Chapter 35 Chapter Seven: There Are No Generals in Shu

Section 1 The Mystery of Jiang Wang's Double Reed In the history of Kuomintang propaganda, it is said that before and after the Anti-Japanese War, Wang Jingwei advocated peace, was a compromiser, and harmed the country; while Chiang Kai-shek was an advocate of war, an anti-Japanese, and patriotic.In fact, in many cases, the opposite is true. Since Wang Jingwei took office as the Premier in 1932, he has handled state affairs with the mood of "jumping into a fire pit".One of the biggest features is that he is willing to take the blame for Chiang Kai-shek and suffer. Ever since the Jinan Incident in 1928 and the September 18th Incident in 1931, Chiang Kai-shek has been hiding from the Japanese, and he has always been a true peacemaker in his bones.Since then, the Tanggu Agreement in 1933 sold out the rights and interests in North China;However, it was Wang Jingwei who stood in front of the screen and took the blame.As a matter of fact, Wang Jingwei himself was originally a main fighter against Japan. He advocated the September 18th Incident in 1931, the January 28th Incident in 1932, and the Battle of Gubeikou in 1935. Fighting the Japanese, and because of Zhang Xueliang's non-resistance (actually ordered by Chiang Kai-shek), he couldn't bear it for a while, so he sent a telegram to invite Zhang Xueliang to go to the field together, so he went abroad.According to Chen Gongbo's "Memories of Eight Years":

At that time, Mr. Wang not only presided over the Executive Yuan, but also served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I didn't think so at the time, and neither did the comrades in Nanjing.Criticism from the outside world was focused on Mr. Wang alone, thinking that Mr. Wang was the one who made the peace, so many people persuaded Mr. Wang that day: "Mr. Wang" knew about the Songhu agreement in Shanghai, and the Tanggu agreement was an afterthought. I know, Mr. Wang should also make a distinction.Mr. Wang said: "Never make any distinctions. Who asked me to be the Premier? The Premier is responsible for everything." Mr. Wang's words can express his mood that day.

Wang Jingwei, as the Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, was actually sent by Chiang Kai-shek to advocate peace. After the peace was established, Wang Jingwei was required to ratify it. Chen Gongbo's memories tell us: How did Chiang Kai-shek seek his own good name, but Wang Jingwei should bear the bad name on his behalf? Even his brother-in-law Huang Yu was sometimes annoyed by the choice of Chiang Kai-shek's character.In Shen Yiyun's "Memories of Yiyun", there is a telegram from Huang Yu dated May 27, 1933, in which he scolded Badi and said: "I hope that in the future we will truly abide by the old covenant of 'sharing hardships', It is designed as a superficial motivational word, so that those who read the telegrams in later generations will regard those who doubt patriotism as younger brothers (referring to Chiang Kai-shek), and those who wrong the country as brothers (Huang Yu claims to be) also." (Page 492) - even Chiang Kai-shek's Brother Huang Yu is like this, how about Wang Jingwei?In fact, Wang Jingwei's situation at that time was just playing the role of misleading the country, acting as a bitter drama for the superficially patriotic Chiang Kai-shek?

According to Chen Gongbo's recollection: Wang Jingwei began to have a tendency to advocate peace, which began in 1933 at the Battle of Gubeikou on the Great Wall.In this battle, "Because the generals in the front came back and reported that the officers and soldiers were unable to fight. The officers and soldiers were not unwilling to fight. They really couldn't fight because our firepower was farther than the enemy's firepower. The threat of artillery fire. After hearing these reports, Mr. Wang gradually tended to make peace.”After the Xi'an Incident in 1936, he increasingly believed that "China should find a way of peace with Japan", otherwise, once war broke out, it would only benefit the Soviet Union.

From January 28, 1932, when Wang Jingwei became the Premier of the Executive Council, formally Wang and Chiang Kai-shek were jointly responsible for state affairs. The determination caused an uproar across the country.On November 1, 1935, the Kuomintang held the Sixth Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Committee in Nanjing. While taking pictures at the opening ceremony, Wang Jingwei was shot three times.This case is now very clear. The shooter was Sun Fengming, a field reporter from Chenguang News Agency. The president of the news agency is Hu Yunqing. Sacrifice the individual, except Jiang to save the country.As a result, Jiang did not come out to take pictures, and the gunman Sun Fengming had taken opium bubbles, and the toxicity would occur regularly.Although Jiang was spared, Wang was shot for Jiang. (See pages 228 to 231 of Cai Dejin's "Critical Biography of Wang Jingwei"). Also got shot.The murderer obviously wanted to kill Chiang Kai-shek? Choose...

After the Xi'an Incident and the "July 7" Marco Polo Bridge Incident, China's all-out war of resistance seemed to have resolved the issue of peace and war.In fact, on the surface, there was a lot of fighting, but secretly, Chiang Kai-shek continued to talk about peace. Even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek was still unwilling to completely cut off the thread of peace talks. Chiang Kai-shek met with the British, American, German, and French ambassadors on July 24, 25, and 263, 1937, hoping that Western powers would mediate.In fact, as early as July 19, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden announced that for the benefit of Britain in China, he had contacted the United States and France, and notified Nanjing and Tokyo that he was willing to mediate. (See Friedman, British Relations with China, p. 93) On July 28, after Chiang made an appointment to meet with the British ambassador to China, Dodds, the British Chargé d’affaires in Tokyo, visited Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, who claimed that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident could be caused by local settlement.But in fact the matter worsened. Although the British public opinion condemned Japan as harming the interests of Great Britain (The Times, 10 August 1937), the British government could only make weak protests.Kong Xiangxi was the Minister of Finance at the time, and through Wang Zhengting, the ambassador to the United States, asked President Roosevelt to mediate.The US ambassador to Japan, Grew, then told the Japanese foreign minister that the US was willing to help resolve the Sino-Japanese dispute if necessary. (See Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, Vot. 1. P. 435) However, the Japanese side, especially the Japanese military, did not welcome the intervention of Britain and the United States at all.And Germany happened to have a good relationship with Chiang Kai-shek since the 1920s. Since the rise of Hitler in 1933, it has established a partnership with the Japanese Empire. In November 1936, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. It is in a favorable position to mediate between China and Japan.It was not good for Japan to reject Germany. Germany took into account its relationship with China. It not only hoped that the incident would be resolved as soon as possible, but also hoped that Japan would consider Germany’s interests in China and remind Japan that its actions in China might reduce the pressure on the Soviet Union. (See Fox, Germany and Far Eastern Question, p. 233) At the end of July, German Foreign Minister Ernst von Weizsacker telegraphed his ambassador to China, Oskar Trautmann: "We have made it clear that the Japanese They know that they cannot use an anti-Comintern pact against China, since that pact has absolutely no purpose in attacking Bolshevism in a third country." (U.S. Department of State, ed. See P.748) At the same time, Germany continued to provide arms to China, and did not immediately withdraw its military advisory group.What the Germans are most worried about is that due to Japan's aggressive actions, China will fall into the arms of Soviet Russia. (See the Taudman Report, contained in German Documents on Foreign Policy, 1: P. 741, 748) This is the background for Germany's willingness to intervene, although it is still cautious for a while.

