Chapter 36 Section 2 The Reason of the KMT-Communist War

When the Kuomintang wrote the history of the eight-year war of resistance, it often said that the Communist Party did not fight the Japanese, but the national army, robbed the territory, and took advantage of the opportunity.It's great to take the opportunity, but they don't have to ask for trouble to fight the national army to grab the territory.Too many territories have been occupied by the Japanese. As long as they continue to fight guerrillas behind the enemy lines, they can seize many territories and win more hearts. Therefore, the more they fight, the more chances they will gain.

The Kuomintang and the Communist Party once boasted to each other who made the most contribution to the war of resistance, but there is one thing that the Kuomintang is absolutely incomparable to, and that is the determination to resist the war.According to the English "Cambridge History of China", during the War of Resistance, there were as many as 500,000 troops from the Central Army who defected to the enemy, and as many as 42 surrendered generals who defected to the enemy in 1943 (Cambridge History of China, Vo1 13, Pt. 2, P. 571), and none of the leaders of the Communist Party and the Red Army surrendered to the enemy or secretly negotiated peace with the Japanese during the War of Resistance, let alone a traitor.How can the Kuomintang resolve itself in this situation?

The Kuomintang said that the Communist Army was fighting the National Army, but it was actually the National Army fighting the Communist Army.Chiang Kai-shek already regretted not being able to wipe out the Red Army before the war; he was even more heartbroken when he saw the Communist Party gaining power during the war, and he wholeheartedly wanted to dissolve, suppress, and destroy the Communist Party.It is absolutely true that Chiang Kai-shek was full of murderous intentions towards the CCP during the Anti-Japanese War.The reason for this is that Chiang originally started as a "Red General", knew the power of the Communist Party, coupled with his character of not allowing others to sleep soundly beside his bed, and was even more afraid that the CCP would seize his power, so he had to get rid of him.The principle of "fair competition" in political competition is a joke to him.His way of acting is always thinking of "I am the only one", preventing others from winning in political competitions.But if you use "strong", there will be a rebound; the strong will not be defeated, and the result of the rebound is that you will be defeated.

In 1966, Zuo Shunsheng came to Taiwan and told Li Ao: When he was in Yan'an, he met Mao Zedong, a fellow from Hunan.Mao Zedong said passionately: "Chiang Kai-shek always thought that there are no two suns and no two masters for the people. I 'do not believe in evil', but I want to show him two suns? Choose?" Can the Kuomintang repent at the end of the day and see the sun? There is more than one, no one believes it will, maybe the Kuomintang has been so arrogant that it is superstitious that it is a divine figure in "Yao Ruyi shoots the nine sunsets", but, so what, the nine suns have set, and Hou Yi is not the same Did the family die and laugh for the world? "Don't believe in evil" is an authentic Hunan dialect, which means that you don't care what it means.Zuo Shunsheng also mentioned in "Wanzhulou Essays", "Mao has the brute force of a Hunanese."Although Chiang Kai-shek was insidious and deceitful, when he encountered the Hunan barbarians, there was no end to it.

Chiang Kai-shek could not tolerate the Communist Party. However, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party did not completely break up during the eight-year war of resistance. There are two main reasons.First, in the general environment where the whole country is united in the resistance against Japan, Jiang dared not openly suppress the Communists on a large scale, so he could only do it secretly.In the later period of the Anti-Japanese War, although the willingness to suppress the Communist Party increased, but due to international observations, they did not dare to act rashly, and could only do it secretly.Second, Mao Zedong's challenge to Chiang Kai-shek was sometimes tit-for-tat, and sometimes retreated, trying not to lead to a rupture, which was Mao's so-called strategy of both unity and struggle.On the one hand, maintain the anti-Japanese national united front, united under the central government, with Chiang Kai-shek as the supreme commander;Therefore, conflicts and contradictions continued, but the Communist Party did not break with the Kuomintang, and pursued the established political strategy of the KMT-CPC cooperation for a long-term war of resistance.

