Chapter 32 In the second quarter, he was forced to go to Liangshan by Zhang Xueliang

Chiang Kai-shek kept talking about "communist bandits", giving people the impression that the CCP is something like bandits.However, after four failed encirclement campaigns, it was known that the problem was serious, and even worried about the survival of the Kuomintang regime.Please see the inside story revealed in Jiang Zuobin's diary on February 15, 1932: The internal troops were restrained by "bandits" and could not be mobilized. There was a shortage of salaries and ammunition, and the traffic was stopped by the Japanese.In such a situation, if you want to fight with others, it is really the so-called self-destruction.What's more, "bandit communists" are springing up everywhere, and every time they want to follow them, they are afraid that they will not be killed by the enemy, but will be killed by the "bandit communists".Woo hoo! ("Jiang Zuobin's Diary", page 410)

Knowing this inside story, I can understand why Chiang Kai-shek has repeatedly said: "Japan is a disease of ringworm and scabies, and the Communist bandits are the troubles of the heart." So when he heard that the fifth siege was successful, he was very happy.On October 22, the Luoyang Chidian Central Executive Committee reported victory. There is a saying: "The red bandits are frowning day by day, and the bandits are exhausted... Qu Kui will be handed over soon." Seventy-five-ninth) On the 31st of the same month, he sent a telegram to the generals of the "suppressing bandits", "This bandit will not be destroyed, not only will the people be ruthless, but also the country will hardly survive. Therefore, the survival of the nation and the success or failure of the revolution are closely related to ours." Whether you can really work hard for the country and the people will be based on this, that is, the honor and disgrace of personal history, and it all depends on this, I hope to tell all the soldiers to work hard to catch up!" (same book, page 761) However, The opportunity was still lost, the interception and pursuit failed, and the Red Army arrived in northern Shaanxi under the leadership of Mao Zedong to establish a revolutionary base.

The new base of the Red Army was far away in northern Shaanxi, which was far less threatening psychologically than the Jiangxi Soviet area, not to mention the Red Army suffered heavy losses during the Long March.But it is not like what Zhang Qiyun said in "Summary of Party History": "So far...the red bandits...only two or three thousand people are left, and they have fled to northern Shaanxi...It is expected that they will finish their work within two weeks to one month." ( Page 966) Even the "Biography of President Jiang" written by Dong Xianguang said: "Although the Communist Party's force has been weakened by the loss of fleeing in those years, it is still a dangerous guerrilla in northern Shaanxi and Gansu. Their base in Yan'an In fact, they are not easy to break through, and they can often plunder undefended areas in Shanxi and Shaanxi from their lairs in the mountains." The theory of "suppressing the Communist Party" that will be completed within two weeks to one month does not hold water in Dong Xianguang's writing.At the same time, Dong Xianguang also revealed such a passage:

In fact, in the 24th year of the Republic of China, one year before the Xi'an Incident, President Chiang had sent one of his most trusted colleagues to Vienna as his personal representative to discuss with the Russian representative whether there was a possibility of joining forces to fight against Japanese aggression.Although this move was fruitless, it was enough to reflect President Chiang's mood during this period.He knew that Japan was the greatest danger to our country, and he didn't even think about cooperating with the so-called Communist Party to deal with Japan. (Page 245)

At first glance, this passage seems strange, but it is not strange at all.Because Chiang Kai-shek knew that the CCP in northern Shaanxi, which could not be wiped out for a while, had Soviet Russia behind it.The name was to test the possibility of uniting the Communist Party to resist Japan, but it was actually because they were afraid of making enemies on both sides with Japan and the Soviet Union. There was a reason for temporarily suspending the use of troops by the CCP entrenched in Yan'an, and sending cronies to discuss with Russian representatives. On June 30, 1977, Chen Lifu published the article "Reminiscences of Participating in the Preparations for the Anti-Japanese War" in the quarterly "Modern China".It is revealed from this recollection that Dong Xianguang's so-called "President Chiang has sent one of his most trusted colleagues to Vienna", the so-called colleagues are none other than Chen Lifu.In his memory, he clearly stated, "According to this situation, the Sino-Japanese war is inevitable, so how should we contact the CCP so that they can fight against Japan together and prevent the Soviet Union from using the Sino-Japanese war to help the CCP expand." The so-called hope "the Soviet Union Not to use the Sino-Japanese war to help the CCP expand” is the real intention, but for fear of affecting the morale of the suppression of the CCP and fear of offending the Japanese, it is very secretive.Chen Lifu had secretly sought out Zhou Enlai, so Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to the Chen family on September 1, 1935. The full text is as follows:

Mr. Guofu Lifu: After ten years of separation, the national crisis is becoming more and more urgent. It is reported that the two gentlemen have joined forces with Russia. Although it is a road rumor, we can already see the recent trend of the two gentlemen.Huang Jun came from Jinling and knew that the planner of Mr. Yangfu was being presided over by a sage.Our party has called for it for several years, and the two gentlemen have inspired and guided them, so that the two parties will cooperate again, and the national crisis will be turned around in one fell swoop. The nearer invaders have entered Yishen, and the puppet army has invaded Sui. This has become a fact. The Japanese Air Terminal was even set up in Dingyuan Camp. The northwest is in danger. So fast, and mutual elimination of national strength, will perish quickly.Since the First Front Army arrived in the Northwest, we have made several requests for a truce. Today, the Second and Fourth Front Armies have also marched northward into Shaanxi and Gansu. Their purpose is to join forces to resist Japan. To protect the Northwest is to protect China. We hereby send you a special gift. The official letter of the Party Central Committee expresses our general policy and the hope and sincerity of establishing cooperation between the two parties, in order to save the nation and resist insults, and to find a new path. The two gentlemen are at the center of your party, and they are very close to Mr. Jiang. I hope to make a further statement. Immediately stop military operations, implement alliances with Russia and the Communist Party, and unanimously resist Japan, and the national barriers will be renewed. No matter how cunning the Japanese invaders or the poisonous traitors are, they will eventually be defeated by the united front.In order to implement this proposition, our side is already ready to conduct specific negotiations with your responsible representative at any time.Now, Mr. Yangfu is very welcome to invite Mr. Yangfu for a face-to-face meeting, but I really hope that the two gentlemen can attend the meeting directly.If Mr. Husband is too busy to spare, I hope that Mr. Lifu will spare no effort so that the two sides can have a responsible negotiation quickly. If you want the two gentlemen to be optimistic, you must not take disparaging words as a hero.