When Japan invaded China, the military was the strongest, and the civilian government did not want the war to expand.Foreign Minister Hirota sent an envoy to Shanghai to discuss peace in early August, which led to negotiations between the Japanese ambassador and Gao Zongwu, Director of the East Asia Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in Shanghai on August 8.The Japanese side proposed: 1. Establish an undefended zone along the Baihe River, and the Chinese and Japanese troops will retreat separately; 2. Not invade the territory; 3. No compensation.On behalf of the Chinese government, Gao stated that peace is possible based on the above conditions. (Refer to "Tokyo War Criminal Trial Records", Exh. 3260) However, the "Dashan Incident" occurred on August 9, which finally triggered the "August 13" Songhu War, and the negotiations naturally aborted.

The battle of Songhu was bloody and bloody, but Chiang Kai-shek continued to test peace secretly. He once asked Germany whether the "German-Japanese Anti-Communist Agreement" could be used to influence Japan, and the German side replied in the negative. (See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1: P. 741, 742 between Toddmann and the German Foreign Minister.) Then on August 21, China and the Soviet Union formally signed a non-aggression pact, and on September 9 On October 21, Hirota declared that he refused to participate in the meeting, but expressed his willingness to negotiate directly with China, and indicated that Germany or Italy could be lobbyists. (See German Ambassador to Japan Derksen to the German Foreign Office, Documents on German Foriegn Policy, 1: P. 769-770) A week later, Japan formally proposed to German Ambassador to Japan Herbert von Derksen: "The Japanese government We welcome Germany to promote peace talks between China and Japan.” (same book, p. 773) Taudman then met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Jie on October 30, expressing his willingness to serve as a bridge of communication.Soon, on November 3, Hirota offered seven conditions for peace talks, which were conveyed by Germany.The key points of the seven conditions are: 1. Inner Mongolia autonomy; 2. Set up a demilitarized zone in North China, appoint a pro-Japanese leader, and satisfactorily resolve the issue of Japan’s mineral development; 3. Expand the demilitarized zone in Shanghai and be controlled by the international police; 4. Stop rowing and revise Textbook; 5. Joint anti-communism; 6. Reduce import tax on Japanese goods; 7. Respect the rights of foreigners in China.Dixon, the German ambassador to Japan, reported to Berlin that he believed that Japan had peace and sincerity on the basis of the above seven conditions, so he believed that it was worth persuading Nanjing to accept it.Berlin's instructions to Taudman also considered these conditions to be the basis for peace talks.On November 5th, when Xu Mo accompanied Ambassador Tao from Hankou to Nanjing for an audience, Chiang Kai-shek reasoned that if China agreed to Japan's demands, the Nationalist government would Overwhelmed by the tide of public opinion.Chiang Kai-shek also said: China cannot formally acknowledge receipt of Japan's request, because China is now the object of concern of all countries at the Nine-Nation Pact meeting in Brussels, and all countries intend to seek peace on the basis of the Nine-Nation Pact.Taudman said: "The steps I am taking now are only to confidentially inform the Chinese government: Japan's opinion on peace expressed to our ambassador in Japan."

However, when the Nine-Nation Pact meeting, which Japan refused to participate in, was still going on, on the day Chiang Kai-shek met Taudman, Japan landed in Hangzhou Bay, and Anyang fell at the same time.On November 8, Taiyuan fell and Ren County fell.On the 9th, Songjiang fell.On the 11th, Shanghai fell and Daming fell.On the thirteenth, Jiyang fell.On the 14th, Jiashan fell.On the 16th, Kunshan fell.On the 18th, Jiaxing fell and Yantai fell.On the 20th, Suzhou fell.On the 21st, Wu Xing fell.On the 24th, the Brussels Conference closed. The resolutions obtained were only to reaffirm the universal principles, to promote peace talks between China and Japan, to suspend the war, and to completely expose the fundamental weakness of no coercive power.Japan continued to march, and on the 25th, Wuxi fell and Changxing fell.On the 29th, Yixing fell and Wujin fell.On the 30th, Liyang fell and Guangde fell.On December 1, German Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath told the Chinese ambassador to Germany Cheng Tianfang: "For the sake of China's interests, don't reject Japan's peace proposal without consideration. It is better to negotiate a peace as soon as possible. China The longer the government delays in negotiating a peace, the greater the danger of the disintegration of the Chinese state.” (U.S. State Department Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, p. 787) On December 2, Chiang Kai-shek summoned his military chiefs to report, first the diplomatic Deputy Minister Xu Mo reported that Taudman had arrived in Nanjing from Hankou.The generals asked: Does Japan have any other conditions?Xu Mo said: According to Taudman, it is only the seven conditions proposed, and there are no other conditions; if they can agree, the war can be ceased.Chiang Kai-shek asked Tang Shengzhi for his opinion, but before Tang Shengzhi answered, he turned to Bai Chongxi.Bai Chongxi said, it's just such a condition, so why fight?Xu Mo said: What Taudman mentioned are just these few conditions.Chiang Kai-shek asked Xu Yongchang again.Xu Yongchang said that it was only on such a condition that he could agree.I asked Gu Zhutong again, and he also said that he could agree.Ask Tang Shengzhi again, and agree with everyone's opinions.Chiang Kai-shek said: First, German mediation should not be rejected, as this is not considered a condition for subjugation; second, the regime in North China must be preserved. ——Chiang Kai-shek obviously panicked.At five o'clock that afternoon, he received Taudman, "willing to use the points raised by His Excellency the German Ambassador as the basis for negotiations."Two other points were expressed: 1. China deeply hopes that in the whole process of restoring peace, Germany will help through mediation; 2. China's sovereignty and administrative power in North China must not be changed and must be maintained intact.That is to say: first, the Germans must be endorsed by all the results, and the Germans should not let go;In the end, Chiang Kai-shek asked: "It is necessary to remind Japan emphatically: Do not announce any proposed conditions until the negotiation is completed." (Refer to "The Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China-The Period of Anti-Japanese War", Part Six, page 113) This is obviously I can't afford to be ashamed, and I have to do everything secretly.

Chiang Kai-shek then met with Tautman again on December 3, thanking the German government for its efforts in mediation, and willing to accept Japan’s conditions in November as the basis for peace talks: 1. China accepts the conditions for peace talks; 2. North China’s territory and sovereignty are independent and complete; 3. 1. Germany mediates from beginning to end; 4. The peace talks do not involve agreements with third countries. (See Documents on German Foreign Policy, p. 787-789) After receiving Chiang Kai-shek's "resolute promise", Taudman reported it back to China.The German Foreign Office determined that "Japan's proposals have been satisfactorily responded to almost all points," and on December 7, they passed it on to Japan.However, at this time, the Japanese army was approaching Nanjing, and the arrogance was extremely strong. Foreign Minister Hirota also expressed doubts about the conditions of a month ago as the basis for the peace talks (see the same book, p. 799), and the mediation took an unexpected change.On December 13, Nanjing fell.

