Chapter 3 Chapter 3 Zhu De on the Long March

After the fall of Guangchang in late April 1934, it was extremely unlikely that the Central Red Army would crush the Kuomintang army's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign in the base area. In May, the Secretariat of the Central Committee made a decision to withdraw the main force of the Central Red Army from the base area, and reported this decision to the Communist International.It was soon approved by the Comintern.However, Bo Gu, Li De and others still have not made a decision to change the strategic policy, and the preparations for the strategic transfer are only carried out secretly among a very small number of central leaders.A "three-person group" composed of Bo Gu, Li De and Zhou Enlai was established.Politically, Bogu was in charge, while military affairs were in charge of Li De, and Zhou Enlai was responsible for supervising the implementation of the military preparation plan.In order to mobilize and contain the enemy forces, reduce the pressure of the Kuomintang army on the central base area, and prepare to implement a strategic transfer, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided that the Red 7th Army would go north and the Red 6th Army would go west.

On October 10, 1934, the Central Red Army began to implement a strategic transfer.Zhu De set off from Ruijin in the evening of the same day with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and embarked on a long march.At this time, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De was nearly 48 years old. He was wearing an old gray military uniform, a small pistol in his waist, and straw sandals on his feet. He walked at the forefront of the headquarters team.According to regulations, he can be equipped with a stretcher and a document carrier, but in order to save manpower, he only needs two horses for riding and carrying luggage and documents.During the Long March, the horse he rode often stayed behind with Kang Keqing to carry the sick and wounded.Although the Central Red Army suffered major setbacks and many commanders and fighters were frustrated when they embarked on the Long March, Zhu De, who had experienced many battles, maintained the spirit of revolutionary optimism, telling stories with laughter and laughter along the way to inspire everyone's revolutionary sentiment.

When Bo Gu, Li De and others commanded the Central Red Army to implement a strategic shift, they made the mistake of fleeing in retreat.They neither convened a meeting of the Politburo to study such a major event as the strategic transfer, which was related to the future and destiny of the Central Red Army, nor did they conduct sufficient political mobilization work for the majority of commanders and fighters.The Red Army brought cumbersome machinery and equipment and other materials, turning the strategic shift into a big move.Although Zhu De is the chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, the main leadership of the strategic transfer is in the hands of Bo Gu and Li De.Zhu De took the overall situation into consideration and tried every means to command the troops to reduce the losses of the Red Army.On the day of October 23 alone, there were as many as 15 military telegrams issued by him to the heads of various legions.He informed the various legions of the enemy's situation, and arranged the marches and battles of the various troops.The troops are required to maintain a high degree of confidentiality during operations. Under the conditions of concentrated movement and combat readiness march of large corps, they must camp in concealment, and strengthen political work, medical rescue and containment during the march.

On October 18, after the main force of the Red Army crossed the Ganshui River in the south, in accordance with the order to break out of the encirclement issued by Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, on the evening of the 21st, it broke through the first blockade of the Kuomintang Army from Wangmudu, Ganxian County, to Xintianjian, Xinfeng County. Then cross the Xinfeng River and turn to the Hunan-Guangdong border. On November 8, the main force of the Red Army passed through the second blockade line between Rucheng and Chengkou of the Kuomintang army and entered southern Hunan. There are two main reasons why the Red Army was able to pass through the first and second blockades of the Kuomintang army relatively smoothly: first, the Kuomintang authorities did not understand the Red Army's intentions of action after the Long March began, and took precautions; On the same day, the Red Army and Chen Jitang, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang South Route Army, secretly reached an agreement to cooperate in the fight against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan.In the process of signing a secret agreement with Chen Jitang, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang South Route Army, Zhu De did a lot of work. In July 1934, Chen Jitang secretly sent people to the Soviet area to approach him, expressing his approval of the Chinese Communist Party's idea of ​​uniting all Chinese armed forces to fight against Japan, and willing to coordinate the relationship between the two parties through negotiations. At the end of September, Zhu De personally wrote a letter to Chen Jitang: Mr. and your Ministry have applied for cooperation in opposing Chiang Kai-shek and resisting Japan, and De and others will welcome it.The situation is becoming more and more urgent, the Japanese invaders are eager to try in South China, and Jiang Jun is increasing his troops in Jiangxi and Fujian. The Fujian incident can serve as a lesson.The letter also put forward five suggestions including the cessation of combat operations between the two sides. In early October, Pan Hannian and He Changgong, representatives of the Red Army, took a letter of introduction drafted by Zhou Enlai in the name of Zhu De to a mountain village near Xunwu to negotiate with representatives of Chen Jitang's department, and reached an agreement on local truce, exchange of intelligence, lifting of the blockade, mutual trade and when necessary Five agreements including mutual borrowing.

During the Long March of the Red Army, Chen Jitang fulfilled the secret agreement of mutual borrowing, 40 miles away from the main road, and did not intercept the Red Army in his defense zone.As a result, the main force of the Red Army was able to pass through the first and second blockades of the Kuomintang army smoothly.This is a classic work of Zhu De and other leaders who took advantage of the contradiction between Chen Jitang and Chiang Kai-shek according to the party's united front policy to successfully pass the two blockade lines of the Kuomintang army for the main force of the Central Red Army.

On November 7, Zhu De issued an order to pass the third blockade line of the Kuomintang army between Liangtian in the north of Yizhang and Pingshi in the southeast of Yizhang.The Red Army broke through the third blockade of the Kuomintang army with difficulty in three routes and entered the Xiangjiang area of ​​Guangxi.At this time, Chiang Kai-shek noticed the intention of the main force of the Central Red Army to march westward, mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, and divided the troops into five groups to block and chase, in an attempt to wipe out the Red Army on the side of the Xiangjiang River in one fell swoop. In mid-November, the Red Army soldiers entered northern Guangxi in two routes. On November 25, Zhu De issued an order to the corps and columns of the Red Army, pointing out: The Kuomintang army's attempt is to stop us on the Xiangjiang River and attack us from both wings.In response to the enemy's attempt, Zhu De made the deployment of the whole army to cross the Xiangjiang River between Xing'an and Quanzhou in four columns.At this time, the front lines of Xing'an and Quanzhou are the weak links of the Xiangjiang blockade, which is very beneficial for the Red Army to rush across the Xiangjiang River.Regrettably, due to the heavy material carried by the troops, the movement was slow and the opportunity was missed.