Linying Shenchi, waiting for Islam.respect this Shi Zhi (first published in "Modern China Quarterly", see also Chen Lifu's "Success and Failure", pages 193-194) In the letter, there are words "Huang Jun came from Jinling and knew that Mr. Yangfu planned and was presided over by a sage." "Huang Jun" refers to Huang Huabiao, "Yangfu" refers to Zeng Yangfu, and "Sage" refers to Brothers Chen, what do "planned" and "hosted" refer to?It refers to nothing else, but Chiang Kai-shek's secret "bandit collusion" operation under the sound of "suppressing bandits".This secret operation was initiated by Chiang Kai-shek.Precisely because it was Chiang Kai-shek who took the initiative, Zhou Enlai's letter said "Huang Jun came from Jinling", and Chen Lifu's article said "It is very difficult for us to connect with him". concealed.This side took the initiative to find the Communist Party, and Zhou Enlai had a reaction over there, so he wrote this letter.Chen Lifu wrote after he received the letter:

After the letter was submitted for reading, he was ordered to continue to contact, and Yu et al. gave an oral reply and allowed it to be forwarded, but it was not necessary to inform Jiang Gong immediately that he had agreed to consider it.This clue has always been connected, waiting for the arrival of the opportunity. After Chen Lifu published Zhou Enlai's letter, Shen Yunlong, Li Yunhan and others said that "September 1" in Zhou Enlai's letter was not September 1, 1935, but September 1, 1936. (Shen Yunlong's essays can be found in his "Historical Lessons from the National and Communist Party Discussions Before and After the War of Resistance Against Japan", Li Yun's Han essays can be found in his "Antecedents and Processes of the Xi'an Incident", both published in "Biographical Literature") But Chiang Kai-shek based on his personal The archives, the outline, and "Soviet Russia in China" written by Tao Xisheng also clearly listed Zhou Enlai's letter on "September 1". Note the words "received in September of the 24th year of the Republic of China". The letter was written in 1935, so there should be no doubt.

Zhou Enlai published "Mourning Mr. Zhang Huainan" in Chongqing's "Ta Kung Pao" in November 1941, clearly saying that "Mr. Huainan accompanied me once to Mogan, and then to Kuanglu". Textual Research and Revision" ("Biographical Literature" Volume 35, Issue 4) clearly stated: Zhou Wennei's so-called "one visit to Mogan" refers to the fact that in the summer of the 25th year, Mr. Zhang accompanied Zhou from Nanjing to Moganshan to meet Chairman Jiang.The so-called "two visits to Kuanglu" means that after the July 7th Incident in the 26th year, Mr. Zhang accompanied Zhou to Lushan Mountain to pay respects to Chiang Kai-shek.

Zhang Chong (Huainan)'s assistant, Du Tongsun, clearly stated in his letter to Xiao Zheng ("Biographical Literature", Volume 36, Issue 5): I remember that on a hot day in the 25th year of the Republic of China, Zhang Huainan (Chong) brothers ordered Zhou Enlai and Pan Hannian to accompany Zhou Enlai and Pan Hannian to set off from Nanjing. The reason why my younger brother accompanied me was to avoid outside speculation because the matter was not made public.When my younger brother, Zhou, and Pan arrived at Mogan Mountain that day, Zhang had already arrived at the villa to wait. My younger brother went down the mountain after completing his mission and stayed overnight at the Die Lai Hotel in West Lake. The next day, Zhang, Zhou, and Pan also went to the Die Lai Hotel. Parting ways, Zhou and Pan went to Shanghai, and my younger brother and Huainan brother returned to Nanjing.This time, Zhou and Pan went to Moganshan to meet the Chairman of the Generalissimo, that is, Zhou Zhimou Zhang Huainan's brother. The incident of "one visit to Mogan and two visits to Kuanglu" mentioned in the article took place in June and July of the 25th year. Therefore, the year when Zhou sent the letter to Mr. Chen Guofu and Mr. Chen Lifu on September 1st must undoubtedly be the 24th year of the Republic of China.

It should be pointed out that it was impossible for Zhou Enlai to meet Chiang Kai-shek in the summer of 1936, and it was all in 1937 that he "went to Mogan once and went to Kuanglu twice".Before the Xi'an Incident, the opponents of the secret negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were mainly Chen Lifu and Pan Hannian.Zhou Enlai wanted to go out, but due to the poor negotiation situation, Mao Zedong sent a secret telegram to Pan Hannian on November 22, 1936: "There is no way to talk about this matter at present. Go out." (Signed Dong, Tianhai Dian, see "Communist Party History Teaching Reference Materials" Volume 15) Nevertheless, as Zhang Chong's assistant Du Tongsun said: "In the twenty-five years (1936) September Before September 1, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had contacted and negotiated many times, so it was logical that last week, on September 1, 2005, I sent a letter to Mr. Chen to re-negotiate the peace talks." ("Who Taught Stalin to Speak" ", "Biographical Literature", Volume 42, Issue 5, Page 55) marked as "Bogu's telegram to Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong about the results of his conversation with people from Nanjing" dated February 27, 1936, It still exists in Beijing Central Archives.On August 14th of the same year, Mao Zedong also sent a letter to Song Ziwen, mentioning the secret messenger Dong Jianwu, saying: "I don't know if I have reached the left or right because of my contempt." (See "Selected Letters of Mao Zedong", pages 45-40 6) There is no need to wait until September 1, 1936, when Zhou Enlai wrote to Chen's Kunzhong, asking them to "advice", isn't it just like "put horse before the cart" (put horse before the cart) ?Look at the content of the weekly letter again.On June 3, 1935, the Japanese army practiced street fighting in Tianjin, which is well known as "those who are close to