Mao Zedong refused to break up, and Chiang Kai-shek did not dare to break up, so the KMT and the Communist Party had no choice but to follow the path of unity and struggle that Mao Zedong had envisioned.Mao set up the chess record and invited Jiang to play, since he was not an opponent.Although Chiang had the upper hand militarily, he was politically passive and inferior. No wonder Chiang said on March 9, 1940, "It is the Communist Party that makes trouble." ("President Chiang's Secret Record", Page 2692) Chiang denounced the CCP’s separatist regime by supporting troops. Reaction is no different from feudal warlords. Mao would not blush at all, because China is still very feudal. If you want to abolish feudalism, you must have an army.The so-called "Government comes out of the barrel of a gun", Mao Ben learned from Chiang.Mao said:

The Chiang Kai-shek of the past ten years was counter-revolutionary.For counter-revolution, he created a huge central army.Where there is an army, there is power, and war solves everything.He held on to this basic point very tightly.For this, we should learn from him. (Xin Ziling's "The Complete Biography of Mao Zedong", Volume 2, page 323) After the Xi’an Incident, the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has been imminent, but Chiang Kai-shek has always disliked the term “Partnership between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party” because it equates the Kuomintang and the Communist Party on an equal footing. However, he does not recognize the Communist Party as a legal political party at all. .He does not want to join the Communist Party, but to dissolve the Communist Party. He wants to merge the Communist Party into the Kuomintang, just like the incorporation of the army.Therefore, although Zhou Enlai repeatedly expressed to Chiang the sincerity of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Chiang always replied vehemently: "Don't mention the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, just mention cooperation with me?" Two nine three, three six three)

From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the abandonment of Wuhan, Chiang Kai-shek was busy dealing with the ferocious Japanese attack, and had no spare power to deal with the Communist Party. There was almost no friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.It is worth noting that Jiang Mao's strategy for dealing with the Japanese attack has been different.Jiang fought regular positional warfare, and it was difficult to concentrate his troops. Facing the enemy's superior firepower, he was often passive and beaten, and he paid a heavy price, leading to a catastrophic retreat.Mao fought mobile warfare, mobilizing the broad masses of the people to fight guerrillas.Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and other generals of the Communist Army seized the opportunity to go deep into the enemy's rear, establish more and more anti-Japanese base areas, and surround the cities and transportation arteries occupied by the enemy.Chiang's frontal combat and Mao's guerrilla warfare can be described as the strategic cooperation of the KMT and the Communist Party in resisting Japan.In addition, in the early days of the Anti-Japanese War, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party cooperated in the battle and won a victory in the Battle of Pingxingguan.In September 1937, Seishiro Itagaki, head of the Fifth Division of the Japanese Army, decided to break through the Great Wall defense line, march into Shanxi, and attack the Pingxingguan area.On September 22nd and 23rd, bloody battles started. Fu Zuoyi was ordered by Yan Xishan, commander of the second war zone, to reinforce, while the 115th Division of the Communist Army was led by Lin Biao to flatten the enemy's flanks.Lin Biao's mobile and flexible tactics cooperated well with Fu Zuoyi's main frontal defense, using favorable terrain to set up ambushes to wait for the invading enemy.On the morning of the 25th, a Japanese supply unit entered the ambush circle, was severely beaten, and its head and tail were cut off.By the noon of the next day, more than a thousand enemies were wiped out, and the traffic of the Japanese army was cut off, which strongly supported Fu Zuoyi's frontal counterattack, and put the 21st Brigade of the Japanese army into a tight siege.On September 30, due to Itagaki's large-scale reinforcements, all ministries withdrew from the battle.This battle can be described as the first and last battle of the Kuomintang and Communist Party's joint fight against the Japanese army.

From Pingjin, Songhu, to the fall of Nanjing, although the Chinese soldiers and civilians suffered heavy sacrifices, their heroism in resisting the enemy is truly impressive.During the defense of Wuhan on September 29, 1938, Mao Zedong specially entrusted Zhou Enlai to write a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, expressing his admiration to Chiang for "leading the whole nation in an unprecedented revolutionary war."At the same time, Jiang was encouraged to "unite the whole people, consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese front, persist in a protracted war, mobilize new forces, overcome difficulties, and prepare for a counteroffensive."The letter repeatedly emphasized unity and reminded the enemy to destroy unity.He believes that "the long-term unity of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party will surely support a long-term war. Although the enemy is fierce and stubborn, he will eventually fail" (see "Secret Records of President Chiang", p. 71 for the full letter), which clearly expresses the long-term desire to cooperate.