Although the violent sun was so pressing, and although Chiang Kai-shek issued a declaration of consistent resistance to Japan, Taudman's mediation did not stop because of this.On December 22, the German ambassador proposed in Hankou the new conditions set by Japan. The key points were: first, China, Japan, and Manchuria (Manchukuo, that is, Northeast China) jointly defend against the Communist Party; The establishment of a special regime in the region; three, economic cooperation between China, Japan, and Manchuria; four, compensation to Japan.Japan also proposed not to stop military operations until the conclusion of the peace treaty, and demanded that the Chinese government accept these terms before the end of the year.Even Germany thought this condition was too harsh, and the German ambassador to Japan, Dixon, believed that the Chinese government could not accept it. (See Documents on German Foreign Policy, p. 804) The German government sent a note to Japan on December 29 that such an outcome would not contribute to the "anti-Comintern agreement". (See the same book, page 811) Hirota argued that the conditions could be modified, but the Japanese ambassador to Britain also said that Japan would like to end the war as soon as possible, but if Chiang Kai-shek did not accept the Japanese terms, he would negotiate peace with the Chinese local government. (See the same book, pages 811, 812, and 813.) Despite this, Chiang Kai-shek still did not dare to refuse outright. On January 13, 1938, he sent Foreign Minister Wang Chonghui to tell Taudman: "After due consideration, we feel that the scope of the changed conditions is too broad. Therefore, the Chinese government hopes to know the nature and content of these newly proposed conditions, so as to study carefully and then make an exact decision." (See the same book. , pp. 815-816) Although Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota said that he would discuss this with the cabinet on this basis, he was extremely dissatisfied with the Chinese government's reply, so at 10:30 am on January 16, 1938, the Fang strongly responded, asking the German side to immediately transfer to Hankou, and requesting the suspension of German mediation. This is the Japanese Prime Minister's "Kotoe Fumimaro Statement", declaring that "the National Government will not be an opponent in the future." (See "Japanese Diplomatic Chronology and Main Documents" Volume II, pages 386-387) Chiang Kai-shek also made a self-clarifying statement on January 18, saying that China will fight to the end for territorial integrity and sovereignty .So far, the peace talks seem to have completely broken down.In fact, although the German mediation ended, the thread of Jiang's daytime peace talks has not been interrupted. Chiang Kai-shek had already established channels in the spring of 1938, mainly relying on Sun Yat-sen's old Japanese friends, such as Kayano Nagachi (1873-1947), Ogawa Heiyoshi (1869-1942) , Touyama Man (1855-1944), Akiyama Josuke (1866-1950), etc.These people seem to be civilians, but they are actually closely related to the Japanese government. They stand on their own national interests and have historical ties with the Kuomintang, and they voluntarily work for peace on both sides. The secret contact between Jiang and Japan was first managed by Kong Xiangxi, who became the executive president after the fall of Nanjing. He set up a secret office in Hong Kong and was in charge of Liu Yunlong and Du Shishan (also known as Shi Shan).Japanese sources claim that Liu is Chiang Kai-shek's nephew, or the son of Chiang's mother and sister. Soong Meiling once went to Hong Kong to "guidance" herself, and everything was done by Chiang's family. According to the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, on January 23, 1938, Kong Xiangxi, the Premier of the National Government, after the Japanese Prime Minister Konoe announced that he would not consider the National Government as a negotiating opponent, he called Touyama Mitsuru to "uphold justice, Make every effort to turn the tide, and let the soldiers of your country wake up as soon as possible."In March and April of the same year, Kayano Nagatomo's assistant, Matsuki Zangji, and Kong Xiangxi's confidant, Jia Cunde, met in secret at Shanghai China Travel Service.Xuanye himself also met with Jia, and Jia took the letter to report to Kong Xiangxi via Hong Kong to Hankou.Kong wrote back asking both sides to cease fighting immediately and respect China's sovereignty. As for Japan's request to resolve Manchuria and Mongolia, China agreed in principle, and specific issues could be agreed upon during negotiations.After Kawano returned to Japan, he discussed with Heiji Ogawa and felt that Kong was sincere. On June 10, Ogawa visited the new Japanese Prime Minister Ugaki Kasunari and his former counterpart Ei Wenmaro.However, Konoe announced not long ago that "the imperial government will not take the national government as an opponent in the future." However, Ogawa and Ugaki believed that they still needed to negotiate with the national government and could cancel the old statement if necessary, so they supported