invade the deep". At the end, it was taken over by the puppet Mongolia, which coincided with "the invasion of Sui by the puppet army has become a fact."At the same time, Mao Zedong led the first front army of the Red Army from Brazil to Hexi, active in the northwest, and had already called for resistance to Japan.Xu Xiangqian's Fourth Front Army has also arrived in southern Shaanxi, and Liu Zhidan has already occupied northern Shaanxi.Yan Xishan reported on the commemorative week on July 22, saying that the 23 counties in northern Shaanxi were almost completely reddened. Chiang Kai-shek also published the "Letter to the People of Sichuan, Kang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia and Qing Dynasty for Assistance in Suppressing Bandits" as early as June 14. .It is completely consistent with Zhou Han's statement "Since the First Front Army arrived in the Northwest, we have counted for an armistice request, and now the Second and Fourth Front Armies have also moved north to Shaanxi and Gansu." Because Zhou Enlai sent a letter to the two Chens on September 1, 1935, Chen Lifu was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to travel with Zhang Chong, who knew Russian, on the day before Christmas in 1935. Both of them held pseudonym passports. From Shanghai to Berlin via Marseille.However, due to the exposure of secrets, he dared not go directly to Moscow. (See Chen Lifu's Lessons from Success or Failure, pp. 196-199) Chiang Kai-shek then changed his plan. On the one hand, he ordered Chen Lifu to return to Nanjing to negotiate with the Soviet ambassador to China; Deng Wenyi returned to Moscow and conveyed the terms of the peace talks.The Soviet Union was afraid of provoking Japan and Germany, and was unwilling to have any alliance with China, but it could consider signing a Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty.Chiang specifically demanded that the Soviet Union not "invade China directly or indirectly" while Japan was invading China.He was not worried that the Soviet Union would "directly" invade China, the main point was "indirectly", which meant aiding the CCP.Chen Lifu admitted: "Actually, we want to sign a non-aggression treaty with Soviet Russia, in order to prevent Soviet Russia from helping the CCP by taking advantage of the Sino-Japanese War." ("Lectures from Success or Failure", page 199) The reason why we, Chiang Kai-shek, actively forged a line with the Soviet Union was that we were afraid that the two sides would fight, and we would use the treaty with the Soviet Union to isolate the CCP.The so-called "uniting with the Communist Party to resist Japan" is just a superficial article. Zhou Enlai expressed his welcome to Chiang Kai-shek's plan to unite the Communist Party against Japan, and reiterated the CCP's anti-Japanese position. Of course, he did not know about Chiang's strategy, let alone the black market hidden in it.So Chen Lifu invited Pan Hannian to Nanjing to negotiate directly.Chen Lifu said that after many consultations, The text of the declaration and the conditions have been roughly negotiated. Zhou Enlai (it should be Pan Hannian's mistake) wanted to return to Yan'an to return to his command. There is an agreement to prevent Zhang from singing high-profile anti-Japanese wars and to preserve his strength.Pan Ze stayed in Beijing to continue the negotiation. Unexpectedly, a few days later, the Xi'an Incident suddenly broke out. Zhang Chong and Zhou Enlai were both in Xi'an at that time, and outsiders rarely know the reason.Its declaration of going to the national crisis together was announced on September 22 of the same year after the July 7th Incident, on the same day as the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty. ("Memories of Participating in Preparations for the War of Resistance") This passage not only mistook the name of the person, mistook Pan Hannian as Zhou Enlai, but also mistook the date. The "Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Agreement" was announced on August 29, 1937. The Manifesto was announced on September 22, not "announced on the same day".In addition, Chen Lifu concealed the important truth even more, so that he became inexplicable: the "joint resistance against Japan" had been "generally negotiated", and Zhang Xueliang had been informed, why did Jiang's refusal to resist Japan lead to Xi'an's remonstrance? The reason is that there was no negotiation at all.On November 10, 1936, Pan Hannian and Chen Lifu discussed the "Draft of the National Salvation Agreement between the KMT and the Communist Party" at the Cangzhou Hotel in Shanghai. However, during the meeting, Chen Lifu suddenly turned tough and conveyed Chiang Kai-shek's words: What Chairman Jiang meant was: since the Communist Party cooperates openly and sincerely, the opposing regime and army must first be eliminated.Secondly, the Red Army can only retain 3,000 people and form three regiments. All senior generals above the division commander will be dismissed and sent abroad, and they will be hired only after half a year of inspection.The Communist Party joins the government as an opposition party. (Quoted from Xin Ziling's "The Complete Biography of Mao Zedong", Volume 2, page 231) Chen Lifu also mentioned in "Success or Failure" that "the content of the negotiation has four points, which are roughly as follows: first, obey the Three People's Principles; second, obey the command of Chairman Jiang of the Military Committee; third, abolish the Red Army and reorganize For the National Revolutionary Army; Fourth, the abolition of Soviet organizations". (Page 202) Pan Hannian once asked Chen Lifu: "Deng Wenyi was active in Russia at the beginning, and Zeng Yangfu sent people to the Soviet area. The discussion was not about incorporation but about cooperation. Why does Mr. Jiang have such an idea now? Probably because he mistakenly believed that the Red Army had arrived. Powerless, or trapped by Japan's