Chapter 34 Lost the best half in the fourth quarter

The Songhu Anti-Japanese War resulted in heavy casualties and huge property losses, which are hard to estimate.The so-called consumption, our side consumed ten times more than the enemy; the so-called long-term, but persisted in Songhu for three months.To be able to fight in Shanghai for three months is really remarkable, at least to break the Japanese dream of conquering China within three months, but in order to resist the war for a long time and preserve strength, enough is enough.However, Chiang Kai-shek was intoxicated by the praise of our army for fighting the enemy in Shanghai by the British and American newspapers. On October 29, 1937, when he personally inspected the front line, he told the senior commander that he must "win" mentally. Overcome the enemy" and "destroy the enemy"! (Volume 14 of "President Jiang Gong's Thoughts and Speeches", Volume 14, p. 642) This kind of Ah Q-style spiritual victory method mentioned by Lu Xun does not help the actual situation. Our army Although he fought bloody battles, he was exhausted, and it was just a waste of time to persevere. However, the supreme commander of the unknown soldiers believed in the law of spiritual victory, and repeated orders: "Retreat without authorization, and follow the military law." Besides, he only likes to hear good news and bad news. When the situation is over, they lose their temper, so that the upper and lower sides report that the morale is strong and cover up the real situation.In the end, Bai Chongxi, the deputy chief of staff of the base camp, and others repeatedly remonstrated before allowing the transfer to the defense positions on the Wufu line and the Xicheng line.

Unexpectedly, the transfer order had been issued, and Chiang Kai-shek learned that the Nine-Power Pact would be held in Beijing on November 3rd and might sanction Japan.Bai Chongxi, who knew the soldiers, told Jiang that under the powerful artillery fire of the enemy, if the retreating troops returned to their original positions, there would be chaos and even uncontrollable chaos, but Jiang insisted on not listening.The consequence of not listening to basic military common sense is that the advance and retreat were out of order and chaos arose, and the three divisions of the Japanese invaders happened to land in Hangzhou Bay on November 5th in an attempt to outflank and annihilate our army.In this emergency situation, there was no choice but to retreat hastily, and there was no time to plan. As a result, 100,000 troops were crowded on the roads, pursued by enemy tanks on the ground, and bombed by enemy planes in the sky. They had to evacuate separately, completely out of control.Fortunately, the troops who withdrew to the positions of the Wufu Line and the Xicheng Line, according to Feng Yuxiang, could not find the location of the fortifications in a hurry, or found the fortifications but could not find the key (see Feng Yuxiang's "The Chiang Kai-shek I Know"). Isn't it a big joke that Chiang Kai-shek's national defense fortifications built for many years have not played a role at all?On February 28, 1938, Chen Cheng gave a lecture on "The History and Lessons of the Shanghai War" in the research class of the Luojiashan General School in Wuchang. He also admitted that it was a mistake not to retreat in an orderly and planned manner. (The original is hidden in the second file in Nanjing) Chiang Kai-shek's will to go his own way led to an improper retreat, which made the defeat of Songhu even worse!

From the very costly Battle of Songhu to the extremely chaotic hasty retreat, once again confirmed the serious lack of Jiang's military command ability.Any commander who is like this should be dismissed and investigated, but who can resign the post of chairman of the Generalissimo?The Chinese soldiers and civilians had no choice but to follow him hard.His military knowledge is so, what about political common sense?From his expectation of the Nine-Power Pact Conference, it can be seen that he is ignorant of the world situation. As a result, not only Germany and Italy spoke out for Japan, but even Britain and France expressed their "neutrality" and "not intervening in the war." They were unable to impose any sanctions on the Japanese invaders.Chiang Kai-shek's hope was in vain, but because of his mistake, he did not know how many brave officers and soldiers who fought bloody battles, as well as innocent Chinese people died unjustly.

The Japanese invaders chased down our defeated army with heavy equipment from the land, sea and air forces, and divided their troops into three groups to attack Nanjing.Under such circumstances, anyone with a little military common sense knows that Nanjing cannot be defended, and there is really no need to make unnecessary sacrifices.Therefore, when Chiang Kai-shek held three consecutive military conferences from November 17th to 18th, Falkenhausen, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi, the heads of the German military advisers, did not advocate defending Nanjing.Li Zongren even advocated declaring Nanjing as an undefended city. According to international public law, no more force can be used, which can prevent the enemy from burning and killing civilians (see "Li Zongren's Memoirs", When Tigers Fight P.66). It is impossible to abandon the defense without fighting, so Liu Fei, the combat team leader of the base camp, suggested that a small number of troops should be used for symbolic defense, and then retreat actively and orderly.However, Chiang Kai-shek neither listened to Li Zongren's proposition nor accepted Liu Fei's suggestion, and focused on the so-called national palace and the mausoleum of the founding father, so he had to stick to it.Therefore, when Tang Shengzhi made a generous statement, wishing to live and die with Nanjing, it was exactly what Jiang wanted, and he ordered Tang to be the commander-in-chief of the Nanjing garrison and guard the capital.However, in less than two days, Chiang announced on November 20 that the capital would be moved to Chongqing, Sichuan.On December 4th, Chiang Kai-shek called a meeting of generals above the division commander, saying that they were defending Nanjing in order to "contain the enemy's forces," and that he would personally lead the troops from Yunnan to break the siege of Nanjing.On the evening of December 11th, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram from Jiangxi to Tang Shengzhi, saying that "if the situation cannot last, we can retreat in time to organize and counterattack." (The original is in the archives of the National Government War History Compilation Committee of the Second Archives in Nanjing), so don't stick to it.In hindsight, it was an irresponsible decision-making.In fact, he flew to Jiangxi in the early morning of the seventh day when the Japanese army began to attack the outskirts of Nanjing.

