Chapter 37 The third section is the strange relationship between Jiang and the United States

Many people's views on Chiang Kai-shek's relationship with the United States are too taken for granted and simplistic.He did not start his career by being pro-American, but by relying on Soviet Russia.Without Soviet Russia in China, the Northern Expedition would not have been possible.After the Northern Expedition and the marriage between Jiang and Song, the relationship between Jiang and the United States was still not very warm, but the relationship with Germany was even closer, and a large number of German military advisers came.After the outbreak of the Pacific War, on the surface, the relationship between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek entered a honeymoon period. In fact, there were ups and downs, not just sweetness at all.

As far as the United States is concerned, Japan's occupation of Northeast China not only violates its consistent open-door policy and the spirit of the 1920 Washington Conference, but also flagrantly tramples on the 1928 Non-War Pact.The United States should impose severe sanctions on Japan for its own interests and world peace. However, due to the rise of isolationism after the European War, the insignificance of commercial interests in China, and the isolation of the colonial Philippines in the Far East, it dare not and is unwilling to impose sanctions on Japan. It only adopts moderate measures. "Non-recognition policy".After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, an all-out war broke out between China and Japan. Although "Time Magazine" listed the Chiang couple as the man of the year, the United States still did not impose sanctions on Japan. It only greatly increased its sympathy for China's aggression and continued to emphasize The principles of the open door and the territorial integrity of China.This is the policy of "participation without commitment" (participation without commitment) that scholars of American diplomatic history often call.In other words, the United States will not let go in the Far East, but it will not be involved in the war because of restraint.

Before and after the Battle of Songhu, Chiang Kai-shek hoped to stop Japan at the Nine-Power Pact Conference in Washington. Although he was disappointed, he still hoped that Britain and the United States could do something, at least to aid China or mediate.Hu Shi and other scholars were ordered to go to Europe and the United States to carry out national diplomacy in the autumn of 1937, which is why. On September 17, 1938, the Nationalist Government formally appointed Hu Shih as Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, and he went to Washington to take office on October 6.On October 17, I received a long telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt, saying: "The Chinese people firmly believe that only the U.S. government is the only leader who can achieve a just peace; ——Like the precedent of the Washington Conference, this is the right time." (For the telegram, see Wu Xiangxiang's "Biography of the Hundred People of the Republic of China", Volume 1, page 178) On the 19th, the White House replied with a polite reply, "In fact, it is said that the time for mediation has not yet come." (See volume 13 of the manuscript of "Hu Shi's Diary") On the 21st, Minister of Economic Affairs Weng Wenhao wrote to Hu Shi again, saying that China's way out, "It seems that the United States has seriously oppressed Japan, contacted Britain and France, held a meeting, and jointly planned Solving the problem is crucial to the survival of the country.” I hope that Ambassador Hu will discuss specific measures with important people in the United States to achieve the goal of saving the country. (See "Hu Shi's Correspondence and Correspondence" Volume II, pages 383 to 384) On the evening of November 8, Weng called again, saying, "Some people in the country are willing to take this opportunity to negotiate peace because their strength is difficult to sustain for a long time." ( See "Hu Shi's Diary" Manuscript Volume 13) It can be seen from this that Hu Shi's main task as ambassador, in addition to borrowing money, is to hope that the US government will intervene in the peace negotiation. What is the determination to resist the war?

