Chapter 7 Chapter 7 The Key Vote at the Zunyi Meeting: Wang Jiaxiang on the Long March

Before the start of the Long March, Wang Jiaxiang did not get the notice he had been looking forward to day and night until the army was about to leave. The Military Commission sent him several stretchers and medical staff who took care of him. They also sent horses, and planned to use horses and stretchers alternately. March with him.It was later learned that when Bogu and others studied the arrangements for the transfer of personnel, they had wanted to leave Wang Jiaxiang as a seriously wounded person in a common people's home to recover from his injuries, and leave Mao Zedong as a person in poor health and get rid of them.Many comrades fought for them, saying that Mao Zedong was the chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic and he must not stay.When Mao Zedong and others learned that Wang Jiaxiang would also be retained, they immediately argued for him, saying that Wang Jiaxiang was the vice chairman of the Military Commission and the director of the General Political Department.Bogu had no choice but to agree that they also moved with the army.Wang Jiaxiang, who learned about these situations, was not only thankful that he was finally able to participate in the Long March, but also deeply grateful for Mao Zedong and others who cared and helped him at the critical moment.

On October 11, 1934, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order to organize Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang into the central team of a column to carry out the Long March.The three of them are called the "three-person group of the central team" to distinguish them from the highest "three-person group" of Bogu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai. Wang Jiaxiang was moved and said to Mao Zedong: "We cannot leave the party organization and the army." Mao Zedong replied firmly: "Yes! The revolution still needs us loyal party members to strive for victory!"

It was getting dark, and the Red Army team stopped in a mountain village, and a password was passed in front: rest in place, and continue to advance on standby. A firewood hut without a door was empty and dark. The guards spread some hay inside and let Wang Jiaxiang and a few other comrades go in to lie down and rest. After a while, several more people came towards the hut, the leader was Mao Zedong, and the people behind him carried an empty stretcher.A little soldier who looked like a guard ran to the door of the firewood house and asked inside: "Comrade, is there room inside?"

Mao Zedong hurriedly stepped forward and grabbed him, and said softly: "Don't shout, it will affect people's rest, let's rest outside for a while!" When Wang Jiaxiang heard the voice, he quickly raised his head and asked, "Is this Comrade Mao Zedong? Please come in." Mao Zedong said happily: "Oh, it's Comrade Jiaxiang!" Wang Jiaxiang said: "Please come in and rest, there is still room, it's too cold outside!" "Okay, thank you very much! Let's stay in this 'Guangsha' room with you and be an outdoor 'poor man'!" Mao Zedong said jokingly as he stepped through the door, and Wang Jiaxiang had already made room for him.Mao Zedong sat down beside Jiaxiang and asked with concern:

"How is your body? Is the wound inflamed?" Wang Jiaxiang also asked him, "What about you? How is your illness? Take care!" Mao Zedong said: "It's still good, but you should be more careful with your injuries!" As he spoke, he took out two cigarettes from his pocket and handed one to Wang Jiaxiang. Wang Jiaxiang raised his hand to block it, and said, "Thank you, we can't smoke now. We are in the firewood hut, and we will become suspects if there is a fire!" It turned out that just a few days ago, in order to provoke the relationship between the Red Army and the people along the way, the enemy sent people to pretend to be members of the Red Army and set fire to houses. Later, the Red Army caught several arsonists and executed them in public.

When Mao Zedong heard this, he quickly said, "That's right, 'You don't put clogs in the melon fields, and you don't wear the crowns in the plums'. Smoking is also not allowed in this thatched house. You and I can only overcome it!" He squeezed the cigarette and brought it up to his nose to smell the smoke.After a while, Mao Zedong seemed to casually say to Wang Jiaxiang: "Smoking addiction is better, and illness can survive, but the heart disease of defeat is difficult to cure!" Hearing this, Wang Jiaxiang was focusing on a major issue that had been on his mind for a long time, so he simply sat up and asked, "Comrade Chairman Mao, I just want to ask you, what do you think of the current situation?"

Mao Zedong paused for a while, but asked him back: "What about you? What do you think?" "Me?" Wang Jiaxiang said slowly: "In a word, if Li De and the others continue to direct like this, it will be terrible!" Mao Zedong went on to say: "So in your opinion, how to get rid of the predicament we are facing?" Wang Jiaxiang said: "I'm thinking about it. It's not okay to lose like this, so I want to ask you for advice." After thinking about it for a while, Mao Zedong approached him and smiled: "Then let me talk about my own views first, and then I will listen to your opinions." As he spoke, he talked about the current direction of action and transfer route of the Red Army, and talked about the fifth time. The failure of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign and the victories of the previous anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns pointed out the differences between the two military ideologies and command principles, as well as the root cause of the failure of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign.

The two were talking with great interest, but the bugle sounded to continue marching outside. Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang's guards came in together and said: "Let's go, Chairman Mao!" "Director Wang, let's go!" Wang Jiaxiang hurriedly got up and went out with Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong patted the grass clippings on his body and said to Wang Jiaxiang: "Let's talk while we walk!" So, the two talked all the way, one left and one right when the road was wide, and one front and one back when the road was narrow. When they walked on the main road, they would go forward and lie down on two stretchers side by side to talk.They talked on the march, they talked at rest, and they talked together when they were camping. One listened carefully, and the other spoke freely.

At this time, Mao Zedong, although he was the chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet, had only one name; although he was still a member of the Politburo, he was not allowed to intervene in major military affairs, had no right to speak in the central government, and had no right to implement correct ideas. Before entering Tongdao County on the western border of Hunan, Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang had a more in-depth discussion on how to get out of the current predicament. Mao Zedong said to Wang Jiaxiang: "Chiang Kai-shek has already arranged a big bag to lure us into it, but our commander-in-chief just couldn't see the danger, or if he saw it, he couldn't change it. He had to get into it, you said. Is he stupid?"

Wang Jiaxiang said seriously: "Of course you can't be such a fool if you foresee the danger, and you can't sneak into the enemy's pocket!" Mao Zedong said: "Yes, the road is open to the sky, and each side should go to the other side. The enemy has set up pocket formations in western Hunan, and we will open a new road to Guizhou." We learned from the intelligence that there are not many enemy troops in the direction of Guizhou, let alone fortifications and fortification systems, so we can take advantage of the situation and change our route, instead of going to Xiangxi, turn to Guizhou, and let Chiang Kai-shek's hard work go to nothing."

