Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Provoking the Heavy Burden of the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee: Zhang Wentian in the Long March

On September 29, 1934, the "Red China" newspaper published an editorial entitled "Everything to Defend the Soviet Union", signed by Zhang Wentian. Zhang Wentian was then a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the People's Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic (equivalent to today's prime minister).In his editorial, he actually announced that the main force of the Red Army was about to leave the base area for a strategic transfer, and answered the most urgent question at the time: Why did the Red Army implement a strategic transfer?Zhang Wentian gave a new explanation for the "offensive line", explaining that according to the circumstances at the time, not only offensive and counter-offensive, but also defensive and retreating struggle methods were adopted, and this was also to realize the party's offensive line.He analyzed the various methods of struggle used in practice, and affirmed that giving up certain Soviet areas and cities in order to "shorten the front line" and break through the blockade of "transfer areas" is advisable under the oppression of the enemy's superior forces and the blockade of fortresses. The method of preserving the vitality and striving for victory in the war quite clearly indicated the strategic intention of the Central Red Army to break through and transfer.Zhang Wentian also went on to clarify how to view the strategic decision to break out of the encirclement and transfer from the perspective of the long-term and unbalanced nature of the Chinese revolution, which is the basic issue of the Chinese revolution.He consciously used this understanding of regularity to summarize and criticize the development track of the "Left" military line in the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression".Zhang Wentian has clearly realized that China's revolutionary war is a "long-term" war and cannot be completely won within a few years.Although the editorial has not completely broken through the shell of the "offensive line", it has clearly and in fact negated the adventurism in the offensive, the conservatism in the defense, and the escapeism in the retreat of the "Left" military line. In order to preserve the vital forces and strive for victory, he has made flexible use of various methods of struggle, especially the methods of retreating, shortening the front line, and transferring areas.

The decision to shift the Red Army's strategy was made at the meeting of the Central Secretariat in May after the failure of the Guangchang Battle, and it was agreed shortly after reporting to the Communist International.But at that time, the central leaders still did not make a timely decision, and the preparations for the strategic transfer were only carried out secretly among a small number of central leaders.In September, various preparations before the transfer began, and the signing of the armistice agreement with Chen Jitang of the Guangdong Army opened a channel for the Red Army to break through from southern Jiangxi to the west.However, for such a major event as the breakout operation, there was no explanation among the cadres and commanders, and it was not even discussed at the Politburo meeting.It was not until late September that Zhang Wentian was asked to write an editorial to explain theoretically the great strategic shift of the Red Army.Therefore, this editorial written by Zhang Wentian is actually announcing on behalf of the Party Central Committee that the main force of the Red Army is about to leave the central base areas for a major strategic shift.

The two senior revolutionaries Dong Biwu and He Shuheng realized that the Red Army was about to leave the Central Soviet Area for a strategic shift after reading this editorial.In his 1936 article reviewing the Long March, "Before Departure," Dong Biwu called it "an editorial on the strategy of the Red Army."Immediately after the publication of this editorial, the General Political Department of the Red Army issued a "political instruction", requiring the entire army to "carry out adequate propaganda and explanation work among the troops" regarding the upcoming military operation based on this editorial.Therefore, this editorial is actually a manifesto and mobilization order for the Red Army's Long March.

When I started the Long March, I didn’t know that there was no such thing as the term “Long March” because it would take a distance of 25,000 miles.At that time, the Red Army was heading westward, implementing a major strategic shift. The initial goal was to reach western Hunan and join the 2nd and 6th Red Army Corps, so it was called the "Western Expedition." When the Long March started, according to the opinion of the "Supreme Trio" composed of Bogu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai, Luo Fu (that is, Zhang Wentian), Mao Zedong and others had to be dispersed among the various field armies.Mao Zedong and Luo Fu raised objections after discussion, which allowed them to stay in the headquarters.Mao Zedong invited Luo Fu and Wang Jiaxiang to march all the way and camp together. On the evening of October 10, 1934, Mao, Luo, and Wang set off from Meikeng in Ruijin, gathered in Yudu, the capital of southern Jiangxi Province, crossed the Chaodu River, and set foot on the road to the west.In this way, Mao, Luo, and Wang walked together and naturally formed a "group of three".In order to distinguish it from the "Supreme Trio", it is called the "Central Team Trio".

It was no accident that Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong walked together when the Long March started.There are two main factors that make them come together, one is the deepening of Bo (Gu) Luo's contradictions, and the other is the development of Mauro's cooperation. In Shanghai, Zhang Wentian learned that the "Left" erroneous line was constantly hitting a wall in practice. Since the autumn and winter of 1932, he had already begun to change from implementing the "Left" line to opposing the "Left" line.After arriving in the Central Soviet Area, Zhang Wentian gradually broke free from the shackles of "Left" from his ideological understanding of principles and policies to the strategic line.At this time, Bogu, the main leader of the Party Central Committee, has not had this kind of awareness for a long time, and his vigilant eyes are always looking for any signs of "rightism", and he will strike mercilessly.That being the case, there will inevitably be differences and contradictions between the two leaders in terms of politics and important principles and policies.

The political differences between Boluo first arose in the understanding of the "three conditions for joint resistance against Japan". After the "January 28th" Incident, Zhang Wentian had some understanding of the changes in domestic class relations under the Japanese aggression, corrected his original over-the-left strategic thinking about the officers of the 19th Route Army, and realized that under the "three conditions" he would be different from any armed forces. The conclusion of a common war agreement against Japan by the troops was "propaganda and a call to action", not only to the soldiers at the bottom and the broad masses of workers and peasants, but also "to the officers at the top".

Bogu disagreed with Zhang Wentian's opinion.Therefore, in the eight or nine months after the publication of the "Three Conditions for Joint Anti-Japanese War" declaration, the Soviet government and the Red Army did not take any initiative and did not conclude an anti-Japanese war agreement with any Kuomintang troops. Regarding the understanding and policy of the capitalist economy, it is another point of difference between Boluo.Bogu juxtaposed the struggle against the feudal remnants, the warlord system, and the imperialists with the struggle against the Chinese national bourgeoisie, and advocated that the basic point of the policy on capitalism is "restriction."

