Chapter 33 Section 3 How to Lead the War of Resistance

When the Xi’an Incident happened, Chiang Kai-shek fled over the wall and was injured at the waist. After returning, he was treated in places such as Shanghai, Hangzhou and Xikou. At the same time, he dealt with the aftermath. , but the general direction cannot be changed, and the civil war is absolutely impossible to continue. With the rising anti-Japanese sentiment in the whole country, it is impossible not to resist.If Japan provokes China again, war will be inevitable.Under such circumstances, it is an objective trend for the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to cooperate again, and it cannot be influenced by any subjective wishes.

On December 28, Mao Zedong of the Communist Party of China issued the "Statement on Chiang Kai-shek's Statement" in response to the "Precepts to Zhang Yang" which he considered "ambiguous and tortuous". Commitment to the promise of "must be believed, action must be resolute", declared that "the people of the whole country will not allow the Jiang family to have any room for hesitation and compromise."If Chiang abandons the wrong policies of the past and "immediately embarks on the front of uniting all parties and factions to resist Japan", "then the Communist Party should give him sponsorship". (See Volume 1 of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, p. 228) A week later, the CCP issued another telegram demanding that Chiang Kai-shek fulfill his promise.In January 1937, the Kuomintang finally abolished the "Northwest Bandit Suppression Headquarters", and the civil war officially stopped.On February 15 of the same year, the Kuomintang held the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee.At the meeting, on the one hand, the "Resolution on Eradicating the Red Plague" was passed, and on the other hand, a motion to unite all parties and factions was passed, but it was not allowed to be published. (See Feng Yuxiang's "The Chiang Kai-shek I Know") After the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek made a statement to the journalists, "On the one hand, he advocates openness of speech, while on the other hand prohibits the propaganda of communism; criminals, while forcing the arrested Communist Party members to surrender themselves.” (quoted from Yang Shubiao, p. 316) fully expresses the contradictions in policy transformation under external pressure.This kind of contradiction somewhat reflects that Chiang Kai-shek was not willing to continue to suppress the Communist Party, and still wanted to incorporate the CCP's party and army through negotiations.

After the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee, Zhou Enlai went to Hangzhou to hold talks with Chiang Kai-shek in late March.There were no conclusions on many specific issues, obviously because Jiang wanted to melt them through unification, while Zhou wanted to maintain independence in unification, but in principle a consensus on cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had been reached.The CCP then issued a "Message to All Comrades in the Party" on April 15, 1937, stating that "the task for the future development stage is to consolidate domestic peace, strive for democratic rights, and realize the war of resistance against Japan."

In May 1937, after Chiang Kai-shek's injury and sores were dismissed, he and Wang Jingwei went to Mount Lushan to convene scholars and celebrities for a discussion.Chen Bulei wrote: During the summer of that year, Jiang and Wang convened celebrities from the academic circles to talk and hold training sessions for educational personnel on Lushan Mountain. ("Chen Bulei's Memoirs", page 12) Zhou Enlai also went to Mount Lushan on June 4 to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek and Song Ziwen.Chiang proposed to organize the National Revolutionary League (he himself is the chairman with the final decision-making power) to supervise the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; the Nanjing government issued the designations of the three divisions of the Red Army, and Zhu De and Mao Zedong went abroad; Wait.Jiang's intention to eat up the CCP was still very clear. Zhou Enlai was not willing to accept it, so he returned to Yan'an in mid-June.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China still made some concessions on June 25. In principle, it agreed to organize the "Tongmenghui" proposed by Chiang. political and intellectual independence.The chief executive of the border area can be appointed by the Kuomintang, but one must be selected from Zhang Ji, Song Ziwen, and Yu Youren.As for the adaptation of the Red Army, Zhu De must be the commander.Chiang Kai-shek still refused to accept, and the agreement failed.However, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out on July 7, and the Sino-Japanese war was imminent, and there was no room for bargaining with the outside world. ...In short, as the mainland scholars said: "Although Chiang Kai-shek was forced to negotiate with the Communist Party for bipartisan cooperation, he wanted to unite the Communist Party under his own rule in the name of cooperation, and unite gradually among the Kuomintang. Melt it away.” (See Yan Ruping and Zheng Zemin’s Biography of Chiang Kai-shek, p. 294)

When it comes to the July 7th Incident, many scholars are arguing endlessly about who fired the first shot on the Marco Polo Bridge.May I ask if robbers run rampant in your house, if you refuse to give in and fight, what is the point of whoever starts the fight?In fact, it was no accident that the accident happened at Lugouqiao. Lugouqiao and Fengtai are the two gateways of Beiping's external traffic.The Japanese army had forcibly occupied Fengtai Station on September 18 of the previous year. If they controlled Lugou Bridge and Wanping City, they would be able to encircle Peiping and consolidate their so-called "specialization of North China".The Japanese military exercises and the disappearance of the soldiers were all for excuses. Later, the missing soldier was found in a brothel. (See Liu Fenghan's "On the History of the Anti-Japanese War", pages 101 to 113) However, the Japanese army still wanted to enter Wanping to search. Obviously, the drunkard's intention was not to drink, but to invade Wanping, and the Wanping defenders rose up to resist. , It is called the July 7th Incident.