Hu Shi was originally a dove, and he used to sing a low-key statement of non-resistance, but at this time he firmly believed that peace is more difficult than war, and he advocated persevering and waiting for change, which was obviously different from the instructions of the Chiang government.In order to express his own meaning, Hu ignored the dissuasion of You Cui Erjun of the embassy, ​​and returned a private telegram to Weng Wenhao. It is said: "During the six years, there was always peace, but today it is no longer possible. During the six years, the main War is harmful to the country, and refusal to take responsibility for peace is harmful to the country, but surrendering today is even more harmful to the country." ("Hu Shi's Diary" manuscript thirteen volumes, November 13th and 14th, 1938) Hu Shi's disobedience and self-assertion quickly responded. In mid-July 1939, American newspapers reported news from Chongqing that Yan Huiqing would replace Hu Shi as ambassador to the United States. (See volume 14 of the same book, July 13, 1939) This was of course a warning, but it was not really carried out.In October of the same year, after Hu Shi discussed the possibility of reconciling the Sino-Japanese War with officials from the U.S. State Department, he spent 40 days writing an English post, saying that if Japan could accept the Nine-Power Treaty for reconciliation, China would of course Welcome, but this is impossible, emphasizing the various difficulties in peace talks, which is what he said, "peace is harder than war."After Hu Shi posted this post, he said: "If the government knows my painstaking efforts for more than 40 days, it will definitely blame me." However, he said: "I will not avoid this responsibility." (See the same book, 19 October 14th and 15th, 1939) After Cai Yuanpei died in 1940, it was reported that Hu Shi would be transferred to be the president of the Academia Sinica. Became an envoy to the United States", but he clearly stated that if he does not become an ambassador, he will not be the president of the Academia Sinica.As a result, Chongqing officials officially denied the recall of Ambassador Hu Shi on July 23, but Chiang Kai-shek sent Song Ziwen. In Hu Shi's words: "A group of ambassadors have come." (See the same book, May 1940. December 24th, 25th, June 2nd, July 12th, 19th, 24th, and December 17th) Song Ziwen, the "Taishang Ambassador" is of course not only "monitoring" Hu Shi, but more importantly The mission is to ask the United States for money and planes.In March 1941, Chiang Kai-shek learned that the "Arms Lend-Lease Act" was applicable to China, and immediately asked Song Ziwen to submit a request for 1,000 aircraft and 30 divisions of equipment.When the Pearl Harbor Incident broke out and the United States and Japan went to war, Chiang Kai-shek couldn't restrain his joy. On December 8, 1941, he wrote in his self-record: "The achievement of the Anti-Japanese War strategy has reached its culmination today." The first draft of the editorial) was so encouraging that the United States had no choice but to fully support Chiang Kai-shek.So on December 23, 1941, Song Ziwen was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Hu Shi said to him: "When you go back, if there is a need to change the envoys stationed in the United States, I can leave at any time." Book Fifteenth, December 24, 1941) Hu Shi finally received a telegram to dismiss his ambassador on August 15, 1942, and on September 10, one month later, Left Double Oaks, Washington on the 8th.The war was not over, and his ambassadorial career was over.Tang Degang said:

Farmers in Mr. Hu’s hometown have a local saying: “Fishing fish and prawns will delay crops? Election.” As China’s ambassador to the United States during the Anti-Japanese War, Mr. Hu left many diplomatically important “crops” behind and did his best to Shouldn't he be dismissed if he went to "fish for fish and catch shrimp"?See page 16 of "Hu Shi Miscellaneous Memories". In fact, the main reason for the dismissal was what Fu Sinian told Hu Shi directly: "I failed to obey the orders of Jiegong. Last year, I said that Jiegong had a call. My husband replied that it was not feasible. Of course, Jiegong's idea may not be done. I see, but this kind of coping method is not his habit." ("Hu Shi's Correspondence and Correspondence" Volume II, pp. 477-478) If he does not follow Chiang Kai-shek's habits, even Hu Shi should be dismissed.Not long after Hu Shi took office, news of his transfer has not yet been "fished for fish and shrimps".