Zhang Wentian put forward the idea of ​​"using" private capital to develop the Soviet economy.Bo Gu accused Zhang Wentian of advocating "concession" and "compromise" as an "opportunistic" policy, and even believed that this "surrender sentiment towards capitalists" was the "main danger" in the current labor movement in the Soviet area, and that "resolute and ruthless firepower Against this danger". The bigger differences between Boluo occurred before and after the "Fujian Incident".Bogu regarded the negotiations with the Nineteenth Route Army as a propaganda measure, and only wanted to expose the deception of the generals of the Nineteenth Route Army through negotiations and enhance the prestige of the Communist Party and the Red Army.Zhang Wentian believed that negotiating a truce with the 19th Route Army and then cooperating in the resistance against Japan would have a major positive impact on crushing the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign and on the entire anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese struggle.In terms of military operations, Bogu adopted a strategy of "not cooperating at all" with the "Fujian Incident", while Zhang Wentian "advocated active cooperation".

The development of the "Boluo Contradiction" from a dark disagreement to a clear conflict was after the failure of the Guangchang Battle.Zhang Wentian resolutely opposed organizing the Guangchang Campaign, but Li De and Bogu didn't listen at all.After the failure of the Guangchang Battle, Zhang Wentian criticized Bogu and others at the meeting of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in mid-May: it was wrong to fight the enemy to the death in the Guangchang Battle.This is a style of play that fights for consumption, causing the main force of the Red Army to suffer undue huge losses.Not only did Bogu not accept it, but he instead labeled Zhang Wentian as a "rightist".The two fought red-faced and red-faced at the meeting, and at a stalemate, they broke up unhappy.After the meeting, Bo Gu pushed Luo Fu out of the organization again, and the rift between Bo Luo could not be narrowed or even healed.

While the "Bolo Contradictions" gradually deepened, the "Mauro" gradually approached each other, and even trusted each other and cooperated closely. Luo Fu met Mao Zedong after entering the Central Soviet Area in early 1933.At first, Luo didn't really understand Mao's thoughts and talents, and the relationship between the two was normal.Soon, Luo was in charge of government work and had more opportunities to contact Mao, and he also got to know Mao and gradually got closer.On issues such as the implementation of the "Three Conditions for Joint Anti-Japanese War" declaration, the signing of agreements and support with the 19th Route Army, assistance to the Fujian People's Government, and the Guangchang Campaign, Mao supported Luo Fu and had major differences with Bogu and others.

After the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet, Luo Fu was elected chairman of the People's Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic.On the surface, it seems that Luo has been reused.However, he, who is in the vortex of high-level contradictions in the party, has "feeled more clearly" than before that this is a clever plan to "kill two birds with one stone".On the one hand, Luo can be pushed out from the central government, and on the other hand, Mao can be pushed out from the central government. From February 1934, Luo's office and residence were moved from Guanyinshan, the seat of the Party Central Committee, to Shazhouba, where he worked with Mao and lived close together.After Luo Fu became the chairman of the People's Committee, he did not follow the intention of Bogu and others to reject Mao Zedong.On the contrary, he adopted an attitude of cooperating with and respecting Mao.After Luo took office, he talked with Mao Chang several times and listened to Mao's opinions.When he chaired a meeting of the People's Committee, he always asked Mao to participate and guide him.Economic work was originally managed by Mao. After Luo took over, Wu Liangping, Minister of the Ministry of National Economy, was still asked to report and ask for instructions from Mao, while Mao still participated in the decision-making of major economic issues.In this way, the relationship between Mauro not only did not become tense, but became closer. From January to February 1934, Luo Fu serialized Mao Zedong's two rural survey reports of Xingguo Changgang Township and Shanghang Caixi Township in six issues in the publication "Struggle" edited by him.He also went on to follow Mao's approach and study the work of grassroots Soviets. In April 1934, the book "How District and Township Soviets Work" co-authored by Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong was published. After the enemy plane bombed Ruijin on August 1, 1934, the residences of Mao and Luo were moved to the ancient Yunshan Temple on Yunshi Mountain.The two get along day and night, have a harmonious relationship, and care about each other in life.Seeing the defeat of the war against "encirclement and suppression", they had to leave this red land poured with blood and sweat, and their hearts were full of depression and resentment.One day before the Long March, Luo and Mao sat on a stone bench under the Jue tree in front of their residence and chatted. After the controversy about the Battle of Guangchang, in early July 1934, Bo Gu and Li De adopted another deployment to "exclude" Luo Fu: sending Luo Fu to Fujian and Jiangxi Provinces for inspection work.In fact, this was an excuse to remove Luo from his leadership position in the government.Luo Fu obeyed the decision and went to Fujian and Jiangxi in the first ten days of July for 40 to 50 days of inspection work, and did not return to Ruijin until late August.At that time, Luo Fu felt that he was "already in a powerless position" and was "very dissatisfied in his heart", so he poured out his unhappiness and dissatisfaction to Mao.Luo's feelings at this time have been smoldering in Mao's heart for many years.From the Southern Jiangxi Conference (1931) to the Ningdu Conference (1932), and the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee (1934), Mao Zedong was repeatedly excluded.Mao's situation in the party at that time was much worse than that of Luo. The candid conversation between Luo and Mao before the Long March set off brought their relationship into a whole new stage on the eve of embarking on the journey. As mentioned above, Mao and Luo achieved the same understanding of the laws of the Chinese revolution and the deep comrade-in-arms