not obedient, all aid will be stopped.Chiang Kai-shek had scruples about Marshall because of his close personal relationship with Stilwell.Although Marshall would not harm the public with selfish interests, he was definitely not a pro-Chiang, and he would not approve of Chiang's personal dictatorship and one-party dictatorship.A democratic coalition government, in Marshall's view, was a matter of course and a necessary prerequisite for peace talks.Chiang had to rely on the United States, and there was no room for rejecting Marshall's mediation.Jiang's magic weapon is nothing more than emphasizing that the CCP is a vassal of Soviet Russia, in order to cater to the US's Cold War mentality against Russia.However, the U.S. believes that if the Kuomintang and the Communist Party cannot cooperate and lead to civil war, they will lose the power to contain the Soviet Union and Russia with China. (See Marshall's Mission to China Vol. 1, P. 6-7) Marshall formed a three-member group with Zhang Qun, a representative of the Kuomintang, and Zhou Enlai, a representative of the Communist Party. After six meetings, an armistice agreement was reached on January 10, 1946, which came into effect at 00:00 on the 14th.On the same day, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was finally held in the Great Hall of the Nationalist Government. (This meeting was held due to the pressure from the US, see Bahite, Hurley and American Foreign Policy, p. 186) In addition to the KMT and the Communist Party, the representatives present included the Youth Party, the Democratic League and social elites. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference did not close until the end of the month. With the support and cooperation of the democratic parties and liberal elements, the CCP gained the upper hand. As Tang Zong said: "At the Political Consultative Conference, the government seems to be judged. It is humiliating and embarrassing. It’s already extreme, but there’s nothing else to do.” (Tang Zong’s "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 580) Finally, five resolutions were passed. Although there were disputes over the number of government committee members, the important thing was to determine the reorganization of the government and end the One-party dictatorship.At the opening ceremony, Chiang Kai-shek announced