Tang Shengzhi, who claimed to stick to Nanjing, explained to reporters on November 27 two things to do to defend Nanjing: "First, I and my troops vowed to live and die with Nanjing, and did not hesitate to sacrifice in the defense of Nanjing; Second, this kind of sacrifice will definitely make the enemy pay a great price." (Quoted from Song Xilian's "General Eagle and Dog", Volume 1, p. 175) On December 9, Tang Shengzhi issued an order as the commander-in-chief, still taking "coexistence and death" as the principle He also ordered Song Xilian, commander of the Seventy-eighth Army, to "command the gendarmes along the river, strictly prohibiting officers and soldiers from crossing the river by boat without permission, and those who violated the law will be arrested and dealt with severely. one).It seems that there is indeed a determination to stick to it.However, when the Japanese army began to aggressively attack the city on December 10, Tang Shengzhi suddenly received a telegram from the Military Commission: "If the situation cannot be sustained for a long time, you can retreat in time to organize and counterattack." On the afternoon of the 12th, the enemy After capturing Zhonghuamen, the whole city was breached in less than two days.Tang Yuan had no evacuation plan, and only held a 20-minute evacuation meeting that day, before deciding to diverge and break through, which resulted in the tragic situation of extreme chaos in Xiaguan that night.According to Li Zongren, "there was no plan when retreating, and the officers and soldiers were allowed to run around and escape separately. A few brave troops did not know what was going on, mistakenly believed that the friendly troops were cowering, and retreated without authorization. Cannibalism, death and injury, the tragedy to the point" ("Li Zongren's Memoirs", p. 458).

After the "cannibalism", the Japanese army entered the city the next day, and committed rape, burning, murder, and rape, resulting in the "Nanjing Massacre" that shocked China and the world.At that time, 27 foreign missionaries, doctors, and teachers voluntarily stayed behind, testifying to the horrific massacre and leaving a record of Nanjing becoming "a living hell".In fact, before entering Nanjing, the Japanese army had already started to kill Chinese along the way as a game of competition, which was reported in Japanese newspapers (see Wilson, When Tigers Fight, p. 68-81 for details).However, after the war, there are still many Japanese who want to renege on their debts, saying that there was no such thing as the Nanjing Massacre.Chiang Kai-shek's "repaying grievances with virtue" is too generous for the 300,000 soldiers and civilians who died in Nanjing (for the number of 300,000, see the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East).

There is nothing to blame for Nanjing being unable to defend. The enemy took advantage of the superiority of soldiers and weapons to attack the strongholds that are easy to attack and difficult to defend with three-dimensional land and air combat.What can be discussed is that the oath of "living and dying with the city" is empty words.If you deal with the enemy with the firm will of tenacity, even if you lose, you can still inflict heavy damage on the enemy.On the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek vowed to fight Tang Shengzhi to the death, but on the other hand, he still held the hope of German mediation.However, peace and war are still undecided, and it is difficult to be united.As for the strategy of defending the city, they gathered a large number of troops in a corner of Nanjing, but failed to deploy troops around the capital city as a barrier, so as to respond to the movement and consume the enemy.No matter how brave the officers and soldiers are, although they spare their lives, they hate killing too few enemies.When it was necessary to retreat and transfer, the order could not be implemented in a hurry, causing serious unprovoked casualties.Wouldn't it be a pity to make such a sacrifice?And this has nothing to do with the strength of the enemy army, it is actually due to our inappropriate tactics and strategy.Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Tang Shengzhi can absolve themselves of the blame.On December 13th, Chiang issued the "Declaration on the Withdrawal of Nanjing for Our Army", saying: "Since the seat of the government has been moved elsewhere, Nanjing is of no importance politically or militarily. This is the battle plan. When the enemy's artillery fire is too intense, causing our army to make unnecessary sacrifices, the front will be moved back. This plan is to order the Nanjing garrison to retreat to other positions and continue the war of resistance. "Volume Thirty) seems to have completely followed the plan and transferred after completing the mission.How could it be! How could it be! In fact, because of the mistakes and confusion in the plan, I don’t know how many unnecessary sacrifices have been made!

