Mao Zedong was originally the founder of the Central Revolutionary Base Area and the main leader of the party, government and army in the Central Soviet Area. However, before the Long March, he was successively subjected to "cruel struggles and merciless blows" by the then "Left" leaders: He was wrongly criticized at the Southern Jiangxi Conference After the meeting, he was deprived of the leadership of the party in the Central Soviet Area; the Ningdu meeting was wrongly criticized and was deprived of the military leadership of the Central Red Army.After the temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of China moved into the Central Soviet Area, it fully implemented Wang Ming's "Left" leaning dogmatic mistakes, and in the name of criticizing the "Luo Ming Line" and Jiangxi's "Luo Ming Line" leaders "Deng, Mao, Xie, Gu" A large number of cadres who supported Mao Zedong's correct views were suppressed, causing great damage to all aspects of work.Just as Bo Gu said at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China: "The Soviet area's opposition to Luo Ming's line is actually opposing Chairman Mao's correct line and style of work in the Soviet area.... The situation at this time can be said: 'The dogma is meritorious, and the imperial envoy celebrates it; the right is guilty, and the right is right." All over the country'."

In September 1933, Li De, sent by the Communist International, arrived in the Central Soviet Area as a military adviser, and the situation worsened.Bo Gu praised him as the "Supreme Emperor", handed over to him the command of the Central Red Army's fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", pursued a "Left" leaning "offensive line", and implemented passive defense when the situation was unfavorable, completely abandoning the previous four campaigns. The strategic policy of "active defense" and the basic operational principles for winning the fight against "encirclement and suppression".They first advocated "defending the enemy outside the country's gates" and required the Red Army to attack across the board; ", "short assault", fighting with the Kuomintang army, so that the Red Army was passively beaten everywhere, making the Central Soviet Area smaller and smaller; finally, the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign failed, and the Central Red Army had to make a major strategic shift.

Although the Central Red Army’s strategic transfer was approved by the Communist International, only a few people were secretly operating it, and it was not discussed in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, so that the general Political Bureau members and senior commanders of the Central Committee were not clear.So did Mao Zedong, a member of the Politburo and Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic.At that time, Mao Zedong, who was standing aside and being criticized, insisted on three principles: first, the minority must obey the majority;He proposed to the central government to inspect Jiangxi Province, which was quickly approved.Bo Gu and Li De once planned to prevent Mao Zedong from being transferred with the Central Red Army.Wu Xiuquan, who served as Li De's Russian translator, said in his memoirs:

"At first they planned not to take Comrade Mao Zedong away. At that time, he was expelled from the core of the central leadership and sent to Yudu to conduct research and research. Later, because he was the chairman of the Chinese Soviet and enjoyed high prestige in the army, He was allowed to go on the long march together. If he had been left behind at that time, the outcome would have been unpredictable." In the end, they still let Mao Zedong join the Red Army on the Long March. Another factor may be related to the telegram sent by the Communist International to the CCP two months ago.At that time, Bogu sent Gao Zili, Minister of the Land Department of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet, to Moscow to attend the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, and asked him to take a message to Wang Ming: Mao Zedong "has made mistakes in big things, but not in small things"; (Referring to Zhou Enlai——quote's note) Thinking of the Soviet Union to recuperate."Wang Ming said: "Who is insured when such a big person comes?" "Mao Zedong can handle big things."For Bogu's oral message, the Comintern sent an official telegram to reply.Wu Liangping recalled:

"Later, a Central Committee meeting discussed the economic and economic issues in the Soviet area. I participated, and Comrade Mao Zedong did not participate. At the end of the meeting, Comrade Bogu read a call from the Communist International, saying that under the current situation, the Soviet area cannot do without Mao Zedong , so I disagree with Comrade Mao Zedong going to the Soviet Union to recuperate from his illness.” These are the reasons why Bo Gu and Li De could not disagree with Mao Zedong and the Central Red Army on the Long March. As soon as Mao Zedong arrived in Yudu, the capital of southern Jiangxi Province, he received a long-distance call from Zhou Enlai, asking him to focus on understanding the enemy's situation and terrain in the direction of Yudu.This is actually considering the question of where the Central Red Army's Long March will break through.Mao Zedong immediately convened several meetings to investigate, and also sought out businessmen and other personnel from areas occupied by the enemy or areas that had just been occupied by the enemy to learn more about the movements of the Kuomintang. On September 20, Mao Zedong sent an urgent message to Zhou Enlai: "The [lower] reaches of the Xinfeng River start from Shangxiawan Beach, pass through Sanjiangkou, Jilongtan, and Xiahuwei, and reach Datian to within ten miles along the east bank of the Xinfeng River. There are enemy teams crossing the river to harass, but they haven’t seen them in the last week.” The telegram concluded: “There is no red martial law in the whole territory of Yudu and Dengxian, and it is easy for enemy agents to come in and out. Now we are paying close attention to the establishment of day and night in the west and south districts. Whistle and eliminate counter-revolutionaries. This is the answer."

This telegram played a role in exploring the way for the central government to make up its mind to break out from the direction of Yudu at the beginning of the Long March. At the beginning of October, Mao Zedong received a secret notice from the central government that "he had a special mission", asking him to return to Ruijin immediately.Mao Zedong rushed back to Ruijin on horseback, and first went to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to report to Zhou Enlai and others the enemy's situation in Yudu, the terrain, and the dryness of the river.Then, in the ancient temple of Yunshi Mountain, a meeting of heads of various ministries of the central government (also known as the Qingshan meeting) was held.Wu Liping, who attended the meeting, recalled: "Comrade Mao Zedong announced and explained the decision to withdraw from the Soviet area to everyone, emphasizing two points: first, the revolution has a future, and everyone should strengthen their confidence in the revolution; Do a good job in the aftermath of the various ministries, so that the remaining comrades can better continue the revolutionary struggle and better connect with the masses.”

At that time, Qu Qiubai, Minister of the People's Commissar of Education, wanted to move with the main force of the Red Army, but Bogu and others refused to let him go.Qu Qiubai asked Mao Zedong to tell the Central Committee.Mao Zedong said, I have already talked to them, but "it doesn't matter". Mao Zedong returned home, stroking the innocent and lively child Mao Mao, feeling very uncomfortable.After a while, Mao Zedong told He Zizhen: "The central government stipulates that in this transfer of the Red Army, lesbians are not allowed to follow the team, let alone children." Looking at He Zizhen, he said: "Why am I willing to keep you? "

After Mao Zedong learned from Zhang Wentian, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, that members of the Politburo were going to be dispersed to various regiments to follow the army, he immediately went to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission to make two suggestions. First, he was arranged with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang during the transfer. First, do not disperse to the various regiments; second, some lesbian comrades should be taken away.He learned that the Central Revolutionary Military Commission had sent troops to build a pontoon bridge on the Yudu River, preparing for large troops to cross the river there, and then rode to Yudu.