friendship established in the struggle against the "Left" erroneous leadership, which is the basis for them to come together. The "three-person group of the central team" formed at the beginning of the Long March provided Mao, Luo, and Wang with an environment where they often exchanged opinions together.The topic naturally focused on the main reason why the enemy failed to break through the fifth "encirclement and suppression".Luo told Mao and Wang about the various disputes with Bogu from the Fujian Incident to the Guangchang Battle.Mao compared the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" with the experience of the previous victories in counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression", and carefully analyzed the mistakes of Li De and Bogu's military leadership in adopting a purely defensive line and negating the tactics of mobile warfare.The casual conversation and full discussion along the way made Mauro closer emotionally and more consistent in their views.As for the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", both Luo and Wang accepted Mao's point of view and realized that it was mainly subjective and was caused by strategic and tactical mistakes in military leadership. The "three-person group of the central team" is of special significance for the successful convening of the Zunyi Conference and for the Chinese Communist Party to achieve a historical turning point.The American journalist Harrison Salisbury humorously titles a chapter of his book The Long March—The Untold Story "The 'Conspiracy on the Stretcher'".Zhang Wentian used philosophical language when summarizing this period of history.He wrote: At the start of the Long March, "He (referring to Mao Zedong) asked me to live with him and Comrade Wang Jiaxiang - thus forming a trio of 'Central Team' headed by Comrade Mao Zedong against the leadership of Li De and Bogu , laid the material foundation for the great victory of the Zunyi Conference." 1.After passing Laoshanjie, Luo criticized Li and Bo together with Mao and Wang.At the beginning of the Red Army's Western Expedition, it seemed like a big move. All field troops became cover teams, moving slowly and being beaten passively.We crossed the enemy's first, second, and third blockade lines, and because we signed an armistice agreement with the Cantonese army, it went smoothly.However, when they broke through the fourth blockade line along the Xiangjiang River at the end of November 1934, they encountered fierce resistance, and the Red Army suffered heavy losses. The "Supreme Trio" almost lost the ability to command in the face of such serious setbacks.Bogu was helpless, and sometimes he used a pistol to draw his head.Li De, the military adviser, lost his temper. Not only did he not admit his mistake, he also attributed the fiasco of the Xiangjiang Battle to his failure to implement his decision in time.Mao, Luo, and Wang felt that they could no longer remain silent about the wrong leadership of the central government. In the first ten days of December 1934, after the Red Army crossed the old mountain boundary and temporarily got rid of the pursuing enemy, Luo Fu, together with Mao and Wang, publicly criticized the mistakes of the central military command within the Politburo.They pointed out that the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was caused by strategic and tactical mistakes in the military leadership; It is also wrong to stick to the original proposal and think that only when we reach Xiangxi and meet with the 2nd and 6th Army Corps can we lay down our luggage and fight to destroy the enemy. 2.The channel meeting adopted Mauro's suggestion and decided to "transfer troops".When the Central Red Army advanced to the Xiangxi Passage area, it received information that Chiang Kai-shek had seen through the Red Army's strategic intention to go to Xiangxi, and assembled five or six times as powerful as the Red Army in Hongjiang, Zangjiang, Guizhou, and Shiqian, Tongren, and Songtao in Guizhou. , Set up 4 lines of defense to form a big pocket, waiting for the Red Army to drill.Under such circumstances, Bo Gu and Li De still insisted on the policy of joining the 2nd and 6th Army in western Hunan.After Luo Fu learned about the important changes in the battle situation, he immediately told Mao Zedong to discuss countermeasures.Together with Mao and Wang, Luo proposed to Zhou Enlai: On the way to Xiangxi, Lao Jiang had set up heavy troops. The original opportunity for the Central Red Army to join the 2nd and 6th Army Corps in Xiangxi had been lost. base. On December 11, 1934, the Red Army captured Tongdao County, Hunan Province. On the 12th, an emergency meeting of the central leaders-the channel meeting was held to discuss the direction of the Red Army's actions.Mao Zedong first resolutely opposed Li De's policy of advancing to the area where the 2nd and 6th Army Corps were located, and suggested marching to Guizhou.Luo and Wang firmly supported it, emphasizing that they should change their course of action according to the changed situation.Zhou Enlai also supported the march to Guizhou.In this way, the proposals of Mao, Luo, and Wang were approved by the majority.At 19:30 that night, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order for the Red Army to enter Guizhou on the 13th.However, after the meeting, Bogu and Li De still insisted on their own opinions, denied the decision of the majority, and ordered the legions to act according to the policy of joining the 2nd and 6th legions. On the 14th, the Military Commission ordered the Red Army to seize Liping and Jinping, Guizhou, and open up a way forward. 3.The Liping Conference made a strategic policy decision and a decision to sum up experience and lessons after a meeting in Zunyi. After the Red Army captured Liping on December 15, 1934, the issue of strategic policy was put on the agenda again. On December 18, Zhou Enlai presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.At the meeting, Luo and Mao had a heated argument with Li and Bo.The meeting made the "Decision on Strategic Policy", which denied Li and Bo's policy of asking the Central Red Army to go to Xiangxi to join the 2nd and 6th Army Corps and establish a base area in Xiangxi, and also rejected someone's proposal to send people to Qianxi.The meeting adopted the strategic policy proposed by Mao, Luo, and Wang in the channel area and supported by Zhou, and decided to establish a new base in the "Sichuan-Guizhou border area, the area that should initially be centered on Zunyi".The meeting also made a crucial decision: After arriving in the Zunyi area, a meeting will be held to summarize the experience and lessons learned in military command since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". 