proposal to prevent communism." ("Pan Hannian's Report to Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Bogu on Negotiating and Cooperating with the Nanjing Government to Anti-Japanese War", November 12, 1936) This is no longer cooperation, but an incorporation operation from the standpoint of suppressing the CCP. Of course, the CCP cannot accept it. Who would surrender without a fight?The negotiations between Pan and Chen were fruitless, and Chiang Kai-shek wanted to incorporate rather than cooperate, which can be seen in his later writing "Soviet Russia in China": Since the Sino-Japanese War was unavoidable, the Nationalist Government began to negotiate with the Soviet Union while also addressing the CCP issue.My policy on the issue of the CCP is that the CCP must be disarmed first, and then the issue of the CCP can be treated as a political issue and resolved by political methods.At the end of the 23rd year of the Republic of China, the five campaigns of encirclement and suppression were initially successful, and the central government assigned Chen Lifu to take on this political task. (Page 72) It is clearly stated that "the CCP must be disarmed first", how is this possible?The basic position of the CCP is to "establish a united front between the two sides under the basic conditions of resisting Japan and preserving the Soviet area and the Red Army." (See Yang Tianshi's "Story of the Republic of China", page 191) The Kuomintang was originally forced by the situation to agree to this united front, but why did Chiang Kai-shek's attitude suddenly become tough?Because when Chen Lifu discussed the non-aggression treaty with the Soviet ambassador, he got the approval of the Soviet side: "If they (referring to the CCP) are disobedient, you (the Kuomintang) will wipe them out." (Quoted from Xin Ziling's "The Complete Biography of Mao Zedong" Volume II, page 232) This is exactly what Chen Lifu said in his memory: "At this time, the Soviet Union only hoped to promote the Sino-Japanese War. Even if they sacrificed the CCP, they would not hesitate. "("Memories of Participating in the Preparations for the War of Resistance") How did Chen Lifu know that the Soviet Union was willing to "sacrifice the CCP"?Apart from the promise from the Soviet side, what else?It is not surprising that the Soviet Union was willing to sacrifice the CCP. Stalin did not like Mao Zedong in the first place, and before Mao defeated Chiang Kai-shek, he did not believe that Mao had the possibility of success.It was not until 1948 that Stalin admitted that he had miscalculated the CCP. After World War II, he told the CCP comrades that there was no hope of seizing power and that they should "compromise" (modus vivendi) with Chiang Kai-shek. (See Dedijer, Tito Speaks, p. 322) Chiang Kai-shek knew that the remnants of the communist army could be wiped out without affecting Sino-Soviet relations, so he went from stopping the attack on Yan'an to aggressively attacking Yan'an.In Mao Zedong's reply to Pan Hannian's telegram on November 12, there was the phrase "Mr. Jiang has made a violent attack recently". (For the telegram, see the third and fourth joint issue of "Documentation and Research" in 1985) Such a high profile forced Zhang Xueliang to suppress the Communist Party, which led to the Xi'an Incident.Chiang Kai-shek later stated in his book "Soviet Russia in China" that before the Xi'an Incident, the CCP had accepted the abolition of the Red Army and Soviets and the cessation of the civil war, which was not true.If this is the case, why didn’t Zhang Xueliang say so when he begged Chiang Kai-shek to end the civil war in Luoyang and Xi’an and unite in the resistance against Japan? Could it be that he concealed the opposite from his deputy commander? If this was the case, why did he force Zhang to suppress the Communist Party? The facts are clear , Chiang Kai-shek came to Xi'an with the civil and military forces of the Manchu Dynasty. He was aggressive and wanted to wipe out the Red Army who refused to accept the recruitment.Because of this, there will be Zhang and Yang's remonstrance.Chiang Kai-shek's "bandit gang" was a fake act, but Zhang Xueliang actually performed Lao Jiang's fake act and broke his plan. No wonder the hatred persisted throughout his life, and he refused to forgive Zhang Xueliang even in death. Undoubtedly, the Xi'an Incident really changed Chiang Kai-shek's established policy of "safety at home before fighting against foreign countries".Chiang Kai-shek was forced to fight against the Japanese by Zhang Xueliang. Before the Xi'an Incident, Zhang Xueliang and the Northeast Army were in an extremely miserable situation in Shaanxi, because they could not fight the Japanese in the Northeast, but instead fought the Chinese in the Northwest.There is a record that Zhang Xueliang’s confidential secretary Miao Jianqiu persuaded him before the incident: “I think the Communist Party in northern Shaanxi is just a disease of scabies, and the Japanese warlord’s aggression against us is a serious problem for a century! The deputy commander should advise Jiang Put down your gun, sir, and cooperate with northern Shaanxi." Zhang Xueliang heard this and said, "My job is the deputy commander of the bandit suppression. You want me to cooperate with the bandits. This kind of idea is too stupid!" Miao Jianqiu said: "You You’re a bastard! You don’t want to avenge the country’s calamity, but you don’t avenge your family’s revenge, and you work as a lackey for others to fight civil wars all day long. What qualifications do you have to call me a bastard?” Zhang Xueliang is a man of measure, and he said: “You’re right, the two of us All of them are bastards!" (Refer to You Jun's "Causes and Consequences of the Xi'an Incident") Therefore, the reason for the Xi'an Incident, simply put, is that Zhang Xueliang and the Northeast Army do not want to be bastards anymore.They hope that the Chinese will not fight