Chapter 6 〇5 Mao Zedong’s Secret Communication with “Yuan Fang”

When we were in Yan'an, we usually called the Communist International "far away".The relationship between the Communist International and the Soviet Communist Party and Stalin is inseparable, so the meaning of "distant" actually includes the Communist International and the Soviet Communist Party. In 1938, I went to Moscow to assist the head of the CCP delegation to the Communist International to work as a porridge. After returning to China in 1940, he continued to serve as political secretary when he was serving as porridge.At the same time, he served as a Russian translator for Comrade Mao Zedong.From then until 1957, I translated most of the documents and telegrams between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the "distant place" (the Communist International was dissolved in 1943).What is described in this article is only part of the situation that can be recalled.

In November 1937, Wang Ming flew back to Yan'an from the Communist International (Moscow) with Kang Sheng and others.Wang Ming and Kang Sheng returned to China in a hurry, and urgently needed to find someone to replace him in the Communist International.They found Wang Jiaxiang who had just recovered from his illness in Moscow. Wang didn't agree, but he couldn't be bothered. He only agreed to replace him for three months and asked Wang Ming to send a representative from the Central Committee after he returned to China. Before Wang Ming left Moscow, Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, reminded him: Mao Zedong was a recognized leader born in the Chinese revolutionary struggle. Highest interest: Wang Ming must be modest and prudent after returning to China.Stalin and Dimitrov also expressed the same meaning in an interview with Wang Ming and Wang Jiaxiang.

In March 1938, Ren Bishi arrived in Moscow and took over as the chief representative of the CCP delegation to the Communist International.Before Wang Jiaxiang left Moscow and returned to China, he and Ren Bishi went to see Dimitrov. Dimitrov repeated the above opinions to them and asked Wang Ming about his performance after returning to China. When Zhou En came to Moscow for medical treatment in November 1939, Dimitrov asked about Wang Ming's performance again with concern.When he heard what Zhou Enlai reported, he was deeply dissatisfied with Wang Ming's separatist behavior, and said that he had clearly advised Wang Ming: "Although you (Wang Ming) are a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International , but not the domestically and party-recognized leaders trained in China’s actual struggles: the well-deserved leader is Mao Zedong.” He also said that this was the common view he shared with Stalin.

When Ren Bishi worked in the Comintern from 1938 to 1940, Chinese comrades in the Soviet Union often said "for Mao Zedong!" just like the Soviets often said "for Stalin"; the Communist International organization said to Ren Bishi that "Mao Zedong can trust him." people".Zhou Enlai came to Moscow and called Zhou Enlai "Mao Zedong's envoy". From the end of 1940 to the beginning of 1941, the Central Committee of our party established a direct communication link with the "distant place". After many experiments and proved that the effect was good, regular communication began.

There is more than one radio station in contact with "far away", but the one that works normally and has been in use for a long time is the radio station code-named "Rural Work Department"; , the Chinese name is Sun Ping), and the radio station of the "Ministry of Rural Work" mostly sends out informational materials and directly contacts Dimitrov (the Communist International); while the station of the Soviet intelligence team sends out major The telegrams involving strategic, strategic, policy and other major issues were directly sent to Stalin, and Dimitrov and Stalin were connected. The radio station of the "Ministry of Rural Work" existed until 1943 in form In the autumn, it actually worked intermittently until 1944, and the radio station of the Soviet Intelligence Group continued to work until the end of August 1949 (since the end of 1945, Alov replaced Sun Ping as the host).The cadres, personnel and administrative affairs of our radio station are under the leadership of Ren Zhoushi and Wu Defeng is in charge.And it was Mao Zedong who used it.At the beginning, Mao Zedong always handed over the telegrams to Ren Porridge, who then handed over the translation to me, and then we jointly proofread and sent them out; I also translated the telegrams to Ren Bishi first, and then he sent them to Mao Zedong, who used It was stored there when Ren Porridge was served.Later, Mao Zedong gradually delivered the telegrams to me directly, and I also sent the telegrams directly to Mao Zedong.After I became the director of the office of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, all the telegrams were kept by me.There are also a very small number of urgent or extremely top-secret telegrams that were translated by Ren Zhoushi himself, and I only learned about them afterwards.Besides me, Liu Yihu and Li Tangbin also translated or managed part of it.

When he started using the "Rural Work Department" radio station in the second half of 1940, Mao Zedong only wrote short articles of two or three lines.Briefly introduced the general situation of our party, our army and the liberated areas.When he knew that "Yuanfang" had been received correctly, he began to write long, specific and detailed telegrams, some of which were more than ten thousand characters long, and had to be sent several times. Here we only trace the contents of the most important and meaningful telegrams: In January 1941, the Southern Anhui Incident occurred. After our party and the Kuomintang reactionaries carried out a series of reasonable, beneficial, and restrained struggles, Mao Zedong wrote to "Yuanfang" A long telegram analyzing cause, effect and lessons, the content is roughly as follows:

1. Chiang Kai-shek perfidiously suppressed the people by unscrupulous means, and made the New Fourth Army into a trap; 2. Xiang Ying is self-willed, trusts the enemy credulously, insists on going his own way, and is deceived. As a result, he loses troops and generals, and loses himself; 3. The Southern Anhui Incident caused great losses and difficulties to the Party, the War of Resistance and Central China; 4. The policy adopted by our party to save the crisis and make up for the losses, the transfer and redeployment of the rest of the New Fourth Army, and the ins and outs of the negotiations with the Kuomintang, etc.