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 (December 7, Washington time), the United States declared war on Japan, and Chiang Kai-shek suddenly became Roosevelt's combat partner.The White House said to Ambassador Hu Shi on New Year's Day of the following year: "You can tell Mr. Jiang that we welcome China as one of the 'Four Powers'." China, which was ravaged by the Japanese devils, could suddenly become one of the top four in the world. No wonder Hu Shi wanted to put quotation marks around the word top four.There is no other reason. Roosevelt saw the potential of a large country with a population of 400 million. Improving China can balance the Soviet Union and Russia. The upsurge of Mrs. Chiang's visit to the United States provided the basis for his China policy. (See Dallek, FDR and American Foreign Policy, P. 390-391) Hu Shi's so-called "waiting for change" has finally come to light.Soon after, economic and military aid came pouring in, and Jiang Song Meiling's visit to the United States was a sensation, and its popularity was comparable to that of Charles Lindbergh who flew across the Atlantic in the 1920s.The climax was yet to come, the Cairo Conference at the end of 1943.

The Cairo Conference allowed China to participate in a historic summit meeting as one of the top four and Chiang Kai-shek as one of the giants.Gu Weijun has made it very clear that all this "really depends on Roosevelt". (See Preface to Liang Jingxing's "Cairo Conference") Roosevelt had already considered the post-war world order in 1943. In this consideration, he hoped for a unified, strong and pro-American China to fill Japan's defeat In the post-Asian power vacuum, it ignored the obstruction of Britain and the Soviet Union, and insisted on improving China's international status.Britain and the Soviet Union blocked it not because they were jealous of China's strength at that time, because China was not strong at all at that time, but because they believed that the name was not worthy of its name, but Roosevelt wanted to help China become stronger by improving his reputation.Thanks to Roosevelt's insistence, Chiang Kai-shek was able to go to Cairo for a meeting, where he sat on an equal footing with the heads of state of Britain and the United States to discuss strategies and the aftermath of the war.

The Cairo conference was held at the Mina House Hotel, fifteen kilometers from the west bank of the Nile, on the edge of the desert, with the pyramids in sight.Chiang Kai-shek and Song Meiling led the Chinese delegation to arrive on Sunday, November 21.In order to improve China's status, Roosevelt treated Chiang Kai-shek very courteously. Even when taking pictures, "Roche let Chairman Chiang sit in the middle. Chairman Jiang resigned, but he sat on his right side, and Churchill sat on the left. Madame Jiang sits together." (See the log of Chairman Chiang’s Cairo Conference, "Cairo Conference" shared by Liang Jingzheng, p. 89) During the six-day conference, Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt and Churchill met three times, Jiang Qiu talked three times, and Jiang Luo talked four times .Finally, the Cairo Declaration was issued, and China took back lost territories such as Northeast China, Taiwan and Penghu.Roosevelt wanted to "incite Vietnam and Ryukyu", and Chiang "could not hesitate to evade both." (See Liang Jingxiang's "Cairo Conference", p. 51) After Chiang Kai-shek returned to Chongqing, Tang Zong, who was beside him, said that "the result of this trip was very satisfactory", and saw with his own eyes that "the committee members were full of energy and without any dust. Tiredness". ("Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 393)

In fact, the Cairo Conference was not a complete success, and it was not as beautiful as it appeared on the surface.Although Liang Jingxiang wrote the book "Cairo Conference", although he used the old official's style of writing to cover up it in many ways, it still couldn't cover it up.He blamed the allies for breaking promises and not treating each other as equals, and imposed many "oppressions".He forgot the old adage that "people must insult themselves and others will insult them".He kept saying how Roosevelt respected Chiang Kai-shek, while Marshall, Stilwell and others were playing tricks, but it was not always the case.At this time, Roosevelt knew the "corruption and inefficiency" of Chiang's government, and made it clear that he had no patience for a regime that did not care about the life and death of ordinary people. to maintain the unity of China.Roosevelt said to his son: "Although Chiang has many shortcomings, we still have to rely on him." (Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 154) It can be seen that Roosevelt supported Chiang, but he had no choice.