Kayano and Kong Xiangxi to continue negotiations. Soon the negotiations focused on Hongkong.Kong Xiangxi found Xuanye's old friend Ma Boyuan and Mrs. Juzheng (Juzheng's daughter is Xuanye's adopted daughter) to come to Hong Kong to help, especially hoping that the Japanese army will not attack Hankou for now.However, the Japanese side’s request that Chiang Kai-shek step down to assume responsibility could not be resolved. Kong Xiangxi’s resignation from the Executive Yuan to replace Chiang Kai-shek was not accepted by the Japanese side.All of a sudden, the issue of Chiang Kai-shek's resignation became an obstacle to the peace talks, and the Japanese military especially held a resolute rejection of Chiang Kai-shek. At about this time, Gao Zongwu, director of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Kobe from Hong Kong on July 5. (See "Wang Jingwei's Group Surrenders to the Enemy", pp. 212-273) During Gao's trip to Japan, commentators always took it for granted that he was ordered by Wang Jingwei, but in fact he was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to rule over Wang Jingwei's peace movement. Gerald E. Bunker had conducted many interviews with Gao Zongwu, saying that Gao Zongwu had direct access to Chiang Kai-shek, "Kao in no sense acting as Wang's agent" (Kao in no sense acting as Wang's agent). (See Bunker, The Peace Conspiracy, p. 75, 80) As early as February 1938, Gao Zongwu was ordered to set up an intelligence agency in Hong Kong under the name of the "Institute of Japanese Studies" to secretly contact the Japanese side.On March 27, after meeting with Dong Daoning, Chief of the Japanese Section of the Asian Department, in Hong Kong, and the Japanese Nishi Yoshinaki, he flew to Hankou, made a report on April 3, and "sent to the Commissioner's seat" on the morning of the 5th .On April 14th, Gao Zihan flew to Hong Kong, "with a secret mission". (Volume 1 of Zhou Fohai's Diary, pages 78 and 83) According to Xi Yixian's "Tragedy Witness-Secret History of the Sino-Japanese Peace Movement", Chiang Kai-shek asked Gao to convey: "The issue of Northeast China and Inner Mongolia can be left for another day. Let's talk again, but Hebei Province should be returned to China immediately, and the integrity of China's territory and sovereignty south of the Great Wall should be respected by the Japanese side. If the above condition is understood by the Japanese side, the war will be ceased first, and the details will be discussed later." May 30 Later, Gao Zongwu came to Hankou from Hong Kong again. Zhou Fohai, who was the acting head of the Propaganda Department at that time, sent him to Chen Bulei. ("Zhou Fohai's Diary", Volume 1, p. 106) On June 5, Gao You was "ordered to fly to Hong Kong".On June 25th, Mei Siping paid a visit to Wang Jingwei and then went to see Zhou Fohai to "discuss the speculation about Zongwu's going to Japan". (Same book, page 116) It can be seen that before Gao Zongwu went to Japan, Hankou knew about it, and Wang, Mei, and Zhou still needed to "speculate" to prove that Gao Zongwu was ordered by Jiang, and even the three of them did not know the details.Zhang Yougu, who was working in the Hankou Military Command Office at the time, said that on July 6, the attendants ordered a plane to send a confidential letter of peace, driven by the pilot Thompson, to Nanjing, and airdrop it to the visiting Prince Chichibu Palace of Japan. , the Northeast can be ceded. (Zhang Yougu's "A Crime of Collaboration with the Enemy by Chiang Kai-shek During the Defending of Wuhan", "Selected Literature and History Materials", Volume 8, pp. 141-142) After Gao Zongwu returned to Hong Kong from Japan, he did not immediately report his life. Zhou wrote in his diary on July 19: "I heard that Zongwu returned to Hong Kong for several days, but there is no news, and Brother Bu has no news." (Page 126. ) Obviously because Japan still "does not regard Chiang Kai-shek as an opponent", Gao felt that it was impossible to repay Chiang's order. As a result, Gao Zongwu sent Zhou Longxiang, Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 22 to "send his report to the Appointment", did not deny that "the other party insisted on appointing a seat", Zhou also expressed "disappointment". (See the same book, page 127) The next day, when Zhou Fohai went to the Chiang Kai-shek mansion for dinner, he saw that Chiang was "unable to cheer up".Within a few days, Zhou heard that Jiang Ling "Wang Liangchou (favored) entrusted the ambassadors of Britain and the United States to try to ask the Chinese and Japanese sides for an armistice from the British and the United States, or to ask the Chinese and Japanese sides to end the war at an early date." (same book, pp. 128-129) "Secret Records of President Chiang" said that Gao Zongwu "became a porter used by the Japanese army to carry Wang Zhaoming's sedan chair" (p. 2558), which is obviously a one-sided statement by Chiang Kai-shek .Jiang Yu was disappointed, and resentfully refused to admit that he had sent Gao Zongwu to negotiate with the Japanese. Zhou Fohai wrote in his diary on July 26: "Talk with Long Xiang for half an hour, and ask him to go