On July 8, the mayor of Peking, Qin Dechun, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek who was still in Lushan, reporting the incident.According to Chen Bulei, after nine days, Chiang "began to learn the outline of it", and Chiang "still did not want to break up the peace, and ordered Song Zheyuan to resist on the spot, and adhered to the policy of not surrendering and not expanding." (See "Chen Bulei's Memoirs", page 121) The Japanese government also expressed its unwillingness to expand, but the premise of not expanding is that China surrenders, and it is impossible not to expand without yielding.As far as Chiang is concerned, it would be tantamount to political suicide if he did not resist like September 18.At the same time, Mao Zedong, Zhu De and other Red Army officers and men called Chiang Kai-shek, asking Yingying to fight against Japan and save the country.On July 16, Jiang Sui invited military and political dignitaries from all over the country to hold a talk meeting at Lushan Mountain.In August, the CCP sent Zhou Enlai and others to participate, and put forward a declaration of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, advocating the launch of a national war of resistance and a joint response to national disasters.The CCP made some concessions, but still insisted that the Kuomintang can only send people to participate in commanding the Red Army.Chiang Kai-shek was indifferent, and it was not until mid-August that he gave in on the issue of reorganizing the Red Army and was willing to join the CCP in resisting Japan.

Although Chiang Kai-shek still "hoped to find a solution to Lu's matter through peaceful means", he knew that the Japanese warlords were full of arrogance and it was impossible to "awaken themselves", so war was inevitable.In his speech to Lu Shi on July 17, he had actually made psychological preparations for the whole people's war of resistance. (See Chiang’s diary on July 19, Volume 2 of President Chiang’s Secret Records, p. 24) On July 20, Chiang returned to Beijing from Mount Lu. One after another embraced Chiang to resist the Japanese, making it impossible for Chiang to retreat. The armistice negotiations broke down. The Japanese invaders invaded Pingjin in the middle of the night on July 28. The 29th Army resisted tenaciously. In two or three days, Pingjin fell one after another.Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary on the 29th:

The ancient capitals of the past dynasties have been reduced to dogs and pigs, what a grief! However, this is expected, so it is not surprising that we have prepared for the handling of the fall yesterday. ("Preliminary draft of the editor-in-chief of President Chiang Kai-shek") Volume IV, page 1140) Although the military strength of China and Japan is very different, it is amazing that they can't help fighting.Jiang Yu repeatedly telegraphed Song Zheyuan in advance that if the Japanese invaders made progress, "the central government is determined to use all its strength to resist the war" and asked Song to "take strict precautions at all times and pay attention to every step" to defend Beiping. However, he still hoped for a peaceful settlement that he knew was impossible. Hastily responded to the battle, and the central government was unable to fully support the 29th Army, which led to a rapid defeat and the loss of famous cities! At the press conference on July 29, he admitted that the failure of Pingjin was "willing to be borne by Yu Yi", and Demonstrated determination to fight.The term "Anti-Japanese War" was also first insisted by Chiang Kai-shek to indicate that China had no choice but to fight against the Japanese aggression!

The real full-scale challenge was the Battle of Songhu on August 13, 1937.The next day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the government issued a statement on self-defense against the Japanese War.On August 19, Chiang finally agreed with the CCP's proposal for the reorganization of the Red Army, and with Zhu De and Peng Dehuai as the commanders and deputy commanders, it was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army.On August 21, the "Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty" was officially announced.On September 22, the Central News Agency published the "Communist Party of China Announces the KMT-CCP ​​Cooperation Declaration".The next day, Chiang Kai-shek made a speech, expressing his acceptance of the CCP, and the second cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was formally established.It can be seen that, strictly speaking, "August 13" was the beginning of Chiang Kai-shek's determination to fight against the whole people. As the chairman of the Military Commission, he exercised the supreme command of the army, navy and air force.Since the Military Commission has become the highest command department, its establishment has been greatly expanded. It has a secretary office and six departments, which are in charge of military orders, military administration, economy, political strategy, propaganda, and training.With the whole country unanimously resisting foreign aggression, Chiang Kai-shek finally became the supreme leader of the unified China.

How did this supreme leader lead China's war of resistance?The History and Political Bureau of the National Defense Ministry of the Kuomintang "respectfully printed" a book "Leaders' Great Achievements in Military Affairs" in 1966. Leaders are all good at it.” Among them, the most evidence of this is the passages that Chiang Kai-shek “decided on a strategy of protracted attrition” as “the basis for victory in the War of Resistance.”The full text is as follows: After the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, the leaders believed that China's military equipment at that time would never allow the method of reckless warfare to resist the enemy with modern land, sea and air force.In order to smash the enemy's "quick battle" attempt and avoid the enemy's continuous attack and destruction, it is decided to use China's large manpower and vast land to adopt the highest strategy of persistent consumption: on the one hand, the enemy is continuously consumed; on the other hand, the battlefield is spread , Differentiate the enemy's advantages, and at the same time actively cultivate combat power to capture the arrival of counterattack opportunities.