I remember the following words when criticizing Xiang Ying: When summarizing and drawing lessons from blood, we must point out that Comrade Xiang Ying was deceived and killed because of his credulous trust in Chiang Kai-shek; , the loss is serious, the lesson is painful, and the experience is beneficial.This incident has educated the whole party, and they will be more aware and vigilant in the future.Mao Zedong's words are all puns. For those "far away" who always trust the enemy and have illusions about the enemy, I hope they can learn from it.Stalin’s guidance to think about it is: during the War of Resistance Against Japan, we must unite with the Kuomintang to fight against Japan, and there must be no struggle;They do not understand and ignore the complex problems of Chinese society and the lessons learned from history.He believes that there should be no struggles within the party, and when there is a struggle, he regards it as disunity.Mao Zedong's strategy and tactics are clear and consistent.That is: to develop and strengthen himself during the Anti-Japanese War, and finally to completely liberate the Chinese people; his united front thought is to unite and struggle, and the struggle must be reasonable, beneficial and restrained.Grinding without breaking, breaking without cracking, constant friction, doing my part, fighting for every inch of land.Mao Zedong's long telegrams basically explained these issues, and I hope that "distant places" can understand them.But they can't understand how.

From April to mid-June 1941, Mao Zedong sent long telegrams to "Yuanfang" almost once or twice a week. Factional struggles within the Kuomintang, etc. explain his strategy and tactical thinking, as well as the secret collusion between Chiang, Japan, and the puppet as well as the relationship between Britain and the United States and Chiang Kai-shek that our intelligence agencies have grasped, and we add analysis when introducing these situations and comments. It is worth mentioning that: On June 18, the underground workers of our party obtained a piece of important information from Hong Kong——Hitler Germany will launch an attack on the Soviet Union in the early morning of June 22. This information immediately reached Zhou Enlai in Chongqing. Zhou Enlai It was immediately reported to the central government.At that time, the central government felt a little strange about this information. How could it know the core secret of German fascism so accurately, even knowing when it would be dispatched in a few days?However, the Central Committee still quickly telegraphed Stalin.However, the Soviet Union was superstitious about the "Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact". June 22 was Sunday, and the Soviet military officers were still on holiday as usual, and they all left their posts since Saturday night, and the German army launched a surprise attack on the Soviet Union just according to the time in the intelligence (early morning of June 22).The Soviet army was in a mess and suffered heavy losses.A month or two later, the Soviet side sent a thank you message to Commander-in-Chief Zhu De in the name of Voroshilov, saying that the information provided by the Chinese comrades was of great help to them.

After that, the exchanges between the Central Committee and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union decreased greatly, and the correspondence with the Communist International also decreased slightly. In the autumn and winter of 1941, the leading comrades of the Central Committee began to rectify and study.At this time, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to "far away": The CCP strives to convene the "Seventh National Congress" as soon as possible, and is now considering the representatives of the "Seventh National Congress" and recommending a list of candidates for the Seventh Central Committee. There are two comrades, namely Wang Minghe Li Lisan, although he is a person who has made mistakes, the Central Committee is still planning to nominate Wang Ming as a candidate for the Central Committee. As for Li Lisan, what mistakes did he make in the Soviet Union?What is the nature of the error?Will it affect his selection as a candidate for the Central Committee?Please report in detail for reference.After quite a while, the Communist International came back with a telegram. The telegram was very long, explaining Li Lisan’s performance in Moscow, the mistakes he made, and the fact that he was arrested. One thing, no statement.

In the late autumn of 1941, the German army was approaching the outskirts of Moscow.In order to prevent the Japanese from sending troops to the west and attack the Soviet Union, and to contain and prevent the Japanese invaders from going north, the Soviet Union repeatedly called to ask how many troops the CCP could deploy, and how many divisions could be supplemented or expanded?How to strengthen the troops and military operations on the front line inside and outside the Great Wall, so as to attack and threaten the rear of the Japanese invaders?Our first reply said that it is easier to organize the strength of several divisions, but without weapons and unable to exert its strength, it is of no use.Shortly after receiving the call, the other party called to discuss: If the channel with Outer Mongolia is opened, the Eighth Route Army troops can go to the border area of ​​Outer Mongolia, receive the provided equipment from there, and then go to the front line. Is it feasible to take turns to equip?Our reply telegraphed that this method would not work, because the troops were in the open area of ​​Mongolia, and it was extremely