that he would accept the decision of the CPPCC. At the closing ceremony, he made it even more grandiose, stating that he supported the "Peaceful Nation-Building Program" stipulated by the CPPCC, and was willing to "protect democracy and freedom as his duty" and " The goal is to establish a country under the rule of law.” He even said that the future government should be jointly borne by the hard-core members of the various parties and social elites, saying that “the heavy burden of nation-building is neither the responsibility of the KMT alone, nor the responsibility of Zhongzheng’s individual.” Finally, he said: "In the future, whether in the government or in the opposition, Zhongzheng will faithfully and resolutely abide by all the resolutions of this meeting in line with the responsibilities of citizens." Speaking of this, there is no doubt that Chiang Kai-shek has complied with the CPPCC resolution on democracy and freedom, and is willing to end the one-party dictatorship and reorganize a coalition government. (See Van Slyke, Marshall's Mission to China, Vol. 1, P. 24) It was hard for those who were listening to Chiang's speech at the time to doubt his sincerity, thinking that civil war was inevitable and democracy was in sight.But in hindsight, the so-called "Zhongzheng has not been interested in politics since he was a child, and his lifelong ambition and career is to dedicate himself to the national revolution in order to save the country and the people" in his speech is hypocritical. There is a passage with no deep meaning: I believe that there will no longer be private armed forces and separate local governments in our country to hinder the unity of government and military orders.Otherwise, no matter how much you sing about democracy, what you actually show will be fake democracy doing its own thing, or even completely anti-democratic actions. Here he alludes to the CCP army (private armed forces) and the liberated areas (local government), hindering the unification of government orders and military orders.In other words, if the CCP does not hand over its military and political power, the democracy promoted by the CPPCC will be fake democracy or anti-democracy.He supports what he thinks is true democracy, and he has no obligation to obey "false democracy".In this regard, his basic position that the CCP should