In the war guidance under the application of this supreme strategy, the first phase is to "exchange space for time" to enhance combat power, and the second phase is to insist on guerrilla attacks in the enemy's rear, to strive for "accumulating small victories into big victories", and possessing from beginning to end. On the battlefield, avoid the enemy's various defeats, maintain the main force, and wait for a favorable opportunity to counterattack.This is the greatest success in the anti-Japanese strategic guidance, that is, the highest creativity in the leader's war decision-making. Before the use of this highest strategy, there was a great crisis, that is, in the second month after the start of the war, at the beginning of August in the 26th year of the Republic of China (1937), after the fall of Pingjin, the Japanese invaders fought with elite troops. The troops went south along Pinghan Road; on the one hand, they invaded from Shanghai with the Marine Corps.If at this time, the decisive battle on the Ping-Han line unfortunately fails, the enemy can drive southward, go straight to the hinterland of Wuhan, divide China into east and west battlefields, keep important materials along the coast of China, and divide China's fighting troops. As a result, the overall situation will be fragmented, and the source of lasting consumption will be lost. The leader had a deep insight into the worrisome crisis, and resolutely concentrated a part of his troops on the North China battlefield. At various key points along the Pingsui, Pinghan, and Jinpu lines, he adopted deep overlapping deployments and multi-line fortifications in sections to carry out successive attacks against the Japanese invaders. resistance.In particular, they took the opportunity to grasp the dangerous obstacles in Chanan and Shanxi, occupied the side positions, secured the natural fortress of Shanxi, and forced the Japanese invaders who arrived in Chanan to feel the threat from the side and back, so they had to change the front of the southward battle to Attack westward; therefore, the threat of Japanese invaders driving southward was lifted, and the battle of Taiyuan postponed the battle of Wuhan in the second year.On the other hand, the main force of more than 50 divisions was concentrated in East China, and the complex terrain of lakes and swamps was used to launch a fierce offensive against Songhu, a politically important area where the international observation department is located. After three months of fighting for every inch of land in the areas of Wusong, Jiangwan, and Liuhe in this general battle that changed the front of the battle, the enemy forced the enemy to move from the historically favorable battle axis "from north to south" (such as the battle between the Yuan Dynasty and the Southern Song Dynasty). The battle of the Manchus against the Ming Dynasty) changed into an unfavorable upward attack posture "from east to west".In this proactive battle, the enemy completely followed our army's actions and lost the opportunity to dominate the battlefield.This shows China's determination to "resist the war to the end" and forced the enemy to reinforce it seven times, mobilize 300,000 elite soldiers, and cause more than 60,000 casualties. The main force was indeed transferred to the Songhu battlefield.This World War I, which pioneered the "protracted attrition strategy" road to victory, covered the westward movement of coastal schools and factories and the evacuation of thousands of loyal compatriots, preserved the momentum of commanding operations, and created an opportunity for a prolonged war. This shows the heroic and bloody battle of the Chinese army. Not only the 800 strong men in the Sixing Warehouse sang the heroic song "China will not perish"; ; the heroic attack of the Jianqiao Air Force against the enemy; especially on the day of "August 14th", it first defeated the Kou plane attacking China's airspace with a record of 0 to 6, shattered the enemy's dream of "destroyed China in March", and won international cooperation. The ridicule of the sick man of East Asia.But for this brilliant record, we cannot fail to thank Mrs. Jiang for her hard work in leading the construction of the Air Force. These countless encouraging situations are the brilliant results of the leader's shifting the axis of the North-South battle.This is by no means a view of "violating the principle of economical warfare" as considered by ordinary military strategists, it is an act of far-reaching strategic advantages! (Page 125-128) "Historical and Political Bureau", which eulogized the transformation of the "from north to south" combat axis to "from east to west" combat axis, was later echoed by Jiang Weiguo all the way. ——After the death of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Wei-guo published "How the Eight-Year Anti-Japanese War Was Won" ("Central Monthly"), Volume 7, Issue 9), and then published "How Chairman Chiang defeated Japan" in 1977 ("Dawn Cultural Enterprise Company"), and until the publication of "How Chairman Jiang Defeated Japan in the Eight-Year War of Resistance Against Japan" ("Dawn Cultural Enterprise Company") in 1985, this former dean of Zhanzheng College and president of the Army University The second son repeatedly performed his father's "great military achievements".Jiang Weiguo's deduction is based on "forcing the Japanese army to increase its troops in Shanghai and change the direction of the Japanese