4.Huang Ping talked in the orange forest, and Luo suggested that Mao come out to command the military.After the Liping Conference, the Central Red Army continued to march westward, preparing to cross the Wujiang River to the north.Li De was very annoyed at the failure of the Liping conference.On the way forward, he and Bogu are still unwilling to give up their wrong strategy.Luo Fu was deeply worried about this.He realized that if Li De and Bogu continued to hold the power of military command, it would be difficult to avoid wrong command.He began to consider the question of changing military leadership. On December 20, 1934, the Military Commission column arrived at Huangping, Guizhou.In a dense orange grove, the two stretchers of Luo Fu and Jia Xiang put down to rest.Wang asked Luo: Where is the final goal of the Red Army, the central government?Lowe said: "There wasn't a definite target.Luo also said: It seems impossible to fight this battle like this. Comrade Mao Zedong still needs to come out.Jiaxiang called Luo Fu's idea to Peng Dehuai that night, and then told Mao Zedong.This news was passed on to Liu Bocheng and other generals, and everyone agreed that Mao Zedong should come out to command. 5.Houchang meeting criticized Li and Bo. Ten days later, on January 1, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in Houchang (Caotang), Weng'an County, Guizhou Province, and criticized Bogu and Li Deyi for establishing a revolutionary base in the border areas of Sichuan and Guizhou. The erroneous claim of the 6th Army rendezvous decided to forcefully cross the Wujiang River, and issued the "Decision on the New Action Policy after Crossing the River".On the subsequent march, Li De's command of the Red Army was stopped again. To sum up, from the first ten days of December 1934 when he crossed Laoshanjie, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang waged active struggles together.The channel meeting laid the foundation for the transformation of the strategic policy; the Liping meeting actually solved the most urgent problem of the direction of march at that time, and realized the task of "transferring troops" proposed by the channel meeting.This is the result of Mao, Luo, and Wang's "central team trio" criticizing Bogu and Li De's wrong leadership and launching struggles after the defeat in the Xiangjiang Battle.The conversation between Luo and Wang in the orange grove in Huangping was a decisive preparation for the change of military leadership.The Houchang Conference resolutely implemented the strategic policy decided at the Liping Conference and consolidated the victory of the Liping Conference.After the meeting, stopping the military command of Li De, the military adviser sent by the Comintern, during the march was not only a major organizational victory, but also a sign that the Chinese Communist Party broke free from the shackles of the Comintern to independently solve the problems it faced.All of these have made ideological and organizational preparations for the convening of the Zunyi Conference. On New Year's Day in 1935, the Red Army forcibly crossed the Wujiang River and won the victory. In the early morning of January 7, the vanguard of the Red Army attacked and occupied Zunyi, leaving hundreds of thousands of "pursuing" enemy troops to the east and south of Wujiang River.This provided a valuable opportunity for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to hold an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Zunyi. On January 15, 1935, the Zunyi Conference, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which decided the fate of the party and the Red Army, was held. The meeting was chaired by Bo Gu.The main topic of the meeting was "reviewing the experience and lessons of military command during the opposition to the five 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns and the Western Expedition".First of all, Bo Gu made a summary report on the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression".Bo Gu believed that the main reasons for the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" were: the reactionary forces were too strong, the enemy directly used 500,000 troops to attack the central Soviet area, and there were also imperialist economic aid and military advisors; the material conditions in the Soviet area were not good The leadership of the broad masses of workers and peasants in the White areas against imperialism and the Kuomintang has not made significant progress in their daily struggles; the development of guerrilla warfare and the disintegration of the White Army are still weak, and the guerrilla warfare around the Soviet areas is not enough;Bogu's analysis is actually using objective reasons to cover up the evil consequences of strategic and tactical mistakes in military leadership.Zhou Enlai, vice chairman of the Military Commission and general political commissar, then made a deputy report. He did not blame the fault on the objective, but focused on reviewing and summarizing the military strategy and tactics of the Central Red Army. After listening to Bo Gu's report and Zhou Enlai's deputy report, Luo Fu first got up and made a report against the central leadership's purely military defense line.This report is commonly referred to as a "counter-report".When he made the "counter-report", he had an "outline" in his hand, and he basically spoke according to the "outline".This "outline" was actually the collective creation of Mao, Luo, and Wang of the "Central Team Trio" and was written by Luo with Mao's viewpoint as the leading factor. What Luo Fu said at the meeting at the moment carries a lot of weight.Because Luo is a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, the secretary of the Secretariat, and the chairman of the People's Committee.At that time, there were four members in the Secretariat of the Central Committee (also known as the Standing Committee): Bo Gu, Luo Fu, Zhou Enlai, and Xiang Ying.Among the participants in the Zunyi Conference, Luo's position in the party was second only to Bo and equal to Zhou.He was the first to stand up at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, and clearly and systematically criticized the wrong military leadership during the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and the Western Expedition, setting the tone for the Zunyi Conference's complete negation of the purely defensive military line.At the same time, this "anti-report" was also a sign of his separation from the "Left" central