difficult to move and live, and they could not hide. Not long after, the other party called to discuss: If the Eighth Route Army is deployed on the Great Wall, look for an opportunity to attack the Japanese army outside the pass, and Is it possible to vigorously interfere with its rear and contain the actions of the Japanese army?We did not answer in the affirmative, but only said: We can play by ear and develop as far as possible inside and outside the Great Wall. But at the same time, we pointed out that due to lack of weapons, we could not complete major combat tasks, and we could not gather too many troops. The rabbits were wiped out by the enemy.Although no specific plan has been reached, our side has still strengthened the deployment of troops inside and outside the Great Wall.The Japanese invaders also quickly noticed, and they didn't dare to act rashly against Su. After the rectification study was fully launched in 1942, Mao Zedong regularly sent telegrams to "distant places" and gave many introductions and explanations, such as: What is the rectification?He explained that it is political study within the party, through learning to correct thinking and understanding; what is it?He explained the "Three Winds"; how to fix it?The method is mainly gentle and gentle, and the methods and methods are: study documents, discuss in groups, express opinions, clarify right and wrong, correct thinking, raise awareness, learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones, cure illnesses and save lives, speak everything you know, talk endlessly, the speaker is not guilty, and those who hear it are warnings, If there is, change more, if not, increase encouragement and so on.However, no matter how they explain it, "Far Fang" can't understand it. They always think that the CCP is trying to figure out the party movement, or it is an unprincipled factional struggle.In particular, Wang Ming fell ill, Zhang Wentian went to the local area to conduct research and research, etc., which made "Yuanfang" even more suspicious.They do not understand the ideological struggle within our party, nor do they understand the necessary rational, beneficial and restrained struggle in the united front.Therefore, the study of our rectification style and our anti-friction struggle against the Kuomintang were all considered indiscriminately as not conducive to the war of resistance, and as weakening or offsetting the strength of the war of resistance.In addition to explaining the "Yuanfang", Mao Zedong also talked with the personnel of the Soviet intelligence team stationed in Yan'an many times, introducing and explaining the rectification movement to them.But all these efforts were in vain. They had their own set of fixed views and ideas, and the various nonsense that Wang Ming instilled in the Soviet comrades aggravated their doubts.One only needs to look at the "Yan'an Diary" by Sun Ping (Vladishulov) published later, to know that Chairman Mao's patient work was all about "playing the piano with the cow". In 1942, Hitler's army occupied the Crimea Peninsula, advanced to the North Caucasus, and besieged Stalingrad in an attempt to cut off the land and water communications between the north and the south and suffocate Moscow.At this critical juncture, the Soviet side once again worried that once Stalingrad fell, whether there would be Japanese treachery. So Stalin tried again, if the Japanese invaded the Soviet Union, how much troops would the CCP have to contain the enemy?I can't remember the specific answer to this question, but we never once boasted, assumed obligations, and always put ourselves in an active position. My real understanding of these practices of Mao Zedong was still during the "Seventh National Congress".One day, Mao Zedong and I came out of Zaoyuan and went to Yangjialing to attend the "Seventh National Congress". We walked and talked on the way.At that time, I couldn't figure out what some problems in the rectification document referred to, so I wanted to take this opportunity to ask Mao Zedong for advice, so what was the essence of Wang Ming's mistakes?When it comes to Wang Ming's specific mistakes on this point and that point, he still can't go beyond the points in the document.But the chairman quickly grasped the crux of the matter from my words.He said: "The key to Wang Ming's problem is that he thinks too little about his own affairs (China's issues)! But he worries too much about other people's affairs!" "Yuanfang" and Stalin simply considered their own problems, and asked us: 1. "Persist in national unity, cooperate with the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, face national disasters together, resist Japan together, and strive for victory" (that is, obey the Kuomintang in everything); 2. "Victory in the War of Resistance After that, continue to unite and cooperate to build the country together.”They simply ignored or did not acknowledge many complex issues and lessons of the Chinese revolution.The Chinese people have shed too much blood in dealing with such issues, and the lessons are too profound!A paper agreement has no binding force on Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, and he can break his promise at any time.However, "Yuanfang" did not recognize this, and only asked us to hold back Japan and reduce the threat to the Soviet Union, but did not understand the specific situation of the Chinese revolution.Wang Ming accepted all these, so Mao Zedong said that he thought too little about his own affairs and thought too much for others. In order to gain their understanding, Zhou Enlai gave a lengthy report to the Executive Committee of the