After the fall of Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek held a military conference in Kaifeng on January 11, 1938, pointing out that "to maintain the lifeline of the country, we must defend Wuhan to the core" and "to consolidate Wuhan, we must guard Jinpu in the east and roads in the north." Qing Dynasty" (Volume 15 of "President Jiang Gong's Thoughts and Speeches", pp. 13-14), because the two railways Jinpu and Daoqing are the barriers of the three towns of Wuhan, and the responsibility for defending the barriers of Wuhan falls on the town of Xuzhou On the body of Li Zongren, the commander-in-chief of the fifth war zone.The division of the Japanese army in southern Lunan went south on March 10th. It went deep alone and was surrounded by a large Chinese army in Taierzhuang. It wiped out at least 12,000 enemies (according to Japanese estimates). There are many, and the attack is still weak after the victory. The Japanese army that should be wiped out but failed to wipe out the depths, let alone expand the results of the battle and change the situation of the battle.It is worth noting that after Chiang Kai-shek received the victory report of Taierzhuang, he transferred another 200,000 people within one month, making a total of 600,000 people, to fight against the 300,000 Japanese reinforcements in Xuzhou, that is, to make a decisive battle. In the positional warfare, he forgot the tactics of outflanking and annihilating the enemy in Kaifeng a few months ago, and also forgot that the North China Plain was conducive to the offensive of the enemy's mechanized troops.Sure enough, Li Zongren realized that "we have gathered hundreds of thousands of troops in the plain area around Xuzhou, which is the best target for the enemy's mechanized troops and air force." Therefore, they voluntarily retreated from Xuzhou in early May, and completely abandoned Xuzhou on May 19.Chiang Kai-shek's 150,000 elite troops were unable to annihilate the 20,000 besieged enemies, and because of the fall of Xuzhou, the enemy invaded the eastern Henan plain. Nanjing Second Archives), but he blamed most of the generals for being "cowardly" and "incompetent in command" (see the warrant dated May 27, 1938, the original copy is in the Nanjing Second Archives), and he seemed to have forgotten that he was a commander The supreme commander of the whole world.

Chiang Kai-shek returned to Wuhan from Zhengzhou on May 25. He was afraid that the Japanese army would march west from Jinpu Road, and that after the Japanese army occupied Zhengzhou, they might attack Wuhan from the west of Longhai Road and the south of Pinghan Road. At the suggestion of the two staff officers in the Ministry, it was approved to dig the embankment on the south bank of the Yellow River to stop the enemy from eastern Henan.Chiang's order to "cover the enemy with floods" was handed over to the First Theater for approval, and the original copy is still in the archives of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government in the Nanjing Second Archives.On June 7th, the iron bridge over the Yellow River was blown up, and two days later, the Huayuankou in the north of Zhengzhou was bombarded. At that time, the price of silver was converted to about 953 million yuan. Nearly a million people died, and more than 6 million people survived in Wangyang Zeguo, which damaged more than 17 million mu of cultivated land and formed a yellow flood zone with endless troubles. .Paying such a heavy price did not stop the enemy from capturing Wuhan.How innocent are the common people, there is such a supreme commander who disregards human life!

However, in the 1950s, He Yingqin published the book "The History of the Eight-Year War of Resistance" that was "approved by President Jiang Gong of Holland".In the book "Battle along the Longhai Road" in 1938, it is said: I abandoned Kaifeng on June 5th, and the enemy divided and attacked Zhongmouwei's. The two places also fell on the 6th, and then invaded Xinzheng. On the 7th, the enemy bombed the embankment of the Yellow River. As the Lu River flooded south, the enemy and ourselves formed a confrontation along the Yellow River. What caught our attention the most in this passage is that "the enemy bombed the embankment of the Yellow River", saying that because the Japanese planes bombed the embankment of the Yellow River, "the embankment near Zhaokou collapsed, and the water flowed through Zhongmuwei's family and flooded along the Jialu River, and the enemy and us followed the Yellow River embankment." The cross-strait situation has become a confrontation".At first glance, there is nothing wrong with this statement, but if you think about it carefully, you will see the flaw.Think about it, the Chinese army was retreating all the way. Suddenly, Japanese planes blew up the embankment of the Yellow River, and the river flooded. The offensive was stopped, so our side took advantage, but the flooding of the river was the result of the enemy plane blowing up the embankment. Why did the enemy plane blow up the embankment to make it hard for us?