army's battle line", and reiterates that "take an offensive against the enemy in Shanghai to force the Japanese army to change its battle line from east to west along the Yangtze River."Jiang Weiguo concluded that: Changing the direction of the Japanese army's operations was a masterpiece of the leader's strategic guidance.This masterpiece shattered Japan's "quick battle" attempt; created China's long-lasting conditions; laid the foundation for the final victory; and saved China's fate. Singing praises is a minor matter, but historical truth is a major matter.Let's take a look at the August 13th Songhu Battle. As far as military common sense is concerned, the equipment, training, and even soldiers of the Chinese army at that time were far inferior to those of Japan, and their combat effectiveness was weak, so it was absolutely impossible to take the initiative to open up battlefields.On the contrary, in order to subjugate China, Japan decided to increase its troops to North China on July 11, and then formulated a plan to send troops to Qingdao and Shanghai on July 12.Kiyoshi Tanigawa, commander of the Japanese Navy’s Third Fleet, advocated the invasion of Shanghai, the economic center of China, and the capture of Nanjing, the political center of China, in order to force the Chinese government to surrender.Chiang Kai-shek took the initiative to prepare for the war when he judged that the Japanese army might launch in the Songhu area.When the Dashan incident occurred on August 9, and on the 11th, the Japanese navy gathered in Shanghai and made unreasonable demands. The Songhu War was about to break out, and Jiang Shi ordered Zhang Zhizhong to advance to Shanghai.In the early morning of the next day, the important areas around the concession were occupied.But the troops that arrived in Shanghai were no more than two divisions and one brigade.It was not until after the war that the main force of the national army began to be transferred from other regions to the Songhu battlefield that the main force transfer was realized.It can be seen that Chiang Kai-shek definitely did not intend to take the initiative to open up a battlefield in the Songhu area.In order to make China surrender, the Japanese side must fight hard in Songhu. Based on the above basic facts, it is very intriguing to look at what Jiang Weiguo said about the Battle of Songhu at the beginning of "taking an offensive against the enemy of Shanghai".Because Chiang Kai-shek's wishful thinking at that time was to use the offensive to eliminate the Japanese marines in the Songhu area.Jiang Weiguo said in "How Chairman Jiang Defeated Japan in the Eight-Year Anti-Japanese War": "Concentrate the main force in East China and quickly wipe out the enemy's naval base in Songhu." Because of this, the initial situation of the Battle of Songhu became a period. "Period of siege".However, according to Gu Zhutong's self-report, during this "siege period", "due to the lack of heavy artillery and insufficient troops, the results of the battle could not be expanded, so the expected goal could not be achieved", and instead "great sacrifices" and "extreme damage" were caused. s consequence. (See "Mo Sanjiushi Self-Report", page 171) He Yingqin also pointed out in "The History of the Eight-Year Anti-Japanese War of the Japanese Invasion of China" that "our army lacks powerful armored weapons and cannot effectively suppress enemy ships and overcome obstacles in the market. So progress has been delayed." (p. 45) Therefore, in the situation of "sluggish progress" and "limited threat to the enemy", the so-called "siege period" and "quick sweeping of Song and Shanghai enemy naval bases" were impossible! Chiang Kai-shek's The method of "concentrating the main force" and wanting to take down the enemy's base areas in one fell swoop is actually the same as when the Empress Dowager ordered the Gan Army, the Wuwei Central Army, and even the Boxers to "concentrate the main force" thirty-seven years ago (1900) in order to take down the enemy's base areas in one fell swoop. Xiadongjiaomin Lane (where embassies of various countries are located) is done in the same way. ——At that time, the Empress Dowager's troops besieged for eight weeks, but they still couldn't take it down. Finally, the coalition reinforcements arrived, but they failed to steal the chicken and lost the rice. Now Chiang Kai-shek's troops only besieged for ten days, and the Japanese reinforcements arrived.As a result, the "period of siege" turned into a "period of defense" in an instant, and everything was reversed.However, the "defensive period" was still due to: "lack of air force and artillery support", "the Japanese army counterattacked violently, and the offensive finally failed", "they retreated to the south bank of the Suzhou River, and the overall situation became more and more unfavorable", and soon the position on the south bank of the Suzhou River After being broken by the Japanese army, they retreated to Kunshan and Suzhou on the night of November 8. Due to the terrain obstruction and road congestion, under the bombing and strafing of Japanese planes, the casualties were extremely heavy, the order was also in chaos, and the entire front was shaken. (See "Mo Sanjiushi's Self-Report" for details, pages 172-173) Gu Zhutong said that not only did "the entire front line shake" in the previous battle, but also positions such as "the original plan to guard the Wu Fu line" "also" Failed to make effective