As soon as Mao Zedong arrived in Yudu, he received a call from the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, saying that the Central Committee had decided to take away 30 female comrades, including He Zizhen, and put them in the recuperation company of the Ministry of Health, but they could not take their children.Mao Zedong immediately sent guards back to Ruijin to inform He Zizhen that Xiao Mao could only be entrusted to the care of Mao Zetan and He Yi who stayed in the Central Soviet Area and insisted on guerrilla warfare.In the war environment, the child was fostered in a local fellow, but was never found again.

On the evening of October 10, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China led the main force of the Central Red Army and more than 86,000 personnel of the central government. They set out from Ruijin and other places and were forced to carry out a long march. After making arrangements in Yudu, Mao Zedong participated in a meeting of main cadres at the provincial, county, and district levels convened by the Jiangnan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China in the Xiejia Temple in the county seat on the 15th. He said at the meeting: The enemy attacked the Soviet area this time. It is a fortress policy, which has been attacked to the gate of our Central Soviet Area, in an attempt to cut off the water to catch fish and completely wipe out the Red Army.The main force of our Red Army must break through the enemy's blockade, go to the enemy's rear, strike and destroy the enemy.And said to the local cadres who will stay in the Central Soviet Area: You cadres who work in the local area, still stay in the Soviet Area, unite the people, and carry out guerrilla warfare.Don't be afraid, don't think that the revolution will fail if the main force of the Red Army leaves.We must not only see temporary difficulties, we must see that there is hope for the revolution, and the Red Army will definitely come back!

On the evening of October 18, Mao Zedong left the capital with his guards and embarked on a journey.When Liu Ying saw Mao Zedong after crossing the Yudu River, she asked, "You always have a 'special mission' in September, right?" She later recalled: "Chairman Mao told me that he came to Yudu mainly The task is to inspect the terrain and choose a route to break out of the encirclement. Now we have taken advantage of the dry season to build five pontoon bridges at selected locations, and we have safely crossed the Yudu River, taking the route chosen by Chairman Mao.” Since the strategic shift of the Central Red Army was strictly kept secret, although the Kuomintang troops had laid out several blockade lines, they did not know which direction the Red Army was going to break through.Although troops were deployed on the first and second blockade lines to the southwest of the Central Soviet Area, they were not strong. The reason was that the main defense area in this direction belonged to the Cantonese Army, and Chen Jitang’s Cantonese Army was in conflict with Chiang Kai-shek’s Central Army. .In the summer, Mao Zedong went to Huichang, the capital of Guangdong and Jiangxi provinces on the southern route, to inspect and guide his work. He took advantage of this contradiction and adjusted some "left" The policy of "struggle" and "peace" in the military has adjusted the relationship between "strike" and "peace", moved the front of the large troops back to the rear, and divided the small troops to promote anti-Chiang anti-Japanese to the Cantonese army, making the south gate of the Central Soviet Area relatively calm. There is a situation of "the scenery here is the best".Subsequently, Chen Jitang sent people to the Central Soviet Area to contact and negotiate matters.After research, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission proposed a negotiation plan, and also sent He Changgong, the head of the Guangdong-Jiangxi Military Region, and Pan Hannian, a member of the Central Propaganda Department, to negotiate in the Guangdong-Jiangxi Military Region. In early October, after three days of negotiations, representatives of the two sides reached five agreements including "truce on the spot" and "borrowing each other's way if necessary".This created favorable conditions for the Central Red Army to break through the first and second blockades of the Kuomintang army. On the night of October 21, the 1st Red Army broke through between Wangmudu, Gan County, and Xintian, Xinfeng County.By the 25th, after fighting, the Central Red Army had all passed the first blockade line set up by the Kuomintang army.Mao Zedong said with deep emotion: From now on, we will go out of the Central Soviet Area! After the start of the Long March, Mao Zedong marched with Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, and began to discuss why the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" could not win.When he camped in Yangfang, Gupi, Xinfeng County, He Zizhen came to visit him from the recuperation company. He talked about holding the hands of the Red Army tightly when men, women and children in Ruijin County sent each other off, and kept saying, "You must come back!" Mao Zedong After listening to it, I said: We owe too much to the people in the base areas. In early November, the Central Red Army successfully passed the second blockade in southern Hunan.At this time, Wu Jiqing, Mao Zedong's bodyguard, had a high fever due to malaria.Mao Zedong gave him his stretcher and comforted him, saying: "It will be tiring for comrades to carry you away, but it doesn't matter, because we are all comrades." In mid-November, they crossed the third blockade in southern Hunan and entered the Xiaoshui and Xiangshui areas. After Chiang Kai-shek found out the intention of the Red Army's westward advance, he immediately deployed "pursuit" and interception, in an attempt to "annihilate the Red Army in the area east of the