Worst of all, the Chiangs obtained a loan of US$500 million in 1942, and at the Cairo Conference, the lions opened their mouths to borrow another US$1 billion.When U.S. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau heard about it in Washington, he lost his temper in private and said: "They are just a bunch of damn crooks." money, and suggested that Chiang Kai-shek and his gang jump into the Yangtze River to die? How embarrassing is it to choose (see John Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, Vol. It's because no one in the crowd is in favor of borrowing one billion.Song Meiling said that Roosevelt had a good-faith response to one billion in Cairo, but Roosevelt asked his subordinates to tell Chiang Kai-shek the reasons for the refutation in detail (see Morgenthau’s post, contained in the same book, page 1 13, see also "Morgenthau's Diary", pp. 960, 1006), which obviously contains the malice of humiliation.The Jiang couple still didn't know what to do, and they threatened not to send the Yunnan Expeditionary Force to Burma, not to build a bomber airport, and even threatened to collapse within half a year, and fully demonstrated the character of "Ruiyuan rogue".However, you have to pay for cheating. This kind of "white tiger" (bluff) can be exposed as soon as the old beauty is exposed.China originally fought for its own survival, not for the Americans, and it would be of no benefit to break the contract and make peace with Japan at this time.At that time, the island-by-island leap forward in the Pacific Ocean was quite successful. Instead of building an airport in China, it could be built on an island close to Japan.The expeditionary force equipped by the United States refused to go to Burma to fight, but they were forced by repeated orders from the United States to stop allocating supplies to the concessions, so they had no choice but to submit obediently.How can this teach people to look up to?How can I expect others to treat me equally?Didn't Chiang Kai-shek bring shame on himself?

What is even more unfortunate is that at the Cairo meeting, Chiang Kai-shek's military aides were unable to ask questions during the meeting.In front of the three heads of state Luo, Qiu, and Jiang, someone asked about the recent situation of the Yunnan Expeditionary Army. No one in China could answer, and it was Stilwell who responded.British Chief of Staff Sir Alan Brooke was originally dissatisfied with the U.S. elevating China, so he took the opportunity to find fault with Marshall. (See Sir Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 55) When Chiang Kai-shek insisted at a meeting to maintain a monthly hump transport of 10,000 tons, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten told him that there were not so many planes Even if there are so many planes, they must concentrate on bombing the Japanese army in Burma before the arrival of the monsoon. Soong Meiling was busy translating, but she was silent for a long time. Finally, she looked at the frowning Mountbatten and said, "Believe it or not." , he (Chiang Kai-shek) didn’t know what monsoons are called. This anecdote was told by Mountbatten himself to Ms. Tuchman. (Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 738). Know what Monsoon is, otherwise she can cover up the embarrassment of this ignorance as skillfully as possible? Choose Liang Jingxiang to blame the "bad comments about the incompetence and inadequacy of the Chinese staff to discuss the strategy" on Stilwell's broadcast (see Liang's "The Cairo Conference", p. 131), then who is to blame for Chiang Kai-shek's ignorance? After the Cairo Conference, due to the victory of the Pacific War and the exposure of Chiang Kai-shek's military, political, and economic weaknesses, the value of the Chinese battlefield was greatly depreciated.What the Americans expected from Chiang was nothing more than maintaining the strength of the war of resistance and dragging down the Japanese army in the interior of China.When they realized that even this little hope might come to naught, they forced Chiang to change course in order to fight more effectively and effectively, so the friction between Jiang and the United States increased day by day. In fact, the root of the friction has been latent since the beginning of the cooperation between Jiang and the United States.When Chiang Kai-shek fought the war alone, he fought as he liked, and no one could interfere with him.He can secretly negotiate peace with the Japanese, annihilate the anti-Japanese New Fourth Army, surround the northern Shaanxi border area, and act arbitrarily... But once he has a partner, and that partner is "rich and powerful", will he let you do