use of it" (page 173), as Bai Chongxi said, "the original plan of the Shanghai Anti-Japanese War was to resist steadily" (page 140). The order was issued hastily, and the troops were not fully prepared, so the retreat began before the original plan was realized" ("Mr. Bai Chongxi's Interview Record", page 141), which is confirmed.It can be seen from this that the entire Battle of Songhu was actually fought against what was expected, and in the end even retreating to the established positions behind "could not be carried out according to the original plan".Gu Zhutong described sadly, "After our army began to retreat in Shanghai, Japanese planes bombarded our main points along the Beijing-Shanghai railway and highway, and Suzhou was under air raids every day." "It was decided on November 14th. After nightfall, I retreated to Wujin. On that day, Suzhou was bombarded by Japanese planes. When I left Suzhou, many fires were burning inside and outside Suzhou city. Refugees helped the old and the young. Although I have been used to the scenes of the battlefield in the past, but at this moment, a picture of chaos and pain has been etched in my mind, and it will not be erased for a long time." Played really badly. Li Zongren arrived in Nanjing on October 12, 1937, and Bai Chongxi accompanied him to visit Chiang Kai-shek the next day. He believed that the Songhu triangle area, "It is not suitable to stick to it. In order to avoid unnecessary sacrifices, our army should stop fighting in Shanghai in moderation. "("Memoirs of Li Zongren", page 677) and suggested that the troops go into battle again to consume the enemy's strength.It can even automatically abandon Nanjing and lure the enemy to go deep in order to carry out a long-term war of attrition.But Generalissimo Jiang stubbornly refused to listen. As a result, "The Battle of Songhu lasted three months, and it was the most sacrificing battle in the eight years of our country's Anti-Japanese War." ("Li Zongren's Memoirs", page 678) Li Zongren said more sadly: "The Battle of Songhu was simply filled with our flesh and blood into the enemy's sea of ​​fire. Thousands of casualties were often caused every hour, and the sacrifice was heroic. There are few precedents in the history of the Republic of China's resistance to foreign aggression." (p. 680) After being defeated, the people trampled on them, and it was horrible. Within a few weeks, the enemy "invaded Gyeonggi from the east and west and encircled Nanjing." ". ("Memoirs of Li Zongren", p. 681) Li Zongren said that it is extremely inappropriate to use the essence of the whole country's military force to make all-or-nothing "(p. 681), this is correct. Even if it is not " It should be moved to Nanjing instead of Shanghai. Bai Chongxi said: "Shanghai has a narrow sea, and the enemy's combined land, sea, and air operations are extremely easy to exert their power. ""If the 'August 13' Shanghai defense battle, our army will only make a slight resistance in order to explain to the people of the country, and withdraw the main force to Nanjing, with deep trenches and high fortifications, commanded by calm generals, and the enemy's sea and air force cannot be presumptuous. If you defend Nanjing in the spirit of defending Shanghai, although Nanjing will eventually be lost, the effect will be greater and the enemy's losses will also be greater. "Unfortunately, Li Zongren was right, "Jiang Gong didn't understand this way", he "neither generals nor soldiers", all "lead the troops to fight with his own will" (page 686), not only It is strategic, and tactically, it also covers everything, including every detail. And this kind of tactics can only be said to be Chiang Kai-shek's own "tactics". Because the characteristics of Chiang Kai-shek's command of troops are that they do not respect the organizational system at all, and Li Zongren said that Chiang Kai-shek had a "stubborn personality" and would not listen to other people's suggestions. At that time, the battle plan was all based on his own will, and others had no room for comment. When besieging the Japanese Marine Corps When he was at the headquarters, Chiang Kai-shek thought that there was an opportunity to take advantage of it, that he could take advantage of the merits, and he commanded everything by himself. At that time, the Songhu area belonged to the third war zone. The commander-in-chief was Feng Yuxiang, and the deputy commander was Gu Zhutong, but Chiang Kai-shek did it himself. Formally, although Gu Zhutong commanded Zhang Zhizhong on behalf of Chen Cheng, he did not have "actual command". The chairman of the military committee often "randomly transfers a company of artillery away through the commander-in-chief, commander-in-chief, army commander, division commander, and directly-administered officials of various levels." In Zhang Zhizhong's memory, he even transferred an army before the battle. !During the Battle of Songhu on August 13, Zhang Zhizhong was the commander of the Songhu garrison and the commander-in-chief of the Ninth Army. At that time, Luo Zhuoying's 18th Army was assigned to his command. However, a wonderful thing happened: the 18th Army secretly Transferred to Chen Cheng, Commander-in-Chief of the 15th Group Army, but Zhang Zhizhong didn't know about it! (See "Memoirs of Zhang Zhizhong" for details, pages 131-132) Dong Xianguang's Biography of President Chiang said: Every major operation in the Shanghai War was designed and directed