Xiangjiang River and the Lishui River." Faced with the increasingly serious situation, Mao Zedong believed that the party and the masses in southern Hunan had a relatively good foundation, which was conducive to the mobile operations of the Red Army. When there is no approach, organize forces to counterattack, find and wipe out a part of the Kuomintang army, so as to reverse the situation of the battle and change from passive to active.Peng Dehuai, head of the 3rd Red Army Corps, also suggested to the Central Committee: "Seize the opportunity to eliminate small groups of enemy troops during flexible maneuvers, force Jiang's army to change deployment, block and contain the enemy"; Mountains, fighting with the Guangxi army, the consequences will be unfavorable." Bogu and Li De rejected these suggestions, passively avoided the battle, and lost a better opportunity. On November 25, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided that the Red Army would rush to cross the Xiangjiang River from Quanzhou and Xing'an in Guangxi, which was the fourth blockade line of the Kuomintang army. On the 27th, the vanguard of the Red Army successfully controlled the ferry.However, due to the excessive baggage carried by the team and the slow movement, the large army was flanked by the superior enemy who had just arrived before crossing the river.Mao Zedong crossed the Xiangjiang River from Huacun with the column of the Military Commission during the fierce battle. The main force of the Central Red Army broke through the blockade of the Xiangjiang River and jumped out of the encirclement, making Chiang Kai-shek's plan to wipe out the Red Army on the east bank of the Xiangjiang River failed. However, the Red Army itself paid a heavy price. people.At this time, Bogu felt that he had a great responsibility and was helpless.While Li De sighed, he blamed others.He first took Zhou Zikun, the commander of the Red 22nd Division, to operate.This division advanced on the bank of the Xiangjiang River to stop the attack and was defeated. Only the injured Zhou Zikun and a dozen others broke out.Li De accused Zhou Zikun of running away, and reprimanded him roughly: Where is your army?What face do you have to escape without soldiers!Order the security squad to tie him up and send him to a court-martial for disposal.None of the soldiers in the guard squad would do anything, and Bogu who was present was silent.Mao Zedong directly intervened and said, "Leave Zhou Zikun to me." He talked with Zhou Zikun and encouraged him to work hard and continue to lead troops to fight.When Li De knew about it, he was furious and attacked Mao Zedong for "retaining defeated generals and winning people's hearts". After crossing the Xiangjiang River and suffering heavy losses, the commanders and fighters began to think, how did all this happen?Liu Bocheng recalled: "The vast number of cadres have seen that since the five 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns, they have failed repeatedly, and now they are almost on the verge of extinction. Compared with the situation before the four 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns, they gradually realized that this is a rejection of Comrade Mao Zedong. As a result of carrying out the wrong line on behalf of the correct line, doubts, dissatisfaction, and active demands for leadership changes have obviously grown in the troops. This sentiment, as the defeat of our army became more and more obvious, reached its climax in the Xiangjiang Battle. " During the march, Mao Zedong analyzed the military command mistakes of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign together with his companions Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, and believed that the Red Army could no longer follow the original plan to join the Red 2nd and Red 6th Army.During the rectification movement in Yan'an, Zhang Wentian wrote: "After the Long March, I lived with Comrades Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang. Comrade Mao Zedong began to explain to us the mistakes made by the central government in the military leadership during the anti-five 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns. The struggle against Li De and Bo Gu began in the Politburo until the Zunyi Conference." At this time, Chiang Kai-shek had already sensed the intention of the main force of the Central Red Army to join the Red 2nd and 6th Red Army, assembled nearly 200,000 troops, and set up four anti-blocking lines to prevent the main force of the Red Army from going northward from the Hunan-Guizhou border.Bo Gu and Li De still insisted on the original plan, and were going to lead the Red Army to continue drilling into the encirclement circle arranged by Chiang Kai-shek. "At this critical juncture, Mao Zedong proposed to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee that the troops should abandon the original plan, change their strategic direction, and immediately turn west to Guizhou, where the enemy's strength is weak. They must not go further north." At this time, Bogu and Li De were already dejected by the failure of the Xiangjiang River, and the command task of the Red Army had been transferred to Zhou Enlai's shoulders.Zhou Enlai agreed with Mao Zedong's proposition. On December 12, the person in charge of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an emergency meeting at Gongcheng Academy in Tongdao City (now Xi Town, County). The participants included Bogu, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Li De.The meeting was convened by Zhou Enlai to discuss the strategic course of action.Regardless of the changed objective situation, Li De and Bogu still insisted on their plan to join the 2nd and 6th Red Army in western Hunan.Li De later wrote: "I urge everyone to consider whether it is possible to let those Zhou (Hunyuan) troops and other enemy troops who are chasing us on a parallel route or rushing to a strategic location westward overtake us. They turned their backs to the north and established contact with the Second Corps." Mao Zedong disagreed with Li De's opinion, explaining that the main force of the Red Army is going north to Xiangxi, and will be encircled by the enemy, and the consequences will be disastrous.He also pointed out according to the telegram materials deciphered by the enemy's station: The Kuomintang army is building four defensive bunker lines with five or six times the strength of the Red Army.He suggested moving westward to Guizhou, where the enemy's strength is weak.Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian supported Mao Zedong's proposition in their speeches, and Zhou Enlai and others also agreed with this proposition.Bogu is no longer stubborn, and Li De quit the venue early because his opinion was denied.According to the opinions of the majority, the meeting passed the proposition of going west to Guizhou. At 7:30 p.m. that day, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an "urgent" telegram, stipulating: "Our army will continue to advance westward on the 13th tomorrow" and "If the First Division has arrived at Hongzhou Division today, it should enter Liping as soon as possible." . The main force of the Red Army marched westward and captured Liping, Guizhou on December 15, but the debate over whether to go north or go west was not over. On the 18th, Mao Zedong attended a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in Liping City.The meeting was still presided over by Zhou Enlai, and continued to discuss the direction of the Red Army's strategic actions.Bogu also proposed to go from northeast Guizhou to western Hunan to join the Red 2nd and Red 6th Army; Li De did not attend due to illness, but asked someone to bring his opinion of insisting on joining the Red 2nd and Red 6th Army to the meeting.Mao Zedong advocated continuing to march to the northwest of Guizhou and establishing new bases in areas where the enemy forces were weak on the Sichuan and Guizhou borders.Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian supported Mao Zedong's proposition.After a heated debate, the meeting accepted Mao Zedong's opinion, and passed the "Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on Strategic Guidelines" written based on his speech, which clearly stated: "In view of the current situation, the Political Bureau believes that the establishment of a new soviet in western Hunan in the past It is impossible and inappropriate to decide on the base area at present." "The Politburo believes that the new base area should be the Sichuan-Guizhou border area, and the area that should be centered on Zunyi at first should be transferred under unfavorable conditions. To the northwest of Zunyi." After the meeting, Zhou Enlai gave Li De the translation of the decision made at the Liping meeting.Li De was furious and questioned Zhou Enlai.Fan Jinbiao, Zhou Enlai's guard, recalled: The two talked in English, "there was a lot of quarreling. The prime minister criticized Li De. The prime minister slapped the table, and the lanterns on the table jumped up and went out, and we immediately turned off the lights. Point." Although Bogu's opinion was rejected by the meeting, he still obeyed the decision of the meeting.When he knew that Zhou Enlai and Li De were quarreling, he said to Zhou Enlai: "Don't talk to him (referring to Li De)." The "Decision" of the Liping Conference has great strategic significance. The Central Red Army won the initiative and waved Gosi's finger, which not only completely disrupted the original deployment of the Kuomintang army, but also won successive battles, and the appearance of the army was completely new.Chen Yun, political commissar of the column of the Military Commission, later published under the pseudonym of Lianchen in the "Records of Experience with the Army Westward Journey": "The Red Army transferred from Hunan to Guizhou, and captured quite a lot at this time. At least one division of Hou Zhidan's troops was disarmed, and the three prefectures of Liping, Huangping, and Zhenyuan were lost. All the cloth stored in the cities was sold out. The Red Army’s morale was very high and their clothes were neat. All the troops wore new military uniforms. The fatigue in southern Hunan has been wiped out.” "When we were passing through a certain village near Jianhe County, we saw an old woman and a boy lying on the side of the road, wearing single clothes, lying on the side of the road, still breathing." According to the old woman, Mao immediately took off a sweater and a quilt from her luggage, gave it to the old woman, and ordered someone to give a bucket of rice. The old woman thanked her and left with a smile.” On New Year's Day in 1935, Mao Zedong attended the Politburo meeting held by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Houchang, and reiterated the idea that the Red Army should first establish a new base in the Sichuan and Guizhou border areas, centering on the Zunyi area.Most of the participants agreed with this opinion, and once again rejected Li De and Bo Gu's erroneous claim that "it is entirely possible to establish a temporary base on the south bank of the Wujiang River, and then Xu Tu marched into western Hunan to join the Red 2 and Red 6 armies", and decided that the Red Army should rush across Wujiang, captured Zunyi.The "Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the New Action Policy after Crossing the River" adopted by the meeting pointed out that after the main Red Army crossed the Wujiang River, "the main thing is to fight against Chiang Kai-shek's main force (such as Xue Yue's Second Corps or other troops), and first destroy the His part is to completely smash the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns" and establish a new Soviet base area on the border of Sichuan and Guizhou. First, the northern