The Battle of the Xiangjiang River was a key battle related to the life and death of the Central Red Army.The vast number of commanders and fighters of the Red Army fought a decisive battle with the Kuomintang army. On November 27, the vanguard of the Red Army crossed the Xiangjiang River and took control of the crossing point.However, due to the fact that the troops are 200 miles apart, especially the huge central column and the Military Commission column, with a total of more than 14,000 people and more than 1,000 burdens, are surrounded by combat troops in a narrow passage about 100 miles long. Jiang was flanked by superior enemy forces.In this dangerous situation, Zhu De was not afraid of danger, and together with Zhou Enlai, he commanded the troops to fight against the enemy, and covered the central column and the Military Commission column to cross the river.The troops in charge of the cover mission paid great sacrifices to cover the central leadership and other troops crossing the river.The Battle of Xiangjiang was the most tragic battle since the Long March of the Central Red Army.With hungry and exhausted troops, the Red Army fought bloody battles for five days and nights, and finally crossed the Xiangjiang River on December 1, broke through the fourth blockade line of the Kuomintang army, and smashed Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to encircle and wipe out the Central Red Army east of the Xiangjiang River.But the Red Army also paid a very heavy price for this.The number of personnel in the Central Red Army and central government agencies dropped sharply from 86,000 at the time of departure to more than 30,000.

The huge price paid by the Red Army caused Zhu De to think deeply.When he summed up the lessons of this stage, he said heavily: he has no experience in breaking through.The Long March was like moving house. We moved everything, but it turned out to be too cumbersome and a disadvantage.The new recruits who came did not have time to add to the regiment or battalion, and those who had never led soldiers would make empty plans. They didn't know how the untrained recruits would follow the veterans, and let the recruits carry things—the whole The headquarters, party and government agencies, and cadres are all important, and even printing presses and military machinery have been moved out.As a result, there are more than 10,000 directly subordinate teams, so more cover troops are needed.

Zhu De learned this bloody lesson, and together with Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang, issued the "Order for Downsizing of Rear Organs" on December 4.The troops abandoned bulky materials and equipment, thus ensuring that the troops can advance lightly.After the Red Army crossed the Xiangjiang River, they continued to march westward and entered the mountainous areas of Xiyan and Longsheng.At this time, the Red Army faced the bombing and strafing of the Kuomintang army's planes in the sky, the dangerous and slippery roads under their feet, and the harassment of the reactionary militias, which made the marching of the troops even more difficult.

In early December, the Red Army entered Hunan again.At this time, the Kuomintang authorities had judged the Red Army's intention to go north to Xiangxi to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army Corps, and stepped up deployments in Chengbu, Xinning, Tongdao, Suining, Jingxian, Wugang, Zhijiang, Qianyang, Hongjiang, etc. They built a bunker line in a timely manner and assembled heavy troops to guard it, in an attempt to annihilate the Red Army in one fell swoop.Bogu and Li De ignored the enemy's situation and still insisted on advancing according to the original plan to join the Red 2nd and 6th Army.As a result, the Red Army was at an extremely critical juncture.At this moment of life and death, Mao Zedong, based on the military situation of the enemy and us, proposed that the Central Red Army abandon the original plan to go north to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army Corps, and immediately turn to Guizhou, where the enemy's military strength is relatively weak, and strive to win a few battles during the campaign. In order to reverse the passive situation since the Red Army broke through.

On December 12, 1934, the head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an emergency meeting in Hunan Channel.Most of the comrades attending the meeting agreed and supported Mao Zedong's proposal to turn to Guizhou.The sudden turn of the Central Red Army to Guizhou was completely out of Chiang Kai-shek's expectation. It suddenly left the Kuomintang's hundreds of thousands of troops in western Hunan, giving the Central Red Army the strategic initiative. On the 15th, after the Central Red Army captured Liping, the troops got the first opportunity to rest and reorganize since the Long March.At this time, Bogu and Li De still advocated that the Central Red Army go north to Xiangxi to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army.Therefore, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting in Liping on the 18th to discuss and study the future strategic direction of the Red Army.There was a heated discussion at the meeting.Zhu De's setbacks and lessons since the Long March made him more convinced of Mao Zedong and agreed with Mao Zedong's opinions very much.He stood with Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang and most other comrades, and denied Bogu and Li De's erroneous claim that the Central Red Army should go to Xiangxi to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army.The meeting passed the "Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on Strategic Guidelines".The decision pointed out: In view of the current situation, the Politburo believes that the past decision to establish a new Soviet base in Xiangxi is now impossible and inappropriate.The new base area should be in the Sichuan-Guizhou area, with Zunyi as the center at first.This major change in the strategic direction of the Central Red Army's Long March by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee enabled the Central Red Army to avoid being in a desperate situation and began to get rid of the passive situation.Zhu De resolutely implemented the strategic