whatever he wants?When Lao Mei interfered with this and that, and interfered to the extent that it might shake Lao Jiang's foundation, Lao Jiang had no choice but to bite the bullet and resist, and friction arose. The most serious and dramatic friction between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek is nothing like the Stilwell incident.After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek to organize the Chinese battlefield, and made Chiang the supreme commander of the battlefield.Chiang accepted it by telegram on January 2, 1942, and asked to recommend a senior general as his chief of staff.Joseph Stilwell (Joseph Stilwell) lived in Pingjin for more than ten years in the 1920s and 1930s. He was a military attache stationed in China and could speak Chinese.However, Stilwell was not only Chiang’s chief of staff, but also the commander of the U.S. military, the military representative of the U.S. president, and the dispatcher of U.S. leased materials to China, etc.But the task is still one, which is to help China fight against Japan. At the end of the 1960s, Chiang Kai-shek opened up the Daxi archives to Liang Jingzheng to write the book "The Stilwell Incident", emphasizing Stilwell's many positions, which caused disputes and troubles.The implication is that Jiang only needs a chief of staff who obeys his orders, and blames Song Ziwen for not clarifying the position of Stilwell's position from the beginning.Liang Jingxiang, like Chiang Kai-shek, doesn't know that this is what other people want to do. Why do they send you a chief of staff who obeys orders?Is it unnecessary?People have doubts about your military ability, so they send Shi to influence you and help you rectify.The problem is that Jiang can't and won't rectify at all, because if the rectification is done according to the old American method, even the old capital will be rectified, such as the feudal relationship of personal loyalty in the army will be rectified. Starting with the military order system, and even reforming the Ministry of National Defense (see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 427), can Chiang Kai-shek bear it? The most embarrassing thing for Chiang Kai-shek is that Stilwell still has the right to deploy "Lend Lease". The U.S. Congress passed this bill to aid the allies. Deployment, but China is deployed by Stilwell, and history does not only follow Jiang's orders.Although Jiang repeatedly asked to be deployed by himself, he was not allowed.It can be seen that Roosevelt can't trust Chiang Kai-shek, so what's the use of blaming Song Ziwen?We know from Tang Zong's diary that Jiang lost his temper to Minister Song and "broke his job." For some unknown reason, Tang Qi didn't know it was because of Stilwell until more than half a month later. (See "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", pages 386, 387, 389) At this point, Chiang Kai-shek should know that Stilwell is much more difficult than Borodin, and Roosevelt of capitalism is more difficult than Stalin of communism. Much smarter? Choose Stilwell's personality was really rough, and he was definitely not a material for diplomacy. He actually wanted to force Jiang to submit by forcefully crossing Guanshan.How could he regard the great Generalissimo Chiang as a "Peanut"?In his diary, Peanut Rice almost became Jiang's code name? But Liang Jingxiang also admitted that the policies implemented by Stilwell were not his own policies, "all were Marshall's policies." (See "The Stilwell Incident", p. 12) Liang should know that the foreign policy of the United States is determined by the president. How could Marshall make arbitrarily determined policies? It is also "Roosevelt's policy."Liang pointed out in his book that Chiang had wanted to replace Stilwell three times, but all of them were shelved for some reason.In the preface to the English version of Liang Shu, Xue Guangqian actually claimed that Jiang’s shelving was based on “moral persuasion in Chinese philosophy and treating subordinates well” (see Liang, General Stilwell in China, p.xiv).Mrs. Xue is deceased, otherwise you can read the newly "unearthed" Tang Zong's diary, and you will know that Chiang Kai-shek "often criticized and shot" when he was in a bad mood.Why did Jiang love Stilwell?Repeatedly shelving is not a mouse-hunting weapon, afraid of offending Roosevelt? Xuanru wrote in his self-record on August 7, 1942: "If I remain tough, I will abandon President Roosevelt's policy of helping China become one of the top four. It is my fault." It is the most unfavorable." See "President Chiang Kai-shek's First Draft" Volume 5 Page 2015 for confirmation. The biggest taboo among the taboos committed by Stilwell was to suggest arming the Northern Shaanxi Communist Army to fight the Japanese.Liang Jingzhen shared Jiang's will, put a red hat on Stilwell's head, and linked Shi Zhi's headquarters with the CCP, forgetting that the mission at that time was to resist the Japanese and not to suppress the Communists.At that time, the Soviet Union was a big communist country. Could the Americans jointly attack Germany and attack the Soviet Union at the same time?Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the Common Area during the Anti-Japanese War was unjustifiable anyway. Tang Zong also revealed in his diary that Chiang "was unwilling to admit the issue of the blockade at the beginning." (See "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", p. 415) Why you refuse to admit it is hard to justify.Chiang Kai-shek didn't like Americans going to Yan'an, but he couldn't stop them in the end, and that's why.Stilwell was neither a Communist Party nor a pro-Communist faction. He just forced Chiang to actively fight, to cooperate with the CCP, and to implement reforms in order to strengthen his resistance against Japan. (See Xu Luhang's "Stilwell and the KMT-Communist Relations from 1942 to 1944", p. 129) He wants to equip the CCP troops so that they can send troops to Shanxi and Henan, contain the Japanese troops, and relieve the pressure on the Ping-Han Railway. The pressure (Stilwell's Mission P. 368-369) is really understandable. Chiang Kai-shek relied on the strong support of the United States, and there were still extremely unpleasant frictions between Chiang and the United States.Although they were also allies, the relationship between Chiang and Great Britain was even worse.On the one hand, Chiang was quite hostile and anti-British when he was a general of the Red Army in Guangdong;So in addition to competing with the British for US aid in front of the Americans, he also wanted to give the British emperor a wink.Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling's trip to India from February 5 to 21, 1942 was a kind of "offensive power", expressing sympathy for India's independence and challenging the British Empire.Chongqing's reports on India, in particular, showed an anti-British stance.Jiang Tingfu once reminded Chiang Kai-shek: "What we can actually do is what can really help India." ("Memoirs of Jiang Tingfu", p. 224) The implication is that there is no need to offend Britain.However, Chiang Kai-shek not only visited India in person, but also insisted on meeting with Gandhi in spite of the British government's opposition. Of course, the British "caught a cold" even more. At that time, the Allied forces in Asia were divided into four theaters in their war against Japan, namely Admiral Nimitz’s Central Pacific Theater, Mai Shuai’s Southwest Pacific Theater, Lord Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Theater, and Chiang Kai-shek’s China Theater.Geographically speaking, Mountbatten had the closest relationship with Chiang Kai-shek's allies fighting side by side. However, due to the inharmonious relationship between China and Britain, there was no close cooperation at all. Instead, there were many disputes.Mountbatten had a particularly bad impression of Chiang Kai-shek, thinking that the Generalissimo would always be a problem: "He can't speak English, he doesn't value Britain's combat capabilities, and he has no concept of military logistics. What he really wants us to do is to help him Keeping the transportation channels so that the American aid supplies can be sent to China one after another. And this is mainly a political issue. This may be the most troublesome problem I have encountered in presiding over the Southeast Asian theater.” (The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten, P .135) Is it by chance that Stilwell had a bad impression of Chiang? By 1944, the Japanese army launched the "Operation No. 1", intending to open up traffic from the northeast to Vietnam, to attack across the board, to capture Changsha and Hengyang, and to see Guilin and Liuzhou. The Chinese battlefield was in danger of collapse. , making it difficult to end the war.Roosevelt then sent a power call on July 6, asking Chiang Kai-shek to appoint Stilwell to lead the Chinese Kuomintang and Communist Army to save the crisis. It is bound to be in danger of setbacks." ("Daxi Materials", quoted from "The Stilwell Incident" shared by Liang Jingzheng, p. 308) Chiang Kai-shek did not dare to reject it outright, and returned a telegram expressing "agree in principle", but said that China's situation It is complicated and requires time to prepare. In addition, I hope to send a political representative to "adjust the relationship between