Wang Jiaxiang nodded and said: "I also know this information. Really, Comrade Bogu would never lead troops; although Li De has rich military knowledge, he turned a blind eye to the current situation and commanded blindly since he entered the Soviet area!" Mao Zedong said thoughtfully: "This is the problem. Where did Li De's military knowledge come from? It came from books, it came from Western countries, it came from general wars and even imperialist wars. Our war is In China, the anti-"encirclement and suppression" war was carried out in the revolutionary base areas when the enemy was strong and we were weak. The environment was different, the conditions were different, and the nature of the war was even more different. How can there be no reason for invincibility if the tactics of battles from a hundred years ago are imitated?" Wang Jiaxiang agreed: "The civil war in the Soviet Union is very different from our country, and the First World War and the Napoleonic War are even more different from ours. It is wrong to use machinery." Mao Zedong went on to say: "Sun Tzu, a military strategist in ancient my country, said: 'Know yourself and know your enemy, and you will never be imperiled in a hundred battles'. Our foreign adviser knows neither the enemy nor ourselves." Wang Jiaxiang said: "I completely agree with you." Mao Zedong said mockingly: "Unfortunately, I am now in a position where I have no right to speak." Wang Jiaxiang said: "Not necessarily, I think many comrades will agree with your opinion." "Who do you think will agree with me?" "I think there must be comrades in the Politburo who agree with you." "Have you talked to them lately?" Wang Jiaxiang nodded. "Okay, we can find some comrades to exchange ideas." "I'll make sure to pass on your opinion to them." After Wang Jiaxiang had this conversation with Mao Zedong, he first approached Zhang Wentian and discussed Mao Zedong's and his own views in detail, hoping that Zhang Wentian would agree to hold a meeting to sum up the experience and lessons of failure.Zhang Wentian listened and clearly agreed.He also went to Wang Jiaxiang and Mao Zedong to continue talking during the march and rest time.In fact, Zhang Wentian had long been extremely dissatisfied with Li De and Bogu's military command in the Guangchang Battle, such as the division of troops and desperation.Mao Zedong compared the failure process of the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" with the experience of the previous victories in the campaign against "encirclement and suppression", and carefully analyzed the mistakes of Li De and Bogu in adopting a purely defensive line of military leadership and negating the form of mobile warfare .They talked all the way, exchanged ideas with each other, and gradually unified their thoughts and opinions.Everyone realizes that the reason for the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was mainly subjective, and was due to strategic and tactical mistakes in military leadership.The current passive situation must be reversed.After discussion, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang gradually formed a relatively consistent view, believing that the direction and route of the Red Army must be changed, and Bogu and Li De should not be allowed to continue to command like this. At the same time, Mao Zedong also had talks with Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, etc., and got their support. At this time, Nie Rongzhen, the political commissar of the 1st Army Corps, was injured and festered on the sole of his foot, and he also moved with the central column on a stretcher.When he fought against "encirclement and suppression" in the Central Soviet Area, he served as the deputy director of the General Political Department. He and Wang Jiaxiang, the director of the General Political Department, were very close colleagues and comrades-in-arms, and they trusted and understood each other very well.After they met on a stretcher on the marching road, they talked several times.Wang Jiaxiang pointed out bluntly that the great victories achieved in the second and third counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" were all due to the use of Mao Zedong's method of luring the enemy deep, concealing troops, attacking suddenly, attacking weak enemies first, then attacking strong enemies, and defeating them one by one. A series of strategic and tactical guiding principles.Facts have proved that people like Bogu and Li De are not good enough, and the leadership should be reorganized and their military command should be removed.He suggested that Mao Zedong should come out as the leader to restore the current crisis situation of the Red Army. After hearing this, Nie Rongzhen said readily: "I completely agree, and I have had this idea for a long time. It is only through the party's high-level meeting that this problem can be resolved." Wang Jiaxiang also said: "Then hurry up and hold a special meeting by the central government to sum up the experience and lessons, change the wrong leadership, and 'bomb' the incompetent people!" As soon as the Red Army entered Tongdao County, Mao Zedong proposed to the Central Committee that in view of the fact that the Kuomintang had assembled nearly 200,000 troops and set up four defense lines to prevent the main force of the Red Army from going northward from the Hunan-Guizhou border, it was suggested that the plan to join forces with the 2nd and 6th Army be abandoned. The troops immediately turned to Guizhou, where the enemy's strength was weak. On December 12, 1934, the head of the central government held a temporary emergency meeting in Tongdao County to discuss Mao Zedong's proposal. The meeting place was Gongcheng Academy on a hill in the east of Tongdao County.This is