part of Guizhou with Zunyi as the center, and then the development of southern Sichuan is the most central task at present." And stipulated: "About The military commission must make a report at the Politburo meeting on the operational policy, as well as the choice of the time and place of the operational." This actually canceled Li De's arbitrary military command in the past.At the same time, after the Liping meeting, Liu Bocheng, who was sent by Li De and Bogu to the Red 5th Army as the chief of staff, was reappointed as the chief of staff. But the debate is not over yet.As Zhou Enlai said: "From Liping to the northwest, passing through Huangping, and then crossing the Wujiang River to Zunyi, the debates along the way became more intense. In the middle of the debate, Chairman Mao convinced many comrades in the Central Committee." Wang Jiaxiang recalled: "Chairman Mao talked with me about some national and party issues along the way, and taught me the combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of the Chinese revolution, which prompted me to discuss the Zunyi Conference with Chairman Mao. It also strengthened my determination to support Chairman Mao." At this time, Wang Jiaxiang proposed to Mao Zedong the idea of ​​convening an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Mao Zedong thought it was a good idea and suggested that he communicate with Zhang Wentian first.Zhang Wentian also agreed with Wang Jiaxiang's opinion of bringing down Li De and Bo Gu, and said: Comrade Mao Zedong has a way of fighting, which is better than ours. If we can't lead, we still need Comrade Mao Zedong to come out. From January 2 to 6, 1935, all the Central Red Army crossed the Wujiang River and marched towards the northern Guizhou area centered on Zunyi. Zunyi, leaning against Lou Mountain in the north and Wujiang River in the south, is the political, economic and cultural center of northern Guizhou.After the Central Red Army broke through the Wujiang River, it liberated this important town in northern Guizhou on January 7.Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and others entered Zunyi City on the afternoon of the 9th with the column of the Military Commission. At this time, Chiang Kai-shek received a reconnaissance report from the Air Force saying that the direction of the Red Army was unknown after entering the Zunyi area. He approved the request of Xue Yue, the "commander of the pursuit and suppression army", and ordered Wu Qiwei of the first column to gather in Guiyang and Qingzhen for training; The Hunyuan Department guarded the Zunyi direction on the south bank of the Wujiang River.This objectively provided conditions for the Central Red Army to rest and reorganize. Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang and others proposed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to immediately prepare to hold an enlarged meeting of the Politburo.Wu Xiuquan recalled: "At this time, Comrades Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian informed Comrade Bogu to give a summary report on the fifth counter-campaign against 'encirclement and suppression' at the meeting, and informed Comrade Zhou Enlai to prepare a sub-report on military issues." Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang were also seriously preparing to speak.After a joint discussion, Zhang Wentian wrote the outline of a report against the "Left" dogmatic military line.Mao Zedong used to make extemporaneous speeches during meetings, but this time he also wrote a detailed speech outline. Bogu realized that there must be a debate at this meeting, and carried out activities in advance.Kai Feng, an alternate member of the Politburo who supported Bogu, talked to Nie Rongzhen several times and asked Nie to speak in support of Bogu.Nie Rongzhen did not agree.Kaifeng reported to Bogu: "Nie Rongzhen is really stubborn!" From January 15th to 17th, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was held at the headquarters of the Red Army in Zunyi City.Members of the Politburo attending the meeting included Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Chen Yun. Alternate members of the Politburo included Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Liu Shaoqi, and Kai Feng. Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, Li Zhuoran, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary-General of the Central Committee, Li De, military adviser, and Wu Xiuquan, translator, also attended the meeting, a total of 20 people. The meeting was chaired by Bo Gu, and a summary report on the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was made.He made some reviews of the mistakes in military command, but mainly emphasized various objective reasons.In his deputy report, Zhou Enlai pointed out that the main reason for the failure of the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was the mistake of the military leadership, and he took the initiative to assume the responsibility.Later, Zhang Wentian made a joint speech on behalf of him, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang, sharply criticizing the "Left" leaning military line.Then, Mao Zedong made a long speech, pointing out: The reasons for the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" and the heavy losses in the great transfer were mainly the purely defensive line in the military, manifested as adventurism in offense and conservatism in defense. Escapism when breaking out. He also refuted the fact that the previous several anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns were victorious when the enemy was strong and we were weak, and he refuted Bogu's excuse for using objective reasons such as the enemy's strength and our weakness to justify the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.At the same time, it systematically expounds the strategy and tactics suitable for the characteristics of China's