Chapter 2 Chapter Two Zhou Enlai in the Long March

In May 1933, Chiang Kai-shek established the "Military Committee Chairman Nanchang Camp" in Nanchang, deployed the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Soviet Area, and personally directed the "encirclement and suppression".He mobilized heavy troops and adopted a new strategy of "fortressism" in the military, advancing step by step and fighting for a long time. In the Central Soviet Area at this time, after four victories against "encirclement and suppression", the Red Army expanded to more than 80,000 people, and the armed forces of the masses also developed greatly. Judging from the comparison of the strength of the enemy and ourselves, it was almost the same as the previous several anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns. If the correct strategic and military principles are followed, it is possible to break the "encirclement and suppression" campaign and achieve victory.

But at this time, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promoted a set of wrong strategic and military principles. On June 13, 1933, the Provisional Central Committee issued instructions on future combat plans.This battle plan was drawn up in Shanghai by Fred Stern, the general military adviser of the Comintern in the CCP.In the instructions, the "weakness" of the front-stage military operations of the Red Front Army was criticized as "the main force is concentrated in a single combat unit, that is, the front army, which cannot cooperate in operations from all aspects."In order to win the two strategic directions of Fujian and Jiangxi at the same time, the instruction required "a number of troops to be transferred from the front army" to "carry out separate operations."

Later, Mao Zedong once called this "hitting someone with two fists" and pointed out that this was wrong. On September 25, 1933, three divisions of the enemy's North Route Army launched an attack on Lichuan in the Central Soviet Area, starting the fifth "encirclement and suppression".The provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China put forward the wrong policy of "defending the enemy outside the country's gates". Mao Zedong later said: "In the fifth 'encirclement and suppression' campaign, the enemy advanced with a new strategy of fortressism, and first occupied Lichuan. Our troops attempted to restore Lichuan, keep the enemy out of the base area, and attack the enemy's consolidated positions north of Lichuan. The saltpeter in the white area. We were unable to win the first battle, and we attacked the Zixi bridge in the southeast, which was also the enemy's solid position and the white area, and we were invincible. After that, we found battles between the enemy's main force and the fortress, and fell into a completely passive position."

Zhou Enlai advocated the use of mobile warfare to destroy the enemy.In April 1933, he wrote an article entitled "On the Enemy's Fortress", which was published in the "Red Battlefield Transactions", in which he said: "Generally speaking, we should destroy the enemy's field army before attacking other Fortress." In an article he wrote in May, he said: "In short, we must use a small number of troops in secondary directions to capture the majority of the enemy's troops, so that we can draw out the majority of troops to attack the enemy in the main assault. direction, and destroy the enemy with certainty." Compared with the enemy, the Red Army generally does not have an advantage, but "concentrate superior forces and weapons in the direction of the decisive battle", and the direction from which the troops are drawn becomes the superior enemy. This is the effective tactical principle of the Red Army in mobile warfare, that is, the tactic of concentrating forces and defeating the enemy one by one.This is consistent with Zhou Enlai's thinking. Even in the spring of 1934, when the central government made serious "Left" errors in military leadership, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De still pointed out in the telegram to Fang Zhimin: You should "concentrate and expand The Red 10th Army wiped out the enemy's attacking troops in mobile warfare" and "dispatched powerful independent troops to extend into western Zhejiang for activities".

However, the central leaders in the rear ignored the different opinions of Zhou Enlai and others and the valuable experience of past battles, and repeatedly ordered the Red Army to penetrate into the gaps in the enemy's fortresses to destroy the enemy, and even said, "If you refuse to attack such fortresses in principle, then Refuse to fight".Both Zhou Enlai and Zhu De were leaders with strong organizational discipline, so they had to follow the orders of the central government.From late September to mid-November 1933, the Red Front Army, in accordance with the orders of the Provisional Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, fought continuously for nearly two months between the enemy's main force and the fortress, but failed to keep the enemy out of the Soviet area. , I suffered a great loss instead.

In September 1933, Li De (also known as Hua Fu), a military adviser sent by the Communist International, arrived in the Central Soviet Area from Shanghai. With the support of Bogu, he actually took control of the leadership of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. On December 20, in the name of unifying the front and rear command, Li De proposed and decided by the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to cancel the name and organization of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Command and the Red Front Army Command, and withdraw the original "front headquarters" to the rear. , and was incorporated into the Central Revolutionary Military Commission.In the future, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission will directly command the armies in the Central Soviet Area to fight against other independent divisions and regiments. In fact, Bogu and Li De will directly command the army.

On January 4, 1934, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De left the front and returned to Ruijin. On April 10, the enemy concentrated 11 divisions to attack Guangchang, an important city in the Central Soviet Area, and formed two columns, Hexi and Hedong, to alternately build blockhouses along the east and west banks of the Fuhe River.The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission disregarded the fact that the Red Army was fighting continuously, was very tired, suffered a lot of losses, and the enemy was well-equipped and powerful. The 23rd Division, with a total of 9 divisions, fought a "decisive battle" with the enemy in Guangchang and the area to the north, and proposed "to fight to defend Guangchang, which is to fight to defend the Chinese revolution", "victory or death" " and other wrong slogans.After the start of the Guangchang Defense War, the fighting was very intense and lasted 18 days.Although the Red Army severely damaged the enemy, it also suffered more than 5,000 casualties, accounting for one-fifth of the total troops participating in the war.The number of cadre casualties is also very large. In one regiment, there is only one company-level cadre left.This battle not only failed to keep Guangchang, but also lost Jianning. On the evening of the 27th, the Red Army withdrew from Guangchang and moved to the west and south of Guangchang.This was a positional battle against the enemy, which had an extremely adverse effect on the Red Army's future operations.