a very neat house, surrounded by a wall made of green bricks, and a piece of ancient vines is attached to the wall.The General Command of the Military Commission is located here. Zhou Enlai announced the opening of the meeting and asked everyone to talk about their opinions on future Red Army actions and how to get rid of the enemy's pursuit. Li De first said, I would like to invite everyone to consider whether it is possible to let those Zhou and other enemy forces who are chasing us on a parallel route or rushing to a strategic point to the southwest overtake us, and we ourselves will turn to the north behind them and fight with the 2nd Army Corps. build connection.Relying on the base of the 2nd Army, together with the troops of He Long and Xiao Ke, we can attack the enemy in a wide area and create a large Soviet area in the triangle bordering the three provinces of Hunan, Guizhou and Sichuan. Bogu couldn't think of any other good way, and felt that he could only follow Li De's opinion and join up with the 2nd and 6th legions. In Mao Zedong's speech, he believed that the Red Army's northward march was undoubtedly a self-inflicted trap.The enemy in Guizhou is weak. If we march there, we can gain the initiative and allow the troops to rest.Then, he introduced the enemy situation he had collected to everyone in detail, and at the same time clarified his views. Wang Jiaxiang stood up and said, I agree with Mao Zedong's analysis, only by doing so can we make the best use of the situation. Zhang Wentian said in his speech that what Mao Zedong said just now is the truth, and it is the conclusion reached after full investigation and research. I hope everyone will seriously consider it. Zhu De also felt that Mao Zedong's analysis was reasonable and advocated proceeding with caution. Zhou Enlai believed that Mao Zedong's analysis was more realistic, and he agreed with Mao Zedong's opinion. After hearing the above opinions, Li De was very annoyed.He believes that "Mao Zedong rudely" rejected his proposal, and put forward the idea that the Red Army "continue to march westward and enter the hinterland of Guizhou".Furthermore, when he saw that Mao Zedong's opinions were not only supported by Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang, but also endorsed by Zhou Enlai, he couldn't help feeling a little annoyed and got up and left in a huff. The meeting was not interrupted by Li De's departure, the discussion continued, and everyone focused on Bogu.After listening to everyone's analysis, Bo Gu felt that it made sense.Now that Chiang Kai-shek has set up a trap in front, it is impossible to squeeze in like Li De.After thinking about it, he said, it seems that the only way to do it is to follow Comrade Mao Zedong's proposal and give up the plan to go to Xiangxi.However, he has not completely given up on his idea of ​​going north to join forces with the 2nd and 6th Red Army. On the 13th, the Red Army marched west and entered Guizhou. Liping was captured on the 17th.Here, the Red Army rested for the first time since the Long March in more than two months, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also had time to further discuss and study the next strategic direction. On the 18th, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in Liping City to continue the debate on the two different strategic approaches. Bogu believes that after the Red Army entered Guizhou, it had already evaded the pursuit of the Kuomintang army.At present, it is completely possible to go to Guizhou along the old road, then turn east to Xiangxi, and then go all the way north, where it is possible to meet the smallest resistance and realize the original plan to join forces with the 2nd and 6th Red Army. Li De did not attend the meeting due to illness, but the trustee brought his opinion of insisting on joining the 2nd and 6th Red Army to the meeting. In Mao Zedong's speech, he still advocated that the Red Army should continue to march to the northwest of Guizhou, and strive to establish new bases in areas where the enemy's strength in Sichuan and Guizhou was weak, and he made a detailed analysis of this. Both Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian supported Mao Zedong's proposition. After a heated debate at the meeting, the vast majority of comrades believed that it was correct for Mao Zedong to abandon the policy of going north, and denied the erroneous claims of Bo Gu and Li De. At the end of the meeting, the "Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on Strategic Guidelines" was made.The decision clearly stated: "In view of the current situation, the Politburo believes that the past decision to establish a new Soviet base area in western Hunan is currently impossible and inappropriate." "The Politburo believes that the new base areas should be The Sichuan-Guizhou border area should be centered on Zunyi at first, but under unfavorable conditions, it should be transferred to the northwest area of ​​Zunyi." After Li De learned of the decision made at the meeting, he was furious, but there was nothing he could do.His "overlord" status was fundamentally shaken. Li Weihan later fully affirmed the important role played by the Liping Conference decision in his book "Memories and Research". Fight mobile warfare and take the initiative to destroy the enemy. In particular, the red 1st and 3rd corps can be 'liberated', so that they can flexibly destroy the enemy's vital forces." After the Liping Conference, the Red Army swept across Jianhe, Zhenyuan, Shibing, Yuqing, Taigong, Huangping, and Weng'an. On December 31, the central column entered Houchang Town, Weng'an County.Taking into account that everyone still has different opinions on future strategic actions, Bogu held a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in