policy determined at the Liping meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. On the 19th, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai issued the "Telegram of the Military Commission to Implement the Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on December 18" to the entire army. The telegram made a clear deployment of the Red Army's future actions and ordered the troops to divide into two groups and turn from the northwest to Guizhou. Advance in Jianhe, Taigong, Shibing, and Huangping areas in the hinterland, and require the Red 2nd and 6th Army Corps and the Red Fourth Front Army to actively act to restrain the Hunan Army and Sichuan Army in order to support the Central Red Army's westward advance. At the end of December, the Central Red Army reached the Houchang area of ​​Weng'an County on the south bank of the Wujiang River.Zhu De issued a series of telegrams on December 31: The 3rd Army Corps should cross the Wujiang River quickly, the 1st Army Corps must complete crossing the river at 8:00 am on the same day, and the Military Commission column must complete crossing the river at 10:00 am on the same day.At this time, Bogu and Li De once again put forward the opinion that the Central Red Army should not cross the Wujiang River, but go back eastward to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army.To this end, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in Houchang on January 1, 1935.The meeting rejected Bogu's and Li De's claims and decided to forcefully cross the Wujiang River.The meeting passed the "Decision on the New Course of Action after Crossing the River".This decision proposes the strategic task of establishing a new base in the Sichuan-Guizhou border area first in the northern Guizhou area centered on Zunyi, and then in the south of Sichuan.The meeting also decided that the Military Commission must report to the Politburo meeting on the operational policy, as well as the choice of the time and place of the combat, in order to strengthen the Politburo's leadership over the Military Commission.This decision actually deprived Bogu and Li De of their military command. From January 2 to 6, 1935, the Central Red Army crossed the natural danger of Wujiang in three routes. On the 7th, the vanguard of the Red Army attacked and occupied Zunyi City, and other troops entered one after another.The Central Red Army entered Zunyi City and was warmly welcomed by the local people. On the afternoon of the 12th, more than ten thousand people in Zunyi held a rally on the playground of Zunyi Provincial Middle School. Zhu De first delivered a speech at the meeting, explaining to the masses that the Red Army is a team of workers and peasants, publicizing the three major disciplines and eight points of attention of the Red Army, and propagating that the Red Army is willing to unite with domestic The idea of ​​all parties, armies and all forces fighting against Japan together.Subsequently, Mao Zedong, Li Fuchun and Zunyi mass representatives also spoke.After the meeting, Zhu De also participated in the friendly match between the Red Army basketball team and the Zunyi No. 3 Middle School basketball team. The Central Red Army suffered repeated defeats in the fifth encirclement and suppression campaign against the enemy, and was almost on the verge of extinction.Mistakes and setbacks educated the majority of Red Army commanders and fighters, making them gradually realize that this was the result of rejecting the correct leadership represented by Mao Zedong and implementing wrong military guidelines.When the Central Red Army started the Long March, Mao Zedong repeatedly conducted in-depth and meticulous work with Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian and other Red Army leaders, analyzing the mistakes made by the Central Committee in military guidance since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and the beginning of the Long March.Mao Zedong's opinion gradually won the approval of Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and most other central leaders.Under such circumstances, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee held a meeting to sum up experience and lessons, and the time was ripe to correct the mistakes made by the Party Central Committee. From January 15th to 17th, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting upstairs of the former residence of Bai Huizhang at Loquat Bridge in the old city of Zunyi, which was the famous Zunyi meeting.Zhu De attended the meeting.The main topic of the meeting was to summarize the experience and lessons learned from the Central Red Army's fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and the Long March.At the meeting, Mao Zedong made a long speech on Bogu’s summary report. He criticized Bogu’s failure of the fifth counter-campaign against “encirclement and suppression” mainly due to the objective reasons that the enemy was strong and we were weak, and analyzed the “Left” military line to implement passive defense. Mistakes in the strategic policy and their manifestations, such as adventurism when attacking, conservatism when defending, and escapism when shifting.In his speech, Mao Zedong also expounded on the characteristics of China's revolutionary war and the resulting strategic and tactical issues. At the meeting, Zhu De clearly supported Mao Zedong's correct opinions, and severely criticized Bo Gu and Li De's wrong military line.In his speech, he sternly pursued Bogu and Li De's serious mistakes in military command that caused huge losses to the Central Red Army, and condemned the provisional central government for rejecting Comrade Mao Zedong and relying on foreigner Li De's blind command, resulting in the loss of base areas and casualties heavy.When he spoke, he also pointed out very excitedly: If we continue to lead like this, we can no longer follow. The Zunyi meeting finally appointed Zhang Wentian to be responsible for drafting the resolution, entrusted the Standing Committee to review it, and then sent it to the branch for discussion.After the meeting, Zhang Wentian drafted the "Resolution of the Central Committee Concerning the Summary of Opposing the Enemy's Five Encirclement and Suppression" based on the opinions of the