After the fall of Wuhan, the war of resistance entered a stalemate, and Chiang Kai-shek's attention was shifted to the issue of the Communist Party.At the same time, the Jiang-Japan peace talks that are still going on and secretly, "joint defense against communism" has always been one of the necessary conditions for the Japanese side.However, the strategy of killing two birds with one stone against the Communist Party's becoming Chiang Kai-shek can satisfy the need to get rid of the confidant's troubles, and can also demonstrate the sincerity of the peace talks with Japan.In January 1939, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang held in Chongqing, the main topic of internal affairs was "organizing party affairs."Chiang Kai-shek made a report and a speech at the meeting, calling for "awakening the soul of the party". In line with the policy of dissolving communism, a special "committee for preventing communism" was set up.In order to strengthen the party, the congress also decided to set up the Supreme Council of National Defense, with Chiang as its chairman, to dictatorship the power of the party, government and military.After the meeting, in accordance with the spirit of the meeting, a series of measures to deal with the Communist Party were formulated, such as "Measures for Handling the Communist Party Issue", "Draft Measures for Preventing Communist Party Activities in Occupied Areas", "How the Eighth Route Army Should Operate Freely in North China and Northern Shaanxi". Disposal", "Measures for Handling Alien Party Issues" and so on. (See "Records of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang") Fifteen months after the War of Resistance, the Kuomintang reaffirmed its anti-communist policy. Although it was not as violent as the purge of the party in 1927, the long-term unity and cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party that Mao Zedong hoped for Naturally, it is vain.