the Chinese, and the Chinese will fight the Japanese. Zhang Xueliang's original plan was to let him negotiate with the CCP first, and then let him speak to Chiang Kai-shek, and finally everyone agreed to speak out.He has succeeded in negotiating with the CCP, and the CCP has sworn to him, even "willing to be commanded, willing to be monitored, and to be condemned at will at any time".In the process of negotiating with the CCP, Zhang Xueliang even cried, and Zhou Enlai also cried with him (see Tadao Ishikawa's "Research on the History of the Chinese Communist Party"). Of course, Zhang Xueliang was moved by the finalization.So after "everyone made a promise not to break their promise", it was time for Zhang Xueliang to "speak hard to Jiang Gong".Unexpectedly, he was always unsuccessful in "trying to speak to Duke Jiang". He used "huge amounts of private money to help the CCP, and the CCP withdrew from Wayaobao on its own, etc., all of which showed that the CCP was taking his friendship and waiting for him to honor the Chinese Communist Party." People unanimously have great hopes for the outside world. In this kind of waiting, Zhang Xueliang's psychological pressure became heavier and heavier, and he deeply felt that it would be impossible to "speak up with all his strength". Finally, under the influence of other factors, he finally embarked on the path of "remonstrance". Even if the individual suffers any loss, he is willing to sacrifice for the country. Since Chiang Kai-shek had decided to end the civil war, he flew to Xi'an to force Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to obey his policies, firmly refused to listen to Zhang and Yang's hard advice to fight against Japan together, and imposed stricter supervision and threats.The most notable thing is that on December 9th, three days before the Xi'an Incident, Chiang Kai-shek wrote a confidential letter to Shao Lizi, Chairman of Shaanxi Province. The full letter is as follows: Lizi Chairman Xunjian: Ke secretly asked the reporter stationed in Shaanxi University Gongbao to publish the following news: Jiang Dingwen and Wei Lihuang have both arrived in Xi'an.Chairman Wen has appointed Jiang Dingwen as the commander-in-chief of the Northwest Bandit Suppression Front Enemy, Wei Lihuang as the commander-in-chief of the border regions of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Sui, and Ningxia provinces, and Chen Cheng also came to Shanxi to pay a visit to Chiang. Troop cloud.But this information does not need to be handed over to the Central News Agency or other reporters, and the newspapers in Xi'an do not need to publish it.Chung Cheng December 9th. ("Materials of the Xi'an Incident", Volume 1, pages 10 to 12) Chiang Kai-shek's purpose was obviously to reveal his determination and arrangements for "suppressing bandits" through "Ta Kung Pao".Of course, this arrangement also warned and threatened Zhang and Yang at the same time. It can be said that it was an extraordinary means adopted by Jiang to achieve his goal.On the other hand, Zhang Xueliang, after repeatedly trying to change Chiang Kai-shek's non-anti-Japanese policy and failed, took extraordinary measures in order to achieve the goal of resisting Japan.This is the Xi'an Incident, also known as the Double Twelve Incident. Zhang Xueliang launched a military remonstrance, mainly because of his young marshal's decision. Of course, the CCP didn't know about it beforehand, and Stalin, who was far away in Moscow, didn't know about it. Therefore, when the Nanjing government suspected that the Soviet Union was instigating the Xi'an Incident, Moscow was very angry and complained to the Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union. Jiang Tingfu protested. (See "Memoirs of Jiang Tingfu", pages 198-199) Since the Russians had an unannounced Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, why and on what grounds did they order Zhang Xueliang, who had no connection with him, to arrest him? One day after the incident, the CCP held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Zhang Wentian's cave. ...On December 15th, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and other 15 people published the "Telegram to the Kuomintang Nationalist Government Regarding the Xi'an Incident", saying that "the Xi'an Incident, Jiang's arrest was frightening, and the incident happened unexpectedly. It is the result of Jiang's three wrong policies of retreating from the outside world, using troops at home, and oppressing the people."He also said: "If the public wants to distinguish themselves from Chiang, stop the ongoing civil war, remove Chiang, hand over to the people of the country for judgment, and unite all parties, factions, armies, and walks of life to organize a united front government." It is the position of "discussing Jiang to resist Japan", but since Jiang is not in their hands, whether to "deliver to the people of the country to judge" is beyond their control.However, after Zhou Enlai arrived in Xi'an on the evening of December 17 at the request of Zhang Xueliang, he was able to agree on five conditions for a peaceful settlement as follows: 1. The civil war was stopped immediately, and all the Central Army drove out of Tongguan. 2. Order the whole country to aid Suizui in the War of Resistance. 