After the failure of the Battle of Guangchang, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting in Ruijin to discuss whether the Central Red Army would withdraw from the Central Revolutionary Base.The time of this meeting was probably in May 1934.After the meeting, this decision was reported to the Comintern, and the Comintern agreed.From the decision to transfer to departure, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee held four meetings.At the first meeting, it was decided that Bo Gu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai would set up a "three-person group" and "the three-person group would handle everything."Zhou Enlai said: The actual situation later was that the "Three Entrants" were mainly in charge of the military, and it was formal, but in fact it was still the masters in politics and Li De in the military.For example, when the Central Red Army was transferred, such a major event as the leading cadres of the party and government who left and who stayed was not discussed in the "three-member group". It was entirely Bogu's decision and Zhou Enlai was not informed.

The Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee decided to evacuate the Central Soviet Area, but Li De, who was in charge of the military, did not actively prepare for the evacuation, and continued to fight recklessly. In early July, the Kuomintang army, with 31 divisions, launched a full-scale attack on the center of the Central Soviet Area from six directions.Li De adopted the erroneous policy of dividing troops into six routes and resisting on all fronts, and continued to fight against the dominant Kuomintang army, saying that "continue to defend the Central Soviet Area with all strength." On August 5, the Kuomintang army concentrated 9 divisions to attack the area north of Yiqian.The Red Army built a position about 15 kilometers deep in front of Gao Hunao, Wannian Pavilion and Post Station.In the Gaohunao and Banqiao defensive battles on the 6th and the Wannianting defensive battle on the 13th, the Red Army repelled many group charges of the Kuomintang army, causing Chiang Kai-shek's elite 89th Division to lose its combat effectiveness and withdraw from the battle, but it also suffered heavy casualties. On the 27th, they had to abandon all positions north of Yiqian.All the rest of the enemy forces advanced towards the center of the Central Soviet Area. By the end of September, the Central Soviet Area consisted of only a long and narrow area formed by the counties of Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Xingguo, Ningdu, Shicheng, Ninghua, and Changting.It was only at this time that the Red Army was really ready to set off and move to a new area.

On August 18, Zhou Enlai published "New Situation and New Victory" in "Red Star".The article said: In June and July, the enemy redeployed troops and repaired the road blockhouses, and in the second half of July, they launched a new step of large-scale offensive.The main line of attack is to attack in the direction of the post with three columns of troops in an attempt to occupy Shicheng.Cooperating with the attack were the attack on Tingzhou from the direction of Liancheng, and the attack on Xingguo with more than five divisions on the northwest line;The article pointed out: The situation in the Soviet area is dangerous, and the Red Army on the one hand must always be ready to dispatch all of them to fight against Japanese imperialism.The article actually hints at getting ready to transfer.

At that time, the "encirclement and suppression" army on the southern front of the Soviet area was the troops of Chen Jitang of the Cantonese Army. They were very negative about the "encirclement and suppression" and fought against the Red Army.Historically, Chen Jitang sent a telegram against Chiang. He was worried that Chiang Kai-shek would copy the hometown of the Guangdong Army from Fujian after defeating the Red Army, so he wanted to negotiate peace with the Red Army.Chen Jitang sent a person who knew Zhou Enlai secretly to Ruijin, and sent a letter to Zhou Enlai, saying that he planned to send Major General Yang Youmin, Chief of Staff Huang Zhiwen, and Huang Xuchu as a negotiating delegation, and hoped that we would send He Changgong, commander of the Guangdong-Jiangxi Provincial Military Region, as a negotiating delegation. General representative, conduct negotiations.Zhou Enlai talked to He Changgong and asked He Changgong to be the general representative to negotiate with Chen Jitang's representative.Zhou Enlai said: "Changgong, if I send you a telegram to tell you that the pigeon you fed has flown, you should come back quickly, and I will send a cadre to wait for you in Huichang." Following Zhou Enlai's instructions, He Changgong wore a suit, straw hat and sunglasses, sat in a sedan chair carried by four people, and brought a company of cavalry to negotiate.When they arrived at the enemy's outpost in Yunmenling, the enemy company commander said to his subordinates: "This is a guest invited by the commander-in-chief." He Changgong negotiated with Yang Youmin and others in a western-style building about 40 miles away from Yunmenling. He Changgong said: "Commander He, let's stop fighting. Let the two settle together. If we defeat you, we won't get anything. If you defeat us, the most you can do is go to Guangdong to eat a few sugarcane." After three days and three During the night of negotiations, the two sides reached five agreements: 1. Agree to cease fighting and cancel hostilities.2. Lift the blockade and open business with each other.3. Interchange of information, with a line telephone.4. The Red Army can set up rear hospitals in northern Guangdong.5. You can borrow from each other, and the two sides retreat 20 li from the current front. At this time, He Changgong received a telegram from Zhou Enlai saying: "The pigeon you fed has flown." Yang Youmin asked after learning about it: "Did you go away?" The pigeon flew into the sky, congratulations." Chen Jitang sent a cavalry company to escort He