The passage "The Eight Years of Anti-Japanese War" is, in fact, an out-and-out lie. There was nothing wrong with the Yellow River embankment being bombed. What was wrong was that it was not the Japanese at all, but the Chinese themselves. ——It was a catastrophic event ordered by Chiang Kai-shek! (Chiang sent Cheng Qiandian on June 11, 1938, ordering "to publicize to the public that enemy planes bombed the Yellow River embankment", the original copy is hidden in the Nanjing Second Archives National Government War History Compilation Committee file) This tragedy was first written about in biographical books and periodicals, but it was the "Biography of President Chiang" written by Dong Xianguang, Minister of Propaganda of the Kuomintang.The book clearly stated: "We will blow up the Yellow River embankment in Zhengzhou, and use the torrential water to fight against the invading enemy." Although this kind of propaganda is well-intentioned, it is also extremely poorly technical.Because the river has no eyes, how can it only flood the Japanese and not the Chinese?In the era of "Secret Records of President Chiang", the Kuomintang's propaganda has taken care of it. "President Chiang's Secret Records" under the section "The Japanese Army's Attack on the Yangtze River", although the propaganda has taken into account the losses of the enemy and ourselves, but "the flood flooded the fields, and the lives of the people will inevitably be affected" (page 144). Numbers are an understatement.How much has China's "people's lives" been "affected"?Chiang Kai-shek ordered the embankment to be blown up, and the losses caused can be divided into two stages. The early losses were mainly in 1938, and the later losses were mainly in 1943.The embankment explosion in 1938 in the early stage diverted the Yellow River, flooded more than 20 counties, and the vast land east of the Ping-Han Railway became Zeguo.Among them, eleven cities were flooded, many farmlands and crops were washed away, four thousand villages were completely submerged, two million people were displaced, and nearly one million people were drowned; the losses in the latter part of 1943, It's a hangover from 1938.Due to the destruction of farmland and crops by the river, coupled with political corruption, it finally led to the Henan Great Famine in 1943. The loss of human life in the famine was between 5 million and 10 million.The report of the famine first appeared in Ta Kung Pao on February 1, 1943. "Ta Kung Pao" first published a report "The Truth of the Disaster in Henan"; the next day, another editorial "Looking at Chongqing, Thinking about the Central Plains" was published. "Looking at Chongqing" means looking at the stink of wine and meat in the homes of senior Kuomintang officials in Chongqing, and "thinking about the Central Plains" means thinking about the starved bones of the five million poor people in Henan.According to an estimate published in the US "National Enquirer" on December 14, 1985, one million Chinese civilians drowned in 1938, and only a few thousand Japanese soldiers. In the Great Famine of 1943 and 1943, 10 million Chinese people died! ——A single atomic bomb killed only 100,000 Japanese people. When Chiang Kai-shek killed his own compatriots, this time it was 100 atomic bombs! According to the comprehensive discussion of Meng Juezi's "KMT's Nature of Letting Water" (September 30, 1984, the ninth issue of "Long Live Commentary Series"): After the reports and editorials of "Ta Kung Pao" were published, the Kuomintang not only did not hurry up to find ways to Instead, he became angry from embarrassment and brazenly ordered that "Ta Kung Pao" be suspended for three days.However, a reporter from the Central News Agency run by the Kuomintang said in a confidential letter circulated internally that "the situation in Henan is even worse than what the Ta Kung Pao said."On February 2, 1943, "Ta Kung Pao" was punished and suspended for three days, and after nearly two months, the American "Time" also published news and comments about the Henan Famine, describing the disaster in Henan, Commented that the KMT is the culprit of the catastrophe. The reports and discussions of Time Magazine were not based on the news and editorials of Ta Kung Pao, but the articles written by Theodore White, the weekly's China correspondent, who went to the disaster-stricken areas in Henan Province to observe and interview on the spot.After the article was published in Time Magazine, the whole world was shocked.Ms. Jiang Songmeiling, who was visiting the United States at the time, was furious when she saw it. She immediately called the owner of "Times", Henry Ruth, and asked him to immediately fire the reporter Bai Xiude who started the rumor.Henry Ruth flatly refused.In mid-August 1978, the new book In Search of History by the famous American journalist and political commentator Bai Xiude was published in the United States, which immediately caused a sensation and became a bestseller.More than a month before the publication of the book, the July 3 issue of "Time Magazine" made a special summary of the part about China in the book. The scourge of famine.The introduction of that issue of "Time Magazine" included not only text but also photos.There are two photos side by side.In one photo, a starving woman with a sad face and a sad face is sitting on the ground looking at her young son who is dying of starvation in front of her.Another photo shows