the Song Family Courtyard in Houchang on New Year's Day in 1935.At the meeting, Mao Zedong reiterated that the Red Army should first establish a new base in the Sichuan-Guizhou border area with the Zunyi area as the center.Most of the comrades agreed with his proposition, and believed that the Red Army should immediately cross the Wujiang River and capture Zunyi.For this reason, the meeting made the "Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the New Action Policy after Crossing the River", which stipulated: "With regard to the operational policy, as well as the choice of the time and place of the combat, the Military Commission must report at the Politburo meeting." In fact, Li De's arbitrary military command in the past was cancelled. However, there are still debates at this time, and some comrades are not yet clear.In order to remove obstacles to unified action, Wang Jiaxiang suggested to Mao Zedong to convene an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to solve the problems of Li De and Bo Gu.Mao Zedong thought it was a good idea and suggested that Wang Jiaxiang communicate with Zhang Wentian first.After Wang Jiaxiang talked with Zhang Wentian, Zhang Wentian also agreed with Wang Jiaxiang's opinion on removing Li De and Bogu from their military leadership positions.He also said that Comrade Mao Zedong has a way of fighting, which is better than ours. If we can't lead, we still need Comrade Mao Zedong to come out. Then, Wang Jiaxiang asked other comrades in charge to exchange views one by one, and gained their support.Nie Rongzhen sat on a stretcher due to a foot injury, and listened to and agreed with Wang Jiaxiang's opinions during the march.Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and other comrades have always respected Mao Zedong. When the temporary central government cracked down on Mao Zedong, they did not change their attitude towards Mao Zedong. This time they did not hesitate to support Wang Jiaxiang's suggestion. The Central Red Army marched westward, crossed the Wujiang River on January 6, 1935, and then occupied Zunyi, a famous city in northern Guizhou, on the 7th, defeating the Kuomintang army's plan to encircle and wipe out our army in western Hunan. From January 15 to 17, 1935, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which reversed the fate of the Party, the Red Army and even the Chinese revolution, was held in the mansion of a small warlord, Bai Huizhang, in the old city of Zunyi.The venue was located upstairs in an aisle-style room that was not too big. It used to be a place where warlords discussed matters with people at home. There was a large long table in the middle surrounded by some chairs. There are many, and I found some rattan chairs, square stools and benches temporarily.Because Wang Jiaxiang attended the meeting with injuries and illnesses, a rattan recliner was prepared for him so that he could lie down and listen when he was too tired.One side of the meeting place is a window with colorful stained glass, and the other side is a partition wall against a glass cabinet. In the middle of the empty wall on the front, a small portrait of Marx was pasted temporarily.In addition to teapots, water bowls and several enamel tea mugs scattered on the big table, there is also a handful of home-made miscellaneous sugar distributed by local tyrants.It really has the seriousness of the highest political meeting of the Central Committee and the guerrilla style that the Red Army often has in peacetime and marching. Among the 20 or so people present at the meeting, apart from the members and alternate members of the Politburo who acted together with the Central Red Army, the other half happened to be what Mao Zedong called "vassals from all walks of life"—the main leaders of the Red Army headquarters and various corps.The head of the Red Army and the political commissar who rushed to the meeting on horseback were still covered in smoke and dirt.On the first day of the meeting, Bo Gu sat in the middle seat as usual when he entered the venue, while other comrades sat scattered around.Because this meeting was held against Li De's will and was directed at him, not only did the pre-meeting preparatory work rule out his participation, but he was only counted as a participant in the meeting, and he was standing next to the door. A chair was placed for him, so that he was in a position to observe and even be tried.The meeting was held at night, and a kerosene lamp was hung from the ceiling in the middle of the venue, which was the only source of illumination for the venue.Several iron braziers with shelves were also placed on the interior floor to increase the temperature of the venue and for attendees to smoke and throw cigarette butts over the fire. Zhou Enlai looked around with his eyes, and said softly to Bo Gu: "Everyone who can come has arrived. Comrades Luo Binghui and Cai Shufan of the 9th Army Corps are stationed too far away to come, and Comrade Li Zhuoran of the 5th Army Corps can't make it for a while, so let's hold a meeting first?" Bogu pushed his glasses, sat upright and said, "Okay, now the meeting begins. I will first make a summary of the anti-five 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns on behalf of the Central Committee, and Zhou Enlai will make a report on military aspects later." He brought a black He took out the prepared outline from his satchel and started a report entitled "Summary of the Five Encirclement and Suppression Against the Enemy".In his report, he said that we did not smash the fifth attack by Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang. As the main person in charge of the Party Central Committee, I am responsible.He believed that the main reason for the failure