to Hong Kong tomorrow and convey everything." Although I don't know what to convey, it is probably for the sake of acceptable peace. If we don't fight against Jiang If Jiang must step down, Wang Jingwei, the veteran of the Kuomintang, can step in.Therefore, Gao Zongwu did not recuperate in Hong Kong, but continued to negotiate with the Japanese in Hong Kong and Shanghai, and found that Mei Siping was involved in the matter, and finally Konoe's new statement and three principles came out. After the communication between Xuanye Changzhi and Jia Cunde, although the Japanese side still wants Jiang to go to the field, if Jiang is determined to "shovel out the communist relationship with Japan, there will be a way after making peace."The so-called method is to be considerate of Jiang's difficulties in not being able to step down for a while, and to promise that he only needs to make an announcement in advance, "and it will be implemented automatically after peace. Ugaki also received the secret approval of Emperor Hirohito to meet Kong Xiangxi on a military boat.So far, the Japanese side has actually revised its proposition of "not using the Nationalist Government as its opponent".On September 25th, Ma Boyuan traveled from Hong Kong to Chongqing via Hanoi, and had detailed discussions with Chiang Kai-shek and Kong Xiangxi.Chiang also sent Zheng Jiemin to Hong Kong for talks.The peace talks between Jiang and Japan are about to hit it off, but Japan has always had internal conflicts, and the views of Lu and Foreign Ministers are particularly at odds.Minister Lu Itagaki Seishiro believes that Hankou is about to fall and the government is about to surrender, so there is no need to issue a statement of withdrawal of troops. He also points out that Foreign Minister Yu Yuan wants to negotiate with Kong Xiangxi as a "national traitor" and opposes the peace talks.Ugaki was forced to resign as foreign minister on September 29, and the unusual talks that had been prepared were also aborted. (See Yang Tianshi's "Searching for the Mystery of History", pp. 608-610; Shi Lequ's "A Conspiracy of Chiang Kai-shek During the Anti-Japanese War", the first series of "Selected Literature and History Materials", pp. 65-67 ) After the Japanese warlords captured Wuhan on October 25, Chiang Kai-shek issued a message to the fellow countrymen, calling for "continuing to carry out the protracted war of resistance." However, he continued to keep in touch with folks such as Kayano in secret.However, although Japan captured Wuhan, it was not as the military thought that China would surrender.The Japanese government was obviously worried that it would go deep alone, and the war would not be resolved for a long time, so it strengthened its willingness to negotiate peace, and Mei Siping also made achievements.Zhou Fohai wrote on November 26, 1938, which is quite interesting: (Mei Siping came from Hong Kong, and after a short talk, he went to the Wang Mansion together to report on the process of contacting Zong Wu in Shanghai, and brought the conditions for both parties to sign and the draft of the guard declaration. (Page 194) This draft is the statement issued by the Konoe government on December 22 on the so-called adjustment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations, the three principles of "good neighborliness and friendship, joint defense against communism, and economic cooperation" (also known as Konoe's third statement to China, see the full text. "Japanese Diplomatic Chronology and Main Documents" Volume III, page 407).Nearly a month before the publication, the Chongqing side already knew the bottom line.Since both Jiang and Wang advocate peace, these three principles can undoubtedly serve as the basis for peace talks.The dispute between Jiang and Wang was by no means a main battle or a main peace dispute. Jiang Zhi's reluctance to go along with it was obviously because Konoe did not explicitly withdraw his previous statement that he would not be his opponent, while Wang believed that a positive response should be made.When Jiang insisted on refusing, Wang Nai decided to leave Chongqing, express peaceful ideas freely, cooperate with the publication of the three principles of the guard, and build momentum in public opinion to force Jiang to the negotiating table. Wang Jingwei's departure from Chongqing happened on December 18, 1938. On this day, he flew from Chongqing to Kunming, and then transferred from Kunming to Hanoi on the 19th.On the 21st, Zhang Qun called Chiang Kai-shek, saying that Wang Jingwei had sent him a call, saying that he "plans to fight for peace and the issue of communism prevention."On the 22nd, Japanese Prime Minister Fummaro Konoe issued the "Statement on Adjusting the Fundamental Policy of China-Japan Relations" for the third time, proposing three principles of good neighborliness and friendship, joint prevention of communism, and economic cooperation.And it is said that it has absolutely no territorial ambitions, respects China's sovereignty, and does not demand military compensation.On the 24th, Long Yun sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that Wang Jingwei had