leadership group and his break with the "Left" erroneous line. After Luo Fu's counter-report, Mao Zedong then made an important speech.Mao spoke for about an hour, deeply analyzing the crux of the wrong military line.Point out that the main manifestations of the "passive defense" policy of "Left" adventurism are: conservatism when defending, adventurism when attacking, and escapeism when transferring.He sharply criticized Li De's wrong military command, saying that he only knew how to talk about soldiers on paper, and didn't consider whether the soldiers had to walk, eat, or sleep, and didn't ask whether they were walking on mountains, plains, or rivers. Playing for a limited time, of course it won't work well.Mao Zedong also used the facts of the first, second, third, and fourth victories in the "encirclement and suppression" campaign to refute the point of view that the objective reasons for the failure of the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign were justified by the objective reasons that the enemy was strong and we were weak.He pointed out that it was the implementation of the erroneous claims of "Left" adventurism in the military that led to the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and caused heavy losses to the Red Army during the Long March. The next speaker was Wang Jiaxiang.He unequivocally supported Luo Fu's "anti-report" and Mao Zedong's speech, criticized Bo Gu and Li De's military command mistakes, and proposed that Mao Zedong should command the Red Army. Zhu De had always been modest and prudent, and at this meeting, he also vigorously pursued the mistakes of the interim central leadership, condemning them for rejecting Mao Zedong, relying on foreigner Li De, losing their base areas, and sacrificing many lives. The leading comrades of the various legions in command at the front all criticized the mistakes of the "Left" military line based on their personal experience, and agreed with Luo Fu's "counter-report" and Mao Zedong's speech.The only exception was Lin Biao, the head of the First Legion.He was a leader in the "Left" error in the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, and the "short assault" criticized at the Zunyi Conference was advocated by Lin Biao. Zhou Enlai was the head of the Military Commission. Unlike Bogu, he admitted in his deputy report that the main reason for the failure of the Red Army's fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was the strategic and tactical mistakes of the military leadership, and took the initiative to take responsibility; at the same time, he criticized Li De and Bogu for their mistakes. .He expressed "complete agreement" with Luo Fu's "counter-report" and the speeches of Mao and Wang. Bo Gu was one of the main critics at the meeting, and his attitude was relatively correct.He presided over the meeting, but did not use his power to suppress different opinions, showing a democratic style and an aboveboard attitude. At the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, Kaifeng was the only one in the CCP who openly opposed Luo Fu's "counter-report" and Mao and Wang's speeches.He expressed reservations about the meeting. Li De is completely in the position of being criticized.He was sitting in the doorway and smoking a cigarette.Listening to Wu Xiuquan's translation of the speeches of the participants, he looked very depressed.He said he "completely and categorically disagrees with the criticism of him".During the meeting, he also spoke to defend the wrong military line, shifting the responsibility to objective reasons and the temporary central government.Li De's bad attitude cannot prevent the Chinese Communist Party from independently making decisive and correct criticisms and conclusions. The Zunyi meeting concluded that Bogut's summary report was "basically incorrect."The meeting held that: "The main reason why the 'encirclement and suppression' cannot be smashed is not objective but subjective, that is, our military leadership has made a mistake of purely defensive line, which violates the basic principles of strategy and tactics in China's civil war." "So in In the sense of defending the Soviet area and successfully smashing the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns", as well as reaching the destination in western Hunan planned for the Western Expedition, they have not fulfilled their own tasks." On the basis of distinguishing right from wrong and pointing out mistakes, the Zunyi Conference has important implications for the military Serious mistakes in leadership also clarified the responsibility: "The enlarged meeting pointed out that the military leadership mistakes were Comrades A (quote: Refers to Li De), Bo, and Comrades Wednesday, and Comrades A and Bo Er should bear the main responsibility." "The enlarged meeting of the Politburo specifically pointed out the serious mistakes made by Comrade XX (quoter's note: referring to Bogu, the same below) in this respect. He led the work of the Military Commission on behalf of the Central Committee. Mistakes in the line of combat command and abnormal phenomena within the Military Commission not only failed to correct in a timely manner, but also actively supported and encouraged the development of such mistakes. The enlarged meeting of the Politburo believed that Comrade XX should respond in this regard Take the main responsibility." Now that right and wrong have been clearly distinguished and responsibilities have been clarified, it is inevitable to change the course and change the leadership.Therefore, the enlarged meeting of the Politburo decided: "We must thoroughly correct the mistakes made in the military leadership in the past, and improve the leadership of the Military Commission." For this reason, the Zunyi meeting made the following decisions at the end of January 17: 1. Comrade Mao Zedong was elected as a member of the Standing Committee. 2. Designate Comrade Luo Fu to draft a resolution, entrust the Standing Committee to review it, and send it to the branch for discussion. 3. Proper division of labor among the Standing Committee. 