of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign was: the strength of imperialism and the Kuomintang. In terms of military strength, the Kuomintang arranged a 1 million army, of which 500,000 were dedicated to attacking the Central Soviet Area. In addition, it also sent foreign military advisers. The absolute advantage over the Red Army was formed; in the white areas, the party did not do a good job in the work of the people, the development of guerrilla warfare was not good, the work of disintegrating soldiers was very weak, and the cooperation between the various base areas was not good; the supply of materials in the base area was too poor, etc. .He made a relatively comprehensive analysis of the objective reasons for the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", and believed that these reasons directly affected the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", which was also the main factor for the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression".However, he said very little about the mistakes in military command during the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", and he did not seriously analyze subjective factors.Because in his view, faced with the severe situation of the objectively disparate forces between the enemy and ourselves, it is difficult for any outstanding military strategist to recover the situation of military defeat.He also repeatedly stated that the political strategic deployment since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee was correct, and continued to defend Wang Ming's "Left" opportunism mistakes. Then Zhou Enlai made a deputy report.In his report, he analyzed in detail the failures since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and the reasons for leaving the central revolutionary base area. He analyzed and pointed out in a more objective manner that the failure of this counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" indeed had problems in military command.He believed that we did not win this war because there were various reasons objectively, but we made mistakes militarily.Zhou Enlai made self-criticism for this and took responsibility. To sum it up, it can be said that Bogu's report emphasized the objective reasons for the failure of the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression", while Zhou Enlai's report focused on examining the subjective reasons for military mistakes. Mao Zedong was the first to speak, expressing his disagreement with Bogu's report.Zhang Wentian stood up and expressed his disapproval.He took out the outline that he had already prepared from his pocket. It was written after deliberation and research with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang, and it was basically Mao Zedong's leading thought.Zhang Wentian sharply pointed out in his speech that the erroneous military guiding ideology in the previous period was mainly manifested in the fortification of Chiang Kai-shek’s fortresses, and the wrong tactics of fortresses against fortresses; We cannot use the favorable opportunity of the 19th Route Army's uprising to attack Chiang Kai-shek and smash the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" strategy; Insist on the false claim of continuing to join forces with the 2nd and 6th legions, etc. In the afternoon meeting, Mao Zedong spoke first.He criticized Bogut's summary report at the beginning, pointing out that the report was not seeking truth from facts, but defending his own mistakes.He said that in my opinion, the "Three-member Regiment" made a mistake on the military line when it directed the Red Army to deal with the enemy's fifth offensive, to put it bluntly.This mistake can be summed up in three stages throughout the war: the first stage is adventurism in the offensive, the second stage is conservatism in the defensive, and the third stage is escapism in the retreat.Mao Zedong's arguments have been praised by many people.He then elaborated on his argument in depth. Mao Zedong's speech was not recorded at the time, and his speech "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War" at the Red Army University in Northern Shaanxi later reflected the basic views of his speech at that time.Mao Zedong believed that in order to achieve victory in China's revolutionary war, we must first understand what are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war.He pointed out that the characteristics of China's revolutionary war are: (1) China is a big semi-colonial country with unbalanced political and economic development, and it has gone through the revolution from 1924 to 1927; (2) the strength of the enemy; (3) the strength of the Red Army Weakness; (4) The leadership of the Communist Party and the Agrarian Revolution.Our strategy and tactics should be judged according to these characteristics, that is, "the possible development of the Chinese Red Army and its possible victory over its enemy" and "the impossibility of the Chinese Red Army's rapid development and its impossibility to defeat the enemy soon", which "provides the long-lasting and, if done wrong, can fail”. Mao Zedong's strategic retreat was "a planned strategic step taken in order to preserve military strength and wait for an opportunity to defeat the enemy because the enemy was strong and we were weak, considering that his attack could not be broken quickly."He criticized Bo Gu and Li De for advocating the so-called "defending the enemy from outside the country".He pointed out: "When two boxers are right, the smart boxer often retreats a step, while the stupid one is aggressive and uses all his skills at the beginning, but the result is often defeated by the one who retreats." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Vol. 1, No. 203 Page) Mao Zedong said that the principles of Bo Gu and Li De can be summed up as follows: "Take one as ten, ten as a hundred, be brave and courageous, and catch up with the victory", "Attack across the board", "Seize the central city", and "Beat people with two fists".When the enemy attacks, the way to deal with it is to "keep the enemy out of the country", "pre-emptive strikes", "do not smash the pots and pans", "do not lose an inch of land", and "separate forces on six routes"; it is "a decisive battle between the revolutionary road and the colonial road"; It is a short assault, a fortress war, a war of attrition, and a "protracted war";And whoever does not recognize these will be punished, given the title of opportunist, and so on. ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong" Volume 1, pages 205-206) Practice has proved that these principles are wrong. Mao Zedong also criticized Li De for only talking on paper and not considering the actual situation.You must know that soldiers have to walk, eat, and sleep.Regardless of the road the march is taking, whether it is a mountainous area, a plain, or a river course, just draw a line on the map and set a time limit to fight. Of course, this is not a good fight.Mao Zedong further pointed out that the leadership methods of Bogu and Li De were "extremely bad", "doing all the work of the military committee" and "using various methods of suppression", so "the decision-making and creativity of the lower-level commanders are the result of being ruled out." obliterated." (Zheng Guangjin and Fang Shike's "The Long March of the Chinese Red Army", p. 228) Mao Zedong spoke for about an hour.His speech was sincere, well-founded, full of philosophy, and very persuasive, which convinced many people in the meeting. After Mao Zedong finished speaking, Wang Jiaxiang, who was lying on the rattan chair, sat up and said: "I agree with Mao Zedong's speech. As he pointed out, the reason why the fifth anti-'encirclement and suppression' war failed was that we made serious mistakes in military strategy. There are some objective factors, but they are not the main ones.” He also said that an important reason for the failure of this counter-campaign against “encirclement and suppression” was that Li De and others repeatedly rejected the correct opinions of Mao Zedong and other comrades, and denied In view of the fact that they and the broad masses have jointly created and effective practical experience in the long-term struggle, a small number of people or even individual people have carried out blind commands that are divorced from reality.Having said that, he looked up at Li De, just as Li De was also looking up at him, and cast a very dissatisfied look at him. Wang Jiaxiang pointed out conclusively: Facts have proved that China's Red Army and China's revolutionary war should and must be led by experienced Chinese revolutionaries like Mao Zedong in order to win.Finally, he solemnly suggested: immediately reorganize the central military command organization, and cancel the military command of Comrades Li De and Bogu.After he finished speaking in one breath, he felt his chest stretched and relaxed.Immediately afterwards, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Li Fuchun and other comrades spoke at the meeting. Most of them criticized the wrong leadership of "Left" adventurism and clearly expressed their support for Mao Zedong's leadership. Only Bo Gu and Li De trembled after hearing this. The meeting continued, and Wang Jiaxiang immediately proposed to hand over the command of the army to Mao Zedong. Everyone agreed, some applauded, and some raised their hands.A serious political struggle has come to a successful conclusion. The final decisions made at the meeting were: to add Mao Zedong to the Standing Committee of the Central Committee; to designate Zhang Wentian to draft a resolution, entrust the Standing Committee to review it and send it to the branch for discussion; The military chiefs Zhu De and Zhou Enlai were the military commanders, and Zhou Enlai was entrusted by the party to be responsible for the final determination of the military command; Wang Jiaxiang was co-opted as a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.After the meeting, the Standing Committee of the Central Committee divided the work, with Mao Zedong as Zhou Enlai's helper in military command. According to the situation of several battles, Mao Zedong learned a lesson from it: in each battle, it is not possible to have many people discuss together as in the past, it is better to form a group of several people.At his suggestion, the central government decided in mid-March to set up a new three-person regiment composed of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang, with full authority to command the battle, with Zhou Enlai as the head of the regiment.From then on, these three men were in charge of the military command during the Long March, leading the Red Army to cross the snow-capped mountains, overcome natural dangers, overcome many difficulties, and bring the Chinese revolution to a new climax. Mao Zedong often said to people later: "Wang Jiaxiang was the first to support me. He could not do without him at the Zunyi meeting. He cast a key vote." I knew about this historic contribution of Wang Jiaxiang very late. I was told by someone else after 20 years of marriage. When I first asked Wang Jiaxiang about this matter, he only nodded without giving a detailed answer. Until the "Cultural Revolution", Mao Zedong once said in a speech: "Wang Jiayang voted for me at a critical moment, and I won." After I found out, I asked Wang Jiayang what was going on, and he told me the details.He said: "First of all, I am personally very dissatisfied with Li De and Bogu's military command. I