majority of comrades present at the meeting, especially Mao Zedong's speeches.This resolution was officially adopted at a meeting held after the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China left Zunyi and arrived in Tashi (now Weixin) County, Yunnan.The resolution fully affirmed the basic principles of strategy and tactics used by Mao Zedong and others to command the Red Army to win many victories against "encirclement and suppression". The main reason for the "encirclement and suppression".Under the conditions that the enemy is large and we are small, and the enemy is strong and we are weak, our strategic line should be decisive battle defense (offensive defense), concentrating superior forces, selecting the enemy's weak points, and destroying part or all of the enemy with confidence in mobile warfare. Most of the troops should defeat the enemy one by one, so as to completely crush the enemy's "encirclement and suppression".However, in the war against the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign, decisive battle defense was replaced by pure defensive line one (or dedicated defense), mobile warfare was replaced by positional warfare and fortress warfare, supported by the tactical principle of the so-called "short assault" This purely defensive strategic line.This enabled the enemy's strategy and tactics of protracted warfare and fortressism to achieve their goals.The resolution also pointed out that Bo Gu and Li De also made mistakes in principle on the issue of strategic transformation and implementation of a breakthrough.They did not change the strategic policy of internal operations in time, and implemented a strategic retreat to maintain the vitality of the main Red Army, thus delaying the opportunity.In the breakout, the action is basically not decisive and fighting, but a kind of panic flight and move. According to changes in the situation, the Zunyi Conference changed the resolution of the Liping Conference to first focus on northern Guizhou and then go to southern Sichuan to establish a base area. It was decided that the Red Army would cross the Yangtze River to establish a base area in the southwest or northwest of Chengdu.After the meeting, according to changes in the enemy's situation, it was decided that the Central Red Army would create new bases in the vast areas of the three provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou. The Zunyi Conference reorganized the central leadership, and Mao Zedong was co-opted as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.The meeting decided to cancel the "three-person regiment" established before the Long March, and the top military chiefs Zhu De and Zhou Enlai were still the military commanders, and Zhou Enlai was entrusted by the party to make the final decision to command the military.Afterwards, while the Central Red Army was on its way to battle, on February 5, in a village in the "Three Provinces of Chicken Ming" at the junction of Yunnan and Guizhou, members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee carried out a division of labor.According to Mao Zedong's proposal, it was decided that Zhang Wentian would replace Bo Guzai as the general manager of the Central Committee (also known as the general secretary by custom), Mao Zedong would be Zhou Enlai's helper in military command, and Bo Gu would be the acting director of the General Political Department. On March 4, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission set up the former enemy headquarters after it entered Zunyi for the second time, with Zhu De as the commander and Mao Zedong as the political commissar. In mid-March, a new "three-person regiment" composed of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang was established in the Yaxi and Gouba areas of Guizhou. Zhou Enlai was the head of the regiment and was responsible for commanding the military operations of the entire army.In this way, the correct leadership of the new Central Committee with Mao Zedong as the core was actually formed.This was a critical decision made by the Chinese revolution at a critical moment when it was almost in a desperate situation, and it saved the party and the Red Army. Twenty-six years later, while remembering this great historical turning point, Zhu De still wrote the following lines very emotionally: After the Zunyi Conference, Zhu De, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai cooperated together to command the 30,000 Central Red Army to gallop on the Yunnan-Guizhou-Sichuan Plateau, and launched a mobile war with hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops chasing and intercepting them.After crossing Chishui four times, the Central Red Army finally jumped out of the enemy's encirclement and began to change from passive to active. On January 24, 1935, the First Red Army Corps occupied Tucheng and continued to advance to Chishui County. On the 27th, when the Central Revolutionary Military Commission arrived in Tucheng, it learned that four regiments of the Sichuan Army Liu Xiang's Model Division 1 were chasing the Red Army and attacking Tucheng. Mao Zedong decided to use the favorable terrain in the valley east of Tucheng to annihilate the enemy.He instructed Peng Dehuai to command the Red 3rd and 5th Army Corps to fight this battle, with the Red 9th Army Corps and the Red 2nd Division as the reserve team. The battle started at 5 o'clock in the morning on the 28th. After several hours of fierce fighting, no major results were achieved.At this time, it was discovered that the information was wrong. It was originally thought that the Sichuan Army had 4 regiments with about 6,000 to 7,000 people, but in fact there were 6 regiments with about 10,000 people, and enemy reinforcements continued to pour in.Relying on its superior strength and better weapons and equipment than the Red Army, the Sichuan Army broke through the positions of the Fifth Red Army and marched towards Tucheng step by step.If the enemy cannot be blocked, the Red Army will be forced to fight against the water with the Chishui River behind, and the consequences will be unimaginable. At this critical moment, Zhu De decided to go to the front line to command.Considering Zhu De's safety, Mao Zedong did not agree.Zhu De took