Changgong back to the Soviet area.After He Changgong arrived in Huichang, Zhou Enlai sent a letter saying that Yudu was waiting for him.He Changgong went to Yudu overnight to report to Zhou Enlai.Zhou Enlai said: "This time the negotiation was very good, but we can't do this anymore, we have to act. There are no other positions for the time being. Please go to the teacher as a political commissar." At this time, the Red Army from all walks of life gathered on the north bank of the Du River (Gongshui).To leave the Soviet area and set out on an expedition, one had to cross the Kudu River, and a bridge had to be built over the river.Yudu River is more than 600 meters wide, 1 to 3 meters deep, and the bottom of the river is sand.In order to build the bridge, Zhou Enlai had lived in the capital for more than 20 days and personally instructed the collection of equipment.To avoid exposure, bridging work will be carried out between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. each day. On October 14, Zhou En came to the work site to inspect. On October 16, the operation of crossing the river began, and it was carried out between 6:00 pm and 7:00 the next morning for several consecutive days. On the evening of October 10, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the headquarters of the Red Army set off from Ruijin and embarked on a journey. On October 21, the expeditionary Red Army broke through the enemy's first blockade.The Cantonese army guarded this blockade line. Due to an agreement reached through negotiations, when the Red Army broke through to the south, the enemy actually retreated while fighting and did not intercept the Red Army. Therefore, the Red Army successfully passed through Chen Jitang's area in a short time.In the following month or so, the Red Army broke through the second, third, and fourth blockade lines of the enemy with the "long-suffering division", breaking through the Kuomintang Central Army and the Guangdong, Hunan, and Guangxi troops. Chased and intercepted by the troops, they broke through the encirclement and crossed the Xiangjiang River.The troops dropped sharply from more than 80,000 at the beginning of the Western Expedition to more than 30,000. The Kuomintang judged that the Central Red Army would go to Xiangxi to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army Corps, and assembled 200,000 troops in Hongjiang and Zhijiang in southern Hunan, Songtao, Tongren, and Shiqian in Guizhou, and set up four lines of defense. From December 4th to 6th, the Red Army crossed the Laoshan boundary.From this time on, disputes arose within the central leadership, mainly over the strategic course of action of the Red Army.Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang openly criticized the military line of the Central Committee, arguing that the failure since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was caused by the wrong line of strategy and tactics in the military leadership.The Red Army should adopt the policy of concentrating superior forces, selecting the enemy's weak points, destroying part or most of the enemy in mobile warfare, and defeating the enemy one by one.He also proposed to Zhou Enlai: In view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had set up heavy troops on the way to the 2nd and 6th Red Army, and the Red Army had lost the opportunity to reach western Hunan, it was suggested to march instead to Guizhou, where the enemy is weak, and establish a border base in Sichuan and Guizhou. On December 11, the Red Army occupied Tongdao County, Hunan Province. On the 12th, the heads of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting in the channel to discuss the direction of the Red Army's actions.Zhou Enlai supported Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang's proposal to march to Guizhou.However, after the meeting, Bo Gu and Li De still insisted on going to Xiangxi to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army. On the 15th, the Red Army captured Liping. On the 18th, Zhou Enlai presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to discuss the strategic policy of the Red Army.Zhou Enlai decided to adopt Mao Zedong's opinion and cross the Wujiang River to the north.The "Decision" of the meeting pointed out that it is impossible and inappropriate to establish a new Soviet base in western Hunan.The meeting decided to hold a meeting after going to Zunyi to summarize the experience and lessons of military command since the anti-five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns.The Liping Conference is a very important meeting. With the Liping Conference, there is the Zunyi Conference.Zhou Enlai later said: The debate in Liping was particularly fierce. I decided to adopt Mao Zedong's opinion, and Li De was furious because of the failure of the debate.Shortly thereafter, Li De's command of the Red Army was suspended. From January 2 to 6, 1935, the Red Army crossed the Wujiang River. On January 7, Zunyi was occupied.Zunyi is an important town in northern Guizhou, surrounded by rolling mountains.It connects Chongqing, Sichuan Province in the north, Guiyang, the capital of Guizhou Province in the south, Wuling Mountain in the east, and Dalou Mountain in the west. There are about 30,000 people in the city, with convenient transportation and a prosperous market.Although the Red Army's western expedition was arduous, it was still a well-disciplined people's army.Zhou Enlai was the general political commissar of the Red Army. He still emphasized political work in addition to handling the overall military situation.After the Red Army occupied Zunyi, the General Political Department issued the "Slogan and Eight Points of Attention on Entering Zunyi City", and Zhou Enlai personally inspected the enforcement of discipline by the troops. From January 15th to 17th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Zunyi.The first issue to be resolved at the meeting was "deciding and reviewing the issue of temporarily centering on northern Guizhou and establishing