4. The three-member regiment was abolished, and the top military chiefs Zhu and Zhou were still the military commanders, while Comrade Enlai was entrusted by the party to be responsible for the final decision to command the military. The Zunyi Conference elected Mao Zedong as a member of the Standing Committee. Since then, Mao Zedong has entered the leadership core of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.The meeting decided to "carry out an appropriate division of labor among the Standing Committee" and "designate Comrade Luo Fu to draft the resolution", which means that Bogu will be removed from the position of the head of the Party Central Committee and will be replaced by Luo Fu.According to Yang Shangkun, who attended the Zunyi meeting and was the political commissar of the 3rd Corps at the time, it was a relatively unanimous opinion formed at the Zunyi meeting that Luo Fu replaced Bogu as the general secretary of the Party Central Committee.Luo Fu repeatedly declined, and this issue was temporarily shelved. The meeting's decision on "cancelling the (highest) three regiments" not only revoked Bo Gu's command of the military, but also formally revoked Li De's command.This is the first time in the history of the relationship between the Communist Party of China and the Communist International.Taking this as a starting point, the Chinese Communist Party began to independently solve the problems of the Chinese revolution. The victory of the Zunyi Conference was the result of the united struggle of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the leading comrades of the various regiments.In the middle, Mao and Luo cooperated and cooperated, which played a key role.Mao Zedong said at a meeting of the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China: "The Zunyi meeting is a key point and has a great impact on the revolution. However, everyone must know that if Comrades Luo Fu and Wang Jiaxiang did not follow the third 'Left' line If it is divided, it is impossible to hold the Zunyi meeting. Comrades put good accounts in my name, but we must not forget the two of them...the two of them were separated from the third "left" line, It works a lot." At the Zunyi meeting, everyone elected Zhang Wentian as the general secretary, but Zhang Wentian repeatedly declined, so the meeting decided to only say "the standing committee will carry out an appropriate division of labor."After the Zunyi Conference, in fact, Bogu could no longer hold the top leadership position.After the defeat in the Battle of Tucheng, the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River and gathered in Tashi (the county seat of Weixin County) in Yunnan. On the evening of February 5, 1935, the central column marched to Huafang, a small village near Shuitianzhai in Weixin County, Jiming Three Provinces.Here the Standing Committee discussed the division of labor, and decided to use Luo Daibo, with Luo Fu (Zhang Wentian) as the general secretary, taking overall responsibility within the party. After Zhang Wentian took over as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, with the support of Mao Zedong and others, he united the Political Bureau and the Military Commission of the Central Committee. On the way to Tashi, he marched all the way and held meetings (known as the "Tashi meeting" in history) to make a series of important decisions. Continue to complete the tasks scheduled for the Zunyi meeting and implement the spirit of the Zunyi meeting in a timely manner.In less than 10 days, several major events were accomplished: 1. Discuss and pass on the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" drafted by Zhang Wentian, that is, the "Summary Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Opposing the Enemy's Five Encirclement and Suppression".This resolution is a historical summary of the experience and lessons of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" war. It is the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the party and the army. It is dominated by Mao Zedong's military thought and is the first systematic exposition of Mao Zedong's strategy and tactics of China's revolutionary war.The resolution was passed at the Politburo meeting held at Dahetan Zhuangzi on February 8, 1935. On February 10, Zhang Wentian delivered a report at the meeting of the column cadres of the Central Military Commission in Tashi Town.Before the Zunyi Conference, Zhang Wentian was the author of the "outline"; at the Zunyi Conference, he was the speaker of the "anti-report"; after the Zunyi Conference, he was the drafter of the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" and the first to convey the spirit of the Zunyi Conference Those who made indelible contributions to the victory of the Zunyi Conference. 2. Discuss and make decisions in a timely manner on the strategic and organizational issues of the Central Soviet Area and the 2nd and 6th Army Corps. After Zhang Wentian took over as the general secretary on February 5, he called the leading comrades of the Central Soviet Area that night, and gave a clear answer to the Central Soviet Area's request for instructions on the strategic policy in accordance with the spirit of the Zunyi Conference, and gave clear instructions on the composition of the Central Soviet Area's leading organization. On February 9, the enlarged meeting of the Politburo discussed the strategic guidelines and organizational issues of the 2nd and 6th Army Corps, and sent a telegram in time. After the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" was passed, a long telegram was sent to the 2nd and 6th Army Corps, the Fourth Front Army and the Central Soviet Area to inform the general meaning of the resolution.The "Zunyi Conference Resolution" was conveyed in a timely manner, establishing the relationship between the new central leadership and the major Soviet areas and Red Army units, and establishing the basic organizational guarantee for the centralized and unified leadership of the entire party and army. 3. Make new changes to the strategic direction of the Central Red Army according to the changed situation.Zhang Wentian presided over an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Dahetan on February 7, and decided to abandon the original plan to cross the river and return to northern Guizhou, "taking the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border as the development area". 