off his hat and said: Deluo, old man, don't just think about my personal safety.As long as the Red Army wins, what a pity for a mere Zhu De!The enemy's gun cannot hit Zhu De!Helpless, Mao Zedong finally nodded in agreement.Zhu De and Liu Bocheng went to the front line to directly command the battle, which greatly encouraged the Red Army commanders and fighters in the bitter battle, and finally withstood the Sichuan Army's charges again and again.At this moment, Mao Zedong notified the First Red Army Corps that was attacking Chishui County to return for reinforcements immediately, and ordered Chen Geng and Song Renqiong to lead the cadres of the Military Commission column to rush to the front to launch a counter-charge.Zhu De personally went to the cadre regiment to command, and finally repelled the Sichuan army's attack and consolidated the position.That night, Mao Zedong and several major leaders of the Politburo held a meeting to study and decided to change the plan to cross the Yangtze River from Luzhou to Yibin northward from Chishui, quickly withdraw from Tucheng to fight, and cross the Chishui River to the west.Zhu De and Liu Bocheng remained in command at the front, Zhou Enlai was in charge of erecting the pontoon bridge across the Chishui River before dawn the next day, and Chen Yun was in charge of arranging the wounded and handling the heavy supplies of the Military Commission column. At 3 o'clock on January 29, after Zhu De issued the "Operation Order to Cross the Chishui River", he immediately returned to the front line to command the battle and cover the entire army's westward crossing of the Chishui River.When he came to the Red Fourth Regiment's position, it happened that Xiao Hua, the organization director of the Political Department of the First Red Army Regiment, was also in the Red First Regiment's position.According to Xiao Hua's recollection: It was raining at that time, and Liu Xiang's model teachers pressed on our position. Boss Zhu came to us with a pistol in his hand to personally command and cover the large troops to cross the river.I was very worried about Mr. Zhu's safety, and tried to persuade him to withdraw several times, but he refused.He persisted with us until dark before crossing the Chishui River with us. During the Long March, Zhu De personally visited the front line many times in critical moments to save the day.The more dangerous he is, the more calm and calm he is.When the Red Army crossed Chishui and entered the Gulin and Xushui areas in southern Sichuan, 12 brigades of the Sichuan Army were closely guarded along both sides of the Yangtze River, and the Xue Yue Division and the Qian Army also rushed to southern Sichuan.Under such circumstances, it was impossible for the Red Army to cross the Yangtze River northward.Therefore, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting and decided to use the main force and attention of the Kuomintang army to focus on the southern Sichuan line, while the northern Guizhou was relatively empty, and suddenly turned to the northern Guizhou.According to the decision of the meeting, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang issued the "Order of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission on the Drawdown of the Legions" on February 10.The order pointed out: In order to meet the needs of the current battle and enrich the combat effectiveness of each company, so as to advantageously eliminate the enemy's vital force and facilitate continuous operations, the Military Commission has decided to implement the reduction of combat units of each legion.The order stipulates the specific plan for the drawdown. On February 15, Zhu De sent a telegram to order the armies to cross the Chishui River to the east and eliminate the main combat target of Wang Jialie's army. From February 18th to 21st, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River at Taipingdu and Erlangtan at the junction of Sichuan and Guizhou, and re-entered Guizhou. The Red Army conquered Tongzi, captured Loushan Pass, and then captured Zunyi. , Wang Jialie Department.In the Battle of Zunyi, the Central Red Army wiped out 2 divisions and 8 regiments of the Kuomintang Army, captured about 3,000 enemies, and won the first major victory of the Central Red Army since the Long March.In order to boost morale and expand the influence of the Red Army, Zhu De called the Ninth Red Army Corps, asking them to post more good news near Tongzi and convene the masses to hold a victory celebration. The Zunyi victory of the Central Red Army shocked Chiang Kai-shek.He flew to Chongqing, ready to encircle and annihilate the Central Red Army in the Zunyi area with heavy troops. On March 4, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to form the former enemy headquarters, with Zhu De as the commander and Mao Zedong as the political commissar.Zhu De, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai deliberately commanded the Central Red Army to wander in the Zunyi area. When the Kuomintang army was lured to come, they suddenly turned around and marched westward. The posture of crossing the Yangtze River north.In order to further confuse the enemy, the Red Army continued to feint to attack Gulin with one part, while the main force turned around and returned eastward quickly. On the evening of March 21, they crossed the Chishui River four times at Taipingdu, Erlangtan, and Jiuxikou.After crossing the Chishui River, the Central Red Army immediately crossed the Wujiang River south, throwing all the heavy troops of the Kuomintang army to the west of the Chishui River and north of the Wujiang River, and completely jumped out of the Kuomintang army's combined attack circle. After the Central Red Army crossed the Wujiang River in the south, it opened up the prospect of marching into Yunnan and crossing the Jinsha River into Sichuan from the north.In order to achieve this strategic goal, the Central Red Army adopted the tactic of attacking the east and attacking the west, feigning a part to the east of Guizhou, making a gesture of going east to Hunan to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army Corps, but the main force went straight to Guiyang.Chiang Kai-shek, who was supervising the battle in Guiyang, hurriedly