Communist International as early as the end of 1939 to January 1940.The meeting was attended by: Chairman of the Executive Committee Dimitrov, his assistant Gottwald (chaired the meeting), German Communist Party representative Pique, French Communist Party representative Marti, Italian Communist Party representative Togliatti , Representative of the Communist Party of Finland Kusinen, Representative of the Communist Party of Hungary Rakosi, Representative of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Manuilski, Representative of the Communist Party of Spain Ibaruri, José, Diaz, Representative of the Communist Party of Japan Sanzo Nosaka, the person in charge of the International Cadres Office Ren Bishi (also a representative of the Communist Party of China) and Martvinov, and an Englishman (can't remember the name).The translators included Xu Jiefan, Shi Zhe and several others. In his report, Zhou Enlai repeatedly emphasized the deep grievances between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. "Three feet of ice are not cold in a day." Your ideas and suggestions are impractical, outdated, and unworkable.His words did not mean to criticize the Communist International and Stalin, but said: Our "friendly troops" (the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek) were yin and yang in the entire War of Resistance Against Japan; , actively anti-communist; internal oppression, external surrender; accumulation of strength, preparations for civil war.Faced with this reality, we have to prepare with both hands, two strategies of struggle, that is: unite with Chiang to resist Japan and prevent Chiang from opposing the Communist Party; actively resist the war while accumulating strength; unite and struggle; cooperate and compete ; Grinding without breaking, breaking without cracking; doing my part, fighting for every inch of land. After listening to Zhou Enlai's report, the attitude of the International Executive Committee when discussing this report was quite different from before.Before that, they always believed that the CCP was disobedient, that they did not fully accept their opinions, and did not act according to their ideas and methods; now they respect Zhou Enlai and his reports.However, they have not really understood these characteristics of the Chinese revolution and the art of struggle against these characteristics. Zhou Enlai's more than 100-page report was condensed by Ponomarev (then Dimitrov's political secretary and later an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee) to 20 pages and circulated to Stalin and others.After waiting for many days, on the eve of Zhou Enlai's return to China, a resolution on Zhou Enlai's report was made in the name of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.The resolution is very general, and its basic content is: the important position and historical significance of China's War of Resistance Against Japan in the world revolution; the great significance of the victory and progress of the War of Resistance Against Japan to the cause of the liberation of the Chinese nation; Persevere unremittingly and achieve final victory, this is the main task and the only goal of the whole nation, etc.It is no different from a letter of advice or recommendation.In fact, differences still exist, but they are no longer publicly exposed and have remained silent. When we returned to Yan'an in 1940, Kang Sheng was already the Minister of Social Affairs and was stationed in Zaoyuan. The Soviet military intelligence team was also stationed in Zaoyuan.This place was made extremely mysterious by Kang Sheng.Perhaps his intention was to keep secrets for the Soviet intelligence group, but the Soviets felt that Kang Sheng had blocked them and strictly supervised them, isolating them from the outside world, and expressed dissatisfaction.Since these Soviets were active soldiers and their numbers were not large, before 1942, they basically went to the front to understand the war situation and collect intelligence.They think that the problem is narrow and single, just to understand the military situation and collect military intelligence.One of the regiment-level cadres surnamed Ivanov, when learning about the enemy's situation in North China, often acted like a military expert, criticizing this and that, thinking that our combat methods were too primitive and backward.Mao Zedong was well aware of these situations.This Ivanov returned to Yan'an from the front in the spring of 1942 and returned home.Before returning home, he bid farewell to Mao Zedong's residence in Yangjialing.Mao Zedong used the opportunity of his farewell to criticize him, to the effect that: we are all backward, and you are not used to everything about us, but we can successfully fight against millions of enemy troops and double our own military strength Grow and strengthen!The self-righteous Ivanov was criticized and still didn't know where his mistake was.This person died on the Soviet-German battlefield shortly after returning home. At the beginning of 1942, in order to strengthen intelligence work in the East, the Soviet side sent a mixed intelligence team headed by Lieutenant General Kislenko to Yan'an.I don't know whether I negotiated with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and got the consent beforehand. After seven or eight people headed by Kislenko arrived in Yan'an, Mao Zedong hosted a banquet for them to clean up the dust, but the first conversation was very unpleasant.Kislenko put on the air of a chief, and introduced to Mao Zedong the name, occupation, military rank, etc. of each of their members, and also briefly introduced their