a telegram and asked him to transfer it on his behalf. Please let me know." On the 26th, Chiang Kai-shek announced at the commemorative week: "Mr. Wang is on leave for four months and is going abroad to recuperate. He hopes to come back as soon as possible to discuss major plans." On the 28th, Wang Jingwei sent a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, thinking that After the Japanese side put forward the three principles, "if we make a statement, it can be used as the basis for peace negotiations", and then "end the war to establish a peaceful situation in East Asia", demanding "resolute decision and implementation upon seeing it".Wang Jingwei's letter was collected in the third volume of "Puppet Organization" in the sixth volume of "Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China (First Edition) - Period of Anti-Japanese War" published by the KMT Party History Society in September 1981.However, the December 28th date mentioned in the letter, "hereby has access to the Central Electricity", has been tampered with and no income has been seen.According to the "Peaceful Anti-Communism and Founding Documents National Government Return to the Capital Anniversary Book" published by the Propaganda Department of the Wang regime in March 1941, the transcript is as follows: Here is a telegram from the Central Committee. In addition to sending it out, I would like to copy and submit it to another paper for reference.On the 9th of this month, Mr. Jiang, the president of Mingye, Zeng Lichen said that the difficulty of China is how to support the war situation, and the difficulty of Japan is how to end the war situation. Both have difficulties, and both know themselves and each other, so peace is very Hopeless.In terms of diplomacy, we look forward to the assistance of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, the non-opposition of the Soviet Union, and the non-combatment of Germany and Italy. We especially look forward to Japan's awakening. If Japan can realize that China cannot be subdued and East Asia cannot be monopolized, peace will finally come.All the comrades who were present that day have heard about all this.It is stated today that it cannot be said that there is no awareness.I still recall that at the beginning of December last year when Nanjing had not yet fallen, Ambassador Germany went to Nanjing to pay a visit to Mr. Jiang. It was the basis for peace negotiations; later, the Japanese side postponed it, and after the fall of Nanjing, they changed the terms and conditions, and the scope was so wide that they followed suit.Now that the side has this awareness today, we should respond with a statement and use it as the basis for peace negotiations, and work hard to make compromises so that the specific plan can be reasonably resolved. It is a good opportunity not to be missed again to end the war and establish a peaceful situation in East Asia. carry on.The power of the Anglo-American law has already seen its beginnings, but this kind of power can only be used for mediation, which is more beneficial to me, and must not be used to resolve wars, so that I can win a complete victory by participating in the war. This is known to all , needless to say.The Soviet Union cannot act alone without breaking away from Anglo-American law. Germany believes that I am willing to engage in peace negotiations and will be willing to assist. The international situation can be roughly seen.As for the country, except for the Communist Party and a few people who fear that China will not perish, that the national government will not fall, and that the Chinese Kuomintang will not perish, they want to be sympathetic to all.After careful consideration, Ming dared to propose this to the central government; in addition to stating his opinions in a separate letter to Mr. Jiang, he only made a statement.Fuwang comrades learn from their stupidity and sincerity, and give their approval. Fortunately, very fortunately.For this, I respectfully wait for you. Wang Jingwei’s telegram clearly explained the process of Taudman’s mediation. The reason for the failure of the mediation was that the Japanese side changed the acceptable conditions in November. More clearly, is there any reason to refuse?On the second day (December 29), Wang Jingwei issued the famous Yan ("Yan" is the abbreviation of the telegram on the 29th, which was telegraphed in "News" on January 1, 1939. ) to Chongqing, again urging acceptance of the adjustment of the Three Principles of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations as the basis for peace talks.Wang's three documents are all included in the "Documents of Peaceful Anti-Communist State Construction", and there is only one basic point, that is, "if the war can be ended with a peace that is consistent with justice", then it might as well end.Wang Jingwei believes that the peace talks with Japan are not his personal prejudice. He said that before the fall of Nanjing, the German ambassador to China Tautman was engaged in mediation. At that time, the price offered by Japan was even harsher than now. I firmly promise."Now after a year of fighting, China has