revolutionary war and the direction of future military operations.As Chen Yun said in the article "Reminiscences Before and After the Long March": "The content of the meeting was mainly about military issues. I only remember that Chairman Mao made a very reasonable speech at the meeting, and the content was the article "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War" Chairman Mao said: "The road needs to be walked with feet, and people need to eat." Bo Gu said at the meeting: "We should think about it." Chairman Mao said: "I agree with you to think about it. But you What needs to be considered is not to continue to stay, but to hand over the position.” At the meeting, everyone made a speech and unanimously supported Chairman Mao.” After the meeting, Chen Yun said in his outline: "Comrade Enlai and other comrades in the enlarged meeting fully agreed with the outline and opinions of Luo Fu and King Mao. Comrade Bogu did not fully admit his mistakes. Comrade Kaifeng disagreed with the opinions of Mao, Zhang, and Wang." Mao Zedong mentioned many times in the early 1960s that Kaifeng used anti-criticism to defend Bogu and Li De.He said: "During the Zunyi meeting, Kaifeng said that my method of fighting was not wise, and I fought according to two books, one was "Sun Tzu's Art of War". In fact, when it comes to fighting, how can I fight according to the book? At that time, I had only read one of these two books. I hadn’t read the other book, The Art of War. The comrade insisted that I had read it. I asked him how many articles there were in The Art of War? What was the title of one article? He couldn’t answer it. In fact, he hadn’t read it either. Since then, it has forced me to read "The Art of War by Sun Tzu." The meeting adopted the suggestions of Liu Bocheng and Nie Rongzhen, and decided that the Red Army was going to cross the Yangtze River north and establish a base in the southwest or northwest of Chengdu.After three days of heated discussions, the meeting also made the following decisions: "(1) Comrade Mao Zedong was elected as a member of the Standing Committee. (2) Comrade Luo Fu was appointed to draft a resolution, which was entrusted to the Standing Committee for review and sent to the branch for discussion. (4) The three-member regiment was abolished, and the top military chiefs Zhu and Zhou were still the military commanders, while Comrade Enlai was entrusted by the party to be responsible for the final decision to command the military.” In accordance with the meeting's decision, Luo Fu drafted the "Central Resolution on the Summary of Opposing the Enemy's Five Encirclement and Suppression" based on Mao Zedong's speech, which was printed and distributed to all branches after being passed by the Politburo.The resolution pointed out that "the purely defensive line in the military is the main reason why we cannot crush the enemy's five 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns"; at the same time, it fully affirmed Mao Zedong's previous anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns summed up the principle of active defense in line with the laws of China's revolutionary war. Principles of strategy and tactics. Shortly after the Zunyi meeting, the division of labor was re-established in the Standing Committee, with Zhang Wentian replacing Bogu in overall responsibility; Mao Zedong was Zhou Enlai's helper in military command. At the most critical juncture of the Chinese revolution, the Zunyi Conference independently resolved the organizational issues of the Party Central Committee based on the principle of democratic centralism, ended Wang Ming's "Left" dogmatic rule in the Central Committee for four years, and established the Mao Zedong's leading position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army "walked his own way", thus saving the Party and the Red Army. In the face of adversity, Mao Zedong experienced the painful training of being isolated for a long time, and he deeply understood the extreme importance of uniting the majority.On the Long March, he worked one by one in the central leadership to make the correct opinions accepted by the majority of people. Only then did the Zunyi Conference achieve a huge turning point.He Zizhen said: After the Zunyi meeting, Mao Zedong said to me with admiration: "Everything must have a majority!" She noticed it more clearly than others: "Mao Zedong has changed a lot after the Zunyi Conference. He is more calm and sophisticated, his thinking is more careful and thoughtful, and he is especially good at uniting people." The new central government after the Zunyi Conference changed the "Left" sectarian cadre policy, severely criticized those who made mistakes, and warmly united.At the same time, rehabilitate those who have been wrongly hit in the past.Jiang Hua recalled, "Chairman Mao has the right to speak, and those of us who have been hit by the wrong line have gradually been 'pardoned'." Luo Ming recalled: "After the Zunyi meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong instructed to use cadres who were attacked by Wang Ming's line. The local work department of the General Political Department notified Liu Xiao to be the local work director of the political department of the 1st Red Army, and I was the local work director of the Political Department of the 3rd Red Army." Deng Xiaoping, who was falsely accused of being the representative of the "Luo Ming Line" in Jiangxi, was appointed as the secretary-general of the CPC Central Committee before the Zunyi Conference.For Xiao Jinguang, who was falsely accused of being a representative of the "Luo Ming Line" in the army and was expelled from the party and sentenced to five years in prison, just after the Zunyi meeting, Zhou Enlai announced to him: "The meeting believes that your question was wrong in the past, so it will be cancelled. As for your punishment, it was decided to restore your party