by President Chiang himself.He kept in touch with every general on the front line by telephone, and went to the front line twice to discuss with the generals under his command.For the past three months, he has been vigilant all night, just like every soldier on the front line.During this campaign, he slept an average of no more than three or four hours a night, and even for such a short period of time, he was interrupted by frequent calls from the front.In all wars since he was commander-in-chief he has been little more than a direct commander. (pages 279 to 280) Dong Xianguang's purpose was to praise how diligent Chiang Kai-shek was in "personally designing and commanding", but he didn't know that the problem was that Chiang Kai-shek "in all wars, he is no different from a direct commander." It is precisely because Chiang Kai-shek's method of commanding is foolish, so after the battle, the officers are hard, but the soldiers are even more miserable! Feng Yuxiang remembered that the army fighting in front, "Although they are very loyal, brave, and patriotic, they are always hungry. . ” The positions were badly built because of cutting corners, and the water inside was often three feet deep.The wounded soldiers in the front often have no medicine, "there is no dressing room, let alone a stretcher team." When the wounded soldiers are transported to the hospital, the wounds have grown maggots, and the dead are not buried (see Feng Yuxiang's "Chiang Kai-shek I Know") Wait for the tragedy.It is understandable that Chiang Kai-shek could not defeat the Japanese, but it is unacceptable to treat officers and soldiers like this. Li Zongren said that Chiang Kai-shek "doesn't know the enemy, and he doesn't even know himself"; Feng Yuxiang said that Chiang Kai-shek "really knows neither the enemy nor himself."These conclusions belong to those who know the soldiers.If Chiang Kai-shek could know himself and the enemy, he should know that this is not how wars are fought.But he, who knows neither himself nor the enemy, fought like this. What is the reason?Li Zongren said that Chiang Kai-shek's decision on the battle of Songhu had three motives: first, "maybe he was impulsive, and he did not hesitate to fight with the Japanese warlords"; second, "maybe he made a mistake in judging the international situation"; I don't know how to fight soldiers, and engage in large-scale international wars with the courage of ordinary people."In fact, from our point of view, there is a fourth, that is, Chiang Kai-shek has always been worried about the fact that the 19th Route Army's Anti-Japanese War took the lead in the "January 28th" Songhu Battle in 1932, thinking that it was Their Whampoa was a mistake of the Central Army, so they did the same thing, thinking that "while everyone is hot, make another one" in the joke of the Northern Qi Dynasty.Chiang Kai-shek's mentality is fully revealed in "The Memoirs of Zhang Zhizhong".Zhang Zhizhong said: Shanghai is the center of our economy, and it is the world's viewer. Our military force in Shanghai is only a group of security guards to guard against bandits.At the beginning of the incident, we must first garrison Songhu with sufficient forces, attack the enemy fiercely, and inflict heavy losses. At least we must maintain communication with the concession and take offensive defense.If you are willing to be passive, even if you occupy the Sufu line or the Xicheng line, it is not appropriate; if you cannot defeat the enemy in one fell swoop in the face of the battle, and you cannot support it for a long time, then the people of the country will recall the "January 28th" battle, and the current Central Army will be reduced. Incompetent. (Page 115) It is precisely because the "January 28th Battle" exposed the "incompetence of the Central Army", so Chiang Kai-shek wanted to perform in Shanghai.At this time, Zhang Zhizhong put forward the idea: My judgment on the enemy's situation in Shanghai is very confident and correct.At the same time, I have a basic concept: this time in the war against Japan in Songhu, we must strive to be the first.I often talk to people that China's dealing with the Japanese enemy can be divided into three periods: the first period he hits me, and I don't fight back; the second period he hits me, I fight back; the third period I judge that he will hit me , I will hit him first. This is called "preempting the enemy", or "strike first to be strong". The "September 18th" Northeast War is the first type; the "January 28th" Battle and the Great Wall Battle are the second type; the Songhu Battle should be the third type. (page 117) Zhang Zhizhong put this idea into a report and proposed it to Chiang Kai-shek, and he got a reply: "I should attack the enemy first, but the timing should be ordered." (Page 117) Chiang Kai-shek first conceived "with the purpose of sweeping up the enemy's base areas in Shanghai, and at any cost, to carry out offensive operations" ("Songhu Battle Process and Nanjing Withdrawal Reviewed by President Chiang after he came to Taiwan", "Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China"), but , this idea was made all the more impossible by the fact that he "missed the opportunity" three times in launching the attack. Zhang Zhizhong's idea of ​​"occupying the whole of Shanghai" and "taking Shanghai as a whole" (page 122) was originally a wishful thinking, and this wishful thinking was obviously based on a mistake in judging the enemy's