surrender has not changed.The problem is that he regards the CCP’s armed forces as the party’s army and is privately owned, while his own army and the Kuomintang party’s army are regarded as the army of the entire country.In fact, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party are parties with "armed troops".Ye Gongchao once mentioned to Chiang Kai-shek that the British asked why the CCP’s use of force is a crime since the Kuomintang’s power was obtained by force.Chiang Kai-shek's answer was: "We have to use force to overthrow the Qing imperial system and the warlord regime. Now that we have no such goal, we should not be able to privately use force." (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 568) He should Think about it, the Qing imperial system and warlord separatism were "overthrown" because feudal corruption was unpopular, and this was the same malady that the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship repeated at that time. The Communist Party used this reason to have "private force" to overthrow the Kuomintang dictatorship Dictatorship with Chiang Kai-shek. Knowing Chiang's true intentions, one can understand why he not only did not implement the resolutions of the CPPCC, but instead did the opposite.Tang Zong's diary has already admitted that Chiang Kai-shek had to convene the CPPCC under the "international request", but he was not willing to do so. He believed that "this Political Consultative Conference was a failure" and was a kind of "humiliation" (see "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek") 》，页五七八、五八Ｏ、五九一），美国人也早就清楚明白，蒋介石一心一意要以武力使中共屈服。他们说蒋挟持了中国成为一个民主而富裕国家的一线希望。 （参阅Ｕ．Ｓ．Ｄｅｐａｒｔｍｅｎｔ ｏｆ Ｓｔａｔｅ，Ｕｎｉｔｅｄ Ｓｔａｔｅｓ Ｒｅｌａｔｉｏｎｓ ｗｉｔｈ Ｃｈｉｎａ ｗｉｔｈ Ｓｐｅｃｉａｌ Ｒｅｆｅｒｅｎｃｅ ｔｏ ｔｈｅ Ｐｅｒｉｏｄ １９４４—１９４９，Ｐ．９０； Ｈａｙｆｏｒｄ，Ｔｏ ｔｈｅ Ｐｅｏｐｌｅ，Ｐ．２０５） 更不幸的是，政协开会期间，大批特务多次前往捣乱，侮辱出席代表。政协的民主同盟代表黄炎培与张申府的居处，被便衣人员侵入骚扰，民盟提出严重交涉，请求查究，国民党代表孙科以政协主席资格，表示道歉，但特务仍未收敛。一九四六年二月十日上午九时，近万群众在重庆较场口庆祝政协会议成功时，特务又来闹场，高声喊打，大会总指挥李公朴、政协代表郭沫若、马寅初、施复亮等被殴伤，造成流血的暴力事件。过了不久，重庆的中共《新华日报》社与民盟的《民主报》社也被暴徒捣毁，报社人员多被殴伤。民盟主席张澜特于二月二十三日致函蒋介石，指出特务一再闹事，虽一再“请求政府惩办祸首”，没有结果，而又发生捣毁报社事件，责问蒋介石说： 使我公知之而故予优容，则人将疑其不诚；使我公竟不知之，则人将谓其不明。中国民主同盟同人本于爱护国家、促成民主，并为维持我公威信起见，谨请迅予严惩较场口血案及捣毁《民主报》、《新华日报》之主使人，并解散特务组织，责令陪都各治安机关切实保证以后不再发生同样事件，使人权获有保障，而政治协商会议所郑重通过之一切决议，得以确实进行。（载《政治协商会议资料》，页四六五至四六六） 特务根本是蒋之工具，若非示意，哪会伤人？唐纵日记中透露，二月六日官邸汇报时，蒋主席即有“对民主同盟为共党做鹰犬应予膺惩”的指示（见《在蒋介石身边八年》，页五八七），张澜的责问和要求岂非与虎谋皮？ 