4. After arriving in Tashi Town on February 9, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was held in the Jiangxi Guild Hall in the town, and a decision was made to implement the reduction of the Red Army troops, requiring that the combat effectiveness of each company be enriched through the reduction. On February 16, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the "Notice to All Red Commanders and Soldiers", conveying and publicizing the major decisions of "transferring troops" and "drawing down", and explaining the principles of mobile warfare in the "Zunyi Conference Resolution".All these laid a spiritual and material foundation for the second crossing of Chishui, the reoccupation of Zunyi, and the first major victory since the Long March—the Loushanguan victory. Another extremely important event that Zhang Wentian accomplished after assuming the highest leadership position in the party was to further establish Mao Zedong's military leadership in the process from the Second Occupation in Zunyi to the Huili Conference. On December 20, 1934, when Zhang Wentian talked with Wang Jiaxiang's Huangping Orange Grove, he proposed that Mao Zedong should come out to command the military.The Zunyi Conference elected Mao Zedong as a member of the Standing Committee.The Politburo meeting on the second day divided the work of the Standing Committee and decided that "Comrade Mao Zedong will be the helper of Comrade Enlai in military command."From then on, Mao Zedong returned to the leadership position of the army and directly participated in the military command of the Central Red Army. After the Tashi meeting, Mao Zedong commanded the second crossing of Chishui, and then occupied Zunyi, winning the first major victory since the Long March, the Battle of Loushanguan.Zhang Wentian believed in and admired Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical principles and military command ability even more, and believed that Mao Zedong was more confident in commanding battles in the front.In Zunyi, Zhang Wentian proposed to set up a former enemy headquarters and asked Mao Zedong to be the commander in chief of the former enemy. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and others agreed, and the order was officially issued on March 4, 1935.This new establishment and appointment handed over to Mao Zedong the power to command the battle flexibly in the front. Afterwards, a debate arose over whether to engage in a new battle with drums.Afterwards, Mao Zedong proposed to Zhang Wentian to set up a new "three-member regiment" with full power to command the military.Zhang Wentian adopted Mao Zedong's opinion, and at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held near Gouba on March 12, he submitted this proposal to the meeting for discussion.The meeting made a decision: Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang will form a new "three-member regiment" (also known as the "three-member military leadership group").In this way, with the support of Zhang Wentian and others, Mao Zedong entered the most important military leadership organization at that time and became the actual military commander of the Central Red Army.The important decision to change leadership at the Zunyi Conference was finally completed. After the establishment of the new "Three-member Regiment", the Central Red Army, under the command of Mao Zedong, won the battles of crossing Chishui three times, crossing Chishui four times, and rushing across the Jinsha River.However, among the top leaders of the Red Army, Mao Zedong's flexible tactics and mobile warfare strategies and tactics are still not really understood. . In the first ten days of May, Zhang Wentian presided over another Huili meeting, criticizing the misunderstood and vacillating emotions that doubted and opposed the policy of mobile warfare, and affirmed that Mao Zedong's policy of mobile warfare was correct and that the new leadership team was able to command well.Through the meeting, the centrifugal tendency was overcome, Mao Zedong's mobile warfare thought was truly accepted by everyone, and Mao Zedong's military leadership was further consolidated. After the meeting, the Central Red Army continued to march north along the road leading to Xichang. On May 19, Zhang Wentian presided over a central meeting in Tiekeng near Lizhou to discuss the marching route.In view of the fact that Xichang was firmly defended by the enemy, the meeting decided to abandon the original plan to besiege Xichang, and instead took the route of Mianning, crossed the Yi nationality area, crossed the Dadu River at Anshunchang, entered northwest Sichuan, and joined the Red Fourth Army.On this day, the advance team of the Central Red Army with Liu Bocheng as the commander was established to open the way for the whole army to go north.After the advance team entered the Yi area of ​​Daliang Mountain, Liu Bocheng and Xiaoye Dan, the leader of the Guji tribe, formed a blood alliance and became brothers.With the help of Yi compatriots, the Red Army troops safely passed through the Yi area and arrived at the Anshunchang Ferry by the Dadu River. On May 25, the advance team successfully crossed the Dadu River. On the 29th, they flew to Luding Bridge again.So the Red Army crossed the river from Anshunchang and Luding Bridge, and all reached the opposite bank on the 30th. On May 31, Zhang Wentian followed the column of the Central Military Commission and crossed the river on the chain bridge to Luding County.Here, he presided over the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and decided that the Red Army should go northward along the snow-capped mountains and avoid densely populated areas. On June 2, the central column was stationed at Hualinping, an altitude of more than 4,000 meters.In the afternoon of the same day, a meeting of cadres above the squad leader of the central column was held, and Zhang Wentian made a report, talking about the victory of crossing the Dadu River and the current situation and tasks. Afterwards, the Red Army marched northward to the banks of the Tianquan River, defeating the six brigades defending the enemy's Yang Sen Department. On June 7, occupy Tianquan. Occupy Lushan on the 8th.Then continue to move forward and climb Jiajin Mountain, which is covered with snow all the year round, has no human habitation and no roads. At noon on June 12, the vanguard of the Red Front Army joined forces with the advance regiment of the Red Fourth Front Army between Jiajin Mountain and Dawei. 1. After the Fourth Front Army successfully joined forces in the Maogong area, the issue of strategic policy came to the fore again. Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, etc. knew that the south was heavily guarded by the enemy, and it was impossible to go south.The enemy has assembled 130 regiments in the east, and it is no longer possible to cross the Minjiang River eastward and take Chengdu.To the west is the vast grassland, and it is an ethnic minority area, and the conditions are even worse.Only to the north, go north to Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu, where the population is dense and the economy is better, which is convenient for the Red Army to expand and develop.Therefore, the policy determined by the Party Central Committee is to go northward to establish base areas in northwestern Sichuan, and then occupy Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu.Zhang Guotao proposed: Go west to Xikang, Qinghai, and Xinjiang, and go to "regional development" with "economically backward and culturally backward"; or go south, "take Chengdu directly, go out of the Yangtze River, and go to Wuhan." There are serious differences between the two approaches.Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, etc. exchanged telegrams, discussed with Zhang Guotao, and exchanged views patiently, hoping that he would change his mind.However, Zhang Guotao completely ignored the opinions of the central government and insisted on his policy of going west or going south. At 4 o'clock in the morning on June 20, Luo, Zhu, Mao, and Zhou jointly called Zhang Guotao again to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the three policies of moving northward, moving westward, and southwestern Sichuan. Immediately come to Maogong to discuss everything.”In order to resolve differences of opinion and unify thinking, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee decided to hold a meeting in Lianghekou. Zhang Wentian arrived in Lianghekou on June 23 and lived in a local Guandi Temple. On June 24, I wrote "Seize Songpan, Chihuachuan, Shaanxi and Gansu!" "The article was immediately published in the first issue of "Forward News" (mimeograph) published that day. The article analyzes that the confluence of the first and fourth front armies "created the possibility of realizing our strategic policy of establishing a new Soviet base area in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu"; (Gong) and other counties "staying for a long time" or "going west" to Qing and Kang are in line with Chiang Kai-shek's blockade policy, which is "extremely unfavorable to the Red Army", thus negating Zhang Guotao's erroneous claims.张闻天认为，要把川陕甘建立苏区根据地的“这一可能变成实际”，战略方向上应该是“北进”，而关键的战役任务是“夺取松潘”。张闻天的文章还论述了在创立川陕甘根据地的过程中争取“决战胜利”的战略意义和“运动战”的战略战术原则，不点名地批评了张国焘“避免战争”的“逃跑主义倾向”。 Zhang Wentian's "Seize Songpan, Redify Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu!" "This article made important ideological preparations for the Lianghekou Conference to decide on the strategic policy of going north.在红军长征的历史上，这是最早的一篇系统阐述北上建立川陕甘苏区根据地的战略方针、明确批评张国焘右倾逃跑主义的文献。 On June 26, a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was held in a lamasery in Lianghekou, focusing on discussing the current strategic policy.The meeting was chaired by Zhang Wentian.周恩来作目前战略方针的报告，阐述必须北上到川陕甘建立根据地的方针，并提出为了实现这个方针，必须迅速打击松潘的胡宗南部；还提出两个方面军要统一指挥。周恩来报告后，毛泽东、朱德、博古、彭德怀、张国焘等12人相继发言。包括张国焘在内，与会者都赞成北上方针。张闻天起草了《关于一、四方面军会合后的战略方针的决定》，于6月28日发出。决定指出：“在一、四方面军会合后，我们的战略方针是集中主力向北进攻，在运动战中大量消灭敌人，首先取得甘肃南部，以创造川陕甘苏区根据地，使中国苏维埃运动放在更巩固更广大的基础上以争取中国西北各省以至全中国的胜利。”“为了实现这一战略方针，在战役上必须首先集中主力消灭与打击胡宗南军，夺取松潘与控制松潘以北地区，使主力能够胜利地向甘南前进。”针对张国焘的错误主张，决定还指出：“大小金川流域在军事、政治、经济条件上均不利于红军的活动与发展。”“为了实现这一战略方针，必须坚决反对避免战争退却逃跑，以及保守偷安停止不动的倾向，这些右倾机会主义的动摇，是目前创造新苏区的斗争中的主要危险。” 两河口会议后，毛泽东、张闻天、周恩来、朱德等即率领中共中央、军委和红一方面军连续翻越梦笔山等大雪山，于7月10日到达黑水县的上芦花。在这里，一面耐心等待张国焘执行两河口会议决议发动攻打松潘战役；一面筹集粮食，准备北上打大胜仗。 在两河口会议上，张国焘虽然表面上赞成北上方针，同意打松潘，但实际上他还是惧怕敌人，想避敌主力，实行其南下（四）川（西）康或西移青（海）新（疆）的退却方针。这时，他的个人野心不断膨胀，自恃红四方面军有8万多人，想以此为资本，取得对党和红军的最高领导权。 张闻天和毛泽东、周恩来为团结争取张国焘，对他一再忍让。两河口会议后，毛泽东与张闻天商量并经常委会决定，任命张国焘为军委副主席。But Zhang Guotao's desire for power was not satisfied.他通过各种方式提出“我军宜速决统一指挥的组织问题”，故意拖延四方面军主力北上的行动。As for the "Songpan Battle Plan", it was delayed as much as possible and would not be implemented. 对于张国焘延迟北上贻误战机的错误，中央提出批评，并要张国焘等速来芦花集中指挥。同时，中央对他在“组织问题”上提的要求还是委曲求全，尽量考虑。张闻天表示自愿让出自己担任的党中央总书记的职位。毛泽东不同意，说张国焘要抓军权，你给他做总书记，他说不定还不满意，但真让他坐上这个宝座，可又麻烦了。经商量，周恩来把总政委的职务让给了张国焘。 7月18日，在芦花召开中央政治局常委扩大会议，讨论“组织问题”。张闻天主持会议并首先提出关于人事安排的意见。经讨论，张闻天最后宣布决定：张国焘为红军总政治委员，徐向前、陈昌浩为前敌总指挥部总指挥和政委，博古为总政治部主任。他强调现在主要任务是集中力量打好松潘战役。同日，中革军委发出通知：仍以中革军委主席朱德兼总司令，并任张国焘为总政治委员。“一、四方面军会合后，一切军队均由中国工农红军总司令、总政委直接统率指挥”。 张国焘担任总政委后，才勉强执行军委为补救延误战机而发布的松潘战役第二步计划，率领四方面军北上向毛儿盖地区集中。可是，到了毛儿盖以后，张国焘又进行了一系列反对中央、破坏团结的活动。He held an emergency cadre meeting in the Fourth Front Army, at which he announced that the central government was implementing an opportunistic line, and demanded that a dozen cadres from the Fourth Front Army be approved as members of the Central Committee, members of the Politburo, and secretaries of the Secretariat.他指责遵义会议是调和路线，要求博古退出书记处和政治局，周恩来退出军委，不达目的即不进兵；还在中央的附近，搞了一次军事示威。同时，他在整个四方面军中封锁中央的影响，做了一个反对中央、反对一方面军的动员，全然不顾中央号召的两军团结北上的政治任务。 而这时敌方胡宗南部已经集结主力，在松潘附近地区构筑了堡垒线，红军攻打松潘的有利时机已经丧失。Not only that, after the mobilization and defense of various enemy troops, a situation of besieging and destroying the Red Army was formed in the snowy mountains and grasslands west of Minshan and north of Maogong.红军处于危局，如不抵制张国焘的错误方针，制止其破坏团结、反对中央的行为，处境将更为凶险。 在这种情况下，张闻天与毛泽东、周恩来等为求得共同北上，促进张国焘转变并争取四方面军，采取了特殊的、十分忍耐的方针。8月4日至6日，张闻天在毛儿盖南20里的小村庄沙窝召开了中央政治局会议，讨论一、四方面军会合后的形势与任务和组织问题。张闻天就第一项议程作报告和结论。在结论中，张闻天着重肯定遵义会议的正确，特别是《遵义会议决议》概括的军事路线的正确，要求四方面军中党的支部都要讨论《遵义会议决议》。关于西北联邦问题，张闻天再一次指出：“是过早的”。 8月9日，中央印发了沙窝会议通过的由张闻天起草的《中央关于一、四方面军会合后的政治形势与任务的决议》。这个决议是一个具有重大现实意义和深远历史意义的文件。它针对两个方面军会合后一个多月来出现的主要问题，运用马克思列宁主义基本原理，总结历史经验，分析当前现实情况，作出了深刻而又具体的回答，有力地然而又是很有策略地抵制和批评了张国焘“西进”、“南下”的错误战略方针，以及其枪指挥党的军阀主义倾向、破坏两个方面军团结的行为和避战退却逃跑的右倾机会主义。 The second item on the Shawo meeting's agenda was organizational issues - "Absorbing cadres from the Fourth Front Army to participate in the work of the Central Committee".张闻天代表政治局提出预先经过磋商的名单，提升3个正式中央委员、3个候补中央委员，两位同志进政治局：一为正式委员，一为候补委员。 张国焘不满意。8月6日的会议主要在这个问题上反复讨论。毛泽东、张闻天等看透张国焘的用心，是企图形成多数来控制党中央，所以在增加中央委员的人数上口径统一，维持原议。但为了尽一切可能同张国焘搞好团结，决定进政治局的两位同志都是正式委员。 沙窝会议以后，为执行《夏洮战役计划》，中共中央决定，会合后的两个方面军组成左、右两路军继续北上。 张国焘又一次玩弄两面派伎俩。他在会上赞成《沙窝会议决议》，而会后却继续同中央北上计划对抗。他回到毛儿盖后即召开四方面军军以上干部会议，再次提出，西出阿坝，占领青海、甘肃边远地区的方针，而不执行经阿坝北进东出的计划。 针对张国焘这一破坏北进战略部署的错误做法，中共中央于8月15日致电张国焘，指出：“不论从敌情、地形、气候、粮食任何方面计算，均须即时以主力从班佑向夏河急进，左路军及一方面军全部应即日开始出动。万不宜再事迁延，致误大计。”“目前洮、夏敌备尚薄，迟则堡垒线成，攻取困难。气候日寒，非速到甘南夏河不能解决被服。”“班佑以北，粮房不缺，因此，一、四方面军主力均宜走右路；左路阿坝只出支队，掩护后方前进；5军、32军即速开毛（儿盖）。”“目前应专力北上，万不宜抽兵回击抚边、理番之敌”。 张国焘对中央的耐心说服教育和明确指示置之不理。 为了克服张国焘的阻挠，中央决定再次召开政治局会议。在召开这次政治局会议的前一天，即8月19日，张闻天在沙窝主持召开了中央政治局常委会。 到会者有毛泽东、博古，王稼祥列席。周恩来因病缺席。会议讨论了对张国焘错误的方针问题、常委分工问题、宣传工作问题。会议认为：应该加强常委会的工作，发挥常委会的作用。确定中央分工如下：张闻天负总责之外兼管组织部，罗迈副之；毛泽东负责军事；博古负责宣传部；王稼祥负责红军政治部；凯丰负责少数民族委员会，这一决定，将领导权集中统一于常委会和党中央总书记，将军事领导掌握在毛泽东手里。这在当时张国焘拥兵自重、向党争权，党内矛盾趋于尖锐的形势下，是十分必要的；对日后战胜张国焘的个人野心和分裂活动，具有关键性的作用。会议还决定加强对宣传工作的领导，《干部必读》由张闻天兼主编，编委成员罗迈、陈昌浩；《斗争》由博古主编，张闻天、王稼祥为编委。 8月20日，中央政治局会议在毛儿盖召开，集中讨论红军行动方针。 会议由张闻天主持，毛泽东作关于夏洮战役后行动问题的报告和结论。与会者一致同意毛泽东提出的以岷州、洮河为中心向东发展，以便取得甘、陕广大地区的行动计划。会议指出，目前左路军应迅速向右路军靠拢。毛泽东作结论说，我们应该坚决向东打，以岷州、洮河为中心，向东发展，不应因为有一些困难而转移向西。会后，发出了《中央政治局关于目前战略方针的补充决定》。 张国焘没有出席毛儿盖会议。张闻天等通过各种方式将会议决定告诉张国焘，明确要求左路军“迅速出墨洼、班佑，出洮河左岸，然后并肩东进”。但张国焘仍然按兵不动，不执行从两河口会议、沙窝会议到毛儿盖会议再三商讨确定的北上东出方针。这样一直拖延到8月30日，张国焘才命令左路军集结后向班佑前进。但是才走一天，8月31日，张国焘又犹豫动摇，却步不前。 毛儿盖会议后，张闻天带领中央机关随毛泽东、周恩来、徐向前率领的右路军行动。8月下旬从毛儿盖出发，进入纵横几百里、渺无人烟、气候变幻莫测的茫茫草地。走了5天，终于在月底通过草地，到达四川、甘肃交界之班佑、巴西地区。右路军部队就在这里