Chiang Kai-shek sitting in his office in military uniform, concentrating on a book held in both hands.That book was "The Destiny of China" signed by Jiang Zhongzheng.There are two lines of English words under the two photos, which means: "One of the most tragic disasters in human history, five million people have died..." There are a dozen or so Page.After this weekly magazine entered Taiwan, all these dozen or so pages were deleted by the Kuomintang. Yu Juezi made a comprehensive discussion: That flood destroyed the ecology of the land in the disaster-stricken area of ​​Henan and affected the subsequent crop harvest. In 1942, there was no rain in spring, summer, and autumn, and it snowed in winter. There was no harvest and the weather was cold. Under the hunger and cold, death began.Since there was no rain in Henan for three seasons, the Kuomintang should have known that all the crops in that area had not been harvested, and furthermore, it should have known that some people would starve to death.At this time, if the Kuomintang ordered to transfer part of the abundant grain stored in the warehouse in Shaanxi next door to Henan, the disaster of starving people in Henan would not be so serious.As a result, none of the things that should be done the most were done; all the things that should not be done were done.In 1942, the troops stationed in Henan asked the Chongqing authorities for a supply of rations. The instructions from the authorities were to "requisition grain on the spot." The so-called "grain collection on the spot" meant that the troops should try their best to obtain military rations at the station.Under this directive, the army became "legal bandits, licensed bandits."They went to the people's homes to plunder food one after another. They didn't plunder until they had enough to eat, they collected as much as they could.Afterwards, commanders at all levels secretly took some of them and sold them on the black market.After selling, the soldiers can only eat 90%, 80%, and 70% full.It was postponed until October 31, Chiang Kai-shek's birthday, in order to express "Chairman Chiang's virtue", it was announced that farmers in the disaster-stricken areas in Henan Province would be exempted from the 1942 land tax.Unfortunately, this "Germany" was announced too late.The Henan local government has already collected the farmers' land taxes in 1942.After the "grain collection on the spot", in order to pay the land tax, small farmers and small households either sold their properties, or sold their utensils, or sold their children.After the weather turned cold, the hunger also started.The colder the weather, the worse the disaster.Just after the start of the famine, brothel owners from cities far away came to the disaster area to "buy" girls cheaply.Big landowners took the opportunity to buy large quantities of farmland cheaply.A land which usually yields twenty or thirty pounds of wheat a year can now be bought by the speculator for as little as sixteen or eighteen pounds of wheat.Later, under the collusion between government and businessmen, those unowned farmlands whose family members died were divided up by big landlords and corrupt officials.Along the way, Bai Xiude saw some people who died of freezing and others who died of starvation.Among the dead were men, women, young and old.Some people who haven't starved to death are still rushing to eat grass roots and bark.Some adults cooked and ate dead children, and some adults brought dead children from other people's homes and cooked them.Almost all the dogs that people used to raise have turned into wild dogs. They no longer live in farm houses and eat human feces, but wander around, eating human corpses.All the villages along the way are empty.In some entire villages there is only one old man waiting to die.Some villages are as dead as a tomb, but a human voice is like a thunderbolt from the blue.The human tragedy that Bai Xiude will never forget is the scene he saw on the snow.A man and a woman were lying on the icy snow, hugging each other tightly. They had no strength to speak, and they didn't want to say anything. They just used their last bit of strength before dying, weeping bitterly. ! "President Chiang's Biography" said that the effect of blasting the embankment delayed the occupation of Hankou for "more than three months"; "President Chiang's Secret Record" also said that the delay was "half a year".Shi Jue discussed the "Yellow River bursting its embankment" in "Mr. Shi Jue's Interview Record", saying: After the Battle of Xuzhou, the enemy invaded the entire Jinpu line and invaded eastern Henan. Taking advantage of Xuzhou's breakthrough, they attempted to invade west along Longhai Road and occupy the middle section of Pinghan Road.At that time, Wuhan, the heart of the Anti-Japanese War, was in a precarious situation. In order to destroy the enemy's plan, delay the enemy's actions, and gain the necessary preparation time, the military authorities broke the Yellow River embankment near Huayuankou in Zhongmou County, causing the river to flood the east of Henan and prevent the enemy from advancing. Although a heavy price has been paid for the advance, it is also worthwhile to stabilize the key areas in central China and gain the time to prepare for the long-term war of resistance. (pages 119 to 120) What is puzzling is, what did "the time of calm preparation for the long-term war of resistance" do so many years before