tasks.Mao Zedong stated openly and honestly: To do a good job in this work, it is best for the two (the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of China) to cooperate, so that things can be done better.The method of cooperation is: you contribute money and technology;The information obtained is shared and used by the two parties.When Mao Zedong said these words, the seven or eight people looked at each other in blank dismay, not knowing how to respond.Naturally, the conversation couldn't continue.Soon, they formally expressed their disapproval of Mao Zedong's opinion, so a series of unpleasant situations occurred, and their personnel had to be withdrawn, leaving only Skovartsov, Sisov and others to do some liaison work. (By the way here: after 8 years, between January and February 1950, that is, during Mao Zedong’s visit to Moscow, in a conversation with only Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai, Stalin proposed to cooperate with our side in intelligence work. The requirements for cooperation, and the conditions for cooperation, are exactly the conditions proposed by Mao Zedong back then, and even expressed urgency. The Chinese side did not say anything, but only agreed, and the specific plan will be negotiated and formulated by specialized personnel. What I want to explain here is: eight years When the former Mao Zedong made this suggestion, they disagreed because they believed that the future of our revolution was uncertain, but 8 years later, the same suggestion was made by them, and it became correct because we have already won. This once again shows that we You should have your own ideas about your own affairs. Mao Zedong criticized Wang Ming for "thinking too little about his own affairs and thinking too much for others", which is really penetrating and instructive.) Sun Ping was sent to Yan'an in May 1942.This person used to hide in the Soviet Consulate in Lanzhou to do intelligence work. He came with a surgeon Alov (a special military surgeon) and a radio operator Nikolai Gemel.Since then, their sources of intelligence have been completely dependent on us.With Mao Zedong's consent, Sun Ping could directly communicate with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Eighth Route Army Headquarters and Xinhua News Agency, as well as various ministries and commissions, the Northwest Bureau, the Border Region Government and many other units.Because he has a certain level of Chinese, he also went to Suide, Northwest Shanxi and other places to engage in activities, directly contact with the masses, and understand the situation. According to Sun Ping himself, he received the greatest help from Bogu, which enabled him to understand the international and domestic issues. The ins and outs of many complex issues, outside the party, and within the party, have a better grasp of the dynamics of the situation.He has spoken about this many times.But in fact, Mao Zedong gave him the most and most systematic introductions. Among the Soviet personnel, he was the one who listened to Mao Zedong's most talks. From 1944 to 1945, Mao Zedong talked to him every other week or two, sometimes twice a week, and each conversation took three to four hours. The content of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Sun Ping is mainly about the changes in the situation in each revolutionary period since the establishment of our party, the differences of opinion within the party in each revolutionary stage, the party's various principles, policies, strategies, and the correctness and mistakes of the party's line. And it focuses on sectarian struggles—the general meaning is: the activities of small factions have had an impact, but have not played a decisive role.It was during the process of translating for him that I systematically understood the history of the party. I was lucky enough to listen to Mao Zedong's "party history class" in person, but what did Sun Ping learn?have no idea.In addition, Mao Zedong also talked about the domestic situation, the basic strategy, strategy and policy of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the complicated relationship with the Kuomintang and the strategy of struggle, etc.This conversation continued until the eve of the party's "Seventh National Congress". I feel that the Soviet side is most concerned and disturbed by two issues: First, when will the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China be held and how will it be held?The second is the relationship between China and the United States.In fact, Mao Zedong had already made arrangements, and introduced the time and agenda of the "Seventh National Congress" to Sun Ping, and invited him to attend the "Seventh National Congress".Sun Ping did attend the meetings of the "Seventh National Congress" and kept a diary after each meeting.As for the relationship with the United States (mainly through the US observation team in Yan'an, exchanges with US ambassadors Hurley, Marshall, Stuart, etc., and reception of foreign journalists, etc.), Mao Zedong told them the main points of the conversation every time he contacted them. Sun Ping or Alof.But how much the two of them can accept and understand is hard to say. In May 1943, the Party Central Committee received a "distant" notice about the dissolution of the Communist International.The general idea is: In the past historical period, due to the needs of the objective situation, the political parties of the proletariat and working class in all countries in the world established their own international organization center - the Communist International.At that time, the international labor movement and the