Soviet base areas decided at the Liping Conference".In view of the changes in the situation, the meeting decided that the Red Army would cross the Yangtze River north and establish a Soviet base in the southwest or northwest of Chengdu. The second topic of the meeting was to liquidate the mistakes of the "Left" line in the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and the Red Army's breakout expedition to the west. This was the central topic of the meeting.Bogu first made a report on the summary of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, saying that the Red Army's defeat was due to the strength of the imperialist and Kuomintang reactionary forces.Then Zhou Enlai made a deputy report on this issue.He pointed out that the main reason for the failure of the Red Army's fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was the strategic and tactical mistakes in military leadership.He took the initiative to take responsibility, criticized Li De and Bogu's mistakes, and expressed full agreement with the outline and opinions put forward by Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang.The meeting held that Comrades Li De, Bogu, and Zhou Enlai were responsible for the mistakes of military leadership, and Li De and Bogu should bear the main responsibility. The meeting finally made the following decisions: 1. Add Mao Zedong to the Central Standing Committee.2. Designate Zhang Wentian to draft a resolution, entrust the Standing Committee to review it and send it to the branch for discussion.3. Proper division of labor among the Standing Committee.4. Cancel the three-member regiment and revoke Bogu and Li De's military leadership.The top military chiefs Zhu De and Zhou Enlai are still the military commanders, and Zhou is entrusted by the party to make the final decision in command of the military.After the meeting, the Standing Committee of the Central Committee decided to use Mao Zedong as Zhou Enlai's helper in military command. The Zunyi Conference actually established Mao Zedong's leading position in the Red Army and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, enabling the Red Army and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to survive in an extremely critical situation. Nie Rongzhen said: "From long-term practice, Zhou Enlai has realized that Comrade Mao Zedong's views are correct, and he also agrees with Comrade Mao Zedong to come out to lead. The attitudes of Zhou Enlai and Comrade Wang Jiaxiang played a key role in the success of the Zunyi Conference." After the Zunyi Conference, the central government decided to march to Sichuan.At that time, the selected place to cross the Yangtze River in the north was the line from Yibin to Luzhou in the upper reaches of Chongqing. On January 19, the Red Army marched in three routes from Songkan, Tongzi, and Zunyi to Chishui and Tucheng.Zhou Enlai and the central column left Zunyi for Sidu. At the Zunyi Meeting, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was criticized for being insufficient to the leadership of the Military Commission. Therefore, at this time, the Political Bureau discussed operations and marching routes every day. Zhou Enlai and Zhu De issued combat or marching orders based on the decisions made at the meeting and organized their implementation. The actions of the Red Army made Chiang Kai-shek feel that southern Sichuan was threatened, so he urgently ordered He Guoguang, the staff stationed in Sichuan, and Liu Xiang, the Sichuan Army, to organize the "Southern Sichuan Suppression General", and sent Pan Wenhua as the commander-in-chief to Luzhou, and concentrated his forces in the Chishui, Gulin, and Xuyong areas. Arrange a blockade to block the Yangtze River.On the other hand, he ordered Longyun's Yunnan army to go to Guizhou, ordered Wang Jialie of the Qian army to cross the Wujiang River to chase after the Red Army, transferred the Shangguan Yunxiang Department of the Central Army from Henan and Hubei to Songkan, and ordered Zhou Hunyuan's troops to cross the Wujiang River to the west of Guizhou. Dading (now Dafang) flanked the Red Army, and Wu Qiwei's troops were on standby in Guiyang. On January 29, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De and others commanded the Red Army to cross the Chishui River to the west, and prepared to cross the Jinsha River from the upper reaches of Yibin to the north.But at this time, the 36 regiments of Pan Wenhua's Department of the Sichuan Army had arrived in Chishui, Gulin, and Xuyong to prevent blockage.The Red Army avoided reality and entered the Tashi area of ​​Weixin County, Yunnan Province.Before entering Tashi, when passing through the three provincial villages of Jiming at the junction of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou, the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided that Zhang Wentian would replace Bogu in the party's general responsibility, and Bogu would be appointed acting director of the General Political Department. On February 8, the Red Army entered Tashi Town, where an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was held.At the meeting, Mao Zedong proposed to return to the east and cross Chishui to regain Zunyi. Around February 20, the Red Army crossed Chishui for the second time, occupied Tongzi on the 24th, captured Loushan Pass on the 25th, entered Zunyi on the 28th, and pursued the enemy until the north bank of the Wujiang River.This battle defeated 8 regiments of Wang Jialie's department and two divisions of Wu Qiwei's department of the Guizhou Army, captured about 3,000 enemies, and surrendered more than a thousand guns. It was the biggest victory since the Long March. After the Red Army crossed Chishui for the second time, Chiang Kai-shek personally flew to Chongqing to "supervise and suppress" and ordered to encircle and wipe out the Red Army in the area west of Wujiang River. Faced with this situation, Chairman Zhu De, Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to set up a special headquarters of the front enemy, "entrust Comrade Zhu De as the commander of the front enemy, and Comrade Mao Zedong as the political commissar of the front enemy", and stipulated that "once the corps arrive at the concentrated area, That is, it is under the command of the front enemy headquarters, but the rear of the 1st and 3rd Army Corps is under the command of the field command". Chiang Kai-shek commanded the army to encircle Zunyi, while the Red Army marched westward from Zunyi. On March 10, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Gouba to discuss the next military action. Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen proposed to attack Daguxinchang (Jinsha County), which was approved at the meeting.Zhou Enlai later recalled: As soon as we set out from Zunyi, we encountered an enemy division guarding Daguxinchang. Everyone held a meeting saying that we would fight and insisted on attacking that fortress.Only Chairman Mao said that we can't fight, and fighting is tough, and we shouldn't lose it. We should destroy the enemy in mobile warfare.But others unanimously agreed to fight, but Chairman Mao's high prestige still refused to listen, and he had no choice but to obey.But when Chairman Mao went back and thought about it, he was still worried and felt that this was wrong, so he came to me again in the middle of the night with a lantern and asked me to delay issuing the order for a while, so I thought about it.I accepted Chairman Mao's opinion and held a meeting early in the morning to convince everyone. After the meeting, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the "Instructions Regarding Our Army Not Attacking Xinchang", which avoided a major loss for the Red Army, because if the Red Army attacked Xinchang, it would not arrive until the 12th, when the Yunnan Army would also rush to join the Guizhou Army , and the Sichuan Army can also flank the Red Army. On the evening of the 10th, the Military Commission ordered the Red Army to concentrate in the Ping'an Village, Fengxiangba, and Huamiaotian areas to seek new maneuvers. After that, in view of the need for concentration and decisiveness in combat, it is easy to make mistakes when convening so many people to discuss, so Mao Zedong proposed to set up a small group to command the military with full authority.Before the Red Army crossed Chishui in the west and crossed the Wujiang River in the south, the central government decided to establish a three-entry regiment composed of Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang, that is, a three-member military command group, with Zhou Enlai as the "regiment leader". The actions of the Red Army after the Zunyi Conference were very different from those in the past. They were erratic, moving from east to west, avoiding the real and attacking the weak, and attacking cities and territories. On March 16, the Red Army crossed Chishui westward again. Chiang Kai-shek thought that the Red Army would cross the Yangtze River north again, so he immediately dispatched troops to southern Sichuan to prevent the blockage.Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly flew from Chongqing to Guiyang to command and intercept. On March 31, the Red Army crossed the Wujiang River to the south, and on April 2, they pretended to attack Xifeng, and the forward approached Guiyang. Chiang Kai-shek was very anxious and hurriedly transferred the Yunnan Army to Guizhou for reinforcements.The Red Army sent a force to cross the Qingshui River to the east, pretending to enter Hunan.Fearing that the Red Army would join the 2nd and 6th Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek urgently ordered the Central Army, Hunan Army, and Qian Army to block the Red Army from leaving Hunan eastward.Unexpectedly, the main force of the Red Army shot a false shot under the city of Guiyang, and then quickly moved south. Taking advantage of the emptiness of Yunnan troops, starting from April 10, the county towns of Kedingfan (now Huishui) and Guangshun (now Changshun) were joined. The white strata in Feng County crossed the Beipan River to occupy Zhenfeng, Anlong, Xingren and other counties, entered Yunnan on the 23rd, and immediately occupied Pingyi (now Fuyuan) and Luoping. On the 27th, Lianke Baishui, Qujing, Zhanyi, Ma Long, and the forwards approached Kunming.Long Yun, chairman of the Kuomintang Yunnan Province, hurriedly mobilized troops to defend Kunming.Taking advantage of the emptiness on both sides of the Jinsha River, the Red Army decided to quickly cross the Jinsha River, transfer to western Sichuan to destroy the enemy, and establish a Soviet base.The Military Commission sent Liu Bocheng to lead a cadre regiment to Jiaopingdu, Luquan County.Zhou Enlai personally went to the cadre group to understand the situation and made arrangements.At the same time, it was decided that the 1st Red Army would capture Longjie, and the 3rd Red Army would go to Hongmendu to occupy the ferry. Mo Wenhua once talked about the situation of rushing across the Jinsha River: On April 29, the cadre regiment advanced to the Yi people's area 280 miles away from the dangerous Jinsha River, and received an order from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to order the cadre regiment to seize the Jinsha River on May 1st. On the 30th, I walked 100 miles a day, got up in the middle of the night and continued to walk, and walked 180 miles a day and a night. The Jinsha River came into view, and the waves were as rough as ten thousand horses galloping.The team quickly approached the river, where there were two small boats that could accommodate 30 people, so they crossed a row of people first.More than 60 Kuomintang soldiers were captured by the river.The two small boats could only ferry more than 1,300 people a day and night, so they searched for boats separately, and finally got 6 boats. The punters punted for the Red Army one after another, making the Red Army cross the river successfully.After the cadre regiment crossed the river to the north bank, they received an order to occupy Tong'an, which was