withdrawn from Wuhan and retreated to Sichuan. The situation is even worse, but the price offered by Japan is actually wider than last year. If this is the case, why can't they negotiate peace?Since the purpose of the war of resistance is to protect the survival and independence of the country, if it can be achieved peacefully, why must it be fought? Wang Jingwei was able to leave Chongqing. Although Wang's vice president had a special status and no one dared to stop him, Wang was not the only one who left, one after another. Could it be that Chiang Kai-shek's spies turned a blind eye?Besides, there is a purpose in leaving, doesn't it mean that Dai Li doesn't even have this bit of information?There must be articles in it.According to Feng Yuxiang's memories of "The Chiang Kai-shek I Know", some people said at the time that this was "Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei singing a double reed". Feng Yuxiang cited the most obvious reason: At that time, the traffic in Chongqing was completely controlled by Dai Li of the Military Control Bureau. People had to register first to buy air tickets when going abroad. After review and approval, senior officials had to get personal approval from Chiang Kai-shek. Wang Jingwei took Zeng Zhongming, Lin Bosheng and many others to fly to Kunming by special plane. Since there was no task given to him by the government or the party department in advance, why did Dai Li not report to Jiang first?It is absolutely impossible to say that Wang Jingwei escaped from Chongqing.When Wang arrived in Kunming, Long Yun still had a telegram to report to Jiang. If Jiang wanted to stop him, he would definitely be able to do it. Regarding Feng Yuxiang's statement, we found circumstantial evidence from a document.In September 1981, the "Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China - Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan" published by the KMT Party History Society, was included in the third volume of the sixth volume "Puppet Organization" in December 1938. On the 19th, "Long Yun sent Wang Zhaoming via Yunnan to Hanoi to submit a telegram to Chairman Chiang." The content is: Chongqing, Jiang Junjian, Chairman of the National Committee of the Communist Party of China: Infringement of secrets.Vice President Wang arrived in Yunnan yesterday and felt unwell today. He left Yunnan and flew to Hanoi at 2:30 in the afternoon.Last night and before leaving, I telegraphed twice in detail.Job Longyun.Effective secret seal. (Page 46) Among the secret telegrams, the most noticeable thing is that Long Yun "tele-presented" Chiang Kai-shek the night Wang Jingwei arrived in Yunnan; and "tele-presented" Chiang Kai-shek again when Wang Jingwei was leaving the next day.可见冯玉祥所说“如蒋要阻止他，是绝对做得到的”，是确实的。 关于这一疑案，朱子家（金雄白）在《汪政权的开场与收场》（李敖出版社一九八八年版）中，也有论述如下： 当年盛传的蒋汪双簧，是应该有其可能的，连日本人也感觉到了这一点，他们曾公然对我说过：“你们中国人是够聪明的，像是在赌台上赌大小，重庆押大，而南京押小，殊途同归，开出来总有一面是会被押中，而押中的也一定是你们中国人中之一面。”因为如果汪氏的出走，事前不得重庆方面的默许，他不能离开重庆，自更不能离开国境一步。 此外另有一个旁证，汪氏在离渝前曾对陈公博说过：“我在重庆主和，人家必误会以为是政府的主张，这是于政府不利的。我若离开重庆，则是我个人的主张，如交涉有好的条件，然后政府才接受。”（陈公博《八年来的回忆》）据此而观，最后两语，意义太明显了。是由汪氏出面去与日本交涉，条件不好，由汪氏独任其咎；有好条件，政府才出面接受，这不是也可能真是一出双簧吗？ 但褚民谊在苏狱中说过几句话：“早有人处心积虑，想把一只臭马桶套在汪先生头上。这次是千载一时的机会，既经动了手，就绝不会轻易放过了。”那岂不是说，本来约定是做假戏，但一出场，就变成做真戏了。这说法的真实性究竟如何呢？又安得再起汪氏于地下而问之?选（页八九八） 这里说“本来约定是做假戏，但一出场，就变成做真戏了”，倒是很可能的。以殷汝耕为旁证，就可明白。殷汝耕在一九三五年成立冀东政府，抗战胜利后被捕，在狱中，他终日念佛，了无嗔意，被提出枪毙时，还从容得很。检察官问他有没有遗言要留，他说：“我很奇怪，当初不是要我组织冀东政府的，为什么今天要枪毙我？”类似殷汝耕的疑案，在缪斌、王克敏等人身上，也都发生过。 汪精卫到河内主要目的就是发表和平主张，采纳与否，权在中央。故发表艳电之后，即准备赴法休养。然而当谷正鼎送来护照与旅费后不久，却发生一九三九年三月二十一日河内刺汪案，结果误中副车，杀死了汪氏秘书曾仲鸣，另有五人受伤。河内法院抓了几个人，以一般凶杀案，草率处理了事。汪氏本人肯定是重庆派人干的，故在《曾仲鸣先生行状》中说：“法文各报皆以大字标明蓝衣社所为，且叙凶手供称，谋杀目的实在兆铭。”（《曾仲鸣先生殉国周年纪念集》卷首）但一时没有确切的证据。哪知凶手们到台湾之后，忽觉自己是锄奸的英雄，一一亮相，如陈恭澍等大写回忆，无异招认，甚至实际开枪的王鲁翘也当上台北警察局长，侃侃而谈，不久遭离奇车祸死亡。河内刺汪案终大白于世，原来是特务头子戴笠奉蒋介石之命干的，戴笠还于二月底三月初亲往河内布置。谷正鼎两度访汪，很可能与戴配合，以观形察势，做好谋杀的准备工作。也可能是单线，谷如陈立夫一样不知情。 我们不认为汪精卫出走前与蒋有默契，汪于一九四Ｏ年十一月二十七日致蒋介石感电犹谓：“兆铭痛感艳电以来，荏苒岁月，国命益殆，民病益深，故不及待执事之赞成，亦不及顾执事之反对。”（《和平反共建国文献》，页一四三）但是我们认为蒋眼开眼闭让汪等出走，特务固不敢拦汪，但特务不会上告蒋来做决定吗？蒋不拦汪，必须从蒋本人的主和意愿来理解。他把汪等当试验气球，放出去瞧瞧。然而蒋为何又要谋杀汪精卫呢？我们的理解有两种可能性，其一是蒋氏“兔死狗烹”哲学，让汪发表和平主张之后，由他后续完成，免得日本人想与汪做对手。其二，如果不除去汪，搞不好，和议成功却让汪氏取而代之。更何况汪氏途经云南，与龙云相处甚笃，如果龙云加以响应，将更增加汪之声势，故明知汪有赴法打算，仍怕夜长梦多，为以后蒋日和谈制造麻烦，于是不惜遣特务杀之。 可是误中副车之后，反而弄巧成拙。这一毒辣的行动，刺激了汪精卫，汪乃在三月二十七日发表“举一个例”，公布了一九三七年十二月六日的国民党秘密会议记录，即“国防最高会议第五十四次常务委员会议记录”，证明了主和之意，国民党大员皆有之，蒋介石尤其主其事。文中并提出三个疑问： 第一、德大使当时所说，与近卫内阁去年十二月二十二日声明相比较，德大使所说，可以为和平谈判之基础，何以近卫声明不可以为谈判之基础？ 第二、当德大使奔走调停时，南京尚未陷落，已经认为和平谈判可以进行，何以当近卫声明时，南京、济南、徐州、开封、安庆、九江、广州、武汉，均已相继陷落，长沙则尚未陷落，而自己先已烧个精光，和平谈判，反不可以进行？ 第三、当德大使奔走调停时，国防最高会议诸人，无论在南京或在武汉，主张均已相同，何以当近卫声明时，又会主张不同，甚至必将主张不同的人，加以诬蔑，诬蔑不足，还要夺其生命，使之不能为国家效力？（《和平反共建国文献》，页八至九） 不仅此也，激动的汪精卫触发了烈士性格，为死友、为主张，干脆一不做二不休，不去法国了，也不理蒋介石高兴不高兴，径自去与日本人谈。 ... 有趣的是，蒋介石公开谴责以及谋杀未遂汪精卫之后，继续经由萱野转告新上任的有田八郎外相：他正积极布置准备对付共产党以及对日和平之意不变。其实，不仅嘴巴上说，还起而行，于一九三九年年初召开国民党五届五中全会时，明显展示反共态度，以配合近卫三原则之二，并设置国防最高委员会。陈诚于二月三日致电在香港的柳云龙说： 今组织之国防委员会，网罗朝野人员，置于蒋氏一人之下，时机一至，便可运用和平而无阻。（《杜石山致萱野长知》，载《小川平吉关系文书》（二），页六○八） 一个月之后，蒋介石亲自发电给柳云龙、杜石山说： 石山兄台鉴：历次来电，暨萱野翁前日来电，均已诵悉，中日事变，诚为两国之不幸，萱野翁不辞奔劳，至深感佩，惟和平之基础，必须建立于平等与互让原则之上，尤不能忽视卢沟桥事变前后之中国现实状态。日本方面，究竟有无和平诚意，并其和平基案如何，盼向萱野翁切实询明，伫候详复。蒋中正蒙。（日本国会图书馆藏） 此电紧要处，为蒋明显可以接受“卢沟桥事变前后之现实”，也就是说满蒙可以不要，但须重尊中国本部之主权，亦即是陶德曼调停时的第一个日本方案。但蒋怕日本别开新价码，故要“切实询明”日方和平的基案。