the war started?Why does it have to be so urgent—to the point where it releases water without even notifying its own people?Why did our own people pay such a painful price for these three months?Is this called "also worth it"?What's more, it is doubtful how much such a painful price will delay the Japanese devils.On the offensive, the Japanese army quickly gave up their intention of invading Wuhan from the Central Plains to the south, and instead took the land route on the east side and the way of attacking Jiangxi.With Toshiro Hata as the commander of the Sixth General, the "Central China Expeditionary Army" was reorganized, and the three divisions belonging to Lieutenant General Higashikuri Toshihiko, the commander of the Second Army drawn from the "Northern China Front Army", took land routes, and the 11th Army Army Commander Lieutenant General Neiji Okamura's four divisions and a detachment cooperated with the Navy's Third Fleet to attack the Yangtze River, marched in two directions, and soon took Wuhan. It can be seen that this strategy is worthwhile. ! In the enemy camp fighting at that time, there was a Taiwanese-Japanese Kawamura Cheng Cheng, who was serving as an army interpreter at the Kawamura Army Headquarters in Xinxiang, Henan Province, and was interpreting for the commander, Lieutenant General Kawamura.In 1940, Kawamura successfully restored his Chinese nationality and changed his name to Chen Wenzhong. Later, he became a professor of Japanese at National Chengchi University. Because he was the father of Chen Lide, wife of Li Ao's friend Wei Zhengzhong, they came to talk at night together one day.According to Chen Wenzhong, when he woke up in the middle of the night and found that the water was knee-deep, he knew that the Yellow River had burst its embankment.Li Ao asked him if the Japanese had thought that the Chinese would blow up the embankment. He said that the Japanese had thought of it a long time ago, but the Japanese judged that if three divisions of the Japanese army were to be drowned, at least three million Chinese people would die. Chiang Kai-shek would not be so cruel.Little do they know that the Japanese made a wrong judgment, and Chiang Kai-shek's cruelty was beyond the expectations of the Japanese devils! Although Chiang Kai-shek brutally blew up the embankment, if he really "gained time to prepare for the long-term war of resistance", let's just say it.But even for the water release operation, there is no "calm preparation", but random. Because Chiang Kai-shek's water release operation is shameful, he has been relying on the Japanese, saying that the water was released by the Japanese army.Because it is a lie, the statement is not uniform.He Yingqin's "Eight Years of Anti-Japanese War" said that the embankment was bombed by Japanese planes; "China Yearbook" (Nanjing Zhonghua Yearbook, September 1948 edition) said that it was bombed by Japanese artillery; It is even said that the embankment split itself after the "heavy rain" (as stated in the "Historical History of the Republic of China" compiled by the Kuomintang Party History Association)...in fact, they are all rumors.At that time, it was Shang Zhen, the commander-in-chief of the 20th Army of the Kuomintang, who was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to blow up the embankment. Shang Zhen then ordered Wei Rulin, the chief of staff of the colonel, to take charge of the matter.After Wei Rulin arrived in Taiwan, he did not dare to announce the story at the beginning. Later, because of the publication of "President Jiang Biography", in September 1976 Zhang Qiyun supervised the revision of "War History Essays", which was written by Liu Shuwan, an engineer staff officer of the Army Lieutenant Colonel. He came forward and published "The Documentary of the Yellow River Breach During the Anti-Japanese War"; six years later, Wei Rulin retitled this article in his own name, "A Documentary of the Yellow River Breach During the Anti-Japanese War", published on December 31, 1982. The fourteenth issue of War History Journal was published.The article records in great detail the release of water without "calm preparation". "National Collection of Revival and Care" (published by the National Father's Industrial Planning Research Society on October 31, 1981) included Wei Rulin's "Biography" and said: After the Battle of Xuzhou, former President Chiang Kai-shek decided to dig the embankment of the Yellow River, causing flooding and preventing the Japanese army from advancing westward. From planning to completion, Ru Lin presided over it. It was spring in the dry season, and the northern Zhaokou of Henan was closed first. Digging dikes failed three times, and finally succeeded at Huayuankou in the north of Zhengzhou. "Failure is the mother of success" is true.During the eight years of the Anti-Japanese War, Huang Fan contributed a lot to blocking the enemy's westward advance and securing the northwest. (pages 110 to 111) In fact, these "indispensable contributions" have long been "watered". Of course, Wei Rulin refused to face this truth, so he also included three paragraphs in "Records of the Yellow River Burst During the Anti-Japanese War" that "expose the CCP's distorted claims." "Review" of: 1. The Yellow River breached successfully, causing an incomparably vast flood with a width of tens of miles and a water depth of only a few feet.Especially in the early stage of the breach, the water flow