more than 20 miles away from the river bank, so they left a company to maintain the order of crossing the river, and the rest attacked Tong'an.After fighting, the enemy suffered casualties everywhere, and more than 600 people were captured, including a regiment leader.Only then did I learn that the enemy in Tong'an had two regiments, including a deputy division commander.The Tong'an battle opened up the way for the Central Red Army to cross the Jinsha River to the north.In terms of numbers, there were only about 80 vanguard troops crossing the Jinsha River, and only 400 guns participated in the Tong'an battle. On May 4, Zhou Enlai crossed the river. Together with Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Liu Bocheng, he commanded the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Red Army Corps to cross the Jinsha River on the 9th.The 9th Red Army also crossed the river at Qiaojia in Yunnan.At this point, the Red Army finally got rid of the hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops besieged and intercepted. On May 12, Zhou Enlai participated in the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held in the suburbs of Huili, where he criticized Lin Biao's request to replace Mao Zedong's military command. On the 24th, the Red Army occupied Anshun Field in Shimian County by the Dadu River.Anshunchang is a ferry crossing by the Dadu River. Like the Jinsha River, it is impossible to build a bridge here.The current of the Jinsha River was so fast that it was impossible to cross the river at right angles by boat. To cross the Dadu River in Anshunchang, the boat had to rush along the current at an oblique angle.At the crossing point, the river is choppy, and an enemy battalion is guarding the opposite bank, blocking fire.In April of the second year of Tongzhi in the Qing Dynasty, that is, in May of the Gregorian calendar, Shi Dakai, the wing king of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, led tens of thousands of Taiping troops to Anshunchang, but failed to cross the river, and the entire army was wiped out.Chiang Kai-shek hopes that after the Red Army arrives here, it will become "Second Shi Dakai". After the Red Army arrived at Anshunchang, 17 warriors successfully crossed the turbulent waves with this wooden boat and captured the opposite bank. On the afternoon of the 26th, Zhou Enlai and other central leaders rushed to Anshunchang. They saw that the Dadu River was too fast. Although there were four small boats at this time, they could only cross a group of people a day. Liu Bocheng led the 1st Division of the Red 1st Army and the cadre regiment to the left bank of the Dadu River; Lin Biao led the headquarters of the 1st Red Army, the main force of the 2nd Division of the Red Army, and the 5th Red Army to follow the right bank of the Dadu River, going back 300 miles, and snatching the Luding Bridge. On the 29th, 22 soldiers from the 2nd Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 1st Red Army, led by company commander Liao Dazhu, occupied the Luding Bridge. By June 2nd, all the Red Army had crossed the river. After forcibly crossing the Dadu River, the Kuomintang regained the Luding Bridge in the back.The Red Army continued to march northward and defeated the interception of six brigades of the enemy's Yang Sen Department at Tianquan River. They occupied Tianquan on the 7th and Lushan on the 8th, breaking through the enemy's Lushan and Baoxing defense lines.Then, climb over the Jiajin Mountain, which is more than 4,000 meters above sea level, covered with snow all the year round, thin in the sky and steep in the road.Jiajin Mountain is located in the northwest of Baoxing County, south of Maogong, and southwest of Maozhou and Li County. Every afternoon, there is heavy snowfall. It is summer at the foot of the mountain, and the Red Army only wears a single military uniform. It is severe winter on the mountain, and it is impossible for the Red Army to replenish their clothes before going up the mountain. , It is also impossible to serve some wine, but each company should boil some chili water and drink a bowl for each person.Many Red Army soldiers died and stayed here forever. On June 12, the vanguard of the Red 1 Front Army crossed Jiajin Mountain, arrived at Dawei in Maogong (now Xiaojin), and joined forces with Li Xiannian, the vanguard of the Red Fourth Front Army. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De and others also crossed Jiajin Mountain and arrived in Wei.Dawei is a Tibetan area.After a day's rest in Dawei, he went to Maogong to join the 30th Army of the Red Fourth Front Army in Maogong.In the evening, a party for cadres of the First and Fourth Front Army of the Red Army was held. In Maogong, the Red Army controlled Balang Pass, the main road from Guan County to Maogong in the east, and Jiajin Mountain from Tianquan and Baoxing to Maogong in the south, resisting the Sichuan army chasing from both sides.So I can rest for a few days and rectify. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhang Wentian called the leaders of the Fourth Red Front Army and said: "In the future, the general policy of our First and Fourth Front Army should be to occupy the three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu, and establish a Soviet regime in the three provinces." The region, the west bank of the Dadu River, and Xikang (Xikang Province at that time, which is now western Sichuan and eastern Tibet) "are deep mountains and poor valleys, sparsely populated, and difficult to provide for." Therefore, in the Qionglai Mountains area, only small troops can be used for activities, and the main force It doesn't seem like a long-term strategy." On June 20, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhang Wentian called Zhang Guotao, asking to "come immediately to make meritorious deeds so that we can discuss everything."But Zhang Guotao couldn't excuse it.Zhang Guotao's slogan at that time was to go south, "take Chengdu straight, go out of the Yangtze River, and fight to Wuhan"; the other was