me and Stilwell", tactfully expressing the contradiction with Stilwell.Roosevelt replied the same day, urging Chiang to "immediately implement the case of Stilwell leading the Chinese army", and believed that the Chinese army under Shi Shi's command should not exclude the Communist army, saying that "it is inappropriate to refuse to support anyone who killed the Japanese."Chiang Kai-shek "approved in principle" on the surface, but was very "depressed" in private, thinking that it was "the most embarrassing and difficult problem". (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", page 447) At the end of June, Roosevelt sent Vice President Henry Wallace to Chongqing, and Chiang immediately complained about Stilwell's "uncooperative attitude" and distrust of Shi's judgment.Wallace then reported to Roosevelt.However, on September 6, Roosevelt sent Patrick Hurley to Chongqing as his personal representative, and still demanded that "Stilwell should be in China as Eisenhower was in Europe."Jiang Chu disagreed, "but in the end he had to agree." (See Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 269-286) Tang Zong, who was beside Chiang Kai-shek, believed on July 8th and 9th that "Stilwell is the commander-in-chief of the Chinese battlefield, and this has become an inevitable fact."He was worried that "Stilwell has the right to command the CCP troops, and also has the right to supply the CCP troops with ammunition and medicines", worrying that this might strengthen the CCP's power.Tang Zong also revealed that Chiang was "extremely anxious" about the oppression of the Americans, and asked Chen Bulei: "Does the United States intend to force me to step down?" He then said angrily: "Why do I love the top four?" Years, pp. 458, 459) were so angry that they didn't even care about the title of "Four Strong". Although Chiang Kai-shek "had to agree", he still wanted to bargain, such as restricting the Communist army, controlling the leased supplies, and replacing Stilwell with Chennault, etc., but he failed. No wonder he was extremely frustrated.In September, the Japanese Army No. 1 operation entered the second phase, with the goal of seizing the U.S. air bases in Guilin and Liuzhou, and at the same time increasing pressure on the Nu River.In this emergency situation, Jiang still refused to mobilize the elite division of Hu Zongnan who had besieged the common area to go south to help, but instead wanted to transfer the Yunnan Expeditionary Force from Burma to Yunnan.After getting the report, Roosevelt sent an extremely insulting telegram to Chiang, which was like an ultimatum: After carefully reading the latest report on the situation in China and exchanging views with various senior staff members, I am deeply afraid that you will face a very critical situation in the near future.The expeditionary force led by you bravely crossed the Nu River will be of great benefit to the war in northern Myanmar, but I believe that if the army does not provide supplementary assistance and directly assists in the opening of the Yunnan-Burma Highway, the victory it has achieved at the cost of a great sacrifice will surely belong to the Nothing. What's more, if the troops there stand still after crossing the Nujiang River, or even propose to withdraw, the Japanese army will use tricks to lure you into hesitation by pretending to step up their offensive in eastern China.The Japanese army also knows that if you continue to attack and coordinate with General Mountbatten's upcoming offensive, the land route to China may be opened in early 1945.The continuation of China's war of resistance and your control can be more assured; on the contrary, if you do not immediately replenish the troops in northern Burma, or send troops to assist the Chinese army on the Nujiang River, we will completely lose the opportunity to open the land route to China , will directly endanger the current air transportation route. If this is the case, you must be prepared to accept the inevitable result and take full responsibility. A few months ago, I repeatedly asked you to take decisive steps to eliminate the danger to you personally and to China's gradual development.Your delay in appointing General Stilwell to command the entire army of China has resulted in the loss of important lands in eastern China, and the consequences are beyond our comprehension.After the Japanese army falls into Guangxi, our Kunming Air Force Station will be directly threatened, and the tonnage of air transport between China and India will inevitably drop sharply. Although the allied forces on the front lines of the world have won every battle, it will take time to realize their direct influence on China.The leap