questioned Li De, but it didn't work." One day, Chairman Mao and I each lay on a stretcher. Not good, lying side by side on a stretcher.After sighing, I said to Chairman Mao: "Zunyi City is just ahead, we should hold a meeting to sum up our experience. If we continue to drag on like this, we will lose every step of the way, and the revolution will lose too much." Chairman Mao hurriedly asked: "Can it be driven? It's just the two of us!" I said: "It must be held. I will do ideological work, and Li De must be brought down! In this way, the Zunyi Conference was successfully held." This is what Wang Jiaxiang told me under my questioning, and he also left these words in his notes. After the Zunyi Conference, the Red Army was faced with the problem of how to get rid of hundreds of thousands of enemy troops. The Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong thought.Northern Guizhou is located in two rivers, with limited room for maneuver, which poses great difficulties to the existence and development of our army.However, the internal contradictions of the Sichuan warlords were sharp, and the Red Fourth Front Army had established bases in Tong (Jiang), Nan (Jiang), and Ba (Central) in northern Sichuan.If the Central Red Army enters Sichuan, it can develop from east to south, redden the whole of Sichuan, and even go north from Shaanxi.Gan, then pointed to the Shanxi and Hebei in the east, and looked at the Central Plains, which was conducive to leading the national anti-Japanese national salvation movement and promoting the development of the national anti-Japanese climax.Therefore, it was decided that the Central Red Army would cross the Yangtze River to the north and join the Fourth Red Army to establish a revolutionary base in western Sichuan. On January 19, Mao Zedong personally led the Central Red Army to leave Zunyi and go north, preparing to cross the Yangtze River between Luzhou and Yibin.At the same time, he ordered the Red Fourth Front Army in northern Sichuan to cross the Jialing River westward, intimidating Chongqing, restraining the main force of the Sichuan Army, and cooperating with the Central Red Army to cross the river; ordered the Red 2nd and 6th Army Corps in Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Guizhou to approach the Yangtze River to actively act in support of the Central Red Army. However, Zhang Guotao was afraid that the Party Central Committee and the Red Army would cross the river into Sichuan, and Chiang Kai-shek's main force would follow him. He took advantage of the fact that the Jialing River was "wide and deep, and heavily defended" to resist the Central Committee's order and did not lead the Red Fourth Army southward to attract the Sichuan enemy. , Instead, the north attacked southern Shaanxi, causing the Sichuan enemy to relieve their worries, concentrated 36 regiments, blocked along the river, and tried their best to block the Central Red Army from entering Sichuan.Other enemy troops from all walks of life also swarmed in, forming a large encirclement circle on the Central Red Army, forcing the Central Red Army to abandon its original plan to cross the river and instead conduct mobile operations in the border areas of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Starting from the end of January, Mao Zedong commanded the battle of crossing Chishui four times, effectively annihilating the enemy, saving himself, and smashing Chiang Kai-shek's plan to encircle and wipe out the Red Army in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou.After crossing the Chishui River four times, he commanded the Red Army to cross the Wujiang River in the south, push into Guiyang, go straight to Yunnan, and cross the Jinsha River skillfully. Finally, he got rid of hundreds of thousands of enemy troops, gained the initiative in the war, and successfully realized the northward crossing of the Yangtze River. strategic plan. In June, the Central Red Army crossed the Tianxian Dadu River, passed through Tianquan, Lushan, and Baoxing, crossed Jiajin Mountain, occupied Dawei, Maogong and other places in northwest Sichuan, and successfully joined forces with the Fourth Red Army. During the Long March of the Central Red Army, the Red Fourth Front Army in the Sichuan-Shaanxi base area once won the victory in smashing the enemy's six-way siege, and the base area was restored and developed.However, when the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army was engaged in the Battle of Southern Shaanxi, various warlords in Sichuan took the opportunity to launch an attack on the Sichuan-Shanxi base.In the face of the enemy's large-scale attack, Zhang Guotao pessimistically believed that after the Central Red Army withdrew from the Jiangxi revolutionary base, Chiang Kai-shek's main force would soon press down on the Sichuan-Shanxi base, and the base would be difficult to cope with the enemy's new attack.Therefore, he arbitrarily abandoned the Sichuan-Shanxi Revolutionary Base and led the Fourth Red Army to retreat westward. 5月18日，张国焘在茂州成立了中共西北特区委员会，俨如中央一级组织，还成立了西北联邦政府，并以此名义发出了致全国、全世界、红军游击队等通电，还把陕北、陕南、川南等地红军游击队划归自己统率，妄图以此自树权威，与中央对抗。 6月，当一、四方面军在懋功会合以后，党中央和张国焘首先就在战略方针问题上发生了尖锐的斗争。 两个方面军会合时，全国的政治形势正处于民族危机加深、抗日民主运动新高涨的前夜。当时，日寇向华北步步进逼。5月29日，日寇借口所谓中国破坏“塘沽协定”，由东北调集大批部队入关，进一步威胁平、津。日寇扬言，中国如不答应其对华北统治权的要求，便要采取“自由行动”。 随着日寇侵略的加紧，国民党卖国投降活动更加露骨。7月6日，国民党与日寇签订了“何梅协定”，向日寇奉送了华北的政治、军事、经济控制权，并按照日寇要求，把驻在河北的于学忠等东北军撤出，调往西北“剿共”前线。 日寇的入侵华北和国民党的卖国活动，激起了全国人民极大的愤怒，促进了民族民主革命的高涨。 红一、四方面军会合之后，为了打开一个新局面，更加有力地促进全国抗日民主运动的新高潮，党中央和中央军委从当时敌我形势和选择创造根据地的优良条件出发，制定了开创川陕甘革命根据地的新的战略方针。 6月16日，党中央致电张国焘指出：“今后我一、四方面军总的方针应是占领陕甘川三省，建立三省苏维埃政权”。目前“宜在岷江以东，对于即将到来的敌人新的大举进攻，给以坚决的打击，向着岷、嘉两江之间发展”。 张国焘反对党中央向北发展的方针，于6月17日致电党中央说：“北川一带地形给养均不利大部队行动”，而“敌已有准备”，不宜过岷江东打。他提出了“集中主力”西进“青海、新疆”或南下川、康的退却方针。 党中央和毛泽东于18日和20日两次电示张国焘，指出他的向西或向南发展的方针是错误的。