to go west to Xikang, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.Those who do not agree with his views are considered to be rightist, and they "should be severely opposed."In order to unify the strategic thinking, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee decided to hold a meeting in Lianghekou on June 26.Zhou Enlai and others arrived at Lianghekou from Maogong. On June 25, Zhou Enlai attended the joint meeting of the Red Army and the Red Army in Lianghekou, and met with Zhang Guotao.Zhang Guotao asked Zhou Enlai, how many troops does the Red Army still have?Zhou Enlai, because Zhang Guotao is also one of the heads of the central government, of course told the truth that there are about 30,000 people.After Zhang Guotao heard this, he believed that the Fourth Red Army now had 80,000 troops, and his attitude towards the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China immediately became tough, and he said that the Fourth Red Army was going west. On June 26, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a Politburo meeting in Lianghekou, Maogong County, to focus on this issue.Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Liu Bocheng, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Bogu, Liu Shaoqi, Kai Feng, Deng Fa, Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen, Zhang Guotao, Lin Boqu, Li Fuchun, a total of 16 people attended the meeting. At the meeting, Zhou Enlai first made a report on the current strategic policy.He reviewed the history of the Red Army's transition to war after it withdrew from the Soviet area, and discussed the reasons why Songpan, Lixian, and Maoxian areas were not conducive to establishing base areas, and they had to go north to Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu to establish base areas around the current policy of action: (1) Sichuan Shaanxi-Gansu has a large area, which is conducive to maneuvering; Songpan, Lixian, and Maoxian are large in area, but the roads are narrow, which is conducive to the enemy's blockade of us, but it is not easy for us to counterattack. (2) The people in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu have good conditions and a large population, which is beneficial to the expansion of the two armies. However, the population of Song, Li, Maojia and Fubian areas is only 200,000. (3) There is a shortage of food in the areas of Song, Li, and Mao, and some places are not even self-sufficient in food. There are also limited grassland cattle and sheep, and their living habits are not suitable.In addition, the enemy is still intercepting and blocking us, trying to trap us in the Song, Li, and Mao areas. If we are really trapped in this area, we will have no future.Therefore, we must move forward quickly, and it is impossible to go east or south. We should develop to the north of the Minshan Mountains (a large mountain range adjacent to Gansu in northern Sichuan) and strive for this area. Mao Zedong spoke in agreement with Zhou Enlai's report.He put forward five points: (1) The Chinese Red Army should use all its strength to develop base areas in new areas.The establishment of base areas in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu can put the movement to create Soviet areas on a more solid foundation, and this is the policy going forward. (2) The nature of our war is not decisive battle defense, not running, but offense.Base areas are developed by attacking.We crossed the mountains to defeat Hu Zongnan, occupied Gannan, and quickly developed northward to establish a new base. (3) We should see which places were ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, and we should break them first.I have to be highly maneuverable, so there is a problem with walking. I have to choose a route to develop northward and seize the opportunity first. (4) Concentrate forces in the direction of Songpan, such as attacking Songpan, if you decide today, you must act tomorrow.The population here is sparse, the weather is cold, and food and clothing are difficult. We should strive to break through in June and go to the determined area via Songpan. (5) Instruct the Standing Committee and the Military Commission to resolve the issue of unified command. Zhu De also spoke in agreement with Zhou Enlai's report, saying: The general strategic policy of relying on the northwest and facing the southeast should be decided.It is necessary to quickly fight out of Songpan, occupy Gannan, defeat the enemy, and establish a base area.It is necessary to mobilize the enemy troops to destroy them in the field. At the meeting, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Bogu, Wang Jiaxiang, Liu Bocheng, Nie Rongzhen, Kai Feng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhang Wentian, etc. all spoke and agreed with Zhou Enlai's report on the policy of going north, believing that the most important thing at present is to fight out from Songpan.Zhang Guotao also made a speech at the meeting, and verbally expressed his agreement with the strategic policy of going north to establish bases in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu. In the end, the meeting "all passed Zhou Enlai's strategic policy, the Political Department made an instruction, and the Political Bureau wrote a decision." On the 28th, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee made a decision on the "Strategic Policy after the First and Fourth Front Army Convergence", pointing out: Our strategic policy is to concentrate the main force to attack the north, wipe out a large number of enemies in mobile warfare, and first acquire southern Gansu to create Sichuan-Shanxi-Gansu Soviet area base.In order to achieve this strategic policy, the main force must first be concentrated in the campaign to eliminate and attack the southern part of Hu Zong, capture Songpan and control the area north of Songpan, so that the Red Army can successfully advance to Gansu.The military, political, and economic conditions of the Great and Small Jinchuan River Basins were not conducive to the