was extremely slow, and the north and south of Kaifeng were all sandy land.Therefore, the people in the disaster area, the old and the young, fled safely to the western Henan area of ​​the Ping-Han Railway. The government distributed a large amount of relief funds.As for the destruction of cultivated land and the annihilation of village houses, it is inevitable.At that time, the people of the whole country had the determination to fight against the scorched earth. As long as they can stop the enemy army and benefit the war of resistance, no sacrifice will be made and no complaints will be made. 2. At that time, the enemy army took advantage of the remaining prestige of the Xuzhou battle, and planned to occupy Zhengzhou with mechanized troops and cavalry, and continued to advance westward, so as to smash the back of Wuhan.Therefore, my Supreme Command (in Wuhan) must make long-distance calls many times a day to inquire about the situation of the Yellow River moving eastward. In the end, it was decided that the water was moving too slowly and the breach was not successful. Li Tiejun, the commander of the First Army (now living in the United States), was dispatched to Break through the project site and inspect the facts.When Commander Li saw Yu and others for the first time, he was anxious and angry, and shouted: "Dog pee! Dog pee!" After Yu, Commander Jiang Zaizhen and the Yellow River Water Conservancy Association explained in detail, Commander Li seemed to understand gradually, and began to leave in doubt.A few days later, former President Chiang Kai-shek sent General Hu Zongnan and his Chief of Staff Luo Lie to inspect the breach engineering office. Chief of Staff Luo was a classmate of the tenth term of Rulin Army University. He met old friends on the battlefield and talked about the breach. Believe in success, report to President Chiang Kai-shek first. 3. In the past few years, the CCP declared in mainland China and Hong Kong newspapers that hundreds of thousands of people were drowned when the Yellow River burst during the War of Resistance Against Japan, causing major disasters and so on.This is certainly the fact that people who participated in the Anti-Japanese War and witnessed the people in the Central Plains had insight into their treacherous and counterfeiting skills.Looking back at that time, if the flood of the Yellow River did not stop the Japanese army, Zhengzhou would have fallen to the enemy, Xi'an might not be safe, and Yan'an, the nest of the "Mao Chief" would also be attacked by the Japanese. This kind of review is really funny.One million people were drowned, and Wei Rulin actually said, "The people in the disaster area... not only did not suffer any casualties, even the pigs, dogs, cattle, and chickens all ran away with them, and there was no loss"! As for the effect of releasing water, it also harmed the people far more than the sleep This can be summarized from the situations such as "the water moves too slowly", "the dog pees! the dog pees!" and so on.According to the "Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China - Period of the War of Resistance against Japan" published in September 1981, the second part "Battle Process" (2) (the confidential file of the Presidential Palace received by President Chiang Kai-shek after his visit to Taiwan "The Process of the Battle of Xuzhou—January to June of the 27th Year of the Republic of China"), it just said "Kaifeng fell in June. The next day the enemy continued to fall into Zhongmu and Weishi, and invaded Xinzheng; The defenders along the coast bombed indiscriminately. On June 8, the Yellow River burst near Huayuan, and the flood flooded the Jialu River and flooded the Jialu River. The area around the Zhongmou Wei clan became the Ze Kingdom. The enemy and we were in a confrontation between the two sides of the Yellow River, and the Battle of Xuzhou came to an end.” etc. In other words, we can't see the mythical pictures and effects depicted by Wei Rulin.Wei Fanglin's "war history" is hard to believe! In Wu Xiangxiang's "History of the Second Sino-Japanese War", he said "digging dikes on the Yellow River to stop the enemy" said: On May 31, the Chinese army avoided a decisive battle with the Japanese army on the plains in eastern Henan, and the main force in the first theater also retreated west of the Ping-Han Railway.At this time, it was decided to dig down the embankment of the Yellow River to cause flooding and stop the Japanese army.On June 4, the Chinese army dug dikes at Zhaokou in Zhongmu County.It was originally scheduled to release water at midnight that day.Unexpectedly, after digging for three days and nights, the water flow was not smooth, and the Japanese army had occupied Kaifeng, and the situation was critical.On the evening of the 7th, the Chinese Military Reform Corps dug an embankment at the mouth of Huayuan. By 9:00 am on the 9th, the gap was dug. Zhongmou, Weishi, Fugou, until Anhui and Jiangsu are a vast ocean. (Page 447) This vast ocean, because of the excessive sand content of the Yellow River, the changeable terrain, and the steady flow of water, since the mouth of the river broke through, Zhongmu, Tongxu, Weishi, Taikang, Luyi, Huaiyang, Xihua, Shangshui, Shen Ten counties such as Qiu; Boxian, Taihe, Guoyang, Fuyang, Yingshang, Fengtai, Mengcheng, Huaiyuan, Shouxian, Fengyang and other ten counties in Anhui Province have been sinking for many years, or rising and falling