In March of the same year, Chiang Kai-shek established the General Spiritual Mobilization Association, and he was also the chairman. He formulated the "National Spiritual Mobilization Program" and advocated "spiritual transformation." March 12, 1939), the spearhead clearly pointed at the CCP and communism.In May, Jiang personally presided over the Spiritual Mobilization Pledge Meeting and parade in Chongqing.On the surface, in order to resist Japan and save the country, the national spiritual mobilization wants the people to "do great filial piety" and "great loyalty", but in the name of the Three People's Principles, it implements the reality of a one-person, one-party dictatorship to achieve "military, political, military orders and administrative dictatorship". The unification of the system” and so on, the defense against communism is actually more important than the resistance against Japan.Knowing that after the defensive situation appeared on the battlefield of the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek had shifted his focus from anti-Japanese to anti-communist. In late November of this year, Zhou Enlai was injured in Yan'an. He called the Chongqing Aviation Committee to send a plane to Moscow for treatment.Chiang Kai-shek was very angry when he heard this, and "ordered the Air Navigation Commission to send planes to pick them up, and not to allow Soviet planes to meet them." (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 103) At first, the Air Navigation Commission refused to send the plane. Didn't it follow Chiang's will?When he saw that "if you don't steal chickens, you will lose a lot of rice", you lose your temper and order to dispatch planes.This small matter shows that Jiang's mind is serious. After little things, there are big things.At the end of the same year, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Hu Zongnan to build a group of fortresses from the west of the Yellow River to Xifeng in Gansu, just like the fortifications of the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign, to encircle the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border area in an attempt to enter Yan'an.Zhu De and Peng Dehuai made a political counterattack against Chiang's military quasi-attack, telegraphed the whole country, and accused the guns of turning their heads inside. (For the telegram, see Volume 1 of "Records of the National Political Council", pages 724-725) In early March 1940, Ye Jianying, Chief of Staff of the Eighteenth Army of the Communist Party of China (that is, the Eighth Route Army), went to Chongqing to attend a meeting and reported the reasons for the friction between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. , but Chiang Kai-shek avoided answering after hearing this, "not mentioning a word." (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", pages 719-720) Until April, when Chiang presided over the Fifth Session of the First National Political Council, He Yingqin made a military report, accusing Yan'an of forming a government of its own, Arbitrarily setting up banks, issuing banknotes, expanding the army, and forming separatist regimes are regarded as the basis for "severe sanctions".At this point, the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party has naturally deteriorated day by day. Large-scale conflicts broke out in Shanxi and Henan, and the CCP launched a political offensive.Jiang was unable to break up, and finally had to order Wei Lihuang to negotiate with Zhu De in Luoyang.Zhu De proposed the legalization of the Communist Party, the protection of "Xinhua Daily", the release of arrested CCP personnel, and the cessation of attacks on the Communist Army.These demands were reasonable and reasonable. Although Chiang could not accept them, he felt the pressure of being passive politically.But he never gave up, and ordered Chen Lifu to formulate countermeasures, which included three items: First, to unify the understanding of comrades in the party on the issue of the Communist Party, so that the Communist Party will not be able to use its skills to sow discord.Second, establish military and political bases to prevent the spread of the Communist Party's influence, and then gradually reduce the area it occupies (such as the Shandong-Hebei Border Region, the Northern Shaanxi Border Region, etc.).Third, eradicate the activities of the Communist Party in the rear provinces. (Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", page 134) According to this plan, Chiang Kai-shek proposed a "Proposal for Prompting" in mid-July 1940, which was also a "Proposal for Prevention". Temporarily under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan of the central government; second, cancel the Hebei-Chahar theater, delineate the 18th Army and the New Fourth Army's combat area, and merge it into Yan Xishan's second theater, with Zhu De as the deputy commander-in-chief, adhering to the order of the Military Commission, commanding Combat; third, order the Eighteenth Army and the New Fourth Army to move to the designated area within one month; fourth, the Eighteenth Army must be organized into six divisions of the three armies and five supplementary regiments, and the New Fourth Army must be organized into two divisions. (See Chiang Kai-shek's "Soviet Russia in China") Its purpose is obviously to strictly regulate the area and strength of the Communist Army's activities, and then prevent it.However, during the Anti-Japanese War, how to stop the Red Army's anti-Japanese activities, especially the activities behind the enemy lines?At this time, the international situation was even more unfavorable. Both Vietnam and Myanmar were blocked, which made Chongqing even more isolated.Many people advocated re-exposing Sun Yat-sen's three major policies and uniting with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Zhu Mao also sent a telegram to make this request. (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 143) But Jiang preferred to take another path, secretly actively carrying out the Chiang-Japanese peace talks (see the previous section of this book), and the tension between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party became more tense. On October 19, 1940, when the communist army was engaged in the Hundred Regiments Campaign, Chiang Kai-shek suddenly ordered He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi to jointly send a telegram to the leader of the communist army, accusing the communist army of not defending the scope of the theater, expanding freely, and not obeying the orders of the central government , Do not attack the enemy but annex the friendly army.According to this, the Eighteenth Army and the New Fourth Army were ordered to move to the area north of the Yellow River within one month, and they were not allowed to cross the border without authorization.Chiang Kai-shek’s real heart trouble was that the territory occupied by the New Fourth Army was