activities and development of most of the Red Army.A small number of forces can be left to develop guerrilla warfare, making this area a part of the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area. After the 1st and 4th Red Army met, the deployment of the Kuomintang troops was as follows: Chiang Kai-shek estimated that the Red Army might enter Xikang, Qinghai, or go north to Shaanxi and Gansu, and at the same time prevent the Red Army from going east, so he assembled the main forces of the Sichuan Army, Liu Xiang, Sun Zhen, Li Jiayu and other departments. About 90 regiments are stationed in the Jiangyou and Wenchuan areas; 27 regiments in the south of Hu Zong are used to defend Wenxian County in Gansu and Songpan, Pingwu, and Jiangyou in Sichuan; The mountain built fortifications and advanced towards the Red Army; about 15 regiments from Liu Wenhui and Li Baobing built fortifications in the Kangding, Danba, and Luding areas and guarded the Dadu River.In addition, use Xue Yue's department to concentrate on Mianyang, Sichuan, and Guo Xunqi's department to gather in Xinjin to support the east bank of the Minjiang River.At the same time, Yu Xuezhong was appointed as the commander-in-chief of "suppressing bandits" in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu.The purpose of these deployments was to prevent the Red Army from entering Gansu or crossing the Minjiang River eastward, and also to prevent the Red Army from crossing the Dadu River again in the south, that is, to use the vast wasteland in northern Sichuan to block and besiege the Red Army and cause it to perish. In view of Chiang Kai-shek's above-mentioned deployment, in order not to be trapped to death, the Red Army must move north quickly. First, it must eliminate the southern part of Hu Zong in the Songpan area, and control the passages north and northeast of Songpan to facilitate operations northward. On June 28, the Military Commission of the Central Revolutionary Army issued the "Operational Deployment for Attacking Hu". On the 29th, the Songpan campaign plan was released.张国焘开始也表示“同意打松潘”，还说“松潘占后，平武、南坪就好打了”。但是，当胡宗南集中10个团以上的兵力于松潘时，张国焘却畏惧不前。 29日，他违背中央决定，提出“一方面军南打大炮山，北取阿坝，以一部兵力向西发展；四方面军北打松潘，东扣岷江，南掠天（全）芦（山）灌（县）邛（崃）大（邑）名（山）”的四面出击的错误主张。由于张国焘的拖延和反对，松潘战役计划未能实现。 6月29日，中共中央召开常委会议，决定张国焘任中革军委副主席。但是，张国焘并不满足，想攫取中共中央的更大权力。他提出“我军宜速决统一指挥的组织问题”，表示要“充实总司令部”，要任总政委。他鼓动一些人向中央要职务，如陈昌浩在7月中旬连续致电中央，表示“职意仍请国焘任军委主席，朱德任前敌指挥，周副主席兼参谋长”，并要“给军委独断决行”的大权。为了顾全大局，团结张国焘北上，周恩来愿意辞去红军总政治委员一职。7月18日，中共中央常委会决定，由张国焘任红军总政治委员，周恩来调中央常委工作，在张国焘尚未熟悉工作前暂由周恩来协助；陈昌浩参加中央军委常委。张国焘在会上提出要将红四方面军一批人增加为中共中央委员，会议没有同意。 红军丧失了进攻松潘的有利时机后，必须另找途径迅速北上。8月3日，红军总部制定了《夏洮战役计划》，改为“攻占阿坝，迅速北进夏河流域”。4～6日，中共中央在沙窝召开政治局会议。当时政治局委员共有8人，张国焘要再增加四方面军干部9人为政治局委员，遭到会议拒绝。会议最后作出了增补3名正式中央委员、两名政治局委员、两名候补中央委员等组织决定，并决定恢复红一方面军总部，由周恩来任红一方面军司令员兼政治委员。 沙窝会议后，中共中央和中革军委决定红一、四方面军混合编组，分左右两路北上。右路军以红一方面军的红1、红3军（即原红1、3军团）和四方面军的红4、红30军组成，由毛泽东、周恩来等中央领导人率领，以徐向前为总指挥、陈昌浩为政委、叶剑英为参谋长，北进向班佑、巴西地区开进。左路军以红四方面军的红9、红31、红33军和红一方面军的红5（即红5军团），红32军组成，由红军总司令部率领，以朱德为总指挥、张国焘为政委、刘伯承为参谋长，向阿坝地区开进，到阿坝后东进到班佑同右路军靠拢，然后向甘南齐头并进。 自从长征开始以来，周恩来一路上十分辛劳。每到驻地，就叫人架起电线，接收各军团的电报，挂起地图观察和抉择行军、作战的路线。等情况汇齐后，经过分析研究，和中央其他领导人商定，然后起草作战命令，下达行军路线，睡觉时往往将近黎明。遇有紧急情况时，常常彻夜不眠，白天又要同大家一起行军。由于粮食缺乏，他同大家一样吃野菜和青稞，终于积劳成疾，到8月上旬，连续几天一直发高烧，不能进食。医生检查后确诊是肝炎，已变成阿米巴肝脓肿，急需排脓。但是在当时环境下无法消毒，不能开刀和穿刺，只能用治痢疾的易米丁，并从高山上取来冰块冷敷在他的肝区上方。同时把因病编在休养连的邓颖超调来照料。周恩来睡在木板床上，一直昏迷不醒，邓颖超就在地上铺了点稻草，睡在一旁照看。靠着冰块局部冷冻，周恩来逐渐清醒过来，后来排出了半盆绿色的脓，烧慢慢退下来，才发现邓颖超在他身边。 这时候，军情紧急。8月19日，中共中央政治局开会研究常委的分工，决定毛泽东分工负责军事。20日，中共中央在毛儿盖召开政治局会议。周恩来因病没有参加。会上，毛泽东首先作报告，再次强调北上创建根据地的方针，并指出红军到达夏洮流域后，应向东向陕甘边界发展。会上大家同意这个方针。 8月21日，右路军开始北进过草地。草地一望无际，都是绒密的青草，气候恶劣，天天下雨，水流满坑遍野，有些地方三四十里水深及膝，犹如泽国。水呈淤黑色，发出阵阵腐臭气味，喝了立刻肚子发胀，甚至胀而致死。地质面硬而下软，因为地面长满青草，草根互相联结，草丛下河沟交错，泥泞不堪，人走在草上就会摆动，必须小心翼翼，轻轻踏步，一不留神就会陷入泥中。地面下的淤泥松而且黏，人和骡马一陷入其中，就不易挣扎出来，越陷越深，甚至遭灭顶之灾。许多干部战士在此恶劣的环境中长途跋涉，缺吃少穿，体质已十分虚弱，牺牲在这草地中。红军在草地行军，没有固定的道路，全靠自己开辟，认准北方，向北前进。 周恩来随红3军过草地，他连续几天发高烧，没有吃东西，身体异常虚弱，根本不能行走。看到这个情况，彭德怀果断地说：“抬”。他要红3军参谋长萧劲光组织担架队，把周恩来等领导同志抬出草地。担架队组成后，在1925年东征中曾任周恩来副官的陈赓自告奋勇担任队长。兵站部部长兼政委杨立三坚持要亲自和战士一起抬周恩来的担架，艰难地走过了草地，磨破了双肩，自己也累病倒了。周恩来自己无法走，心中很难受，多次想挣扎着走下担架来又做不到。几十年后他仍念念不忘这段革命情谊，50年代杨立三去世时，时任国务院总理的周恩来，一定要亲自给杨立三抬棺送葬。 胡宗南发现红军北上后，即令第49师于8月27日向包座急进，会同在上下包座地区的独立旅堵截红军。8月底，已经北出草地的右路军与敌军激战，歼敌军一个师共5000多人，缴枪1500支，完全占领上下包座。这是红一、四方面军会合后的第一次重要战斗。至此，红军北出甘南的门户已经打开，胡宗南的主力部队远在千里之外，甘南敌军不多，碉堡封锁线尚未筑成，从下包座到甘肃的西固、岷州只有五六天路程，沿途是汉人区，路宽、粮多、房多，如果左路军能迅速靠拢过来，红军集中向东北开进，将能打开新的局面。 这时，左路军也已经过了草地，到达阿坝地区。但是，到阿坝后，张国焘又对北上发生动摇。9月2日，他致电中央，说什么“噶曲河水涨，上下30里均无徒涉点”。3日，他又致电中央，公然反对北上方针，决定南下，说什么“茫茫草地，前进不能，坐以待毙”，“决定明晨分三天全部赶回阿坝”。还说，再北进，不但时机已失，恐也多阻碍，要右路军也南下“回击松潘敌”。 9月6日，周恩来随红3军在阿西，得知在甘肃南部的国民党军只有新编第14师师长鲁大昌的一部，于是和彭德怀、李富春告知红1、3军休整几天，并致电在前面的红1军集中在俄界，向罗达侦察。8日，中共中央政治局委员都来周恩来住处开了一次非正式会议，到会的有毛泽东、周恩来、张闻天、博古、徐向前、陈昌浩、王稼祥。会议分析了南下、北上的利弊。周恩来和毛泽东都认为只有北进才有出路。陈昌浩表示南下要再走草地，不好，建议力争左右两路军一道北上，如果张国焘坚决要他回去，他主张南下。会议经过讨论，决定7人联名答复张国焘，指出：目前红军行动是处在最严重关头，左路军如果向南行动，则前途将极端不利，希望左路军补充粮食后，改道北进。 9日，张国焘从阿坝致电徐向前、陈昌浩并转周恩来、洛甫、博古、毛泽东、王稼祥，仍坚持南下。这天，他背着中央另电陈昌浩要他率右路军南下，企图分裂和危害党中央。由于陈昌浩正在作报告，电报先到了右路军参谋长叶剑英手里。叶剑英看后觉得事关重大，借机到毛泽东住地给毛泽东看了。毛泽东感到情况紧急，立即与洛甫、博古等磋商，一致认为等待张国焘率左路军北上不仅没有可能，而且会招致不堪设想的严重后果，当即到红3军驻地与周恩来、王稼祥召开紧急会议。会议确定中共中央和红1、红3军立即北上，脱离险境。 10日清晨，中共中央率红1、3军北上。周恩来率领后梯队出发，途中制止了前来追赶想动武的红四方面军同志，保护了红一方面军干部危秀英等脱险，然后经阿西于11日到达俄界。在阿西时，中共中央政治局致电陈昌浩、徐向前，令他们率红4、30军跟进，并规定以后右路军统归中革军委副主席周恩来指挥。12日，中共中央在俄界召开了政治局扩大会议，决定以红1、3军组成中国工农红军陕甘支队，司令员彭德怀，政治委员毛泽东，并成立由彭德怀、林彪、毛泽东、王稼祥、周恩来组成的五人团进行军事领导。17日，红军攻克甘南门户、号称天险的腊子口。27日，周恩来出席在榜罗镇召开的中共中央政治局常委会议。会议决定陕甘支队向陕北苏区行进，和当地红军会合。 红军到达甘南，这里人烟稠密，物产丰盛，各个伙食单位都买到了羊肉、面粉、盐、油，这同雪山草地吃野菜青草，几个月不尝油、盐相比较，真是大不相同了。到了哈达铺，休息两天，这里的物价便宜。总政治部特别提出口号：“大家要食得好。”这个新奇的口号传遍了整个部队。各个连队伙食单位都宰鸡杀鸭，屠猪宰羊，每天三顿，每顿三荤两素。战士们喜气洋洋，不约而同地说“过新年啊！” 榜罗镇会议后，陕甘支队作好了去陕北的政治动员和物资准备。29日，中央中共率红军分三路北上，翻过六盘山，通过回民区，穿过国民党军的两道封锁线。10月7日在固原县青石咀消灭来犯的东北军何柱国部骑兵一部，缴获敌马百余匹。红军从此有了自己的骑兵部队。19日，到达陕甘苏区的吴起（今吴旗）镇，并击溃尾追而来的敌军骑兵2000余人。10月22日，周恩来出席在这里举行的中共中央政治局会议，会议决定党和红军今后的战略任务是建立西北的苏区，领导全国的革命。至此，红一方面军主力完成了历时一年、纵横十余省、行程两万五千里的长征。 陕甘支队在吴起镇短期休整后，10月底经保安东进，于11月初在甘泉附近同红15军团会合。11月3日，中共中央政治局召开会议，研究常委的分工问题。会前，张闻天有一个考虑：军事方面由毛泽东负责，周恩来负责组织局的工作。会上王稼祥提出，周恩来从事军事工作有经验，毛泽东也支持周恩来从事军事工作，提出主要仍由周恩来负责，自己当副手。周恩来表示：个人愿意做军事工作，但领导不必更换，由毛泽东任主席。最后，会议决定成立中华苏维埃西北革命军事委员会（实际即中革军委），毛泽东为主席，周恩来、彭德怀为副主席。从此以后，毛泽东与周恩来这两位伟大的军事家一直密切合作，互相配合，周恩来协助毛泽东指挥军事，决胜千里之外，直到取得中国革命的胜利。