forward of the Allied forces in the Pacific Ocean is really rapid; but unless you take positive actions immediately, the rapid leap forward in the Pacific Ocean will not affect the situation in China.You must act immediately in order to preserve the fruits of your heroic resistance over the past few years and the effect of our assistance to China, otherwise all political and military plans will disappear completely due to the collapse of the military. During the meeting with Prime Minister Churchill in Quebec, I firmly believed that you will be able to advance on the Nu River, so I decided to intensify the battle to open up the route of assistance to China. I firmly believed that the only way to destroy the Japanese army's plan for China was for you to immediately supplement the Nu River. At the same time, General Stilwell must be appointed immediately and given full power to command the entire army of China.The realization of this step will further increase the determination of the United States to aid China.Although we are currently fighting simultaneously on both sides of Europe and the Pacific Ocean, we must proceed immediately to aid China.I firmly believe in your insight, and I will agree that the requested action is a step that should be taken immediately.I and all the senior officials here believe that if you and our plans to aid China are delayed or hesitated, they will disappear completely, so let me tell you frankly, Zhu Xiliang. Roosevelt, September 18, 1944 (Quoted from Liang Jingxiang's "The Stilwell Incident", pages 324-326) The tone is insulting, and the words reveal their meaning.However, Roosevelt's telegram was changed hands by Stilwell, which just gave Shi an opportunity to publicize his personal grievances, which is tantamount to adding insult to injury.Ms. Tuchman also believed that the telegram could not hide the superiority of white people. She doubted that Roosevelt would use this tone to treat European heads of state. (See Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 629) On the 19th, Stilwell went to Chiang’s residence in Huangshan, and Hurley was also there. give up.Chiang Kai-shek remained silent after being humiliated, and only recorded in his diary that day: "This is really the greatest shame in Yu's life." 1) Stilwell was surprised by Jiang's silent reaction, but he was still excited, "When crossing the river, I was delighted to see the bright lights of Chongqing." (Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 631) However, this "insulting incident" gave Chiang an excuse to renege on his appointment as the commander of the Chinese Theater and the Sino-US Allied Forces. He insisted that Roosevelt send another wise man, and asked Hurley to convey it.However, after Chiang Kai-shek asked for Stilwell's replacement on September 25, there was no news, which made "the Commissioner a great headache for Stilwell".Jiang also stated at the Central Committee meeting: "If Roosevelt disagrees, he will not hesitate to break up." But there was no response, which still made "the committee seat very depressed recently."Finally, on October 19th, I received a reply from Roosevelt, agreeing to call Stilwell back, "the serious situation between China and the United States has been resolved." (See Tang Zong's "Eight Years with Chiang Kai-shek", pages 462, 464, 465, 466) During the tense 20 days between Yudu and Washington, the channels between the two sides are still smooth.Roosevelt was reluctant to send others at first, because he thought that if Stilwell could not do a good job, it was impossible for others to do a good job.However, after Jiang repeatedly pleaded, he finally sent Albert C. Wedemeyer, but he no longer claimed the responsibility of commanding the Chinese army.The situation on the Chinese battlefield continued to deteriorate, and Roosevelt turned from contempt to contempt.In February 1945, the two Luoqiu secretly promised Stalin's brigade rights in Yalta, the restoration of Russia's railway rights in the Northeast, the return of South Sakarin and Sakhalin to Russia, and so on.Why?In order to ask Stalin to send troops to the Far East within two to three months after Germany's defeat.Why?Because of the disappointment and contempt for China's combat power.If after the Pearl Harbor Incident, the Chinese army could fight a few more battles like August 13 and Taierzhuang, and if the KMT and the Communist Party could truly cooperate and expand the victories like Pingxingguan, China's post-war status would be greatly different.People must insult themselves and others will insult them.We often say that the "Yalta Secret Treaty" betrayed us, but we have betrayed ourselves first.What caused it?Who ordered it?