蒋介石怂恿特务的结果，终于出了大乱子、吃了大苦头。一九四六年七月十一日，在政协开会期间被特务打破头的李公朴在昆明被暗杀了。四天以后，著名的西南联大文学教授闻一多在参加李公朴追悼会后也被人枪杀了。李、闻都是民盟的骨干分子，蒋介石一直认为民盟是共产党“鹰犬”、一直想要“膺惩”，所以事发之后，十目所视，莫不视向特务，成为震动中外的重大政治谋杀事件。民盟失去两大要员，固然打击不小，但蒋介石及其政府受到的冲击更大，对国民党的最后溃败，有推波助澜之功，不亚于几个师的威力。 民盟秘书长梁漱溟亲往昆明调查此案后，于八月二十五日在上海举行记者招待会，报告调查经过和结果： 可以用吞吞吐吐四字来说明此案。一是李案“未捉获凶手”，只拿出闻案来“公审”，是李案“吞”而闻案“吐”。二是承认是昆明警备司令部两个中下级军官干的，这是“吐”；但是出于凶犯“个人气愤”，这样就“吞”去了暗杀的主谋者。三是“公审”只许中央社记者参加，这是“吐”；但拒绝《大公报》记者及其他报社记者参加，这是“吞”。四是“公审”好像审判完结，这是“吐”；但问是否再审，他们答不出来是“吞”。（梁漱溟《忆往谈旧录》，页二二九） 此案之所以不能在高压之下一口“吞”了，因为特务干得太明目张胆、民愤太大，然而梁漱溟的调查毕竟无以查出整个内情，内情必须要由里面的人来透露。当时戴笠已因飞机失事去世近四个月，蒋介石派唐纵到昆明去处理这件案子。唐赴昆明前，于七月二十二日凌晨五时接到军统人事处处长郑修元（化名郑履冰）长电，“报告李、闻案与警备部有关”。唐于二十三日飞抵昆明，郑修元以及云南警务处处长李毓桢与昆明警察局长龚少侠向他“报告李、闻案真相与经过情形”，唐要他们“对外谨慎言论”。唐于二十六日由昆明飞上海，翌日飞九江，前往牯岭去见蒋介石报告此行经过，唐说： 主席愤怒犹未已，大骂霍揆彰是疯子。余曰，闻一多于招待记者会时，侮辱领袖，力斥特务分子，刺激过甚，青年人血气方刚，一时控制不住。主席长吁短叹，曰：汝再赴昆明一行。（《在蒋介石身边八年》，页六三四） 事情闹得太大，失了面子，所以蒋介石大发脾气，大骂霍揆彰。霍揆彰何人？乃警备总司令也，又是陈诚的亲信。唐在牯岭遇见陈诚办公室高参张振国，说是霍受领袖痛骂，无计可出，彼已函昆明稽查处将行动有关人员拘捕，挺胸做烈士?选七月二十八日下午三时，蒋又召见唐，唐向蒋陈明： 李闻二案宜分开，以示非有计划之行动，闻案以受刺激而出于义侠之偶然行为，李案以云南人出面承担，为报复李公朴构煽部队之义侠行为。主席曰，不好，李案如不破，则暂作悬案。（前引书，同页） “以示非有计划之行动”，岂非“此地无银三百两”？无异自认是警备总部有计划之行动，为了向社会交代，必须编造故事。李案的故事编造得不好，所以蒋介石要把它暂作“悬案”。唐纵于七月三十一日再度飞往昆明，与卢汉、顾祝同、霍揆彰等商量具体步骤。云南省主席卢汉说：“案情不必调查，已成公开秘密。”当时的公开秘密就是特务干的，乃决定“由地方青龙、金马等组织中挺出一人担当本案责任”。（见唐纵《在蒋介石身边八年》，页六三五）已可证明原非两个中下级军官因一时气愤而杀人，乃是警备总部有计划的行动，所以才必须找替罪羊出来“担当责任”。 唐纵得知全部真相，并以特务们的案情报告“简略草率”，为之“甚不怿”?选（见同书，页六三七）他的日记所记虽语焉未详，但蛛丝马迹已很清楚，很可旁证沈醉于《军统内幕》一书中所说霍揆彰实系主凶： 霍杀害这些民主人士的目的，原来是想讨好蒋介石，希望改派他当云南省政府主席。因为霍是陈诚系中的重要骨干分子，他从陈诚口中了解到蒋介石对同情中共的民主人士一向恨之入骨，满以为这样一来可以更加得到蒋的宠信，却没有想到竟会得到相反的下场。（下册，页四五七至四五八） 陈诚说蒋恨民主人士入骨，完全正确。事实上，案发前一个多月的六月五日，蒋有明确指示“对民盟不必姑息”，“应施打击”。（见唐纵《在蒋介石身边八年》，页六二二）霍不“姑息”民盟分子李公朴、闻一多以邀宠，则蒋虽不杀李、闻，而李、闻却因蒋而死矣。美国方面对此事件的反应是十分强烈的，杜鲁门总统于八月十日写了一封“措辞严峻”、“甚至唐突”的信，要求中国大使馆立即转送蒋介石，其中特别提到“最近昆明发生暗害中国著名自由主义者事件，不容忽视，这些残暴的谋杀事件不论其责任谁属，其结果已使美国注视中国局势，且日益认为中国当局只图以军队或秘密警察等暴力解决重大社会问题，而不采取民主手段”。（见《顾维钧回忆录》第六册，页十七）马歇尔亦曾于有人在场时，当面向蒋介石提及李、闻二教授被刺事，令蒋十分难堪。（Ｒｅａ ＆ Ｂｒｅｗｅｒ ｅｄ．，ｔｈｅ Ｆｏｒｇｏｔｔｅｎ Ａｍｂａｓｓａｄｏｒ，Ｐ．２—３） 蒋介石连手无寸铁的民盟都容不了，遑论“小米加步枪”的中共，更遑论联合政府?选但是联合政府乃是战后和谈的基础，基础既不存在，则国共停战不过是暂时的，虚有其表耳。至国共在东北公开兵戎相见，一发而难以收拾矣。 苏联军队进据东北后，最初阻止中共接收，然而由于蒋介石的过度亲美以及美军出现华北，使苏军延迟撤兵（斯大林要求美军同时撤出未果），乃不再阻止新四军与八路军发展。苏军于一九四六年四月十四日撤出长春，即由三万中共军队进入，逼投降国民党的伪满军退出。蒋遂以“俄国已决心在北满制造共产党伪政权”（见蒋介石一九四六年四月二十日反省录）为理由，密令徐永昌进剿。此时虽距公开内战还有好几个月，但“停战”变成断断续续的“休战”，和平基本上已名存实亡。 一九四六年五月三日，苏军撤出东北，蒋介石、宋美龄夫妇回到南京，五月五日宣布还都，五月六日斯大林邀蒋介石访俄，蒋竟然认为是“离间中、美关系之最大阴谋”而加以拒绝。