the strategic golden area of ​​the three provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui. Once the war ended, the important towns in East China were likely to fall into the hands of the CCP. Of course, he was seriously concerned. The New Fourth Army moved. (See Meng Juezi's "Retribution of Chiang Kai-shek—Results of the Gu Zhutong Massacre", pages 1-10) A month later, Zhu De and other generals of the communist army published a good telegram. The side expressed its willingness to drive the New Fourth Army to the north of the Yangtze River and make military concessions to the Kuomintang.On December 9, Jiang issued a warrant with the order of the chairman, allowing the New Fourth Army in the south of the Yangtze River to move to the Jiangbei area before the 31st of the same month, and to move to the area north of the Yellow River on January 30 next year.The Eighteenth Group Army south of the Yellow River was limited to moving north of the Yellow River on December 31. (For the original trace of the warrant, see "Bitter Hearts and Solitary Achievements", p. 224) It can be seen that Chiang Kai-shek deliberately planned to drive all the communist troops to the north of the Yellow River.By late December 1940, most of the 100,000 troops of the Jiangnan New Fourth Army had moved northward. However, when the remaining New Fourth Army headquarters and three detachments with a total of more than 9,000 people were preparing to move north, if they followed the route drawn by Zhu Tong, they would be in the jaws of the Japanese heavy artillery. So Zhou Enlai asked Jiang to change the route. Jiang pretended to promise it, but when he traveled to the Maolin area on January 6, 1941, he was suddenly surrounded and wiped out by more than 80,000 people under the command of Chiang Kai-shek's direct lineage, Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang. After seven days and nights of bloody battle , only more than 2,000 people broke through, and the remaining 4,000 people were either killed or captured.The army commander Ye Ting was captured, and the chief of staff (should be the deputy army commander and political commissar—editor) Xiang Ying was killed.This is the sensational "Southern Anhui Incident". Originally, more than two years ago, Mao Zedong had already instructed the New Fourth Army to go deep into the enemy's rear as soon as possible and carry out independent guerrilla warfare from a military and political perspective.Zhou Enlai also personally conveyed to the New Fourth Army the policy of "strengthening the south, fighting east, and developing north" to the New Fourth Army in February 1939.On September 19, 1940, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China hoped that Ye Ting and Xiang Ying "led the troops to cross the river immediately to reinforce eastern Anhui".Three days later, Zhu Mao called again.But Xiang Ying was reluctant to part with the base area that had been established, and wanted to "guard southern Anhui".When Chiang Kai-shek, He Yingqin, Bai Chongxi, etc. were rushing to and fro, Mao Zedong urged Ye and Xiang to cross the river as quickly as possible and use eastern Anhui as their base.After the Hao telegram was issued, Mao made it clear: "If you stay in southern Anhui, you must prepare for a civil war and suffer political disadvantages. Please consider it." (Quoted from Huang Kaiyuan et al. (1981) 3, p. 20) Although Ye and Xiang sent an advance regiment northward to Wuwei in mid-October, they still could not make up their minds to move northward.Xiang Ying still repeatedly cited the difficulties of the north crossing to the central government.On November 24 of the same year, Yan'an called Ye and Xiang again: "You must prepare to start the operation by the end of December." On November 30, Mao sent another telegram to Ye and Xiang: "Now start moving in batches, The move was completed by the end of December." The New Fourth Army did not begin to move some non-combatants until December 3rd, completely unaware of the urgency of the situation, and dreamed of asking the Kuomintang to pay their salaries before starting.In the end, Mao Zedong severely criticized Xiang Ying in his telegram on December 26, and then moved north immediately two days later, but chose the wrong route to the north (see the same book for details, pages 21-22). , Delayed the opportunity even more, and fell into the encirclement of the Kuomintang army, and was wiped out on January 14, 1941. Chiang Kai-shek originally wanted to use excuses to eliminate the New Fourth Army. On the day after he issued the warrant to move northward within a time limit, he secretly ordered Gu Zhutong to deploy. (See "Selected Materials on the Southern Anhui Incident", p. 402) On December 25, Gu Zhutong and Shangguan Yunxiang were ordered secretly: the operation must be particularly secret and swift, and the New Fourth Army should be completely wiped out, so that it does not slip through the net.On January 8, Gu Zhutong issued another secret order to Shangguan Yunxiang, "Strictly order to encircle the current area, cut off the power within 12 hours, and annihilate it with one blow." (The original is in the Second Archives of Nanjing) Ye Ting and Xiang Ying were unaware of the situation and were hesitant. Not only did they miss the opportunity to break out of the encirclement and preserve their strength, but they also fell right into Jiang's plan and were wiped out. Chiang Kai-shek originally estimated that it would take three months of fighting to annihilate the New Fourth Army, but unexpectedly it took only more than a week.In terms of rewards for meritorious deeds, Shangguan, the commander of the 32nd Group Army, was rewarded with 50,000 yuan in French currency (the monthly salary of a colonel at that time was about 120 yuan).On January 17, excited, Jiang resolutely revoked the designation of the New Fourth Army and handed Ye Ting over to court-martial.On January 30, still satisfied with the matter, he wrote in his diary: Resolving the case of the New Fourth Army and revoking its designation is a major event in the process of the national revolution, and its nature may be even greater than the Zhongshan warship incident on March 20 in the fifteenth year of the Republic of China.See "Secret Records of President Chiang", p. 2717. He compared this incident with the Zhongshan warship incident, which is very interesting and helps to understand the nature of the Zhongshan warship incident, which turned out to be a self-directed anti-communist tactic.However, for him, the Southern Anhui Incident was not as successful as the Zhongshan Ship Incident. It did not suppress the Communist Party, and even harmed others and himself, which was completely outweighed by the gains.Chiang Kai-shek thought he had a plan, but he forgot that he led the anti-Japanese coach and wiped out an army that had made great contributions to the anti-Japanese war.The spokesman of his Military Commission said that the New Fourth