transferred 3 brigades of the Yunnan Army to Guiyang to assist in the defense.The main force of the Yunnan Army has been dispatched, and the door for the Red Army to enter Yunnan has been opened. On April 7, Zhu De ordered Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen to go south from Guiyang to Longli. On April 8, one part of the Red Army feinted to attack Guiyang and one part feinted to attack Longli. On the second day, the main force crossed the Hunan-Guizhou Highway from Guiyang to Longli, and marched towards Yunnan at a day and night marching speed of 120 miles.When the Yunnan Army entered Guizhou, the Red Army went straight to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province.This goal was achieved. The Central Red Army feinted a shot near Kunming, and then unexpectedly made a big stride northward, heading straight for the Jinsha River.The Central Red Army crossed the Jinsha River successfully on May 8, relying on 7 small boats to go back and forth at Jiaopingdu. After 6 days and nights, they all successfully crossed the Jinsha River. After the Red Army skillfully crossed the Jinsha River, it suddenly left the chasing Kuomintang army in the south of the Yangtze River, and the distance between the journeys was more than a week. On May 12, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting in Huili.Lin Biao and others expressed dissatisfaction with the circuitous maneuvering of crossing the Chishui River four times and crossing the Jinsha River in the north. He even wrote a letter to the Central Committee of Three, demanding that Zhu De and Mao Zedong step down.Mao Zedong criticized Lin Biao at the meeting and said: You are a baby, what do you know?At this time, it is not feasible to confront the enemy directly. It is necessary to go around in circles and walk more.Zhu De and Zhou Enlai also severely criticized Lin Biao, affirming that Mao Zedong's command was correct.The meeting decided that the Red Army would continue to march westward, cross the Dadu River, and join the Fourth Red Army. On May 21, the Central Red Army reached Mianning County in the Yi area.Zhu De delivered a speech at the mass meeting.He said: Yi and Han are one family, and the poor must unite to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and the Sichuan warlords in order to live a good life.He also issued the "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Announcement" in the name of the Red Army General Headquarters: The announcement issued in the name of Zhu De had a wide influence among the Yi people.Liu Bocheng, the chief of staff of the Red Army who served as the advance mission, made an alliance with Xiaoyedan, the leader of the Guji tribe of the Yi nationality, in accordance with the party's ethnic policy.With the trust and help of the Yi people, the Red Army passed through the Daliang Mountain area and reached Anshunchang on the south bank of the Dadu River. On May 25th, seventeen warriors of the advance team of the Red Army braved the enemy's bullets to cross the turbulent Dadu River and captured the ferry on the opposite bank.The Dadu River was deep and fast, and it was impossible to build a bridge. Only a small boat could not ensure that tens of thousands of Red Army troops crossed the river on time.Leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhu De decided to seize the Luding Bridge, another crossing point in the upper reaches of the Dadu River, by marching in a hurry.Zhu De immediately ordered the 1st Division of the 1st Red Army and the cadre regiment to form the right column and go northward along the east bank of the Dadu River; Dingqiao rushed forward. On the 29th, the vanguard of the Red Army arrived at Luding Bridge and seized the entire bridge.Zhu De, who arrived later, personally commanded the Red Army troops to cross the Luding Bridge.So far, Chiang Kai-shek's delusion that "Zhu De and Mao Zedong become Shi Dakai's second" has been completely shattered. On May 12, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting in the iron factory near Huili County to study the future military operations of the Red Army.The meeting decided that the Central Red Army would continue to march north, and criticized Lin Biao and others for their suspicion of Mao Zedong's leadership and their disagreement with mobile warfare. In mid-June, the Central Red Army crossed Jiajin Mountain, the first snow mountain on the Long March, arrived at the Maogong area, and successfully joined the Fourth Red Army. The 30,000 or so Central Red Army and the 80,000-strong Fourth Red Army joined together in victory, which greatly enhanced the strength of the Red Army and made the commanders and fighters of the two fronts feel extremely excited. On June 25, Zhu De, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, etc. came to Lianghekou, north of Maogong, to meet Zhang Guotao, the leader of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, who came to meet with him from Zagunao (now the county seat of Li County).On the same day, the red 1st and 4th front army meeting was held in the torrential rain.Zhu De and Zhang Guotao delivered speeches successively.In his speech, Zhu De warmly praised the heroic deeds of the Red Fourth Front Army from Hubei, Henan, Anhui, to the Sichuan and Shaanxi bases, repeatedly defeating powerful enemies and growing stronger.And pointed out: The meeting of the two main Red Army is not only the victory of the Chinese proletariat, but also the victory of the proletariat and all the working people in the world!When Zhang Guotao spoke, his tone was arrogant, showing an intention to go against the Party Central Committee's northward policy.This cast a shadow on the joy after the two armies joined forces. In order to unify the thinking and further clarify the strategic policy after the meeting of the two armies, the Party Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Lianghekou on June 26.At the meeting, Zhou Enlai made a report on the current strategic policy, pointing out that the economic conditions and mass conditions in the Maosongli area are not conducive to the establishment of a base area for the main force of the Red Army here, and it is impossible to develop eastward, southward and northwestward. Establish bases