Communist parties of various countries were still in their infancy, and the Communist International played a certain role in helping and guiding them.Today, the communist parties of various countries have been tempered and grown up, and have accumulated rich experience. They can basically deal with the complicated problems in their own revolutions independently, and there is no need for organizations like the Communist International to intervene in the internal affairs of various countries. After the historical mission, there is no need to exist.Therefore, the International Executive Committee decided to dissolve the Comintern as an organization and at the same time cancel all its subsidiary organizations. At the same time, "Yuanfang" also sent a notice to establish an intelligence bureau.It means: Due to the special needs of the European situation, the fraternal parties in Europe decided to set up an intelligence bureau to study the international situation, exchange information, and so on.In fact, after the outbreak of the German-Soviet War, international agencies have become intelligence agencies. The Communist International was disbanded, but our connection with Stalin continued, and the Soviet institutions and personnel in Yan'an did not change because of this. In 1944, a group of foreign journalists came to Yan'an from Chongqing, including Protsenko from the Soviet Union.Chairman Mao received him and talked to him about the party's organizational situation and ideological education.Party development and cadre training issues.Protzenko proposed that consideration should be given to the issue of how to further develop after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War and the training of cadres. After the interview, the chairman thought that Protzenko had a brain and insight. Sun Ping has a common language with Wang Ming and others, but he is always incompatible with Mao Zedong's queen. From 1942 to 1944, at the beginning of the rectification study-examination of cadres-elimination of counter-revolutionaries, Sun Tzu heard from Wang Ming and Bogu their introductions and evaluations from their own perspectives, and he accepted them all.Therefore, although Mao Zedong gave him and other Soviet personnel many introductions and explanations, they were still puzzled.But when Kang Sheng expanded the campaign against counter-revolutionaries, Wang Ming and his like, who were a little worried at the beginning, relaxed their minds, watched the fire from the other side, and gloated.The Soviet personnel, on the other hand, adopted the attitude of "letting the wind and waves rise, and sit still on the fishing boat".Later, under the personal intervention and leadership of Mao Zedong, before the "Seventh National Congress", the problems of wronged comrades in the eradication of counter-revolutionaries had basically been resolved. During the "Seventh National Congress", all the staff who participated in and attended the conference temporarily moved to Yangjialing. In Zaoyuan, only Chen Gang and I had to attend the conference and take care of the work of the government, shuttling back and forth between Zaoyuan and Yangjialing.According to Mao Zedong's arrangement, I also need to do some translation for Sun Ping. At the end of the meeting, Chairman Mao's evaluation of the meeting was: "We held a meeting of victory, a meeting of unity."These words are both a truthful evaluation and an answer to Stalin. As soon as the meeting was over, Mao Zedong talked with Sun Ping.One is to ask him about his understanding and impressions of the "Seventh National Congress"; the second is to introduce to him the process and significance of the meeting (that is, to help him understand the conference); the third is to ask Sun Ping to forward the main documents and speeches of the "Seventh National Congress" to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.Sun Ping conveyed the news to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with his own hearing, seeing and understanding, and in his own way.What Mao Zedong emphasized to him: The five-person leadership core (Central Secretariat) headed by Mao Zedong was finally formed at the conference, which is the most prestigious, united, and powerful leadership core in the history of our party. one of the important conditions.Sun Ping may have conveyed this point.However, during the conversation, Sun Ping did not express any opinions, nor expressed his position. Among the Soviets, Mao Zedong talked the most with Sun Ping.In the conversation, Sun Ping rarely interrupted, and sometimes he couldn't arouse Mao Zedong's interest in the conversation.So, nothing unpleasant happened to their conversation. The "Seventh National Congress" opened for 49 days from April 23 to June 11, 1945.During this period, many major changes have taken place both internationally and domestically.First, the Soviet army captured Berlin on May 2 and Prague on May 9, and this day was regarded as Victory Day.The remnants of fascism were also quickly swept away.This indicates that the war in the East is coming to an end.From a historical perspective, the "Seventh National Congress" of our party is the most timely, most leisurely, and most effective congress, and it has laid a good foundation for the victory. From the end of the European War on May 9th to August 9th when the Soviet Union sent troops to Northeast my country, Inner Mongolia and North Korea, during the three-month period, the Soviet side did not disclose any information to us, and the outside world did not see any signs of Soviet military operations. sign.We only knew that the Soviet Union declared war on Japan after