suddenly, Occasionally it can be cultivated, but it does not help in reality. The disaster area is as wide as 23,000 square kilometers; if the Yellow River and Huai River rise at the same time, the sea transportation cannot accommodate it, and it will endanger the Lixia River area in Jiangsu Province.Guihaiba was opened in 1938, and the flooded area included five counties including Gaoyou, Taixian, Dongtai, Yancheng, and Xinghua; the disaster area covered 6,000 square kilometers, a total of 29,000 square kilometers.The disaster areas are mainly located in eastern Henan, northern Anhui, and northern Jiangsu, which happen to be important agricultural areas. If this continues, it will be miserable.It took seven years to complete the project.According to Zhang Qun's inscription in the "Yellow River Garden Helong Commemorative Book" published by the Yellow River Blockage and Restoration Engineering Bureau in September 1947, the full text is: Dangling the Yellow River, benefiting forever, In the middle of the revolution, the barren and the deserted, Collapsed from the garden, poisonous and painful year after year, Mourning for my legacy, life is like a doll. Dedicated to defending, exhausted to receive merit, Thousands of people are working hard to celebrate this close. If the people are ill, the fate of the country is boundless. Punish the past and learn from the future, and always honor the title. That's right, under the "relict" of "life is like a dragon", the Yellow River has been reconnected.But there is another chapter in the evil heart.According to Xu Fuling's "The Heinous Crimes Committed by Chiang Kai-shek on the Yellow River", after the victory, the Kuomintang blocked the Huayuankou breach and returned the Yellow River to its original course. , there are more than 400,000 residents.Fortunately, the Kuomintang's secret operations were exposed, causing public outrage, and the agreement was negotiated and the Kaifeng agreement was signed.But soon the Kuomintang did not abide by the agreement, which aroused strong protests from the CCP, threatening that "it will be forced to take necessary self-defense measures", and then negotiated again in Nanjing, with little progress. The Huayuankou was forcibly blocked to release water, brazenly allowing the raging water of the Yellow River to flow into the old channel.However, the CCP is already prepared, and has already begun to restore the embankment on its own, putting forward the slogan of "anti-Chiang and rule the Yellow River, protect the family and self-defense". Chiang Kai-shek's plot did not succeed. (See "The Liquidation of Chiang Kai-shek" edited by Li Ao, pages 131 to 142) It is said that after Xuzhou abandoned the defense, the Japanese invading army has controlled the territory of eastern China from the northeast, Inner Mongolia to Hangzhou Bay. Chiang Kai-shek should have known but did not know that the Japanese army could avoid the torrential waters of eastern Henan and go south from Bengbu and Hefei, along the Dabie Mountains. Attack Wuhan with the Yangtze River north and south.So he started busy defending Wuhan again.As early as July 18, he told foreign reporter Snow that "Wuhan will be able to hold on," but at the same time he said: "Even if Wuhan cannot hold on for a day in the future, it will not damage the end of the War of Resistance." "It must be." There is a difference between being able to stick to it and "or not being able to stick to it", which shows that he had no idea.When the Japanese army landed in Jiujiang on the 25th, they lost confidence in defending Wuhan. On the 26th and 29th, they wrote in their diaries, "I will never make unnecessary sacrifices for the defense of Wuhan."次保卫武汉战略，当取韧性”!但是在三十一日向武汉各部队长官训话时则说，“此次保卫武汉的战役，乃是我们国家前途和整个抗战局势最重要最紧急的关头”，说了许多为什么要保卫武汉的大道理，然则又回到非坚守不可的论调，并宣布处决失掉马当要塞的师长薛蔚英。蒋介石原想在武汉外围的大别山、长江阻遏敌军，然而虽然将士用命，仍节节败退。日寇还用毒气弹，而我军全无准备，死伤甚惨，难以抵挡敌人攻势。蒋介石早在八月间向英国记者说，扬子江战斗，“吾人深信必能获得较四月间台儿庄一役更大之胜利”，又成了不能兑现的空言。 日本侵略军于进攻武汉的同时，于十月十二日在大亚湾强行登陆，再于二十一日攻陷广州，粤汉铁路通海受阻，促使蒋介石放弃武汉(参阅蒋一九三八年十月二十二日日记，载《蒋总统秘录》，页二五二四)，并于十月二十五日于武汉近郊激战时，飞往南岳。以前强调武汉会战的成败，关系到抗战的前途，现在又改口说：“抗战军事胜负之关键，不在武汉一地之得失!”(蒋介石一九三八年十月三十一日《为国军退出武汉告全国国民书》)令人莫衷一是。从唐纵日记得知，蒋介石飞抵“南岳时，已两点钟，轿夫也未预备，至山上，房间也未布置，委座大怒”。(《在蒋介石身边八年》，页七十八)战时还要讲究“布置”，真不可思议，应该想想遭大水大火无家可归之人。 武汉失守后，日本沿粤汉路南下，于十一月十一日攻陷岳阳。蒋介石以为日军的目标是长沙，遂于翌日电令湖南省主席张治中： 长沙如失陷，务将全城焚毁，望事前妥密准备，勿误! 同时，张治中接到侍从室副主任林蔚的电话：“我们对长沙要用焦土政策!”(张治中一九五九年致郭沫若函)张既是省主席，唯有遵命，把这个任务交给长沙警备司令酆悌执行。 一九三八年十一月十二日晚上，敌人尚在数百里之外，长沙南门外伤兵医院失火，士兵误以为是信号，大举放火，烧了三昼夜，烧死两万余人，城内大部分房屋焚毁。当蒋介石于十六日自南岳山中到长沙视察，但见此一名城一片瓦砾。此一乱来，不仅当地民愤极大，而且引起中外谴责。即使要焚城，亦得要有疏散民众的计划呀！这两万余条人命谁来负责啊！蒋介石下令将长沙警备司令酆悌、警备二团团长徐昆、湖南省警察局长文重孚等三人枪毙了事。然而始作俑者、下令烧掉长沙者，岂非蒋介石乎？他为了有替罪羊，只好挥泪斩亲信爱将酆悌了。 蒋介石先放大水，又放大火，这个样子领导抗战，使本来已受灾受难的中国百姓更苦更惨矣！ 蒋介石于失掉武汉后告诉国人，抗战已进入第二期，将转守为攻、转败为胜，说说而已。事实上，武汉会战之后，中国军队转入山岳地带，交通阻滞，日军不易进一步内侵，何况敌军战线已拉得甚长，无足够的兵力占据面积广大的中国，更不能征服恨日本人入骨的中国军民，唯有封锁与围堵以求逼降。中国方面则凭山丘形势整补，虽有时出击，即如长沙之捷，并无力反攻，扭转颓局。整个战局基本上形成相峙状态，较好的东半壁江山，沦入侵略军之手。一九四○年七月抗战三周年，失土约一百六十万平方公里（见唐纵《在蒋介石身边八年》，页一三九），而且失土仍在持续增加。“转守为攻”云乎哉？ 蒋介石于一九三八年元月在开封军事会议上说，这几个月来的失败，“不是我们一般下级官兵不勇敢、不牺牲；而是由于我们一般高级将领在平时缺乏研究、没有实学长技拿来教育部下；到了战时，对于一切战术战略，又不能根据基本典范纲领和战阵实际情况，随时随地研究改进，以致指挥失当，虽有很多部队，也不能发挥相当效力，所以被敌人打败！”这段话讲得正确级了，唯不知是否包括他本人在内。然而这段话本是下一段的引文，接下去他说：“我们高级将领中还有观望不前，图保实力，不努力、不合作，所以敌人才敢进来。”这是逮捕与枪决韩复榘的“罪状”。抗战期间被处决的集团军令一级的将领，还有石友三。石、韩都有反蒋记录，所谓因违反军纪而遭处决，恐怕大有公报私仇的成分。而且抓人处决不是经由正当的军事法庭审理，而是由戴笠用特务手段来处理的；死罪与否，全凭蒋介石手批。再说韩复榘弃守山东，或罪有应得，然而抗战以来，弃守名城的高级将领不知凡几，包括蒋氏爱将刘峙在内，不闻有何惩处，则更难免双重标准之讥矣。他没有提到的是，自抗战以来，他唯有从苏联获致军援。自一九三七年起到一九三九年止，苏联送给蒋介石一千架飞机、二千名飞行员、五百位军事顾部，以及二亿八千万元低利贷款。