situation.For example, he said: "The original goal was to break into the gaps, not to attack the fortifications, but because every passage was blocked by the enemy's solid obstacles, and the chariots were used as mobile fortresses, in the end we had to attack all points." (p. 124) How can we be lucky if there are fortifications everywhere, "not attacking fortifications"?According to the historical data disclosed by the Kuomintang more than 40 years later, we found that until August 13th, Chiang Kai-shek was still asking Zhang Zhizhong whether "fifteen heavy howitzers and 500-pound bombs" could "destroy" the reinforced concrete What about the Japanese barracks! (Refer to "Chairman Chiang's Instructions to Beijing-Shanghai Garrison Commander Zhang Zhizhong on Preparations for the Attack Plan of the Japanese Barracks and Their Headquarters and the Destruction of the Japanese Camp") It can be seen that Chiang Kai-shek has not yet figured out the minimum fortifications and weapon performance. "Just because of the momentary anger (Chiang Kai-shek wrote another character, "angry" is a mistake in the word "偾")", and the fight broke out.He told Zhang Zhizhong not to "rely on momentary anger", but he himself was even more "angry" than Zhang Zhizhong! Zhang Zhizhong said "angrily" at that time, "No matter how many reinforcements Japan comes, there is absolutely no possibility of winning" (see "Shanghai Under Fire" edited by Chen Gongbo); Not worth a blow from our army" (September 12, 1939, "Wen Wei, Chairman of the Generalissimo, Attending Beijing Telegram", contained in "Jiang Feng's Letters"); after the reinforcements landed, Chiang Kai-shek became "angry" again Said: "We must drive the enemy down the Huangpu River!" In the end, the Shanghai battlefield clearly retreated, and Chiang Kai-shek said "angrily": "This time the position has been transferred. We have moved to the last line of the Shanghai war. Everyone should hold on to it." The determination to sacrifice, stick to death, and swear to survive and die with Shanghai!" (He Yingqin, "The Eight-Year History of the Japanese Invasion of China", p. The above" (The First Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China--The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Part Two, "Battle Course", September 25, 21937, "Instructions from Chairman Jiang to Yu Hanmou, Director of the Guangzhou Appeasement Office, Please Instructions from Guangdong Then transfer the third division to Beijing for reinforcements and hope to send more troops to join the war"); it is "more than half of our army's departments have been killed and injured" (see Zhang Qiyun's "Summary of Party History", page 1155); One person" (Zhang Qiyun's "Summary of Party History", page 1156), means "all officers and soldiers of the battalion below the battalion commander will make a heroic sacrifice in the city" "Jiang Feng's Letters" September 8, 1937 "Jiang The chairman of the general committee, Qi Shi, participated in the Beijing telegram, saying that Yao Ying, the 18th division regiment, was "martyred by the whole battalion" ("Jiang Feng Shujian" October 12, 1937, "Chairman Jiang's Wenwu Telegram") is " The air force dare not be active in the daytime" ("Mr. Bai Chongxi's Interview Record", page 146), "I have no extravagant expectations for my own air force to go to the front to cooperate with each other" ("Recalling a Moment in the Ten Thousand Light Years--Memoirs of Sun Yuanliang ", p. 211), it is "that our army, which is at a disadvantage in equipment, has little chance to fight back except to use the darkness of night to attack" (Gu Zhutong, "Mo Sanjiushi Self-report", p. 17 1) The mobilization ability could not keep up with the "great casualties" ("Sun Yuanliang's Memoirs", page 221), and "the food and ammunition in the rear could hardly be sent to the front line" (Cao Juren, Shu Zongqiao, "Chinese Anti-Japanese War Painting History" ), it was "they were taken off the line of fire without seeing the enemy's face at all" ("Memoirs of Sun Yuanliang", p. A Collection of Thoughts and Speeches (Speech) March 8, 1938 "The War of Resistance Against Japan Will Be Sure to Win the Final Victory")!... Chiang Kai-shek was in a hurry to deal with the situation, and he could only say "use tactics to make up for the inadequacy of weapons, use strategy To make up for the shortcomings of the tactics, so that the enemy will fall into a passive position at every turn", etc., can only say "one mind, stay calm, stand firm, stand still", etc., can only say "deep ditches and wide ditches, solid walls and thick covers, hold on to difficulties, Take the opportunity to attack, avoid the big enemy, fight the small enemy, and control the enemy to death" and other words, only say "wounded rather than retreated, rather than surrendered" and other words (Zhang Qiyun's "Summary of Party History", p. 1154).In the end, the army was defeated, and he even said: "It is not the failure of the battle, but the failure of the retreat!" Final Victory, Volume 15, Page 149) On March 8, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek gave a speech to the students of the general school's research class, "The War of Resistance against Japan will surely win the final victory" ("President Jiang Gong's Thoughts and Speeches", Volume 15, pp. 145-15) 4) Before the lecture, I read Article 5 of "Qi Jiguang's Quotations" to everyone.Qi Jiguang said: "Madam, there are three ways of fighting. There are 'calculated