and military membership, and the central government also considered rescheduling your work." During the Zunyi Conference, Chiang Kai-shek made new deployments for the pursuit and interception of the Red Army, mobilizing 400,000 troops in an attempt to encircle and wipe out more than 35,000 Central Red Army in the northwest area of ​​Wujiang.The situation around the Red Army became more dire. Under such circumstances, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided that starting from January 19, the troops would gradually move northward and concentrate in the Chishui and Tucheng areas at the junction of Sichuan and Guizhou. On the 20th, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the "Crossing the River Operation Plan", deciding to cross the Yangtze River north between Yibin and Huzhou, enter the northwest of Sichuan, and join the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army to establish a new base. The Red Army advanced to the east of the Chishui River on the 27th in three routes.On the way to Tucheng, Mao Zedong discussed with Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Liu Bocheng, etc., and believed that both sides of the road were valleys. If the pursuers went deep alone, the Red Army could take advantage of the favorable terrain at Qinggangpo to the east of Tucheng, concentrate superior forces, and encircle and annihilate Chess master Guo Xun of the Sichuan Army. This battle was proposed by Mao Zedong and decided by the Red Army Headquarters, with the Red 3rd and 5th Army as the main combat force.It started in the early morning of the 28th, the Sichuan Army suffered a major blow, and the Red Army also paid a lot of price.After several hours of fierce fighting, no major results were achieved.Later, it was discovered from the numbers of the captured prisoners that the original intelligence was wrong. The enemy army was not four regiments with more than 6,000 people, but six regiments with more than 10,000 people.The combat effectiveness of the Sichuan Army was also underestimated, and its reinforcements were about to arrive, and the battle situation gradually turned against the Red Army.The Red Army was immediately led by Chen Geng and Song Renqiong to reinforce the column cadres of the Military Commission.Under the command of Zhu De's personal visit to the forward position, the cadre regiment rushed forward, and finally repelled the Sichuan army's attack and stabilized the position.Mao Zedong saw this scene on the top of the mountain and praised: "Chen Gengxing, you can be the commander of the army." Then, the Red 1st Army, which had gone north to attack Chishui County, rushed back to join the battle and consolidated its position.This is the Tucheng battle. That night, Mao Zedong proposed to convene a meeting of several leaders of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.According to the new situation that the Kuomintang troops from all walks of life were rushing to besiege, the meeting determined that the original plan to cross the Yangtze River here could not be realized, and decided to withdraw from the battle quickly and cross the Chishui River to the west.The battle was not well fought.Bogut once said at that time: It seems that narrow empiricists can't command. On January 29, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River and entered the Gulin and Xuyong areas in southern Sichuan.At this time, the 36th regiment of Pan Wenhua's Department of the Sichuan Army had been deployed in Chishui, Gulin, and Xuyong on the south bank of the Yangtze River to prevent the Red Army from crossing the Yangtze River north from here.Mao Zedong and the leaders of the Military Commission believed that under such circumstances, they should not love to fight, and immediately ordered all the legions to avoid the real situation, get rid of the Sichuan army, and enter the Tashi area of ​​Weixin County, Yunnan Province. Mao Zedong entered Tashi Town with the column of the Central Military Commission on February 8 to attend the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held here.At the meeting, Mao Zedong summed up three lessons from the failure of the battle in Tucheng: "First, the enemy's situation was not accurate. I originally thought that there were four regiments, but actually there were six regiments, and there were follow-up troops; The combat effectiveness of the army is estimated to be too low; third, the troops are dispersed, and the first army should not be allowed to go north. We must learn the lessons of this battle and refrain from it in the future!" He proposed to return to the east, cross Chishui again, and regain Zunyi.His reason is: we should take advantage of the enemy's illusion, look for favorable fighters, concentrate superior forces, develop the expertise of the Red Army's mobile warfare, and actively destroy the enemy.To this end, it is necessary to reorganize the troops, implement light equipment, streamline the organization, and enrich the company. When the Pan Wenhua Division of the Sichuan Army and the Sun Du Division of the Yunnan Army approached Tashi from the north and the south, the Central Red Army suddenly turned around and marched eastward, crossing the Chishui River again.The Central Committee issued the "Message to All Red Commanders and Soldiers", pointing out: In order to secure victory, "the Red Army must frequently move the combat area, sometimes to the east, sometimes to the west, sometimes to take the main road, sometimes to take the small road, sometimes to take the old road, and sometimes to go new road, and the only purpose is to achieve victory in combat under favorable conditions." The Red Army crossed the Chishui River for the second time around February 20 and returned to northern Guizhou.中革军委决定集中主力进攻桐梓和娄山关以南的黔军，乘胜夺取遵义。这次战役，先后击溃和歼灭国民党军队两个师又八个团，俘敌约3000人，取得长征以来最大的一次胜利。毛泽东随中央军委纵队登上娄山关，极目四望，吟成《忆秦娥·娄山关》： 西风烈，长空雁叫霜晨月。霜晨月，马蹄声碎，喇叭声咽。