3. Song Ziwen was responsible for the establishment of the Nanjing Transitional Government and the elimination of all pro-Japanese factions. Fourth, the establishment of the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces. 5. Release political prisoners, realize democracy, arm the masses, hold a meeting to save the country, first hold a preparatory meeting in Xi'an. From this agreement, it can be seen that the CCP's position has gradually changed from "discussing Chiang Kai-shek against Japan" to Zhang Xueliang's idea of ​​"supporting Chiang Kai-shek against Japan".On the 19th, the CCP held an enlarged meeting and accepted the opinion of "protecting Chiang's safety and eliminating civil war."It is rumored that the peaceful resolution of the Xi'an Incident was the result of pressure from the Communist International, which is not true.The Comintern did have "instructions", but it did not arrive at Bao'an until December 20 (see Mao Zedong's call to Zhou Enlai at 20:00 on December 20, 1936), and the policy for a peaceful settlement has long been settled .The purpose of Zhang Xueliang's remonstrance was always to "support Jiang to resist Japan." Once Chiang agreed to resist Japan, how could there be any reason not to resolve it peacefully?To say that the Communist International "instructed" the CCP and that the CCP influenced Zhang Xueliang is to underestimate the determination and arbitrariness of the young marshal.In fact, Zhang Xueliang has a lot of ideas.When the Xi'an Incident was successfully resolved, Zhang Xueliang personally sent Chiang Kai-shek back to Nanjing. Because Zhang Xueliang's purpose of remonstrance had been achieved, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to stop the civil war.But after Jiang returned to Nanjing, he kept saying that he did not promise anything. For example, at the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee on February 18, 1937, he reported the Xi'an Incident: "Zhongzheng always ordered him to repent immediately. Send Chiang Kai-shek back to Beijing, and I don’t want to hear anything else from him.” Although his promise as a leader was unsubstantiated, after the Xi’an Incident, Chiang Kai-shek’s abandonment of the first security policy is the best proof.It proves that Zhang and Yang's military remonstrances did prompt him to turn his domestic guns to the outside world, that is to say, he would no longer fight the civil war and unify the outside world, that is to say, he would no longer bear the burden of humiliation and no longer give in to Japan's aggression.After this "no more", unless the Japanese warlords stop their aggression, it is only a matter of time before the outbreak of the War of Resistance.Sure enough, as soon as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident happened and China resisted, all-out war was inevitable.Therefore, the causal relationship between the Xi'an Incident and the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War is very obvious.If you ask how the War of Resistance was fought, the simplest answer is the Xi'an Incident, because it completely changed Chiang Kai-shek's policy of non-resistance. The Xi'an Incident achieved the cessation of the civil war and the nation's unanimous resistance to Japan, which is also the historical significance of this incident.Achieving the goal is of course a success.For Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, it was also a success, because after the incident, Chiang Kai-shek's personal prestige reached an unprecedented height (and unprecedented).His popularity soared, of course, because the people of the country believed that he would lead the war of resistance.For the Communist Party, it was also a success, because the cessation of the civil war gave the Red Army a chance to breathe, regroup, and develop.The only thing that failed was the two protagonists of the incident.Zhang Xueliang was placed under house arrest, and Yang Hucheng's family was murdered.Moreover, the Northeast Army, which most wanted to resist Japan, was not allowed to resist Japan and was disbanded! Zhang and Yang suffered great disasters because they contributed to the War of Resistance, which is indeed a great historical irony. But this great irony did not happen by accident, but was caused by Chiang Kai-shek's deliberate deliberation.After the Xi'an Incident, Generalissimo Jiang was determined to lead the whole country in the resistance against Japan, and his reputation was in full swing. How could he give people the impression that he was forced to resist Japan?Therefore, he repeatedly denied that the Xi'an Incident had any positive effect and significance, and insisted that it was a rebellious incident that committed rebellion.The reason why he escaped safely was due to his own spiritual inspiration! Therefore, he did not hesitate to forge the so-called "Chairman Jiang's Instructions to Zhang Yang", did not hesitate to try Zhang Xueliang by military, imprisoned Zhang and killed Yang, and did not hesitate to publicize that Zhang and Yang are lawless warlords remnants.All these are creating the impression of punishing rebellion, while trying to "downplay" the positive role played by the Anti-Japanese War. Chiang Kai-shek's main project to cover up the truth of the Xi'an Incident was "Xi'an Half Moon".He said it was a diary at that time, so many historians cite it as a factual record.Wu Tianwei's English monograph "Xi'an Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History" (The Sian lncident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History), although it is known that "Xi'an Banyue Ji" was actually written by Chen Bulei (see page 228) , is still quoted as a "famous diary", and even used to prove that after Zhang read Jiang Zhi's diary and documents, his attitude changed and he regretted it with tears. (Pages 86-87) Li Yunhan's "Research on the Beginning and End of the Xi'an Incident" cited a lot of archival materials. In the chapter "The History of the Incident", he repeatedly quoted the "Xi'an Banyue Ji" at length, which is regarded as The most reliable historical data, and based on it to reconstruct the historical facts of the "Xi'an Incident" for half a month. (See pages 49 to 75) However, the full text of "Xi'an Banyue Ji" starts and ends in one go, in an orderly manner, unlike an original diary.It is simple and close to classical Chinese, and it is more like Chen Bulei's handwriting.Sure enough, after Chen Bulei committed suicide at the end of 1948, Shanghai Twentieth Century Publishing House photocopied his handwritten manuscript and published