能不说是求和心切吗？事实上，此时蒋介石已不经手孔祥熙，由自己直接遥控了，宋美龄也于七月十六日亲自飞到香港与萱野面晤。会谈设于香港大酒店三五Ｏ号房间，柳云龙代表蒋方提出七点：一、平等互让；二、领土完整、主权独立；三、恢复卢沟桥事变前状态；四、日本撤兵；五、共同防共；六、经济提携；七、不追究维新政府、临时政府人员的责任（参阅杨天石《寻求历史的谜底》，页六至四）基本上响应近卫三原则。杜石山于会后致电蒋介石称：“和平之事，当在汪氏等所欲谋者未成熟之前，始克有济，否则夜长梦多，多一纠纷即添一障碍，届时钧座虽欲当机立断，恐亦为事实之所不许也。”（《小川平吉关系文书》（二），页六至五）至此，蒋与汪已开始做“和平”竞赛了。接着小川平吉于三月二十四日赴港，听取萱野汇报后，并与蒋方进一步商谈，小川与萱野提出是否可首先讨伐共产党，以实现局部停战，宋美龄与蒋介石的回答都是正面的，并谓可用“密约办理”。杜石山告诉小川，蒋“现已布置了大量嫡系军以对付共产党”，以及“在议和成功之时，望以日本的先锋队进行讨共”。 （《小川平吉关系文书》（二），页六五三）蒋又于四月间派马伯援与小川在港联系，很可能有进一步的表态，但马突于四月二十四日逝世。五月六日，小川又与张季鸾会谈，更明言日本最关切排共。蒋介石反共意愿虽高，但在那个情况下，马上翻脸伐共自大有顾忌。然小川等急于要蒋明确表态，甚至要到重庆来谈。相逼之下，蒋终感化暗为明维艰，想缓一缓，将和平要求先在国防会议提出再说。小川等在杜石山等人一再解释下，对蒋氏苦心表示谅解。 六月间，中共对蒋日和谈已有所闻，乃迫蒋履行诺言，广西方面也表示如果中途妥协，将单独抗战，使蒋更不敢公开表态。此时汪精卫已到东京与平沼首相会谈，但蒋介石不仅仍然保留香港联络点，而且宋美龄再度飞港与柳云龙等会商，并由杜石山会见小川，要求阻滞汪精卫新政府的成立。小川等则想于汪政权成立前，逼蒋公开表态，接受和平条件，因而重申蒋日双方在军舰会谈前议。（阅《小川平吉关系文书》（二），页六四○至六四三）蒋于七月七日抗战二周年文告，重申抗战到底的国策不变，他能不如此重申吗？但被日方认为缺乏诚意，更倾向汪精卫。不过，蒋于七月十六日在重庆发表军事委员会组织与人选，规定蒋有权执行国府组织法第一一一条之规定，即宣战、议和、缔约的权力，已为蒋全权议和订下法律根据。蒋又于八月初经杜石山转告日方已有分共决心，并派郑介民、王景惠先后赴日，力阻汪日之间的和平运动。小川也开始积极活动，于八月十日走访近卫文麿，并连夜进京会晤首相，提出所谓“战胜国宽宏大度”的第三方案，由小川携赴重庆谈判，同时要求对方派出孔祥熙一级的代表参与预备会议。重庆方面得此报以及汪政府将延期成立之消息后，孔祥熙声言将牺牲一身，决心在参政会提出“和平”案。此时德国与苏联已缔定互不侵犯条约，日苏亦已有妥协迹象。蒋、孔怕孤立，故更加积极求和。但此一世界形势的发展也使日本军方更为嚣张，对日本政府横施压力，被迫于九月十三日声明扶持汪精卫成立中央政府。蒋、日和谈再次触礁。蒋介石对汪组府“深恶痛绝”，不谓无因。唐纵在一九三九年十月二日的日记提道： 委员长发表重要谈话，对汪逆召开伪代表大会及企图成立伪中央政权问题，深恶痛绝。委座从未公开斥辱何人，此为第一次，并表示海枯石烂，永不宽赦。（《在蒋介石身边八年》，页一○一） 照说汪精卫去做“逆”，自毁历史，蒋介石又何必“深恶痛绝”呢？其所以“深恶痛绝”，显因汪破坏了蒋日和谈之故。汪是已下了海的，摆明在搞，然而蒋却一直暗干，想下海因考虑太多而不敢下海?选 一九三九年底，南京的汪政权开场之前，高宗武与陶希圣突然出走，抵达香港后，于一九四Ｏ年一月二十一日，在《大公报》上刊登来函，并公布轰动一时的文件——《日支新关系调整要纲》。此为一九三九年十一月的日方草案，修正案改称《日华新关系调整要纲》，于同年十二月三十日签字。由于初次公布的是草案，日方要求十分苛刻，更凸显此一《要纲》的卖国性质。在轰动之余，重庆在宣传与情报战场上，似犹全胜，而使南京汪政权大惊失色，窘态百出，莫可奈何。 高、陶的出走成功，已可确定得自杜月笙以及重庆地下工作人员的协助。陶希圣抵港后，于一九四○年一月十九日收到蒋介石亲笔函，令陶“坦率详陈附逆经过”。黄仁霖于二月十七日自港返渝时，陶托黄转呈回函一件，陶对蒋给予“戴罪图功”的机会，“铭感于衷”，自称罪民陶希圣（见亲笔原函影本）。然而陶氏此件于二月十三日就被日本情报人员密得，冈崎总领事以第八二号极密件发电给东京外务省有田外务大臣，当晚收达（见日文影印原件）。从此一密件得知，高宗武“之参加汪方，早得中枢谅解”，可证高非仅为汪奔走和谈，也一直为蒋效驱驰。高是蒋之人马，尚有四条旁证： 一、当时汪派国民党怕蒋派国民党谋杀，都不敢住租界，而高宗武独住法租界的花园洋房，因为他心里明白，他是敌人的朋友。 二、一九三九年夏天，高宗武随汪精卫到日本，据亦在随行之列的周隆庠说，影佐祯昭见汪，要把高宗武留在日本，因觉其形迹可疑，但无确实证据，经汪极力反对而未留下。影佐是日本情报头目，显然已有风闻。 三、高宗武到香港后不久赴美，一九四二年五月二十八日，陈布雷打了这样一通电报给驻美大使胡适：“胡大使：咸（二十七）日由贺主任耀组名义汇上美金四千元，系委座发高君宗武旅学费，即请转交高君，并复为荷。弟陈布雷。勘。”四千美金在一九四二年不是一笔小数目，学费其名，奖金其实。 四、据高宗武本人的访谈，他自港赴美前，蒋介石曾写亲笔信给他，誉为“浙东强人”（见Ｂｕｎｋｅｒ，Ｔｈｅ Pｅａｃｅ Ｃｏｎｓｐｉｒａｃｙ， Ｐ．２０６），与蒋要求自称罪民的陶希圣，戴罪图功，相映成趣。 汪政权虽然建立，汪记“和平运动”却因高陶事件，受到致命性的打击，但是骂汪逆的蒋介石并未一心主战，仍然继续他暗地里的“和平运动”。一九三九年十二月下旬，日本驻香港武官铃木卓尔中佐，会见了蒋介石的舅子宋子良。几次会谈后，日本支那派遣军总司令部就派今井武夫大佐到香港。一九四Ｏ年二月十四日，今井武夫和宋子良在香港东肥洋行会见。商定在二月底举行中日两方正式圆桌会议。今井武夫赶到南京，向西尾总司令报告说，奉命在十九日飞东京向闲院宫参谋总长和畑俊六陆相说明会谈内容。参谋本部立即派谋略课长臼井茂树大佐到了香港，实地了解情况。三月二日，中国代表全体到齐，除宋子良外，还有重庆行营参谋处副处长陈超霖、最高国防会议主任秘书章友三、陆军少将张汉年、张治平等人。 三天之后，蒋宋美龄以治牙为名也到达香港。三月八日会谈开始，在东肥洋行二楼举行。会谈前双方出示证件，以明身份。日方由陆军大臣畑俊六出证明书，中方由最高国防会议秘书长张群出证明书。会谈内容主要有关“满洲国”问题、日华共同防共问题、汪政权问题，以及日本在华北驻兵问题。其中当然以共同防共的意见最趋一致，其他问题也有商量余地。宋美龄于五月间再度来港。宋子良还邀今井武夫在香港海面上游艇中密谈，强调蒋委员长确实想和（见《今井武夫回忆录》，页一四四），如和谈成功，最快可于七月间对共产党进行讨伐。于是六月六日，双方代表经多次磋商后，一致同意由板垣征四郎、蒋介石、汪精卫三人举行长沙会谈。七月二十二日双方在香港签署备忘录如下： 下记日华代表关于进行停战会谈事，系分别遵照板垣总参谋长及蒋委员长意旨，并互相确认各自上司有关进行会谈的亲笔证件后，约定事项如下： 一、时间：八月初旬 二、地点：长沙 三、方法：板垣征四郎及蒋介石商谈日华停战问题 代表铃木卓尔（印） 代表宋士杰（印） 昭和十五年七月二十三日 这就是日本人所谓的“桐工作（Ｋｉｒｉ Ｋｑｓａｋｕ）”。宋士杰为宋子良的化名，其实宋子良也是特务顶替的。 同时，蒋介石又于六月二十一日致电香港杜石山，再邀萱野前来和谈，并代致“表示后悔”之意。萱野原拟八月初赴港，然因板垣正着手于“桐工作”而受阻。在侍从室工作的唐纵已于八月五日觉察到，“日来和平已在暗中举行，此事关系重大，外间知者极少。”（《在蒋介石身边八年》，页一四五）唐纵并未参与其事，他只是从“许多小征候”观察而知。八月二十八日，戴笠又告诉唐纵，“张季鸾昨天回来，今日又飞香港，这是与日秘密交涉有关。”（同书，页一五一）可为正在进行中的“桐工作”的一个旁证。 这个“桐工作”，可以说是蒋日和谈的最高潮。谈到三个人会谈的地步，实由于战局对中国不利，当时英法都想与日本妥协，日军又已进占宜昌，直接威胁到重庆。蒋于和战之间自然动摇到最严重关头。然而正当“桐工作”积极进行之际，近卫文麿第二次组阁，蒋氏记得近卫有不与他做对手的声明，遂于七月三十一日要求以某种方式撤销，他才放心。他也顾虑到汪日之间的条约，汪政权已经成立，与汪平起平坐也是难题。不过，汪倒是很愿意日本与蒋直接和谈（参阅Ｂｕｎｋｅｒ，Ｔｈｅ Ｐｅａｃｅ Ｃｏｎｓｐｉｒａｃｙ，Ｐ．１５５—１５６），惟蒋提出“有汪无蒋，有汪无和平”的论调，要求汪出国、隐退，甚至把汪交给蒋处理，日方表示难以接受。更重要的是中共发动了“百团大战”，日本人写的《太平洋战争史》认为百团大战“是中日战争开始以来最大的一次激战，给予日本军队以沉重的打击”，并认为中共抗日力量的展示，使“蒋介石不敢脱离抗日阵营”，显然蒋若不抗日，中共还是会继续领导抗日。这种说法已被大陆学者证实，他们更进而指出，百团大战就是因为获知“桐工作”而发起的。若然，则中共救了蒋介石没去当汉奸。蒋介石既然起了犹豫，板垣虽于八月二十二日写来亲笔信，深信三人会谈“当能确立调整两国邦交之基础”，向蒋打气，但蒋终于不敢接受，于九月中旬由宋子良转达，推说重庆意见不一，“目前不应马上举行长沙会谈”。九月十九日，所谓“桐工作”以失败告终。虽如此，蒋介石并未因此放弃和谈。他于同年的十一月一日又托杜石山致电萱野，有谓： 蒋公既以石山等与先生有所约，中日和平路线绝对已有维持，故拒绝红军进攻平津以断日军接济，不准小张复出而重东北纠纷。（《小川平吉关系文书》（二），页六九六） 我们从这一则密电才知道，蒋介石不放小张（张学良）原来还有日本因素。 蒋介石又于十一月十六日向头山满与萱野长知致意，说是宋子良擅自与板垣代表晤谈、接受条件，并说宋子良“惧而避之美国”云云，显然要在国民党的日本朋友面前推卸责任。（蒋原函可见于杨天石《民国掌故》，页三二九）其实，连宋子良都是假的。今井武夫到一九四五年才弄清楚，与板垣代表谈判的宋子良，根本是戴笠手下特务曾广（王新衡）顶替的（见《今井武夫回忆录》，页一四六至一四七、一六二），再据参与“桐工作”的香港大学教授张治平于一九五三年访日时，告诉今井武夫，当年会谈蒋介石确是幕后的大老板，由戴笠秘密执行。（同书，页一六三） 蒋介石虽然一再解释，殷勤示意，日本政府仍然于一九四○年十一月三十日正式承认了汪政权。但是蒋介石依然没有死心。一九四一年五月，萱野到澳门，蒋又派柳云龙前往征询和平意见。萱野建议托头山满，蒋即赠相片示意。头山满却不领情，认为蒋不识抬举，对愿提携的日本“反戈”，骂蒋“终竟是傻瓜”?选自此蒋与这些日本“民间人士”无法再从事有意义的谈判。上面这些秘密接触，都是从日本战败后公布或泄漏出来的文件证实的，宣传绝不中途妥协、宣传抗日到底的蒋介石当然是守口如瓶的。这些秘密接触，当然只有他们优为之，他们干了，也不会戴上“通敌叛国”的帽子。 蒋介石暗通日本，多次密谈，只因日本政府受到军方的干扰，拿不定主意，而蒋之一方，则感到难以“化暗为明”，迟迟难决而延误时机，再加上共产党一直在揭他的底，以及半途杀出一个汪精卫，更加搅了局，却让蒋介石最后“八年一觉渝州梦，赢得人间抗战名”?选 最有趣的，照龚德柏《汪兆铭降敌卖国秘史》的说法，汪精卫生前死后的一大罪状，乃在于他“妨碍中日讲和”?选龚德柏是拼命丑诋汪精卫的，但弄巧成拙，岂不正好反证了蒋介石那边在跟日本讲和吗？是以“蒋汪双簧”的谜底是，两人并无默契，各自搞一暗一明的“和平运动”，只因阴错阳差，两人的“努力”不仅不能“合流”，反而相互抵消。“和平”的失败，却让蒋介石熬到意外的“胜利”。 蒋介石与日本讲和的管道，于抗战八年之中，始终不断，连燕京大学校长司徒雷登亦曾于一九三九、一九四○、一九四一年，替蒋向华北日军提过只要长城以南主权的和平条件。 （见Ｓｈａｗ，Ａｎ Ａｍｅｒｉｃａｎ Ｍｉｓｓｉｏｎａｒｙ ｉｎ Ｃｈｉｎａ，Ｐ．１２５）近人论史，居然还要以为用“抗战到底一词来表达其（蒋）领导对日抗战的基本方针，足以涵盖一切”（见蒋永敬《蒋中正先生领导对日抗战的基本方针——抗战到底》，载《蒋中正先生与现代中国学术讨论集》第二册，页四九九），请问“涵盖”得了与日寇暗通款曲的事实吗？