Xiongguan Road is really like iron, and now it is over from the beginning.从头越，苍山如海，残阳如血。 接着，当蒋介石重新调整部署、指挥军队向遵义一带合围时，中央红军又由遵义向西开进。3月10日，毛泽东在苟坝出席中央政治局扩大会议，讨论林彪、聂荣臻提出的进攻打鼓新场（现金沙县）的建议。周恩来回忆说： “从遵义一出发，遇到敌人一个师守在打鼓新场那个地方，大家开会都说要打，硬要去攻那个堡垒。只毛主席一个人说不能打，打又是啃硬的，损失了更不应该，我们应该在运动战中去消灭敌人嘛。但别人一致通过要打，毛主席那样高的威信还是不听，他也只好服从。但毛主席回去一想，还是不放心，觉得这样不对，半夜里提马灯又到我那里来，叫我把命令暂时晚一点发，还是想一想。我接受了毛主席的意见，一早再开会议，把大家说服了。” 会后，中革军委给各军团发出《关于我军不进攻新场的指令》的电报，避免了一次将要发生的重大损失。毛泽东从这件事中得到一条教训：作战不能再像过去那么多人来集体讨论，还是成立一个几个人的小组。经他提议，中央决定成立周恩来、毛泽东、王稼祥组成的新三人团，全权指挥作战，以周恩来为团长。 这时，由于红军的行动忽东忽西，飘忽不定，迂回曲折，穿插于国民党重兵之间，使蒋介石无法摸清红军的战略意图，只得分散兵力，四面防堵。为了进一步迷惑对方，调动国民党军队西移，红军在3月16日下午至17日中午分别从茅台附近三个渡口第三次渡过赤水河，向西进入川南古蔺地区，并派一个团伪装主力继续向西北挺进，主力却在附近山沟丛林里隐蔽集结。 蒋介石得到飞机侦察的情报，果然误以为红军又要北渡长江，急忙调集各军迅速奔集川南古蔺地区。20日，蒋介石还得意地声称，“剿匪成功，在此一举。” 在达到调动国民党各路军队大举西向的目的后，红军决定立刻掉头再次东渡赤水河，返回贵州。20日下午，党中央和总政治部向各军团发出指示：“这次东渡，事前不得下达，以保秘密。” 这时，贵州境内的国民党兵力已十分空虚。红军主力在3月21日晚至22日晨神速地第四次渡过赤水河。“四渡赤水”，充分显示出中央红军在遵义会议后一反以前的情况，好像忽然获得了新的生命和活力。它是毛泽东在军事指挥中的“得意之笔”。红军第四次渡过赤水河，完全出乎蒋介石的意料之外。他们随即挥师南下，大踏步越过遵义仁怀大道。31日南渡乌江，跳出国民党军队的合围圈。红军前锋直逼贵阳，直到城郊，蒋介石惊惶失措。他的随从高参晏道刚后来回忆道：“四月五日夜，贵阳外围风闻有红军游击队活动，蒋又问黔灵山、东山、螺绥山、照壁山、图云关、大小关等处的工事及城防守备兵力强度，特别关心清镇飞机场的情况，彻夜不安。是夜蒋泻肚子，遗屎床上，宋美龄伤风发烧。次日一早侍从副官蒋孝镇挨蒋大骂，责怪不该让他住透风的房子。蒋孝镇心有不服，对我说：'他受惊了怪房子'。” 红军总参谋长刘伯承回忆道：“这时候，蒋介石正亲自在贵阳督战，慌忙调云南军阀部队来'保驾'，又令薛岳和湖南部队东往余庆、石阡等地布防，防止我军东进与二、六军团会师。在部署这次行动时，毛主席就曾说：'只要能将滇军调出来，就是胜利。'果然，敌人完全按照毛主席的指挥行动了。于是，我军以一军团包围贵阳东南的龙里城，虚张声势，迷惑敌人。其余主力穿过湘黔公路，直插云南，与驰援贵阳的滇军背道而行。这次，毛主席又成功地运用了声东击西的灵活的战术，'示形'于贵阳之东，造成敌人的过失，我军得以争取时机突然西去。一过公路，甩开了敌人，部队就像插上了翅膀，放开大步，一天就走一百二十里。途中，连克定番（今惠水）、广顺、兴义等县城，并渡过了北盘江。四月下旬，我分三路进军云南：一路就是留在乌江北牵制敌人的别动支队九军团，他们打败了敌人五个团的围追，入滇时，占领宣威，后来经过会泽，渡金沙江；另两路是红军主力，攻克霑益、马龙、寻甸、嵩明等地，直逼昆明。这时，滇军主力全部东调，云南后方空虚，我军入滇，吓得龙云胆颤心惊，忙将各地民团集中昆明守城，我军却虚晃一枪，即向西北方向金沙江边挺进。” 进入云南后，红军的主要任务是：抓紧“滇军主力全部东调，云南后方空虚”的机会，以最快的速度抢渡天险金沙江，把一直紧紧围追堵截的国民党军队远远抛在后面。 在奔袭云南途中，贺子珍所在的干部休养连突然遭到国民党飞机的袭击。她因掩护伤员而被炸得遍体鳞伤，鲜血直流，昏迷过去，经检查，发现挂花十七处。她苏醒后对赶来的毛泽民夫妇说：“我负伤的事情，请你们暂时不要告诉主席。他在前线指挥作战很忙，不要再分他的心。请你们把我寄放在附近老百姓家里，将来革命胜利了，再见面。” 毛泽东赶到，她又说：“润之，把我留下，你们前进吧！”毛泽东对她说：“子珍，你不要那样想。我和同志们，绝不会把你一个人留在这里！” 红军进入云南东部平原后，有一个很大的困难：“由于没有地图，对云南的地形道路很陌生，靠一份全省略图，地点路线都很不准确。全军都不知道金沙江渡口的位置在哪里，仅靠询问向导探索前进。用这种侦察方法，至多只能查明两三天的行程，往往要走不少弯路。”4月28日，先遣分队在通往昆明的公路上，截获一辆汽车，车上有龙云送给薛岳的云南省十万分之一的地图。毛泽东知道后十分高兴。他说：“我们正为没有云南详图而犯愁的时候，敌人就送上门来了，真是解了燃眉之急！”“从一定意义上说，这一战绩比在战场上缴获的武器还重要，可谓巧获呀！” 当晚，毛泽东同中共中央、中革军委负责人立刻开会，研究抢渡金沙江的行动部署。他说：遵义会议后，我军大胆穿插，机动作战，把蒋介石的尾追部队甩在侧后，获得了北渡金沙江的有利时机。云南境内的地形条件，不像湖南、贵州有良好的山区可以利用，我军不宜在昆明东北平川地带同敌人进行大的战斗。我军应该趁沿江敌军空虚，尾追国民党军距我们还有三四天行程，迅速争取渡金沙江的先机。 中革军委一面派先锋团直逼昆明，迫使云南当局调兵固守昆明，削弱金沙江的防务，一面率主力迅速北上到金沙江南岸，准备过江。 金沙江，是长江的上游，两岸崇山峻岭，水流湍急，吼声如雷，素称天险。毛泽东和中革军委决定：在洪门渡、龙街渡、皎平渡三个渡口抢渡金沙江。毛泽东等随中央纵队从皎平渡渡江。从五月三日至九日，中央红军主力全部渡过金沙江。国民党追兵在薛岳率领下赶到金沙江边时，已在红军过江后的第七天，船只已经烧毁，只能隔江兴叹。这样，红军就摆脱了几十万国民党军队的紧追堵截，取得了战略转移中的决定性胜利。 渡过金沙江后，红军得到几天的休整时间。5月12日，毛泽东在四川会理城郊出席中共中央政治局扩大会议。那时，林彪给中革军委写了一封信。“林信大意是：毛、朱、周随军主持大计，请彭德怀任前敌指挥，迅速北进与四方面军会合”。 毛泽东批评了林彪，“你是娃娃，你懂得什么？”周恩来、朱德等发言支持毛泽东，称赞他在危急的情况下，采取兜大圈子、机动作战的方针，四渡赤水，佯攻贵阳，威逼昆明，北渡金沙江，才摆脱了敌人的重兵包围。会议统一了认识，维护了团结，并决定立即北上同红四方面军会合。 红军继续北上，先要通过彝族聚居地区，才能到达大渡河畔。毛泽东嘱咐先遣队司令员刘伯承：先遣队的任务不是打仗，而是宣传党的民族政策，用政策的感召力与彝民达到友好。只要我们全军模范地执行纪律和党的民族政策，取得彝族人民的信任和同情，彝民不会打我们，还会帮助我们通过彝族区，抢渡大渡河。刘伯承坚定地执行了党的民族政策，与沽基族首领结盟修好，并对其他部族做了工作，顺利地通过彝族地区，赶到大渡河的安顺场渡口。 蒋介石立刻又命令在大渡河以北地区加紧布防，致电各路将领：“大渡河是太平天国石达开大军覆灭之地”，“希各军师长鼓励所部建立'殊勋'”。 安顺场在大渡河南岸，是一个河谷地带，两侧四五十里是高山。部队在这样的深沟中没有回旋余地，兵力也无法展开，极易被敌人伏击消灭。刘伯承率先遣队到达后，找到两只小船，由十七名勇士坐着过河，占领了渡口。先遣队各部陆续过江。但此处架桥不易，全军难以在短时间内从这里过江。5月26日，毛泽东、周恩来、朱德抵达安顺场，听取刘伯承、聂荣臻详细汇报过河和架桥的情况后，立刻决定红军沿大渡河两岸赶向安顺场以北一百七十公里的泸定桥，限两天赶到。红军克服重重困难，按时赶到，战胜守军，占领了泸定桥和泸定县城。红军主力在6月2日全部渡过大渡河。毛泽东对指战员们说：我们的行动已经证明，中国共产党领导的红军不是太平军，我和朱德也不是“石达开第二”，蒋介石的如意算盘又打错了。 过了泸定桥，红军继续北上。6月8日，中共中央和中革军委发出《为达到一、四方面军会合的战略指示》，指出：“我军基本任务，是用一切努力，不顾一切困难，取得与四方面军直接会合。”“我军必须以迅雷之势突破芦山、宝兴之线守敌，奇取懋功，控制小金川流域于我手中，以为前进之枢纽。” 实现这个战略目标的关键，是要翻越海拔四千九百多米的夹金山。山上终年积雪，气候变化无常，空气稀薄，人迹罕至。6月17日早晨，毛泽东喝完一碗热气腾腾的辣椒汤，身穿夹衣夹裤，手持木棍，沿着前面部队走出的又陡又滑的雪路，向山顶攀登。他把马让给伤病员和体弱的女同志使用，并且说：“多有一个同志爬过雪山，就为革命多保存了一份力量！”走到半山，气候骤变，冰雹劈头打来。他拉着战士的手前进，同时嘱咐大家：“低着头走，不要往上看，也不要往山下看，千万不要撒开手！”一会儿，冰雹停止，但越近山顶空气就越稀薄，一些体力弱的战士一坐下去就再也没有起来。毛泽东对坐在雪地里休息的戴天福说：你坐在这里非常危险的，来，我背着你走。警卫员吴吉清抢先把戴天福背起，在毛泽东帮扶下走向山顶。越过山顶后，下山就比较容易了。当天下午，他们就到达懋功县达维镇，受到三月中旬退出川陕根据地来到川西的红四方面军先头部队的夹道欢迎。18日，他们进入懋功县城，会见在这里迎候的红四方面军先头部队第30军政委李先念。 红一、四方面军的会师，是红军长征史上的一件大事。它大大增强了红军的力量，使集结在这个地区的红军兵力达到十多万人，为开创新局面创造了有利条件。 两军会合后红军的行动方向应当指向哪里？是就地发展，还是继续北上，这是关系到红军今后命运的头等重要的问题。不料，恰恰在这个大问题上立刻发生严重的、难以调和的分歧。 还在两军会合的前夕，中共中央收到红四方面军领导人来电请速决“今后两军行动大计”。朱德、毛泽东、周恩来、张闻天在6月16日致电四方面军领导人张国焘、徐向前、陈昌浩，明确地指出：“今后我一、四两方面军总的方针应是占领川、陕、甘三省，建立三省苏维埃政权，并于适当时期以一部组织远征军占领新疆。”但张国焘、陈昌浩复电中共中央，不同意这个战略，提出红军北攻阿坝，组织远征军，占领青海、新疆，或暂时向南进攻。 到达懋功县城的当天，毛泽东、张闻天、周恩来、朱德就战略进攻方向问题再电张国焘、陈昌浩、徐向前，提出：“目前形势须集大力首先突破平武，以为向北转移枢纽。”“望即下决心为要”。张国焘于20日又致电中共中央，提出向西发展，并说“目前给养困难，除此似无良策”。中央复电张国焘，指出：“从整个战略形势着想，如从胡宗南或田颂尧防线突破任何一点，均较西移作战为有利。请你再过细考虑！”这样重大的问题，在往来电报中自然是难以解决的，因此，中共中央在电报中请张国焘“立即赶来懋功，以便商决一切”。 25日，毛泽东和中央其他领导人到懋功县城以北的两河口，欢迎从茂县前来的四方面军主要领导人张国焘，并举行两大主力红军会师大会。朱德致欢迎词，说明两大主力红军会师的重大意义和北上的方针。张国焘在讲话中却公然提出同中央相悖的西进方针。 毛泽东和张国焘都是中共一大的代表，已经多年不见了，但一见面谈话却并不投机。 第二天，在两河口举行中共中央政治局扩大会议。周恩来在会上作了目前战略方针的报告，从地域是否便于机动、群众条件和经济条件三个方面，阐明红军应该去“川陕甘”，“我们如陷在懋、松、理，就没有前途”。提出以运动战迅速北上攻打驻松潘的胡宗南部，创造川陕甘根据地。张国焘在发言中勉强表示同意中央的北进方针，又同时提出也可“向南”，“向成都打”的问题。毛泽东发言同意周恩来的报告，提出：一、中国红军要用全力到新的地区发展根据地，在川陕甘建立新根据地，这是向前的方针，要对四方面军同志作解释，因为他们是要打成都的，而一、四方面军会合后有可能实现向北发展。二、战争性质不是决战防御，不是跑，而是进攻，因为根据地是依靠进攻发展起来的，我们应当过山战胜胡宗南，占取甘南，迅速向北发展。三、我须高度机动，这就有个走路的问题，要选好向北发展的路线，先机夺人。四、集中兵力于主攻方面，如攻松潘，胡宗南如与我打野战，我有二十个团以上，是够的。今天决定，明天即须行动。五、责成常委、军委解决统一指挥问题。 会议经过三天讨论，通过北进建立“川陕甘”根据地的战略方针。28日，政治局根据会议精神作出《关于一、四方面军会合后的战略方针》的决定。指出：“我们的战略方针是集中主力向北进攻，在运动战中大量消灭敌人，首先取得甘肃南部，以创造川陕甘苏区根据地。”“为了实现这一战略方针，在战役上必须首先集中主力消灭与打击胡宗南军，夺取松潘与控制松潘以北地区，使主力能够胜利地向甘南前进。” 6月29日，毛泽东又出席中共中央政治局常委会议。会议除决定张国焘为中革军委副主席，徐向前、陈昌浩为军委委员外，主要听取博古关于华北事变的情况报告。毛泽东发言时指出：日本帝国主义想把蒋介石完全控制在自己手下，“党对时局应有表示，发表文件，在部队中宣传，反对日本”，这是“最能动员群众”的。 会议决定，以中共中央名义发表宣言或通电。 张国焘回去后，自恃他所领导的军队人数多，又策动一些人给中央写信伸手要权。他还以“统一指挥”、“组织问题”没有解决为借口，故意拖延执行中革军委在两河口会议后制定的《松潘战役计划》。 中央红军为了执行《松潘战役计划》继续北进，在7月初翻过第二座大雪山，抵达卓克基，10日到达芦花（今黑水县）。朱德、毛泽东、周恩来致电张国焘，催促他立刻率部北上，并要张国焘、徐向前、陈昌浩迅速到芦花集中指挥。 张国焘到芦花后，中共中央在18日举行政治局常委会议，讨论组织问题。张国焘提出要提拔新干部，主张增补一批人“可到军委”。毛泽东说：提拔干部是需要的，但不需要这么多人集中到军委，下面需要人。会议为了团结张国焘共同北上，同意将原由周恩来担任的红军总政委改由张国焘担任，周恩来调中央常委工作。中革军委当天发出通知：“仍以中革军委主席朱德同志兼总司令，并任张国