it (provided by his wife, Ms. Wang Yunmo, and there is a preface by Ms. Wang in front of the book).This photocopied manuscript was typesetting and published by Taipei "Biographical Literature" in 1967 under the title "Memoirs of Chen Bulei".Judging from its content, it seems more appropriate to call it "Chen Bulei's Self-Compiled Chronicle".In the 25th year of the Republic of China, Bingzi (1936) December 26th, there is such a record: At noon, I went to the airport to welcome Jiang Gong, and then went to the official residence. Jiang Gong gave Yu a draft order to discuss with his wife in detail. (Biographical Literature Edition, page 118) It is known that the so-called precepts to Zhang and Yang in Xi'an were written by Chen Bulei after returning to Nanjing according to the instructions of the Jiang couple. Not only that, but also in the 26th year of the Republic of China Ding Chou (1937) February 2nd wrote: When Jiang Gong went to Hangzhou, Yu (Chen Bulei) and Dr. Zheng went together to spend the lunar year in Hangzhou. They set up a new hotel and wrote "Xi'an Half Moon". Yu wrote that he went to Shanghai after he was done, and Mr. Jiang went to Shanghai to ask a doctor to check his body when he returned to West Edhams Road. (page 120) It is known that "Xi'an Banyue Ji" is not Chiang's diary from December 11th to December 25th, but the product of Chen Bulei's "closed doors" in the hotel according to Jiang's meaning, and, " The project" is not small, and "Wangdi" is needed to help Yu copy it ("Wangdi" is Chen Bulei's brother-in-law Weng Zuwang, who is Chen Zhi's confidential secretary, and his daughter is an underground member of the Communist Party of China. She married Jiang and is currently the chairman of the National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China Qiao Shi, whose original surname is Jiang).Chen's manuscript, which he did not expect to publish before his death, unexpectedly revealed the truth inadvertently.The strange thing is that although this precious historical material came out as early as 1948, it was not noticed and cited by many experts who studied the "Xi'an Incident". Since "Xi'an Banyue Ji" was fabricated by Chen after the fact, rigorous historians can no longer refer to it as Jiang's diary.However, since Chen’s fabrication was based on Chiang’s will, it still has historical value. Its value lies in the fact that it can reflect Chiang’s “anachronism” and is Jiang’s subjective judgment and positioning of the “Xi’an Incident” afterwards. . Chiang’s diary compiled by Chen Bulei began on December 11th, which happened to be the eve of the incident, and recorded various doubts, such as: “Get up early and take a walk in the courtyard, and see two people in Lishan. , the heart is quite different." "Hanqing is in a hurry today, and he is in a trance, and I think it is different." This is the foreshadowing of writing the article, and "in hindsight"! The intention of the whole article is everywhere to maintain and decorate the dignity of the leader.In fact, after the "Xi'an Incident", the trend of "supporting Chiang Kai-shek and resisting Japan" has become irreversible. In order to unify the country and maintain the dignity of the leader, Zhang Xueliang insisted on accompanying Jiang back to Beijing regardless of the consequences. Give Jiang enough face.However, "Xi'an Banyue Ji" went a step further, trying to highlight the righteous image of the chairman, if it is said: "The rest of the body can be killed, the head can be broken, and the limbs can be killed, but the personality and righteousness of the Chinese nation must be maintained. ""You have weapons, and I have righteousness; although I have no weapons, I must know that righteousness and mouthpiece are the remaining weapons, and I must defend the personality of the nation, and seek to be worthy of being a follower of the prime minister and not losing to the martyrs of the revolution." And bluntly Zhang Xueliang and others released him because they read his documents and diaries and were inspired by his great personality. They even used Song Meiling's mouth to compare his disaster in Xi'an with Sun Yat-sen's disaster in Guangzhou.It is obvious that this is not only to maintain the face of the moment, but to use this "diary" to shape the historical reputation of the future. However, if the historical truth is to be pursued, the sacred veil must be lifted to see the true face.We might as well use the record in "Xi'an Banyue Ji" to compare it with the records of other people at that time. "Xi'an Banyue Ji" describes the moment of arrest as follows: At that time, the search by the rebels became more and more urgent. They heard that the rebels on the cave said to each other: "There is a man in plain clothes here, or he is the chairman of the committee." The soldiers shouted and said, "Don't mess around!" Yu Nai resisted and replied, "Yu is Chairman Jiang, you must not be rude! If you take Yu as a prisoner, you can shoot Yu immediately, but no slight insult is allowed. "The rebels said they didn't dare, and three of them shot into the sky, shouting: "Chairman Jiang is here!" Xuan Sun Ming, the ninth battalion commander, came forward, knelt down and wept to Chang Yu, and said: "Chairman, please come down the mountain." Yu Nai knew that the besieger of Xingyuan was the second battalion of Zhang Zhiwei.Sun Suihu went down the mountain and went to Huaqing Pool in front of Xingyuan. Yu wanted to go inside to rest for a while, but saw that the objects inside the door were messy and the corpses were lying on pillows.孙坚请余登车入西安，谓：“委员长所居之室，已凌杂不可居，营长奉上官命，请委员长入城。”余命孙：“找尔之副司令来!”孙曰：“副司令在西安相候。吾人非敢对上官叛变，实对国事有所请求，将面陈于委员长，望委员长接纳吾人之所请。”余怒斥曰：“叛逆狂谬至此，无多言，欲毙余，则速毙余可也!”孙与第一○五师第二旅旅长唐君尧又向余敬礼，请登车入城。余欲见汉卿询其究竟，遂登车行。 (《西安事变史料》，一九八三年出版，上册，页四) 文中的孙铭九营长亦有回忆，临潼扣蒋应是他一生最难忘的一刻，同样一事，请看他是怎样写的： 此时天色即将全明，可以看清地形地物了。我同士兵一起急往山上搜索，恨不得将蒋介石一把抓住才好。忽然跑在我前面的陈思孝(卫队营一个班长)喊着：“报告营长，委员长在这里呢!在这里呢!”我应声赶紧跑上前去，只见蒋介石刚从洞里出来，弯着腰扶着石头站在洞口边，卫队营的卫士们四面包围着拥挤在左右。