五月十九日开始在东北发动攻击，先后攻克四平街与公主岭，又于二十三日攻占长春。蒋原说共军非撤出长春不能继续和谈；马歇尔乃要求蒋下停战令以免扩大，而蒋以视察东北为名，告诉马歇尔回来再说。蒋显然觉得一举夺取长春，证明中共实不堪一击，乃想大打一阵后再停战。宋美龄陪蒋介石于五月二十四日抵达沈阳后，致一英文长函给马歇尔，除表示仍将遵守前订停战协定外，提出三项要求：一、中共让中央政府接受东北主权；二、中共不干涉恢复全国交通；三、国共代表意见不一时，美方有最后决定权。马将此函交周恩来，周于二十六日回信，原则上同意作为谈判的基础，只对所提三项要求略做澄清，并要求停战。但停战须等蒋回京，蒋到六月五日才回到南京，马歇尔立即要蒋宣布停战以便和谈，而蒋仅允休战十日，说是所有条件谈妥后再正式停战。马要求无限期停战，但蒋仅略做让步，允多休战五日（参阅Ｍａｒｓｈａｌｌ'ｓ Ｍｉｓｓｉｏｎ ｔｏ Ｃｈｉｎａ Ｖｏl 1，Ｐ．１３６—１３９）及休战期限将满，在各方压力下，蒋再延八天。最后中共对宋美龄提出的三项要求多少做了让步，但蒋介石又提出新要求，就是苏北地方政权问题。蒋不仅要共军自苏北撤走，而且共方警察、保安以及行政人员也须撤走，完全由国民党接收。中共不答应，只允按照政协决议原则选举改组政府之后，由新政府来接收。至六月二十九日休战期满前夕，虽经马歇尔苦心劝说，蒋仍不肯接受马氏的解决方案，也不肯暂行保留未有协议部分，不肯签字停战。也不愿宣布谈判破裂，于七月二日要国共五人小组：周恩来、董必武、邵力子、王世杰、陈诚去商谈未了问题，谈了十天仍无结果，蒋借此下令开火，并立即登上庐山，显然是要躲避马歇尔。 马歇尔于七月十四日跟上庐山，此后飞来飞去，到九月一日为止，一共九上庐山（幸而马歇尔夫人也住在庐山，尚可公私两顾），一再向蒋进言停战，仍无办法。（见Ｍａｒｓｈａｌｌ'ｓ Ｍｉｓｓｉｏｎ ｔｏ Ｃｈｉｎａ，Ｖｏｌ 1?熏Ｐ．１９０）蒋却于八月十一日又向中共提出五项要求：一、中共自苏北、皖北撤退；二、中共自热河朝阳撤出；三、中共自胶济铁路全线撤退；四、中共于六月七日以后所占晋、鲁各地须撤出；五、中共须于十月十日之前自兴安省撤退，自黑龙江、吉林两省撤出一半。这五项要求又超出苏北地方政权问题远甚，真是没完没了。中共则要求停战后才能谈，到九月底，蒋终于答应停战，马歇尔正感高兴，而此时蒋军进攻张家口打得顺手，中共抗议，若不立刻停止，和谈全面破裂，责任由国民党来负，顿形紧张。而蒋于十月二日又提出有关国府委员名额与驻军地点两点声明。这两点连马歇尔都感不妥，要求见蒋，蒋则避而不见，马将这两点声明交给周恩来后才得与蒋见面，此时马已气蒋，要求杜鲁门把他召回，司徒雷登也认为“蒋氏进军张家口，同时又利用马将军和我继续和平谈判，这会连累及美国方面的信誉的”。（《司徒雷登日记》，页九）最后马与司徒雷登大使于十月六日和蒋谈了八个钟头，连饭都没有吃，蒋仅仅答应停战十日。（见梁漱溟《忆往谈旧录》，页二Ｏ四） 周恩来见到蒋之两点声明已不高兴，及知马要中共于停战十日之内实行这二点才能停战，更感有助蒋为虐之嫌，于十月九日给马歇尔写了一个备忘录，说明不能接受两项要求的原因，并责怪马阴助蒋，无意和平。马歇尔辛苦一场，结果是猪八戒照镜子两面不是人。据董必武和王炳南告诉梁漱溟，马帅大发雷霆，气得发抖。（见《忆往谈旧录》，页二Ｏ七至二Ｏ八） 正在此危机时刻，国民党军队于十月十一日攻克了中共重要据点张家口，蒋介石得此佳音捷报，高兴之余，更不顾中共反对以及政协决议，拟于十一月十五日召开国民大会。国共之外的第三方面势力仍想做最后努力，蒋于十月二十一日接见中间派人士后，又立即飞往台湾，显无谈判诚意，至二十五日国民党拿下安东，大家才明白蒋早已决定大打特打了。 马歇尔声望极高、信心极强，对于调停失败当然耿耿于怀。连亲蒋的国民党学者邵玉铭，在他的司徒雷登传里，也不得不指出，马歇尔对蒋一意想用武力解决感到非常愤怒。（见Ｓｈａｗ，Ａｎ Ａｍｅｒｉｃａｎ Mｉｓｓｉｏｎａｒｙ ｉｎ Ｃｈｉｎａ，Ｐ．１７１）黄炎培于一九四七年元旦写的一首绝句：“去年一月政协开，今年决议烧作灰；借问将军马歇尔，将军端为何事来”（见许汉三《黄炎培年谱》，页二Ｏ一），很可表达马帅离华前的落寞心情。马歇尔最大的败笔是他以大力促成政协完成自由民主的决议，而不能大力使决议落实，他谴责国共双方的“极端（ｅｘｔｒｅｍｉｓｔ ｅｌｅｍｅｎｔｓ）派”破坏了和平（Ｍａｒｓｈａｌｌ'ｓ Ｍｉｓｓｉｏｎ ｔｏ Ｃｈｉｎａ，Ｖｏl．１，Ｐ．４３１—４３３），实系外交辞令，因中共方面的意见相当一致，固然没有什么“极端派”，国民党方面派系虽多，一切都是蒋介石说了算，他若要和平，谁敢破坏？所以和战的关键人物无过于蒋。蒋一心要“消灭共匪”，原无意要和，然逼于情势，震于马歇尔的威名，不得不加以敷衍，后来发觉美国因战略关系，冷战形势已成，不会主动放弃蒋政府，也不会断绝军援、经援，更因反共的“麦卡锡主义”（ＭａＣａｒｔｈｙｉｓｍ）抬头，亲蒋的“中国游说团”（Ｔｈｅ Ｃｈｉｎａ Ｌｏｂｂｙ）在华府实力强劲，乃有恃无恐，大耍起“瑞元无赖”的性格，令马帅九上庐山，吃尽苦头，而和谈不成。马歇尔于和谈失败后，曾于十二月一日与蒋介石见面，坦白警告蒋，内战将导致整个经济崩溃，绝不可忽视中共的力量，而蒋不同意马之悲观看法，认为中共在他的攻势下，不可能维持八至十个月。一周之后，蒋又向美国驻华大使司徒雷登说，即使没有美援，他亦将在十个月内消灭中共?选（参阅Ｓｈａｗ，Ａｎ Ａｍｅｒｉｃａｎ Ｍｉｓｓｉｏｎａｒｙ ｉｎ Ｃｈｉｎａ，Ｐ．１８４）蒋既一意要打，劝阻不成，打输了又怪美国人援助不力，又再度呈现了“瑞元无赖”的性格。