the Soviet army entered the Northeast and fought against the Japanese army.However, our Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong not only seized this opportunity tightly, but also used it very skillfully.During this period, Mao Zedong was very energetic and worked tirelessly day and night.Party, government, and military cadres at all levels also showed extremely high fighting spirit.A large number of cadres set out from Yan'an and other base areas, using all means of transportation and various methods, and basically rushed to the front line and various areas in Northeast China on two legs, not only to catch up with the surrender of the Japanese invaders, but also to catch up with the Kuomintang planes. , ahead of the vehicles and boats, we are indeed ahead of them. Since the Soviet Union recognized the Chinese Nationalist Government (that is, the Kuomintang government) as the only legal government, signed agreements and treaties with it, and assumed obligations at international conferences, it tried its best to avoid any formal relations with the Chinese Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army. After the surrender of Japan, this attitude was also maintained.They also put pressure on our party according to their agreement with the United States and Britain, "persuading" us to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek to "maintain domestic peace" and "jointly build the country."Before the Kuomintang-Communist peace talks, although the Soviet side vowed to guarantee Mao Zedong’s safety during the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations, none of the Soviet personnel showed up during the entire negotiation process, leaving or returning to Yan’an, and the intelligence team personnel in Yan’an did not make any announcements. Opinion, no attitude expressed. As soon as Japan surrendered, Sun Ping and others were eager to return home, but Moscow asked him to persist until the end of October, probably to observe the development of the Chongqing negotiations.But as far as I know, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong did not discuss this issue with them.This may be because the Soviet embassy in Chongqing knew about it early and in detail. Sun Ping had to return to Moscow before the October Revolution. On October 25th (or 26th) we bid farewell to Mao Zedong. The main idea of ​​the conversation was: the headquarters called to ask us to finish our work in Yan'an, and a plane will be sent to pick us up soon. We bid farewell to you and thank you for your kind words to the Chinese comrades. Our caring care and work help!We have nothing to keep as souvenirs, only our 4 spare automatic rifles. We would like to present all of them to Chairman Mao. Please send someone to pick them up.Not much language, dry.When they left the next day, three female staff took them to the airport. On the eve of Hu Zongnan's attack on Yan'an, in late December 1946, one afternoon, Mao Zedong asked me: "Where are the telegrams and passwords from the 'distance' kept? How are they managed?" I replied: "All are kept in my hands. here." He ordered me to destroy them all.I asked: "Can I clean it up, pick out a few of the most important documents, keep them properly, and carry them with me when I am marching?" Mao Zedong Lilang replied: "No! What if you are injured or killed? You quickly Go and clear out all those documents!" I followed the order and went back to the office, just as I cleared out the large bag of documents, Mao Zedong followed me to the door of my office and asked me if I had cleaned it thoroughly?When he was sure that all the documents were in front of him, he looked through them roughly and asked me to burn them immediately.I burned it in the stove at the door, and he waited by the side until all the documents were reduced to ashes before leaving.On the one hand, I feel sorry for the destruction of these historical materials, and on the other hand, I admire Mao Zedong's rigorous, thorough, and foolproof work spirit.Since then, until 1948, no written materials in this regard have been preserved.Moreover, as far as I know, such telegrams have never been conveyed in the original text at the Central Secretariat or the Politburo meeting. Mao Zedong only selected the necessary content to integrate into his speech. In June and July 1947, when the central government moved to northern Shaanxi and held a meeting here, the KMT’s propaganda machine and Western news agencies shouted in unison: The CCP’s headquarters in northern Shaanxi has been completely destroyed by the KMT army; They were defeated and suffered heavy casualties; He Long, Jiang Qing and others were captured and sent to Xi'an;Moscow actually believed these news, and immediately sent a telegram to our Party Central Committee to suggest that if the situation is critical and it is difficult to support them, they plan to send a plane to pick up several leading comrades of the Central Committee to leave China temporarily to avoid the edge.At this time, I was at the location of the Northwest Bureau of Matigou in Zichang County. I received a telegram from the Central Committee asking me to rush to the Central Logistics Agency in Linju, Shanxi Province immediately.On the first day after I received the order, I drove 140 miles to the bank of the Yellow River, and arrived at Sanjiao Town, Linxian County the next day.At this time, Dr. Mi had returned from Xiaohe to Sanjiao, and told about everything he had seen with his own eyes. Everyone laughed at the enemy for deceiving himself and talking in sleep.Alov also reported the real situation to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the false alarm was over. In October, after the battle of Shajiadian was over, the central government moved to Shenjiabao in Jia County.At this time, Mao Zedong asked me to accompany Alov to come here. The content of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Alov was mainly to summarize the paragraph from the withdrawal from Yan'an to the end of the Shajiadian Battle.He analyzed and evaluated the significance of the Shajiadian Battle, how the war situation would develop in the future, and changes in the domestic situation, and even talked about many details.We talked twice. In December, the central government moved to Yangjiagou, Mizhi County, and held a central meeting here.