in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu.Mao Zedong, Zhu De and others made speeches, agreeing to the development strategy of Beishangchuan, Shaanxi and Gansu to establish base areas.In Zhu De's speech, he emphasized: we must quickly move out of Songpan and occupy Gannan.It is advocated that the two front armies should have a unified command, act in unison to attack the enemy, and ensure the victory of the war politically.Zhang Guotao also expressed his agreement with the policy of going north at the meeting.At the end of the meeting, the "Decision on the Strategic Policy after the First and Fourth Front Armies Converge" was passed, which clarified that the future strategic policy of the two front armies is to concentrate their main force to the north, destroy a large number of enemies in mobile warfare, and first acquire southern Gansu to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area Base area; in order to realize this strategic policy, the main force must first be concentrated to attack and eliminate the southern part of Hu Zong, seize Songpan and control the area north of Songpan, so that the main force can smoothly advance to Gannan. In order to enhance the unity and friendship of the Red 1st and 4th Front Army and unite Zhang Guotao to work together, Zhu De had a sincere talk with Zhang Guotao all night when he was in Lianghekou.Mobilize him to command the troops to capture the Songpan area and seize strategic points to open the way to the north.But Zhang Guotao refused on the pretext that the enemy's fortifications were too strong. According to the decision of the Lianghekou meeting, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission drew up the "Songpan Battle Plan" on June 29, stipulating that the First and Fourth Front Armies should form the left, middle, and right columns and the Minjiang detachment. , Based on the opportunity of an unstable foothold, quickly and resolutely capture Songpan, and control all roads north and northeast of Songpan.According to this plan, Zhu De immediately led the Red Army to go northward from the Maogong area to climb several snow-capped mountains such as Mengbi Mountain, Changban Mountain, Dagu Mountain, and Tuoluogang. child cover. Although Zhang Guotao expressed his agreement with the strategic policy of going north at the Lianghekou meeting, he did not implement the "Songpan Campaign Plan" for a long time and stayed put.He thought he had 80,000 troops, while the Central Red Army had only 30,000, and his personal ambitions further expanded.After the Lianghekou meeting, he called the Party Central Committee to put forward another set of propositions: On the one hand, the army went south to attack Dapao Mountain, north to take Aba, and developed one part to Xikang; the fourth army attacked Songpan in the north, seized the Minjiang River in the east, and plundered the sky in the south (all) , Lu (mountain), Guan (county), Qiong (崃), Da (Yi), and Ming (mountain).And asked the Party Central Committee to quickly resolve the organizational issue of unified command.He also instigated his followers to request the reorganization of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the Red Army headquarters, with Zhang Guotao as the chairman of the Military Commission and given arbitrary power, in an attempt to put the entire Red Army under Zhang Guotao's control. After the Red Army headquarters arrived in Luhua on July 10, the Fourth Front Army did not follow up as planned.Zhu De, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai immediately called Zhang Guotao, hoping that he would go north quickly as planned.In order to win over Zhang Guotao, maintain the unity and unity of the two major Red Army forces, and go north together, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee accepted Zhou Enlai's proposal on the 18th to change the position of the Red Army's general political commissar to Zhang Guotao.On the same day, the Central Military Commission issued a notice: Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, will still be the commander-in-chief, and Zhang Guotao will be the chief political commissar.1. After the 4th Front Armies join forces, all armies will be directly commanded by the Commander-in-Chief and the General Political Commissar of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. On the 20th, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission changed the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 9th armies of the Red Front Army to the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 32nd armies respectively, and the designations of the 4th, 9th, 30th, 31st, and 33rd armies of the Fourth Front Army remained unchanged.It was also decided to set up the former enemy general headquarters, with Xu Xiangqian as the former enemy commander in chief, Chen Changhao as the political commissar, and Ye Jianying as the chief of staff. In mid-July, Zhang Guotao led the Fourth Red Army to Luhua. From July 21 to 22, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in Luhua to listen to the situation report of the Fourth Front Army.In his speech, Zhu De affirmed the achievements of the Fourth Front Army in establishing base areas, expanding the strength of the Red Army, and breaking the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" many times.At the same time, it also analyzes the shortcomings and deficiencies of the Fourth Front Army in terms of military political work, local work, and strategic and tactical coordination, hoping to summarize and improve them.Zhu De tried his best to restrain his emotions in his speech and did not make sharp criticism.Because he knows very well that during the period when the Red Army is fighting, everything obeys the needs of the war and suspends discussion of issues other than military issues.The extremely ambitious Zhang Guotao did not listen to Zhu De's opinions at all, spreading rumors such as "there is a problem with the central political line", "the Central Red Army should be responsible for the losses of the Central Red Army", "the military command is not unified", and secretly stepped up the anti-central split Activity. In order to maintain the unity of the First and Fourth Front Armies, Zhu De always talked about the strengths of the Fourth Front Army, said more words of encouragement, and treated each other with sincerity, so he was quickly supported by the commanders and fighters of the Fourth Front Army.