发现蒋的陈思孝和卫士们报告说，我们先看见这块大石头旁边像有人在走动，一会儿又没有了。我们沿这个方向搜索至大石头旁，见洞里蜷伏着一个人，便喊道：“是不是委员长？赶快出来，不出来就开枪了!”里面连忙回答：“我是委员长，你们不要开枪，不要开抢!”随后站了出来。我走到蒋介石的面前，只见他全身冻得发抖，抬头看了我一眼又赶紧避开，说：“你打死我吧……”我说：“不打死你，叫你抗日!”此时，蒋的脸色苍白，赤着双脚，上穿一件古铜色绸袍，下穿一条白色睡裤，浑身都是尘土。“你们是哪里来的？”蒋问。“是东北军!是张副司令命令我们来保护委员长的，请委员长进城，领导我们抗日，打回东北去”我回答。“啊!你是孙营长，你就是孙铭九？”“是我!你怎么知道我的名字？”“嗯，我知道，有人报告我的。”蒋可能看出我不伤害他，便说：“你是个好青年……你把我打死好了，你打死我吧!”“副司令要委员长领导我们抗日，没有叫我打死委员长。”我解释并催促蒋说，“委员长快下山进城吧!副司令在那里等着你呢!”蒋一歪坐在地上，发怒地说：“叫你们副司令来!我腰痛不能走!”蒋的腰痛是真的，是他从五间厅往外逃跑翻越后墙时摔的。我见蒋不走，便劝他：“此地不安全，请委员长还是赶快下山去吧。你腰痛，我们背你下山。”蒋还是不动，并要马骑。我示意左右卫士把蒋从地上扶架起来，拥推着下山了。来到华清池，蒋又不愿意进西安城。我和几个卫士便连推带拉把他弄上了汽车。我也上了车。(《西安事变亲历记》，北京中国文史出版社，一九八六年出版，页二二一至二二二) 两文对照，用词遣句虽异，所述事情实同。孙铭九的回忆朴实无华，口口声声委员长，并无故意贬诬之处，读来生动真实。反观陈布雷编写的蒋氏回忆，则刻意修饰，一心想在极为窘困的情况下，描述领袖之临危不惧与义正辞严，以凸显蒋氏的尊严，不免言过其实，过度渲染。如谓孙铭九一见到蒋，“向余长跪而泣!”蒋、孙初次面对，孙绝无向蒋“长跪而泣”的感情，今见孙氏回忆所述，盖知跪泣一景，乃系虚设，而非实有。 我们把蒋介石的说法与孙铭九所记对质，可得八点： 一、蒋介石说听到他的侄儿蒋孝镇“与叛军厉声争执”，这是替蒋孝镇脸上贴金，事实上，孙铭九说蒋孝镇“这个家伙已经吓得面无人色”，讲话“半吞半吐”，又何来“厉声争执”？在蒋孝镇表示不知道蒋介石行踪后，孙铭九即拿枪对着他说：“你不说真话，我马上毙了你!”于是蒋孝镇“赶紧回头向山上看了一眼”。孙铭九就按着“目指的方向，指挥队伍往上搜查”。 二、蒋介石说他被发现时“抗声答曰：'余即蒋委员长，尔等不得无礼!'”孙铭九回忆却是：“我们沿这个方向搜索至大石头旁，见洞里蜷伏着一个人，便喊道：'是不是委员长？赶快出来，不出来就开枪了!'里面连忙回答：'我是委员长，你们不要开枪，不要开枪!'随后钻了出来。” 三、蒋介石说孙铭九一见他就向他“长跪而泣”；孙铭九回忆却是：“我走到蒋介石的面前，只见他全身冻得发抖，抬头看了我一眼又赶紧避开，说：'你打死我吧……'我说：'不打死你，叫你抗日!'此时，蒋的脸色苍白，赤着双脚，上穿一件古铜色绸袍，下穿一条白色睡裤，浑身都是尘土。'你们是哪里来的？'蒋问。'是东北军!是张副司令命令我们来保护委员长的，请委员长进城，领导我们抗日，打回东北去!'我回答。'啊，你是孙营长，你就是孙铭九？''是我!你怎么知道我的名字？'嗯，我知道，有人报告我的。'蒋可能看出我不伤害他，便说：'你是个好青年……你把我打死好了，你打死我吧。''副司令要委员长领导我们抗日，没有叫我打死委员长。'我解释并催促蒋说，'委员长快下山进城吧!副司令在那里等着你呢!'” 四、蒋介石说：“找尔之副司令来!”孙铭九回忆：“蒋一歪坐在地上，发怒地说：'叫你们副司令来!我腰痛不能走!'蒋的腰痛是真的，是他从五间厅往外逃跑翻越后墙时摔的。” 五、蒋介石说“遂登车行”；孙铭九回忆却是：“我见蒋不走，便劝他：'此地不安全，请委员长还是赶快下山去吧。你腰痛，我们背你下山。'蒋还是不动，并要马骑。我示意左右卫士把蒋从地上扶架起来，拥推着下山了。来到华清池，蒋又不愿意进西安城。我和几个卫士便连推带拉把他弄上了小汽车。我也上了车。” 六、蒋介石说上车后“孙铭九与唐君尧旅长既扶余登车，夹坐余之左右；另一副官坐车前，即张汉卿亲信之侍从谭海”；孙铭九回忆却是“在车里，我坐在蒋的左边，唐君尧坐在蒋的右边；前面是副官长谭海和司机。蒋皱着眉头刚说出'太挤了'一句话，随即又把话咽了回去。车子向西安奔驰着，蒋不断地用手抚摸胸前，紧闭双眼，口中嘘嘘地呼着长气。我问道：'今天以前的事过去了，今天以后怎么办？'蒋说：'你们副司令有办法了''我们副司令拥护委员长抗日。'我说。'我也没有不抗日呀。'蒋小声说，'打共产党是国策，没有错，是我决定的。'蒋显然是动气了。我据理反驳。他说：'你……我是国家领袖、我是国家的最高统帅，国策是由我决定的，国策没有错!你不懂!'蒋此时神态改变，怒形于色，并说：'你不要再和我说话，你不要再和我说话了。'遂闭上眼睛。到灞桥附近，路上军队甚多(后来知道这是张学良派来协助卫队营扣蒋的)，汽车时停时走，蒋眼睛向外看，不一会儿沉寂打破了，他问我：'这是哪里的军队？'我简单地说：'东北军。'车到西安城门，门口有岗哨值勤。蒋又问：'这是哪个军队？'我说：'十七路军。'进城门后，车子一直开到新城大楼绥靖公署，我和蒋下车进入早巳预备好的住室。” 七、蒋介石说抵新城大楼后“孙铭九以护卫之责交付于宋而去”；孙铭九回忆却是：“我同蒋进屋后，把他引到一张靠椅上坐下，我站在蒋的右后侧，靠着一个小茶几。蒋仍手抚胸膛，一言不发。隔了一段时间，他才开口，几次让我坐下，并重复说：'你是个好青年。'这时有人进来送茶，又有人送来张学良的大衣，以后又送来牛奶。蒋不喝也不穿。他问我：'你们副司令怎么还不来？'我随口答应道：'马上就来的。'蒋又叫道：'叫你们副司令快来!'我没有答应。约半小时左右，张学良穿着蓝色丝绸棉袍推门进来，脸上显出得意的神情，对蒋微欠身子，劈头便说：'委员长受惊了!你这回交给我做做看!'蒋说：'我看你有什么好办法!'这时我后退了出来，刚出门，便听到张与蒋争吵起来，声音很高。上午十时，我走出了新城大楼……” 八、蒋介石说第二天孙铭九来见，请他移居，他说：“此处即我死处，余誓死绝不移出此室。”孙铭九回忆却是：“十二月十三日晚间十一时许，张学良把我找去，说：'我想把委员长搬到咱们这里来住，刘师长去请，他不肯来。我看你与他对付得很好，你去一趟吧。想办法请他一定搬到这边来。'我即去新城大楼，为了免除蒋的恐惧，我特意将服装整理一下，把腰间手枪顺着皮带转到身后，才小心地推门进去。刚向蒋敬礼还未开口，他便惊慌地急问：'你这么晚来做什么？'我立正答道：'副司令请委员长搬家，命令我来接委员长。这里不舒适，副司令公馆旁边的新房很清静，请委员长起来同我一起走吧!'蒋即说：'我不去，我不去!今天这样晚了，你来干什么？明天再说，你回去。今天太晚，我不去。'我上前一步说：'请委员长起来走吧，晚间外边无人，方便些。'说了半天，他还是不去。我看不好再勉强行事，便后退一步说：'今天黑夜委员长不愿意搬，我回去报告副司令一下。'蒋松了口气说：'好，好!你快回去吧。'我出来用电话报告了张学良，张说：'就等明天吧。'这时已是凌晨—点钟了。次日(十二月十四日)下午，张学良又叫我去看蒋，并问他是否需要什么东西，以便使他心情平静下来，便于进行谈判。这次见面，蒋似乎已明白我昨夜来此并无加害他之意。我一进门，蒋即说：'你是一个好青年，好青年。'接着讲了一套文天祥、史可法忠诚爱国的故事和孙中山蒙难得救的经过等等。神色与昨天不同了。又说：'我是国家的最高统帅、军事最高长官，军人应以服从为天职。你是军人，应以服从长官为重。'我看出蒋的用意是要我服从他，便说：'我绝对服从我们的副司令。'他又转了话题说：'你家中都有什么人，东北家乡还有父母吗？我也是贫农出身的。'想用这些话来取得我对他的同情。蒋最后还说：'以后你常到我这里来听故事吧!'我回去把这些情况都向张学良做了汇报，张说：'随他讲去吧。'” 根据以上的八点对照，发现在蒋介石的笔下，他自己是威武不屈的、临危不乱的、视死如归的、神气活现的、大义凛然的；但在孙铭九的笔下，他却是藏头缩尾的、狼狈不堪的、贪生怕死的、张皇失措的、喜怒无常的、坐在地上耍赖要马骑的。最妙的是他不止一次称赞孙铭九是“好青年”，据孙铭九告诉陈平景，从捉蒋那一幕，他充分看出蒋介石的性格，一面是上海泼皮的性格，一面是上海奸商的性格。蒋介石最后且以“孙中山蒙难得救”的故事想打动孙铭九，一切就都呼之欲出矣! 孙铭九押送蒋至新城大楼后，即辞出，前往张、杨处报告经过，乃由杨虎城部特务营宋文梅营长监视，形影不离，以察言观行。《西安半月记》记蒋、张于事变后首次见面：“约半小时后，张始来，对余执礼甚恭，余不为礼，张垂手旁立。”宋文梅则记张于九时三十分左右到达，“蒋见张来，神色突变，仍呆在座椅上，继续出声长吁。”所谓“不为礼”者，乃张二次对蒋说：“委员长!受惊了？”蒋不作答。至于“执礼甚恭”、“垂手旁立”，显然是文人踵华之词。最后蒋还是说了话，令人感到蹊跷的是，至此蒋已知东北军发动兵谏，而《西安半月记》竟谓：“余(蒋)问：今日之事，尔(张)事前知之乎？(张)答：不知!”蒋之问，已属多此一问，而张居然说“不知”更不可能。细阅当时在场的宋文梅之追忆，始知当日中午蒋要与陕西省主席邵力子见面，蒋与邵谈话时要宋离开，宋不肯，乃听到蒋问邵：“西安发生的事情，你事先知道吗？邵答不知道，蒋听后便不再说话。”(宋文梅《我所经历的西安事变》，载《西安事变亲历记》，页二五一至二五四)显然，陈布雷在写文章时，“邵”冠“张”戴了。益见若果系蒋氏当日日记，绝不可能有此误记，转手陈布雷又不及细察，因而有此不自觉之误。 蒋住新城大楼后，张要蒋移居自宅巷内的较舒适新宅，以便于随时见蒋，但蒋坚持不肯，邵力子去说，也不肯，最后澳洲人端纳来见后，才同意移居与端纳同住。邵力子对这件“移居的事”，感到“疑怪”，但没有答案。《西安半月记》说：“余知叛部之意甚险，决以正气与精神力量与之斗争。”接着发了一大段慷慨激昂、视死如归的议论，诸如：“长隶革命之籍，古来忠烈，刀锯鼎镬，甘之如饴”，以及“总理之大无畏精神”、“耶稣受恶魔四十九日之磨折试炼”等，以便“于叛部交付所谓人民公判时做最后之牺牲”。(页十一)仅仅要他移居，何以如此严重？蒋对孙铭九持枪来请，更谓“余(蒋)大怒”!其实孙怕蒋恐惧，特意把“腰间手枪顺着皮带转到身后”，但蒋仍感惊慌，坚持不允在黑夜中移居。孙看在眼里，认为“这种情形说明，蒋是误解了我们的用意，以为我们要在黑夜间把他拉出去枪毙，因而怕离开住地”。(《西安事变亲历记》，页二二四)监视蒋的宋文梅亦说：“孙(铭九)因奉命必须迁移，要我劝说，但蒋心存疑惧，坚决不肯。最后，我请孙入室共劝，蒋见孙腰间带着手枪，更加疑惧，向孙说：我是行政院长，应该住在这里，其他地方，我不去。”(同书，页二五五)孙、宋二人的观察，颇有助于理解何以蒋氏不肯移居的心理。然而何以端纳一来，疑惧顿消，就肯移居了呢？这与端纳是外国人大有关系。蒋氏不是挟外自重，而是挟外自安，在蒋氏心理上，有外国人在旁，总不至于被拉出去枪毙。端纳与蒋同住一屋，其道理亦就不言可喻了。 《西安半月记》一壁大力为蒋撑门面，以维护委员长的尊严，另一壁则尽量抹黑张学良。后者显然与前者相关，因张脸愈黑，则显得蒋脸愈白。最关紧要的是，全文全面封杀张、杨兵谏的原始动机，并加以歪曲，内容基本导向是，张、杨受人(影射共产党)迷惑，犯上作乱，然经领袖伟大人格之感召而悔改。然则“西安事变”之结束，乃因西安叛部之动摇而改变初衷，并非蒋氏答应改变“攘外先安内”的政策而遭释放，如谓：“与余妻研究此次事变之结局，觉西安诸人心理上确已动摇，不复如前之坚持；但余绝不存丝毫侥幸之心，盖唯以不变者驭天下之至变。”(页二十三)此与历史真相相距甚远。 张、杨兵谏的动机原甚单纯，就是要蒋停止内战，团结全国力量，坚决抗日，以争民族生存，简单地说，即出于爱国心。这种动机单纯得使不明内情的人，不敢信以为真，即贤者如胡适与傅斯年亦断然不信，认定张学良别有政治野心。然五十余年来，史料大出，显示动机就是如此单纯。按诸张学良事变前后的言论，也相当一致。杨天石已将纽约哥伦比亚大学所藏孔祥熙“西安事变”期间未刊电报，连载于北京出版的《团结报》上(一九九一年一月二日至二月二十日)。其中颇多孔、张间电报，为孔氏回忆录所不录，颇可明张之心迹及其单纯的动机，以及和平解决之真相，足以揭露《西安半月记》的隐饰。 张学良于事变爆发之日(十二月十二日)，致蒋妻宋美龄文电，即明言留蒋促其反省，绝无伤害之意，只因“此次绥东战起，举国振奋，介公以国家最高领袖，当有以慰全国殷殷之望，乃自到西北以来，对于抗日只字不提，而对青年救国运动，反横加摧残”。其抗日救亡的动机，已表露无遗。张又于事变后第四日(十二月十五日)复孔祥熙电，亦谓：“弟等此举，决纯为实现救国主张，绝无一毫对人私见”，再度表白其单纯之动机。张再于事变之第五日(十二月十六日)复电冯玉祥，更谓：“介公果能积极实行抗日，则良等束身归罪，亦所乐为，纯洁无私，可质天日。……良等苦闷，惟在抗日未能及早实施。”冯玉祥提及愿担保张之安全，张曰：“担保一层，尤无必要，盖良固不惮以七尺之躯，换得主张之实现也。”更进一步表明不惜以性命换取纯正之主张。张复于事变之第八日(十二月十九日)，又重申：“文日之举，纯为积极实现抗日救国主张，如中央确能改变政策，积极领导抗日，行动实现后，用我则愿做先锋，罪我亦愿束身归罪。”最后张于事变之第九日(十二月二十日)致电外交部长张群，有曰：“文电既已褐橥八项主张，则八项之外，自无余事，口是心非，弟不为也。”凡此足见张于私函密电中，与平昔公开之主张，完全一致，并以此为交涉之严正立场，则张学良发动“西安事变”之动机，纯为抗日救国，已无可怀疑。 宋美龄于复张学良元电(十二月十三日)中，原亦针对张氏主张，谓“凡吾兄所建议，苟利国家，无不乐于采纳”，又谓：“我国为民主制，一切救国抗敌主张，当取公意，只要大多数认以为可，介兄个人，当亦从同”，侈言民主固非实在，然表明可从公意。再谓：“昨日之事，吾兄及所部将领，或激于一时之情感，别具苦衷，不妨与介兄开诚协商，彼此相爱，当可无话不说。”但是蒋宋美龄于《西安事变回忆录》(载《西安事变史料》上册，页二十六至五十一)中，为配合