在18日的电报中指出：“目前形势须集中火力，首先突破平武以为向北转移枢纽”。并针对张国焘的错误，指出：“经阿坝与草原游牧区域入甘、青，将感绝大困难，甚至不可能。向雅（安）、名（山）、邛（崃）、大（邑）南出，即一时得手，亦少继进前途”。 由于问题重大，往来电报难以取得一致意见，中共中央在20日给张国焘的电报中，请他“立即赶来懋功，以便商决一切”。 6月26日，中央政治局在懋功县属的两河口召开了扩大会议，以统一战略方针，进一步讨论和决定红军的战略行动。参加会议的人员有毛泽东、朱德、周恩来、刘伯承、王稼祥、张闻天、博古、刘少奇、凯丰、邓小平、林彪、彭德怀、聂荣臻、张国焘、林伯渠、李富春等。 周恩来首先代表中央和军委作目前战略方针的报告。他从地域是否便于机动、群众条件和经济条件三个方面，阐明了红军应该去“川陕甘”，“我们如陷在懋、松、理，就没有前途”。他提出以运动战迅速北上攻打驻松潘的胡宗南部，创造川陕甘根据地。 张国焘接着发言，他勉强表示同意中央的北进方针，但同时又提出也可“向南”、“向成都打”的问题。 毛泽东在发言中，同意周恩来的报告，提出：（一）中国红军要用全力到新的地区发展根据地，在川陕甘建立新根据地，这是向前的方针。要对四方面军同志做解释，因为他们是要打成都的，而一、四方面军会合后有可能实现向北发展。 （二）战争性质不是决战防御，不是跑，而是进攻，因为根据地是依靠进攻发展起来的，我们应当过山战胜胡宗南，占取甘南，迅速向北发展。 （三）我军须高度机动，这就有个走路的问题，要选好向北发展的路线，先机夺人。 （四）集中兵力于主攻方面，如攻松潘，胡宗南如与我打野战，我有20个团以上，是够的。今天决定，明天即须行动。 (5) Instruct the Standing Committee and the Military Commission to resolve the issue of unified command. 王稼祥发言也赞成周恩来的报告和毛泽东的意见。他说，我们在川陕甘建立根据地有几个好条件：“首先是一、四方面军会合后力量大了，其次是帝国主义的干涉远，敌人又隔离，群众受压迫，易于接近我们，等等。”现在主要的问题是，坚决斗争，扩大苏维埃区域。我们到这个地区，主要是为了消灭敌人。对于战争怎么打法，他说：“敌人采取堡垒战对付我们，因此我们应有大的区域，便于机动，在运动战中去消灭敌人。如果我们采取堡垒战去对付敌人，是不能取得胜利的。现在我们没有后方，还是带游击战争的形式。中央苏区的经验告诉我们，不能全采用正规战争，现在应当正确运用过去的经验。”鉴于目前一、四方面军已经会合的情况，我军应该迅速地打出去，打到川陕甘广大地区，建立我们的革命根据地。 其他同志也一一发言，一致同意周恩来的报告，认为，一、四方面军会合后，打开了一个新局面，使我军在川陕甘建立根据地有了可能。大家赞同这个报告中提出的在川陕甘建立根据地，首先向甘南发展的战略方针。 会议议定由张闻天起草一个决定。6月28日，中央政治局正式通过了关于一、四方面军会合后的战略方针的决定。其中指出：“我们的战略方针是集中主力向北进攻，在运动战中大量消灭敌人，首先取得甘肃南部，以创造川陕甘苏区根据地。”“为了实现这一战略方针，在战役上必须首先集中主力消灭与打击胡宗南军，夺取松潘与控制松潘以北地区，使主力能够胜利地向甘南前进。”这个决定从组织原则上奠定了北上建立川陕甘苏区根据地的方针，否定了张国焘的错误主张。 张国焘对这一决定采取了口是心非、阳奉阴违的两面派态度。他回到杂谷脑后，自恃所领导的军队人数多，便策动一些人给中央写信伸手要权。他还以“统一指挥”、“组织问题”没有解决好为借口，故意拖延执行中革军委在两河口会议后制定的《松潘战役计划》。中央为了团结他共同抗日，组成了以王稼样、李富春、林伯渠、李维汉、刘伯承、叶剑英等为代表的慰问团。慰问团到达杂谷脑后，受到了四方面军指战员的热列欢迎。 7月18日，中央在黑水县芦花召开政治局常委会议，研究如何统一指挥和组织问题。对于把什么职务安排给张国焘，周恩来从全局考虑，提出让出他的总政委职务。张闻天认为军权不能让出，还是把自己所担任的总书记让出好了。经过讨论，毛泽东认为还是让出总政委好一些。如果让张国焘当总书记，直接指挥全党，搞不好还要出大问题。反复研究后，大家同意了毛泽东的意见，并以军委主席朱德和副主席周恩来、张国焘、王稼祥的名义向各兵团首长发了通知：“奉苏维埃中央政府命令：一、四方面军会合后，一切军队均由中国工农红军总司令、总政委直接统率指挥。仍以中革军委主席朱德同志兼总司令，并任（由）张国焘同志任总政治委员。”会议决定，周恩来调中央常委工作，中革军委常委由4人增至5人，增补陈昌浩。 然而，张国焘权力拿到手后，他指挥的部队行动却并不积极。由于他的拖拖拉拉，红军不能集中主力向东突进。到8月初，胡宗南部已乘机集中兵力于松潘；薛岳部也进抵文县、平武，与胡宗南部互相策应。这时红军已难以执行原定的《松潘战役计划》，只得依据此时的敌情变化情况，重新制订《夏洮战役计划》。军委提出的这一计划，要求红军改为攻占阿坝，迅速北进夏河流域，突击敌包围线之右侧背，向东压迫敌人，以期于洮河流域消灭敌人主力，形成在甘南广大区域发展的局势。 在此期间，毛泽东知道张国焘的思想还不通，就同王稼祥商量再单独跟张国焘谈谈。朱德总司令也说：“稼祥同志，很多同志都信服你的话，你再去做做张国焘的工作，叫他不要老是这样固执己见了。”王稼祥正为党内这一严重分歧而不安，同意由他和毛泽东一起，与张国焘比较深入地交换一下意见，努力说服他放弃自己的主张。 毛儿盖之夜，月暗星稀，时时传来几声犬吠羊咩和红军哨兵警惕的口令声。毛泽东约张国焘来到王稼祥的住处，作一次形式随便但内容严肃的深夜谈心。 王稼祥住在一座藏民的小木楼上，楼下是主人家的牛棚马圈。为了这次谈话，王稼祥不仅认真准备了自己要说的意见，甚至连有些重要的措词都作了慎重考虑。他又叫警卫员找来一点儿烟叶和砖茶，烧了一大壶水。 张国焘是骑马来的，毛泽东领他上了小楼。王稼祥亲自动手为他们彻上了砖茶。毛泽东把烟叶拉到自己手边，高兴地说：“还是稼祥同志想得周到，连'粮草'都预备好了。”说着三人围着一盏不断发出膻味的羊脂油灯，尽量心平气和却又各怀心事地开始促膝谈心。毛泽东以最大的耐心与诚挚，深入而详细地解释了中央的北上方针，委婉地指出了张国焘主张的危险后果。王稼祥不断支持、补充着毛泽东的意见，并对中央方针作了进一步的阐述，又以非常谦和诚恳的态度，劝说张国焘以大局为重，正确理解并认真执行中央的指示、决议。 张国焘开始还不断为自己强辩，后来则越来越无言以对了。最后他对毛泽东和王稼祥苦口婆心的谈话，索性不置一词，实际是沉默抗拒。他一会儿不耐烦地把脸转向灯光背阴处，使人闹不清他是在听谈话还是打瞌睡；一会儿又故作疲惫地朝王稼祥的床铺上一靠，摆出了一副你说你的、我休息我的架势。眼看满满一盏羊脂油已快熬干了，楼下牲口的反刍嚼草和响鼻哼叫声也渐渐停息。他们的谈话从黄昏开始，一直到凌晨三时。此时，张国焘故意大声打着哈欠，表示不想再听下去了。王稼祥也感到有点口干舌燥，身上困乏心中发急。只有惯于夜间工作的毛泽东，一面抽着大叶子烟，一面继续侃侃而谈，大有“不达目的，决不收兵”之意。张国焘只得表示，容他回去再考虑考虑。他不再拒绝，但也没有接受毛泽东和王稼祥的意见。 8月4日至6日，中央政治局在毛儿盖附近的沙窝召开会议。会议通过了《中央关于一、四方面军会合后的政治形势的决议》，重申北上方针，强调创造川陕甘根据地是当前红一、四方面军面临的历史任务。张国焘表面上再次表示同意中央的北上方针，实际在思想上仍没有放弃因畏惧国民党军队而主张退却的打算。他回去后不久，又提出经阿坝向青海、宁夏、新疆退却，同中央规定的北进夏河流域计划背道而驰。中央又反复地向他做工作，他还是坚持己见。 19日，中央政治局在沙窝召开常委会议，研究常委分工等问题，决定由毛泽东负责军事工作，王稼祥负责政治部工作，张闻天负责组织部工作，博古负责宣传部工作。会上，王稼祥提出，应当开展对张国焘的斗争，这样才能解决问题。毛泽东说，我在毛儿盖时已经说过，斗争是需要的，但目前开展斗争是不适宜的。目前我们应采取教育的方式。 第二天，中央政治局在毛儿盖召开扩大会议，由毛泽东作夏洮战役后的行动问题的报告。此时，中共中央所在的右路军在东侧，张国焘所在的左路军在西侧。毛泽东从军事、经济、民族、地形等条件论证了红军主力不应向西而应向东。他指出，目前我们的根据地应以洮河流域为基础，将来向东发展，后方移至甘肃东北与陕西交界地区。 会议对毛泽东的报告进行了讨论。发言者都同意毛泽东的主张，认为我军应以岷州、洮河为中心向东发展。王稼祥等发言时着重指出，不应该把向东向西看成为一个小的问题，这是一个根本原则问题。向东是转入反攻，转入新的形势，是创造苏维埃新中国；向西不仅是军事上的退却，而且是政治上的退却，是缩小苏维埃运动，而变为少数民族的民族革命运动，是创造新疆人民共和国。因此，应克服一切困难，坚决向东发展。 这次会议通过了由毛泽东起草的中央政治局关于目前战略方针之补充决定，用以补充6月28日中央政治局两河口会议通过的《关于一、四方面军战略方针的决定》。因为张国焘没有出席会议，中央致电朱德、张国焘，通报了这次会议的精神，指出：“目前应举右路军全力，迅速夺取哈达铺，控制西固、岷州间地段，并相机夺取岷州为第一要务。左路军则迅出洮河左岸，然后并力东进，断不宜以右路（军）先出黑错、旧城，坐失先机之利。” 8月下旬，毛泽东和王稼祥等随右路军通过茫茫草地北上，向四川、甘肃交界的岷山地区前进；张国焘和左路军仍向西去了阿坝地区。9月初，张国焘致电陈昌浩、徐向前转中央，再次表示反对北进，坚持南下，并说“左右两路决不可分开行动”。9月9日，他又背着中央，另致电陈昌浩率右路军南下，企图分裂和危害党中央。 右路军前敌指挥部参谋长叶剑英看到张国焘的这份电报后，立即秘密地赶往中共中央驻地向毛泽东作了报告。 毛泽东于当晚在阿西同张闻天、博古、王稼祥和正在病中的周恩来等召开紧急会议，当机立断地决定率红1、3军团迅速脱离险区，立即北上。同时，他们于10日以中央名义致电张国焘，严肃地表示：“右路军南下电令，中央认为完全不适宜的。中央现恳切地指出，目前方针只有向北是出路，向南则敌情、地形、居民、给养都对我极端不利，将要使红军陷入空前未有之困难环境。中央认为北上方针绝对不应改变。左路军应速即北上”。中共中央还专门发布了《为执行北上方针告同志书》。其中指出：南下是草地、雪山、老林，人口稀少，粮食缺乏，敌人在那里的堡垒线已经完成，我们无法通过。“对于红军，南下是没有出路的。南下是绝路。”“你们应该坚决拥护中央的战略方针，迅速北上，创造川陕甘新苏区去。” 但是，张国焘仍然坚持自己的主张，继续反对党中央的北上方针。 为解决张国焘阴谋分裂红军所造成的危险局面，9月12日，中共中央政治局在四川省俄界召开了扩大会议。出席会议的有毛泽东、张闻天、博古、王稼祥、凯丰、刘少奇、邓发、叶剑英等共21人。 这次会议着重讨论了今后的行动方针问题。会上，点名批判了张国焘的右倾分裂主义，揭发了张国焘反党、分裂红军、反对北上抗日方针以及退却逃跑和军阀主义等大量错误事实。多数同志提出要给张国焘作组织结论，开除他的党籍。 毛泽东在报告中说，我们现在背靠一个可靠的地区是对的，但不应靠前面没有出路、后面没有战略退路、没有粮食、没有群众的地方。所以，我们应到甘肃才对。张国焘抵抗中央决议是不对的。他还指出，我们与张国焘的斗争，目前还是党内的斗争，组织结论是必要的，但不一定现在就做，因为它关系到团结和争取整个四方面军干部，也关系到在四方面军中的很多一方面军干部的安全。我们应当尽一切可能争取四方面军北上。（《中国共产党历次重要会议集》（上）第174页） 毛泽东的报告还强调指出，不管张国焘等人如何阻挠破坏，中央仍要坚持两河口会议上既定的北上战略方针。中央认为，向南是没有出路的，无论从地形、居民、给养等各方面条件看，南下都只能是减员，没有战略退路，部队会被消灭在那里。报告认为，红军总的行动方针是北进，但考虑到目前中央只是率领1、3军团单独北上，力量是削弱了，从当前的敌我形势出发，行动方针应该有所变化，首先打到甘东北或陕北，进行游击战争，以便得到共产国际的指示与帮助，整顿休养兵力，扩大队伍，创建根据地。 与会同志一致同意毛泽东关于今后行动方针等问题的报告，并认为张国焘企图以武力要挟党中央的事件不是偶然的，从两河口会议以来，他就进行了一系列的反党活动，问题是相当严重的。但为了通过他去争取和团结四方面军的干部，大家都同意了毛泽东的意见，暂时先不给张国焘作组织结论，并提议要在1、3军团中加强解释工作。 关于北上部队的组织问题，会议决定将军委纵队和红一方面军主力（红1、红3军）缩编为中国工农红军陕甘支队，司令员为彭德怀，副司令员为林彪，政治委员为毛泽东，政治部主任为王稼样。由毛泽东、周恩来、王稼祥、彭德怀、林彪成立一个五人团，领导军事工作。 这次会议还通过了《关于张国焘同志的错误的决定》，严肃指出，张国焘反对中央北上的战略方针、坚持向川康藏边境退却是错误的。中央同张国焘的争论，其实质是由于对政治形势的分析与敌我力量估量上存在着原则的分歧。中央号召红四方面军的同志团结在中央周围，同张国焘的错误倾向作坚决的斗争。 排除了张国焘的干扰破坏，红军陕甘支队在毛泽东、周恩来、王稼祥、彭德怀等同志的正确领导下继续北上。 9月27日，他们到达渭县的榜罗镇。中央政治局常委会议在这里召开，毛泽东、张闻天、周恩来、博古和王稼祥出席。会议根据最新了解到的陕北有刘志丹红军的情况，改变俄界会议关于接近苏联建立根据地的决定，决定把中共中央和陕甘支队的落脚点放在陕北，在陕北保卫和扩大苏区。 第二天，毛泽东在陕甘支队连以上干部会议上作报告，号召全支队指战员突破长征的最后关口——固原、平凉封锁线，同陕北的同志们会合。 支队政治部为宣传解释中央新的决策，使广大干部、战士都能明了行动的方向和