Army rebelled because they wanted to set up base areas in the Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou triangle areas occupied by the enemy. The hat of cooperating with the Japanese invaders to jointly oppose the Communist Party (see "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Volume II, pages 734-735) provided Yan'an with a big topic for a fierce political attack on Chongqing, making Jiang passive everywhere and trying to restrain him. Domestic public opinion, on the other hand, has to explain to the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, which is a mess.The secret agents did not allow the "Xinhua Daily" published in Chongqing to publish the news that the New Fourth Army was wiped out by the regiment, and Zhou Enlai had a guilty conscience. On the second page of the newspaper on January 18, Zhou Enlai only wrote: "Sorrow for the victims in the south of the Yangtze River", in the At the opening of the skylight on the third page, there were four sentences and four sentences inscribed: "A strange injustice through the ages, a leaf in the south of the Yangtze River; why should we fight each other if we fight in the same room?" Instead, it caused a sensation in Chongqing and aroused wider sympathy for the CCP.The Kuomintang secret agents banned newspapers and arrested newsboys, but the description became darker and darker.Chiang Kai-shek's revocation of the designation of the New Fourth Army was even more of a mistake? What's the use of revocation?Instead, the New Fourth Army was "liberated" and no longer belonged to the National Revolutionary Army led by Chiang.On the third day after the revocation, Mao Zedong ordered Chen Yi to act as the commander of the New Fourth Army in the name of the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.Although more than 6,000 of the army had been wiped out, there were still more than 90,000 in central China and southern Jiangsu. Chiang Kai-shek was completely out of his control, and he no longer mentioned the matter of being transferred to the north of the Yellow River.In fact, after the Southern Anhui Incident, Mao Zedong organized the New Fourth Army in the south of the Yangtze River and Huang Kecheng's department into seven divisions, and officially issued an order on February 28, 1941.Soon, three strategic regions were established in central China, which happened to allow the Red Army to fully develop in central China.In May 1949, Chen Yi led the Third Field Army to capture Shanghai, and became the mayor of Shanghai, and Tan Zhenlin became the chairman of Zhejiang Province, both of whom were members of the former New Fourth Army.Even in the military, Chiang is absolutely worth the candle. In politics, Mao Zedong was even more tit-for-tat and aggressive.He accused the pro-Japanese faction of the Kuomintang of instigating an anti-Communist upsurge and wanted to jointly suppress the Communist Party with Japan, "replacing the War of Resistance with Civil War, Independence with Surrender, Unity with Split, and Light with Darkness. The matter is dangerous and the plan is poisonous." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Vol. 2, p. 731) This is a very severe accusation. Under such severe accusations, it is no wonder that Chiang Kai-shek often feels powerless in his peace talks with Japan.And Mao Zedong went further and put forward twelve points of coercion, not only demanding the admission of mistakes and canceling "reactionary orders", but also demanding the release of political prisoners, the abolition of one-party dictatorship, and the implementation of democratic politics.The most interesting thing is that Mao also asked Jiang to "implement the Three People's Principles and obey the Prime Minister's will", indicating that Chiang neither implemented nor obeyed. Under the CCP's powerful political offensive and the pressure of Chinese and foreign public opinion, Chiang Kai-shek publicly stated on January 27, "We will never cause a civil war due to sanctions against rebellion", meaning that he would not break with the CCP because of this, and emphasized that he would not be like Wang Jingwei. To sabotage the war of resistance and betray the nation like that, the tone has changed from offensive to defensive.On March 1, the National Senate was to open. Seven members of the Chinese Communist Party claimed that they refused to attend before the solution to the aftermath of the Southern Anhui Incident had been determined, which created another problem for Chiang Kai-shek.At the meeting on March 8th, Jiang promised that "there will be no army to suppress the Communist Party in the future", and "sincerely persuaded Mao Zedong, Dong Biwu and other politicians", and elected Dong Biwu as a permanent politician, and released the 16th Army of the Kuomintang. Twenty-five people including Li Hua from the Eighth Route Army.On March 14, Chiang also specially invited Zhou Enlai and his wife to lunch. (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 198) This development prompted Mao Zedong to call Zhou Enlai on March 12, scolding Chiang Kai-shek, "This big rascal actually bullies the weak and fears the strong."The Zhongshan ship incident made Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist tide succeed, but the New Fourth Army incident not only failed, but turned even more retrograde. His desire to unify military orders and government orders was even more hopeless. Many people believe that the Southern Anhui Incident ended the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. They even said that Mao Zedong agreed to the anti-Japanese united front due to the pressure of the Communist International. It just happened to be an opportunity to end it. What a joke? Why did Mao want to break with Jiang?Do you hope that the peace talks between Jiang and Japan will succeed and unite to suppress the Communist Party?Mao launched a fierce political attack on Chongqing due to the Southern Anhui Incident, and he held on to the word "reason". However, he did not name Chiang after the attack, but only referred to him as a "pro-Japanese faction". As well as defending the nation-state, there is obviously room for it.In this struggle, Mao Zedong strategized and won thousands of miles, "reasonable, concessional, and beneficial" is indeed a brilliant move.The withering of a leaf in the south of the Yangtze River has won extensive sympathy and support for Yan'an, and the interest of this political capital has also flowed in. In late May 1943, the Communist International suddenly disbanded. Chiang Kai-shek thought that communism was over, so he seized the opportunity to recruit the CCP again. However, as far as Mao Zedong was concerned, the absence of the Communist International was like the loss of a "mother-in-law" who was in charge. , On the contrary, he became the leader of the Communist Party of China, who has the power to make the final decision, and Chiang Kai-shek made a wrong wishful thinking again.