据徐向前回忆：朱德认为四方面军的干部年轻、有朝气，部队生龙活虎，纪律严明，是一支难得的有战斗力的队伍。希望一、四方面军相互学习，取长补短，团结一心，渡过眼前的困难，争取更大的发展。他的这些话，完全是顾全大局的肺腑之言，给我留下难忘的印象。朱总司令作风朴实，宽厚大度，平易近人，为接近过他并与他共事的干部、战士所称道。 由于张国焘一再拖延北上的战略行动，致使当朱德和红军总部、中央机关于7月底到达毛儿盖时，形势的发展变化对红军极为不利：国民党军主力胡宗南部已在松潘集中，基本上完成了堡垒线的构筑，并控制了经松潘北去的大道，原来担任追击红军的敌薛岳部和川军也从东南方向压来。军委原定的松潘战役计划已难以实现。根据形势的发展变化，中革军委于8月初决定以红军主力西指阿坝，北进夏河地区，争取在洮河流域消灭阻敌，进入甘南。8月3日，中革军委制定《夏（河）洮（河）战役计划》，决定将一、四方面军混合编成左、右两路军北上。8月4～6日，中央政治局在沙窝召开会议，讨论研究一、四方面军会合后的形势与任务。会议作出决议，重申北上抗日、创建川陕甘革命根据地的方针是正确的，而加强一、四方面军的团结是实现这个方针的基本条件。一切有意无意的破坏一、四方面军团结一致的倾向，都是对于红军有害，对于敌人有利的。决议同时强调一、四方面军必须进一步加强党的绝对领导，反对过高地估计敌人力量、对革命前途悲观失望的右倾动摇。朱德在沙窝会议上发言时指出：两个主力红军会合后的力量增强了，创造川陕甘苏区是有把握的，要提高自信心，克服各种困难去战胜敌人。对一、四方面军，不能轻率地说谁好谁坏，存在缺点是可以改进的。 沙窝会议后，按照中央的分工，朱德和总参谋长刘伯承率总部赴左路军集结地卓克基。至此，朱德暂时告别多年来并肩作战的毛泽东、周恩来等领导人，开始直接与张国焘共事打交道。朱德与党内同志打交道一向以宽宏大度、谦虚礼让而著称。但要与张国焘共事打交道，朱德深知可不是一件容易的事。一、四方面军会师后，特别是张国焘担任红军总政委后，他目空一切，专擅用权，排斥总司令和参谋长，而以个人意志挟制红军总部领导，进而同党中央对抗。 朱德、张国焘和刘伯承率总部去左路军后，接党中央来电，准备改变主力经阿坝北上的方案。因此，要求一、四方面军主力均宜走右路。左路阿坝，只出支队，掩护后方前进。但张国焘不同意党中央的决定，更听不进朱德的劝说，仍坚持西出阿坝，甚至提出深入青海、宁夏、新疆的主张。无奈，中央政治局于8月20日在毛儿盖索花寺再次召开会议，会议通过《关于目前战略方针的补充决定》。决定指出：企图使红军主力西渡黄河，深入青、宁、新僻地是不适当的，是极不利的，是错误的，是一个危险的退却方针。要求红军迅速夺取以岷州为中心的洮河流域，向东发展，以创造川陕甘革命根据地。会议改变了夏洮战役计划的具体部署，变右路军为北进主力，要求左路军向右路军靠拢。会后，党中央和前敌指挥部立刻率领右路军进入艰难的草地行军，同时将毛儿盖索花寺政治局会议的决定电告张国焘和朱德。8月底，党中央率右路军走出草地，在班佑、巴西、阿西、包座地区等待左路军到来。 朱德遵照党中央的部署指挥左路军先头部队于8月21日攻占阿坝，但张国焘却无视党中央关于左路军向右路军靠拢的决定，在阿坝按兵不动。在党中央一再催促和朱德的极力劝说下，张国焘方与朱德率领左路军第1纵队于8月30日向东进入草地，向班佑前进，同时向位于卓克基、马尔康等地的第2纵队发出北进向右路军靠拢的命令。左路军进入草地后的第三天，张国焘以噶曲河涨水为由，拒绝继续穿过草地到班佑与右路军会合。他独断专行以“朱、张”的名义致电党中央：嘎曲河涨水，上游侦查七十里，亦不能徒涉和架桥，各部粮食只能够吃三天，茫茫草地，前进不能，坐待自毙，无向导，决于明晨分三天全部赶回阿坝。朱德和刘伯承坚持左路军应向右路军靠拢，共同北上。为了搞清噶曲河的水情，朱德亲自来到河边堪察。当朱德了解到噶曲河水最深处只有齐马肚子深，部队完全可以徒涉的情况后，多次向张国焘提出过河北上。But Zhang Guotao stood still.这样，朱德同张国焘之间发生了严重的争执。据时任总部一局一科参谋陈明义回忆：在总部的一个帐篷里，张国焘和他的秘书长黄超同朱德争吵，要朱德同意南下，态度很激烈。我当时是总部一局一科参谋，不知道他们吵得对不对，但总觉得他们用这样态度对待总司令不对。张国焘还煽动个别人员给朱总施加压力，但朱总一直很镇静，他说他是一个共产党员，要服从中央，不能同意南下。 张国焘不顾朱德、刘伯承的反对，重新布置左路军的行动，并于9月5日电令正要北上的第2纵队就地巩固阵地，备粮待命。 在张国焘坚持南下的那些日子，等待在巴西的党中央几乎天天开会，谋求妥善解决的办法。随右路军行动的徐向前、陈昌浩也致电朱德、张国焘，要求以不分散主力为原则，左路军速来北进为上策，右路军南去为下策。但张国焘一意孤行，于9月8日以“朱、张”的名义致电徐向前和陈昌浩，要右路军准备南下。当晚，中央政治局向左路军发电，要求左路军迅速北上，如果南下，则前途将极端不利。 朱德接到党中央的电报后，力主左路军应该执行中央北上的命令。但张国焘不听朱德的劝阻，又于9月9日单独用个人的名义致电徐向前、陈昌浩并转中央，坚持他的南下的主张。党中央当即回电张国焘：北上方针决不应改变，左路军应速即北上。 9月10日凌晨，中共中央得知张国焘背着党中央电令右路军南下，企图分裂和危害党中央的情况后，为贯彻北上方针，避免红军内部可能发生的冲突，果断地决定率1、3军先行北上。11日，党中央再致电张国焘，指令他立刻率左路军向班佑、巴西开进，不得违误。张国焘无视党中央对他的一再争取，反于12日亲拟电致1、3军领导人，声称1、3军单独东出，将成无止境地逃跑，要1、3军速归。朱德断然拒绝在这个电报上签字。 在朱德的军旅生涯中，他经历过许许多多的坎坷和磨难，但从没有像在左路军那样心情沉重。在与张国焘右倾分裂行为斗争的极端艰难的时刻，朱德暗下决心，跟着这支队伍，哪怕遇到再多的艰难曲折，也要把它最终带到党的正确路线上来。 左路军折回阿坝后，张国焘立刻大造反对党中央的舆论，并实施对朱德的围攻。张国焘在川康省委及红军中党的活动分子会上攻击党中央率1、3军北上是“逃跑主义”，极力鼓吹南下。一些人跟着张国焘起哄，要朱德当众表态：“同毛泽东向北逃跑的错误划清界限”、“反对北上，拥护南下”。张国焘也逼着朱德表态。 朱德面对张国焘等人的无理围攻，非常镇定地说：党中央北上的方针是正确的。北上决议我在政治局会议上是举过手赞成的，不能出尔反尔。我是共产党员，我的义务是执行党的决定。并再次告诫张国焘等人；南下是没有出路的！这时有人冲着朱德大喊：既然你拥护北上，那你现在就走、快走！朱德非常从容地说，我是党中央派到这里工作的，既然你们坚持南下，我只好跟着你们去。当刘伯承看到张国焘等人如此蛮横地围攻朱德，挺身而出，非常激动地质问张国焘等人：现在不是开党的会议吗？你们怎么能这样对待朱总司令！刘伯承的话音刚落，张国焘等人又把攻击的目标转向刘伯承。刘伯承紧紧地同朱德站在一起，旗帜鲜明地表示拥护党中央北上方针的坚定立场。 9月17日，张国焘发布南下命令。左路军和右路军中的4军、30军分别由阿坝、包座地区南下，于10月初集中到卓克基、马尔康、松岗和党坝一线。10月5日，张国焘在四川省理番县卓木碉召开高级干部会议，公然另立党的“中央”、“中央政府”、“中央军委”、“团中央”，宣布“毛泽东、周恩来、博古、洛甫应撤销工作，开除中央委员及党籍，并下令通缉”。12月5日，张国焘狂妄地要求中共中央“不得再冒用党中央的名义”，只能称北方局，中华苏维埃共和国中央政府只能称陕甘政府，红一方面军只能称北路军。至此，张国焘分裂党、分裂红军的行动发展到登峰造极的地步。 面对张国焘分裂党和红军的行为，朱德坚持原则的坚定性和策略的灵活性。他心平气和地跟张国焘等人说：大敌当前，要讲团结嘛！The Red Army is one family.中国工农红军是在党中央统一领导下，是个整体。大家都知道、我们这个“朱毛”，在一起好多年，全国全世界都闻名。If a "Zhu" like me were to oppose "Mao", I couldn't do it!不论发生多大的事，都是红军内部的问题，大家要冷静，要找出解决问题的办法来，可不能叫蒋介石看我们的热闹！ 卓木碉会议后，朱德的处境更加艰难。他和刘伯承住在一起，没有行动的自由。朱德深沉地跟刘伯承说：过去军阀混战时，死是不值得的。现在为党的利益奋斗而死，是可以的。当然，个人是无所谓的，可是任事情这样发展下去，对整个革命不利呀！ 由于朱德和刘伯承在红军中享有极高的威望，张国焘没敢对他们采取极端行动。不久，朱德被派到前方部队去，刘伯承则被调至红军大学工作。朱德到前方部队后，利用各种机会做广大指战员的思想工作。他要求随左路军行动的原红一方面军5、9军团指战员，一定要坚持真理，坚持斗争，坚决拥护党中央北上方针，但要讲究正确的斗争方法，要顾全大局，要讲革命团结。四方面军广大指战员都是好的，革命的，都是我们的阶级兄弟。眼前的困难曲折总会能克服的。他还设法同四方面军的干部战士接触谈心，包括当面辱骂过他的人。朱德平易近人的作风、恢宏凝重的态度、循循善诱的话语，赢得了广大指战员的敬重。朱德还设法保护由于不同意张国焘南下、反对张国焘分裂党和红军而遭受其迫害的同志。 由于张国焘拒不执行党中央北上的正确方针，顽固坚持南下，致使红四方面军由南下时的8万人，经几个月的苦战锐减到4万余人。挫折和失败使四方面军广大指战员受到教育，逐渐认识到张国焘的南下方针是错误的。 朱德在左路军工作这段艰难的日子里，历经磨难。它坚持高度的原则性，绝不轻率地采取任何决裂的做法，努力说服争取教育四方面军广大指战员。当四方面军重新北上再度同党中央会合时，他动情地对红5军团政治委员李卓然说：你看，现在还是党的路线胜利了。如果我在初时不忍耐，就不能取得以后在四方面军工作的地位，那么就不能说服四方面军干部了。 1935年12月30日晚，朱德致电毛泽东、彭德怀等，介绍四方面有关情况。这是朱德随左路军行动后首次以个人名义给党中央发电，因为红军总部的通讯联络机构已被张国焘严密控制。毛泽东等接电后十分兴奋。毛泽东、朱德等领导人深知，要把两支革命力量再汇聚到一起，关键问题是要排除张国焘分裂主义的障碍。朱德为此深感自己的责任重大。转折的时机终于到来了。 1935年2月16日，中共驻共产国际代表团成员张浩从陕北致电张国焘：说明“共产国际派我来解决一、四方面军问题”。1936年1月24日，张浩又致电张国焘说：共产国际完全同意中国共产党中央的政治路线，中央红军的万里长征是胜利了。来电没有承认张国焘自立的“中央”，而要他成立西南局，对中央在原则问题上的争论可提交共产国际解决。张浩代表共产国际给张国焘的电报，对张国焘起到了一定的约束作用，一些跟着张国焘跑的人也表示服从共产国际的决定。孤家寡人的张国焘不得不表示“急谋党内统一”。朱德和刘伯承等趁机做张国焘的工作，要他取消自立的“中央”，服从党中央的领导。1936年1月27日，张国焘致电陕北，要求“和此间同时改为西北局和西南局”。党中央回电拒绝了张国焘这一无理要求，但作为过渡办法，同意西南局直属共产国际中共代表团领导，暂时同陕北党中央发生横向关系。 1936年2月，国民党当局增调重兵向天全、芦山地区发动大举进攻，张国焘被迫不断率部西撤。2月中下旬，四方面军陆续撤离天全、芦山、宝兴地区，向康北地区的道孚、炉霍、甘孜进军。四方面军进入甘孜地区时，部队减员过半，只剩下4万余人，而且给养极其困难。此时，张国焘的南下方针在实践中已宣告失败。 就在四方面军遭受重大损失和处境非常困难的情况下，党中央从陕北不断把各方面的情况电告红四方面军，要求其继续北上。红四方面军广大指战员要求北上抗日与党中央会合的愿望，以及对张国焘的分裂行为的不满情绪日益增长。从莫斯科回到陕北的张浩，也以中共驻共产国际代表团的名义对张国焘进行帮助。朱德、刘伯承不断劝说张国焘取消他另立的“中央”，北上与党中央会合。任弼时、贺龙领导的红2、6军团，也即将到达甘孜地区。在这种情况下，张国焘被迫同意北上，并于1936年6月6日宣布取消他另立的“中央”。 1936年2月下旬，年近50岁的朱德率领红四方面军先后翻过3000多米高的雪山夹金山和5000多米高的雪山党岭山。红四方面军进入康北地区后，为策应红2、6军团北进，决定在该地区停留一段时间。 红2、6军团于1935年11月开始长征。11月19日，红2、6军团为争取主动，在任弼时、贺龙、关向应、萧克、王震等领导下，从桑植地区出发，开始实行战略转移。1936年1月进入黔东石阡、镇原、黄平地区。由于国民党军队四面紧逼，部队又向黔西、大定、毕节等地转移。3月下旬，部队到这盘县、亦子孔地区。3月30日，红2、6军团接到朱德总司令、张国焘总政治委员的电报，命令他们北渡金沙江同位于甘孜地区的红四方面军会师。红2、6军团立即离开盘县地区向西急进，渡过金沙江，翻越大雪山，于7月2日到达甘孜地区，与红四方面军会师。会师后，党中央指令红2、6军团合编为红二方面军（红32军编入），任命贺龙为总指挥，任弼时为政治委员，萧克为副总指挥，关向应为副政治委员。此时，张国焘虽已取消另立的“中央”，但并没有改变同党中央对抗的立场。他企图拉拢红2、6军团领导人站在他的一边，遭到红2、6军团领导人的坚决抵制。在朱德、刘伯承、任弼时、贺龙、关向应等力争下，红2、4方面军决定共同北上，同党中央和红一方面军会合。 7月上旬，红二、四方面军从甘孜出发，于8月到达甘肃南部。中共中央和中革军委为了促成抗日民族统一战线，迎接全国的抗日高潮，已于8月提出三支红军主力会师后，合力夺取宁夏的战役计划，以巩固和扩大西北根据地，并打通与苏联的交通，形成西北抗日局面，进而出兵绥远，推动全国大规模抗战的实现。9月14日，中共中央和中革军委为此要求进抵甘南的红四方面军立即占领隆德、静宁、会宁、通渭地区，控制西（安）兰（州）大道，与在固原西部的红一方面军部队靠近，阻止胡宗南部西进；同时，派聂荣臻、左权率部到西兰公路以北，迎接红二、四方面军北上会师，争取两个月后夺取宁夏。但张国焘此时又对北进方针发生动摇，于9月21日命令红四方面军撤离通渭等地，掉头西进，打算迅速从兰州以西永靖、循化一带过黄河，进到凉州、永登地区。后经党中央的耐心说服并命令，以及朱德和红四方面军一些领导人的抵制和斗争，加之在兰州以西渡河困难等因素，张国焘只好放弃这一打算。9月下旬，红四方面军继续北进。 10月9日，朱德率领红四方面军指挥部到达会宁。当他见到党中央派来的一方面军部队时十分激动，禁不住热泪盈眶。21日，红二方面军领导人贺龙、任弼时、关向应、刘伯承在平锋