就在会议期间，毛泽东给苏共中央发了一份电报，其内容与他这次会上所作的报告——《目前形势和我们的任务》一致，说明解放战争已发生了根本的转折，进入了反攻阶段。 1948年，毛泽东原拟秘密访苏，后接受斯大林的意见，放弃了这一打算。后来到了西柏坡，在9、10月间的一天午饭后，毛泽东把阿洛夫邀到他的住处，坐在院中一棵大树下，向他介绍中国各主要战场的情况，以及今后发展趋势。毛泽东兴致勃勃他讲着，当他讲到我们取得伟大胜利的同时，还会有某些难以预料的失误时，阿洛夫想安慰毛泽东，急急忙忙插了话，说：“我们有一句谚语：砍伐树木时，难免有木屑飞溅”。意思是说胜利中也难免会有损失。这样两句话，不知为什么竟堵塞了毛泽东的言路，没有再谈下去。中苏两国接触，有许多民族性格和思维逻辑的不同而互相不能理解，以致发生不愉快。但就这件事来说，我作为一个中国人，也不能理解为什么这样两句话竟会扫了毛泽东的兴，他再也没有了兴致，由高谈阔论突然变成了冷场，无趣无味地结束了。 1949年3月，中央机关刚进北平时，住在香山。很快，柯瓦廖夫等人也从东北来到了北平。又过几天，他把当时留驻北平的苏联领事齐赫文带到香山来拜会毛泽东。那天傍晚，毛泽东在双清别墅接见了他们。坐定后，齐赫文先是祝贺中共、解放军取得的胜利，然后要求毛泽东给他们介绍一下我军各战场上的一般情况，诸如我军的战略部署、进军计划、以及对战局展望，如许可，还想知道我党的各项基本方针和政策，以及对敌人的分析，即敌人还能支持多久等。毛泽东只是笼统他说明了一般形势，但明确指出胜利肯定属于我们。他说：“你们很快就会看见，淮海战役胜利结束后，接着将是渡江南下，解放江南。只要不出现其它意外变化，或出现什么意料不到的复杂形势，胜利是有把握的。不过至今为止，尚看不出会发生什么特殊的意外。例如：我们不允许美军在秦皇岛登陆，也不许他们舰队靠岸，结果他们溜走了；在天津郊区，美军出城试探了一下，与我们的武装力量发生了一点冲突，打了它几下，他们就缩回城里去了；在青岛市郊外，美军也出来了几个，但一受冲击，就龟缩到城里去了，而且很快把他们的兵舰撤离了青岛。至于其它港口，如烟台、威海等地，就没有遇见美舰。所以，到现在为止，还未出现美军想同我们交锋的意图，也未看出他们想阻挡我们前进的征候。我们是比较有把握地进行着斗争，推行着我们的政策。胜利终归是属于我们的！” 柯瓦廖夫在香山期间，毛泽东批转的一些电报和文件都译给他看，但他不感兴趣。他同毛、刘、周、朱、任都见过面，谈过话，而毛、刘同他谈话较多，主要是启发他的思想，使他能对中国革命的性质、任务、特点、意义以及重大政策等，能有所了解和比较正确的认识。让他知道中国革命不同于“十月革命”，但中国不会停留在目前阶段，而是要继续向前发展的。例如：在刘少奇访问苏联前夕，即7月1日下午（这时，毛泽东已经住在中南海），毛泽东特约柯瓦廖夫来会见，同他谈了较长一段时间的话。主要内容是：1.关于解放战争当前发展变化的大概形势；2.中国革命现阶段的基本特点和主要任务；3.解放战争一定要进行到胜利的结局，但发展道路是曲折的、迂回的，历来就没笔直的道路。革命会分阶段进行，但是一定要进行到底。这是一条较长、较远的路程：由人民民主阶段的各项革新，过渡到社会主义建设阶段，但都是要有条件的，这条件就是人力和物力，二者缺一不可。我们目前要准备和要争取的，就是这两条。毛泽东这些话说给了柯瓦廖夫，实在没引起什么反应。此人正像1950年1月斯大林对毛泽东介绍的那样：柯瓦廖夫是一个铁路上的工程技术人员，不懂政治，没有政治经验，或者说，在政治上他完全是个门外汉。他如果钻进政治里，就会像老鼠钻进了风箱。 毛泽东和柯瓦廖夫谈到最后，还表示了对他的关心，他说：这回你陪代表团走远路，会辛苦的，不过你顺便同家人团聚一次，也是个好机会，又间到他个人还有什么要求，需要我们帮他解决什么问题？他没有提出什么。可是后来发现，他不知通过什么渠道，弄到一罐子水银，足有三四十公斤，带回苏联去了。 柯瓦廖夫拜会毛泽东之后，同我一起从中南海乘车出来，准备先回香山，再按计划当晚出发去东北，与刘少奇为首的访苏代表团会合。车子刚出中南海的西门，柯瓦廖夫就说：“七一(俄罗斯人的旧俗认为凡属1号的日子，是不吉利的——笔者注）本不应该出远门，因为不吉祥。”话音刚落，就在西四拐弯处撞倒了一个骑自行车的青年，压坏了他的腰、腿和自行车。于是处理事故，耽误了几个小时，不得不把行期推到7月2日。 1949年10月1日的开国大典，苏联派来了一个庞大的代表团，以法捷耶夫、西蒙诺夫、杜布罗维娜等为首的工青妇群众团体成员被邀请会见毛泽东主席。在这次会见中，除了一般的礼节和祝愿外，毛泽东发表了非常精彩的长篇讲话。他那生动活泼、有声有色的演讲，扣紧了听众的心弦，许多人流下了激动的热泪。他讲的主要内容概述如下： 中国劳苦大众、中国的革命在近百年来所走过的艰苦道路，所进行的轰轰烈烈、前仆后继、顽强不屈和坚持到底的革命斗争，走过了一条坎坷不平、曲曲折折的道路。革命的先驱者，抛头颅、洒热血，终于找到了有力的战斗武器——马列主义。吸取了十月革命的经验，推翻了压在自己头上的三座大山：帝国主义、封建主义、官僚资本主义。中国人民在解放斗争中所遇到的，有外来侵略者帝国主义屠杀中国人的事件，也有中国统治者杀害自己同胞的事件。20世纪以来爆发的革命事件很多，几乎是一波未平，一波又起。但最重要的、震撼世界的大事件，除了1917年苏联的十月革命，就是1949年中国革命的胜利了。解放了5亿中国人民和起先锋队作用的2亿苏联人互相结合，使世界力量的对比发生了很大变化。中国取得今天的胜利不容易的。辛亥革命推翻了清王朝的压迫，却未获得民族解放，未能摆脱外国帝国主义的侵略、奴役和压迫；而国内的封建势力、官僚豪绅、地主恶霸、买办阶层，仍然爬在人民头上为所欲为，作威作福。1925—1927年的大革命，取得了很大胜利，但是买办资产阶级和土豪劣绅不喜欢，他们同帝国主义勾结起来，把革命人民一巴掌打倒在地，把人民浸泡在血泊中，千千万万的人牺牲了，留在人间的同志从地上爬起来，除去自己身上的泥土和血污，擦干脸上的血和泪，掩埋好牺牲了的同志和亲人，又重整旗鼓，建立自己的立足之地，这就是上山，建立根据地。前后历时10年的浴血奋战，走了二万五千里，爬雪山，过草地，冲出重重围困，进行了无数次的战斗，终于找到了立足之地。紧接着就是八年抗日战争。须知，这是在毫无外援，完全靠自力更生坚持下来的。外国侵略者被打倒了，但人民还未得到喘息，甚至还未来得及伸伸腰，蒋介石国民党又在美帝国主义的怂勇和支持下，打响了内战，企图一举消灭人民革命力量，独霸中国。可是这一回，人民已经有了以往数十年中多次的经验教训，决心依靠自己的力量解放自己，不再受人的欺骗、愚弄和出卖。我们依靠自力更生，根据独立自主的原则，坚定不移地同敌人进行一次最后的较量，作一次你死我活的决战，把革命进行到底！这是中国共产党人的决心，也是全国劳动人民的意志！我们的决心兑现了，中国革命胜利了！但这仅仅是我国人民在长征路上迈出的第一步，我们前面的路程还很长，摆在我们面前的任务还是很多很多的。只要不骄做，努力前进，中国的发展进步将会是较快的。中国具有的优势之一，就是有一个好近邻，所以中国不是孤立无援的…… 客人们凝神屏息，全神贯注。他们被深深地打动了，许多人热泪盈眶，这是一个罕见的场面。 毛泽东最后建议他们同我国的劳动群众作些接触，作家们可以随军到前方去看看，了解我们的军队生活、战斗能力、战地实况、军民关系等等。随军甫下，还可以看到旧时劳苦大众的生活状况，也可观察到部分作战过程，但是特大规模的战役不会有了。作家西蒙诺夫回国后完成了一部不甚成功的作品《战斗着的中国》。 毛泽东第一次访问苏联的情况，我在《陪同毛主席访苏》一文中写到的情节，不再重述，这里仅作一些补充： 1950年1月12日，美国国务卿艾奇逊在国会新闻俱乐部发表了长篇讲话，其内容是挑拨苏中、苏蒙关系的。当时苏方提出有关各国都发表一项官方声明，予以驳斥，给他点颜色看看，有关国家都同意了，但并未明确什么叫“官方的”。结果，苏联和蒙古都以外交部部长的名义发了声明，中国则只是以新闻署长的名义发表了声明，内容都是驳斥艾奇逊的。苏方对此十分注意，可能还是疑虑重重，1月中下旬的一天；他们郑重其亨地派人来说：斯大林邀请毛泽东、周恩来到克里姆林宫会面，无须再邀别人，而主人方面也只有斯大林和莫洛托夫二人参加，翻译也只要师哲一人去。我们到了斯大林的会客室，确实只有斯大林和莫洛托夫在等候。 先是斯大林说：今天请你们来，只想在这个范围内谈一个问题，莫洛托夫有些话要说。 接着他又问：“关于驳斥艾奇逊的造谣，中国政府发了声明否？” 回答：是用胡乔木的名义发表的。 斯大林又问：“胡是什么人？” 回答：他是新闻总署署长，也是用这个身份发表声明的。 斯大林说：“按西文的习惯，任何新闻记者都可以对任何问题发表自己的意见或评论，但他们并不代表官方的立场和观点，他们怎么说都可以，也不必对自己的话负责，所以他们的话是一文不值的。” 莫洛托夫说：“上次我们谈定，关于艾奇逊的谈话，我们应该分别各自发表一项正式声明，驳艾奇逊的胡说八道。本来我们谈定用官方名义发表的，而你们却用新闻总署名义讲话，新闻总署并不是权威，它代表不了政府，而且新闻记者的谈话也决代替不了官方的观点和意见。” 斯大林接着说：“这么一来，我们的步调就乱了，各行其是，会减弱我们的力量，我认为我们都应该信守诺言，紧密配合，步调一致，这样才会更有力量。来日方长，今后互相协作，相互配合的机会和场合会很多的。把这次作为前车之鉴吧，吸取经验教训，加强今后的合作，是我们应该做到的事情。这次事情虽然不是什么大不了的，但没有按原定方针做，乱了步伐，削弱了战斗力，给敌人留了可钻的空子。只有信守诺言，步调一致，才能显示出斗争力量。” 毛泽东始终未发一言。周恩来讲了几句，主要是解释，由于这样一种气氛，他显得十分矜持。会见时间很短。 斯大林也许是为了缓和气氛，临时安排前往他的别墅，说他组织了一个夜宴，请大家欢聚快乐一番，斯大林特地把毛泽东和周恩来请到他的车子上，井让他们坐在后排的主位上，他和我坐加座上。一路上，大家都沉默不语，空气异常沉闷。我为了打破这种僵局，先同斯大林谈了几句闲语，然后问他：“你不是答应过要到我们代表团的住处去作客吗？”斯大林立即说：“我是说过的，而现在也没有放弃这个愿望……”他的话还还未讲完，毛泽东问我：“你同他说什么？不要请他到我们那里去作客！”我立即承认我谈的正是这个。毛泽东又说：“把话收回来，不请他了！”斯大林似乎也猜到了我们谈的是什么，于是问我：“他说什么？”我回答，“是我们之间的话。”气氛又重新变得像铅一样沉重，大家一言不发，一直沉闷了30分钟。 车子接近别野时，斯大林打亮了信号灯，大门随之洞开。进入会客厅，还是我们4个人。莫洛托夫落得很远。 半小时以后，莫洛托夫、马林科夫、布尔加宁、贝利亚、卡冈诺维奇、维辛斯基和罗申等人都来参加宴会。人虽不少，主人也不断地敬酒、劝吃，讲了许多趣事、笑话。然而，客人却高兴不起来，无论怎样努力，气氛仍然异常冷落。斯大林为了作些改善，在饮宴间，他拿出他收藏的艺术品请大家欣赏，并亲自作说明，还指着墙上挂的湘绣“鹰”，说是盛世才赠他的礼品，并问那上面绣的字（“飞得最高，看得最远”）是什么意思？给他解释之后，他非常高兴，客人却没有共鸣。他又去开留声机，继而请大家跳舞。即使这样，也没有改变沉闷的空气。开始时，主人起舞，客人旁观。后来，几个人死拉硬拽，把周恩来和我拖下舞池。但他们轮番去拉毛泽东，却没有成功。于是，斯大林听音乐，毛泽东在一旁观看，一言不发，这样一来，更加衬托出了不和谐、不愉快和格格不入的场面。只有周恩来灵活自如，他也吃也喝，也谈也笑，也歌也舞，同时一举一动又都紧跟毛泽东，不失自己的尊严。 半夜三更，我们回到自己的住处，无论在路途中，还是回去以后，谁也没有再提起今天的事。 不管遇到什么样的不愉快，斯大林和毛泽东缔造了中苏友谊，这是不可辨驳的事实。到了赫鲁晓夫时期，情形就大不相同了。