wars', there are 'death-sacrificing wars', and there is 'confused wars'. What is 'calculated wars'? You have to count more and you have to count less. What is 'death-sacrificing wars'?" But Yun Wo is full of enthusiasm and serves the country, and the thief is just moving forward. ... What is a "confused war"? I don't know the enemy, I don't know myself." Chiang Kai-shek said that we can't fight on September 18, and if we want to fight, we will be confused. In fact, what he fought in August 13th was a typical "confused war" of "knowing neither the enemy nor oneself".People who know soldiers know that fighting in the "narrow land and sea" in the Shanghai area first gave Japan the convenience of troop transport and joint operations.If you want to conduct positional warfare in this kind of area, it is impossible to hold it; "I want to drive the enemy down the Huangpu River!" is simply delusional.But when Chiang Kai-shek became "angry", he underestimated the enemy in this way.This kind of underestimation of the enemy, he himself had to admit later.On November 28, 1938, in his "Precepts for the First Nanyue Military Conference (4)" ("President Chiang Kai-shek's Thoughts and Speeches" (Speeches), Volume 15, page 539 To May 48), the statement is as follows: After the war in Shanghai, when our loyal and brave soldiers were fighting the enemy in the Songhu position, the enemy was unable to succeed, so they took advantage of the emptiness to land at Jinshanwei in Hangzhou Bay. Army, so all the troops deployed in this area were transferred to the front, so that the whole plan was hit, and the country suffered great losses. This is the greatest responsibility that my commander should bear! I am really sorry for the country! (Page 545) 可见蒋介石在军事素养上根本不佳，他口口声声明朝抗倭英雄戚继光，殊不知戚继光时代的日本人侵略中国，登陆地点就在“杭州湾金山卫”!真不知蒋介石是怎么从戚继光战史中学教训的! 蒋介石军事上闹笑话，其中一个原因，是因他误信德国顾问。根据一九三七年八月二十九日的《德籍总顾问法肯豪森呈蒋委员长报告》，其中有“故长期抵抗，宜永久依托上海”，“目前加入上海方面之部队，虽未能完全驱敌出境，然究能到处拒守，使敌不能前进”(《中华民国重要史料初编——对日抗战时期》第二编《作战经过》二，页一八一)等话。由于德国与日本的关系，德国顾问的主意实在不无可疑。(参阅冯玉祥《我所认识的蒋介石》，页八十二、九十五)当然不管主意好坏，蒋介石既然采纳了，就得负责任。最后，相当于全中国总兵力的五分之一，就这样伤亡了。(据黎东方《蒋公介石序传》估计，页三六五)“在抗战一开始之际，最珍贵的军队便受到了如此严重的损害。” 李宗仁说：“检讨京沪会战的得失，我们不能不承认我们的最高统帅犯了战略上的严重错误。我们极不应以全国兵力的精华在淞、沪三角地带做孤注的一掷。”(《李宗仁回忆录》，页六八五)即使要在淞沪孤注一掷，也应该打积极的防御战，而蒋提出的“获胜的要道”，令国军坚守阵地，来对抗敌人的飞机大炮(见《先总统蒋公全集》，页一〇七三)，却是单纯的、消极的防御战，形成失去主动、惨遭挨打的局面。这种“战略上的严重错误”，国民党学者虽也同意“似非得计”，但总以有桑榆之收为辩。以张其昀为例，张其昀在《党史概要》中说： 总观八一三战役，我军毅然以主力使用于淞沪方面，因上海乃我经济重心，中外观瞻所系，故我不惜任何牺牲，予以强韧作战。双方作战重心，乃由华北移至华中，相持三月以上，使我长江下游工厂物资，得以内运，国际观感亦为之一新，所获政略上之成效尤伟。以作战观点言之，敌拥有便利之海洋交通，易于发挥陆海空军联合之威力，我则后方交通未辟，集中迟缓，本难发挥优势，而欲与敌在上海行阵地战，似非得计。然就全国地形言，如当时在黄河流域与敌作战，尚不如在长江流域，利用湖沼山地，较为有利。上海敌我主力三个月之激战，使在华之敌军，不能任意行动，造成我华北有利之形势，尤其使山西之我军，有准备之余裕。结果在山西之敌军，始终不能西越黄河一步，此实为战略上最大之成功。(页一一五七至一一五八) 不过，张其昀这种战略论，是会被国际军事家见笑的，曹聚仁，舒宗侨《中国抗战画史》(联合画报社)曾委婉转述出国际军事家的看法：“我军从闸北战线撤退，实力保存不过十分之五；敌军则增援二师团，加入战斗，锐势正不可挡。我军退保苏州河南岸，阵地虽已缩短，敌舰炮攻击威力减低，依然招架不及，难于还手。当时，国际军事家认为我军在上海所引起的牵制战，对于侵略者是直接有利的。”原来蒋介石“最精锐部队三十万人被牵制着留在上海作战”的干法，实际上，却是“对于侵略者是直接有利的”。淞沪之战，蒋介石“把当时在北战场以外的十分之七八的部队，都调到了上海”，为了“吸住日军的主力，不让他们一举而席卷绥宁陕甘川滇，走蒙哥可汗与忽必烈可汗囊括南宋的老路(板垣征四郎向日本参谋本部所提出的方案正是如此)”。但是，弄巧反拙的是，他自己的主力反倒被这一行为吸住，而在派重兵保山西方面，也因为北边怀来和张家口的失守和南边保定的失守，竟陷于两面作战!结果，十一月八日上海和太原同时失守!回想八一三后两天(八月十五日)，日本人快速反应，立刻下了全国总动员令，编组了上海派遣军和华北派遣军，分路双杀，三个月不到，侵略者就占尽了“直接有利”的便宜。当时华北派遣军司令寺内寿一分析：“中国的军队，经过了山西会战、南京会战以后，已经接近崩溃的边缘；任何地区，只要有一个联队的兵力，就可以完成扫荡的任务。今后中国军队无力作战，只要扫荡扫荡就可以了事了。”(参阅曹聚仁、舒宗侨《中国抗战画史》)虽然语言相当狂妄，但就军事观点看，也不无部分道理在，因为照蒋介石和他手下大宣传特宣传的“领袖军事上的丰功伟业”，当年不论在北战场或东战场，都志在诱敌深入——“实施全面之战争，而不争区区之点线”。(《总统蒋公思想言论总集》(书告)一九三八年十月三十一日《为国军退出武汉告全国国民书》第三十卷)但是，若志不在争“区区之点线”，为何当年要花偌大人力物力修前面的防线？当年在江南花了三年时力筑苏嘉铁路，联络京沪铁路和沪杭铁路，并在杭州湾的乍浦和长江下游的福山镇修要塞两座，两座要塞之间建立“兴登堡防线”，包括常熟、苏州、吴江、嘉兴、平湖在内；又在陇海线以北，修“马其诺防线”，从潼关起沿黄河南岸到考城，再东经曹县、单县、沛县，沿运河到利国驿、台儿庄，再穿运河经邳县、郯城，直到连云港。这些蒋介石的战略是阵地防御战。在北战场，是准备日本军队进到黄河沿岸的“马其诺防线”时，再杀敌致果。在东战场，也摩拳擦掌，准备日本军队拿下京沪进到“兴登堡防线”时，再杀敌致果。结果两条劳民伤财的国防线，都在兵败山倒下泡了汤、都没发生阻敌效果。(参阅沈亦云《亦云回忆》)由此可见，真的情形乃在“区区之点线”之根本不能守。 李宗仁批评蒋介石犯了“战略上的严重错误”，固属知兵之言，但这一错误的真正严重性，李宗仁却未道出。首先用博大观点道出这一真正严重性错误的，乃是龚德柏。 龚德柏一生为言论自由八次被捕，最后一次最长，被蒋介石秘密关了七年，到六十七岁时才出狱。出狱后，他秘密写了一部书——《中日战争史》，其中批评蒋介石的错误，当然不能问世。一九八〇年，他以九十之年，赍志以殁。龚德柏死后，李敖得到此书秘本，发现他颇有独到之见。我们不同意龚德柏的一个主要结论，认为日本真正要打的是俄国，中国抗日战争，不仅可以避免，甚至可以因而获利。他不知道日本打俄国之前，先要中国屈服的，除非中国想当朝鲜第二，抗战便不可能避免。这当然也显示“日本无人”，把反共的蒋介石硬逼向联共抗日之路。不过龚德柏批评蒋介石的淞沪之战，确是博大精深的。他认为蒋指挥上海作战，完全违反孙子兵法所谓“不若则能避之”的原则，以至于遭到惨重的损失，使“中国训练多年之二百万国防军，百分之七十以上损失净尽，几使中国亡于日本”。龚氏指出，中国人痛恨日本蛮横无理，人人奋战，死而无怨，但“这样的无意识地牺牲掉”，“由人道的立场思之，亦不胜悲痛”。然而孰令为之？What caused it?蒋介石说上海作战的目的在“打破敌人的战略，使他们不能按照预定计划，集中兵力，侵略我们华北”，龚德柏认为是“幼稚的话，不但蒋委员长不应说，即稍有常识的人也不应说”。因为“在上海做全面战争，用兵百余万；而日本对抗我们，只用四个师团。两个半月后，始决定增兵，由金山卫登陆，以结束上海战争。日本所用的全部兵力，不过其所能动员的极小一部分而已。即令我们把这些兵统统歼灭，亦不能牵制日本不向华北用兵。观后来日本在华北的兵力大于上海南京战场，即其证明。蒋委员长若真说过这话，也不过打败了，无话可说，只得借此解嘲而已”。由此可见，所谓“由北而南”作战轴线转为“由东而西”轴线，全是“解嘲而已”。而蒋纬国所说八一三淞沪之战“虽有相当损失及放弃若干重要都市，但却达成了迫诱敌人走向错误方向之战略目的”之言(《中央月刊》第七卷第九期)，所谓“走向错误方向”的，却原来是“蒋介石”自己!这个以“主力集中华东、攻击上海之敌、力保吴淞要地”的“国军作战计划”，仍然保存在南京二档馆《国民政府军事委员会档案》之中。 至于国防部史政局《领袖军事上的丰功伟业》中所说的“民族救星”在转换作战轴线上的“天纵英明”、“延缓了第二年的武汉会战”云云，也全是谀词。试看蒋介石一九三八年十一月二十五日“第一次南岳军事会议开会训词”的一段不经心透露，便可明白了。蒋介石说日本军队“从前他攻陷我们南京，本可尽力追击，一直攻下武汉”!(《总统蒋公思想言论总集》 (演讲)第十五卷，页四八八)可见蒋介石自己承认过当时日本军队有一鼓作气攻下武汉的能力!这也就是龚德柏所说的：“假使日本军阀在南京攻陷后，如我所想象的，另用生力军两师团，在船上待命。江阴攻下后，即由海军保护，溯江直上，沿江占领九江武汉宜昌重庆。试问世界的大战略家，有方法挽救否？韩信之取三秦、李靖之擒颉利，即是这种气魄。日本军阀何足道哉!其投降也活该!”“假使二十六年年底，武汉重庆都失陷了，试问蒋委员长，有什么方法继续作战？”可见当时日本没有“尽力追击，一直攻下武汉”，只是日本不想用牛刀杀鸡，自己失算而已，绝非在蒋介石八一三淞沪之战的事先算计之中。事后说什么怕日本人走蒙哥、忽必烈打南宋的老路而要如何如何，其实何必蒙哥、忽必烈？日本只要有点“韩信之取三秦、李靖之取颉利”的“气魄”，一九三七年年底，武汉重庆就“都失陷”了!我们真替领导全国抗战的蒋委员长捏一把冷汗! 然而就在一九三八年之春，中国国民党在武昌珞珈山武汉大学召开临时全国代表大会，在四月一日那天的第四次会议中，吴稚晖提议并推举蒋介石为总裁，确定领袖成为党中领导的重心，其性质等同孙中山所拥有的“总理”。此乃蒋介石权力的最高峰，他自己也认为是三十年来的最大成就，集合了前所未有的党政军大权。(参阅张其昀《党史概要》第三册，页一二一四)。