Chapter 16 Chapter 15 Before and After the Luochuan Meeting

The Luochuan meeting was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held at a historical turning point when the nationwide Anti-Japanese War just broke out.Zhang Wentian not only presided over the Luochuan meeting, but also presided over the "Central Bureau Political Meeting" (August 9) before the meeting. The name of the meeting is according to the minutes of the meeting.To prepare for the Luochuan meeting, after the meeting, he hosted the "United Front Symposium" to implement the spirit of the Luochuan meeting.His historical contribution to the Luochuan Conference should be fully affirmed.

On August 9, 1937, Zhang Wentian presided over the political meeting of the Central Bureau in Yan'an.Attending the meeting were Politburo members Mao Zedong, Kai Feng, and Zhang Guotao, and 19 people in charge, including Dong Biwu, Guo Hongtao, Wu Liangping, Cai Chang, Lin Biao, Luo Ruiqing, Xiao Jinguang, Xu Xiangqian, and Luo Mai (Li Weihan).Zhang Wentian made a report on "The Current Political Situation and the Party's Tasks after the Fall of Pingjin".This meeting has the nature of a preparatory meeting for the Luochuan Conference. After the "July 7th" Incident, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued "Electricity for the Japanese Attack on Marco Polo Bridge" on July 8, calling on the whole nation to carry out the War of Resistance; On the 15th, Zhou Enlai handed over the "Communist Party Central Committee Announcement of the Kuomintang-Communist Cooperation Declaration" to the Kuomintang in Lushan Mountain. On the 21st, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued "Instructions on the Current Situation", advocating the general mobilization of the national army and the people of the whole country, the realization of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the establishment of the anti-Japanese national united front, the democratization of government agencies, and the elimination of all pro-Japanese factions. The traitors should carry out unified, active and comprehensive resistance.This actually proposes a line of all-out war of resistance for the whole nation.The instructions also stipulated that the Red Army should immediately change its name and prepare to dispatch to North China immediately to fight directly against Japan. On the 23rd, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Second Declaration for Japanese Imperialism's Attack on North China" by telegram, which systematically proposed the "Eight Measures" for the implementation of the resolute war of resistance, expressing and enriching the instructions within the party on the 21st. On the idea of ​​realizing a nationwide war of resistance.On the same day, Mao Zedong wrote "On the Policy, Method and Prospect of Opposing Japan's Attack", expressing that the Communists are willing to unite with the Kuomintang to implement the policy and method of resolutely resisting the Japanese War and strive for the prospect of victory.Under the pressure of the Japanese invaders, Chiang Kai-shek also made a speech on July 17 during the "Ming Xu" in Lushan, confirming the policy of fighting against Japan; Now that we are at the last moment", "the only way is to mobilize the whole plan, lead the whole country, fight in unison, and persevere to the end to defend the country." . On August 6, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and others went to Nanjing to prepare to attend the National Defense Conference. On August 7, Mao Zedong ordered the various departments of the Red Army to prepare for dispatch.The initial military cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party began to take shape.Therefore, in the situation of the July 7th Incident and the fall of Pingjin, there were a series of important issues around the center of "strive for victory in the War of Resistance" - the line of the War of Resistance, the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, military strategy, the strategic tasks of the reorganized Red Army, operational policies and procedures, etc. urgently need to be resolved.

It was against this background that Zhang Wentian’s report at the political meeting on August 9 was made.Prior to this, Zhang Wentian had already written "On the Situation after the Fall of Pingjin" on August 2.Weekly Volume 1, Issue 13, signed by Luo Fu.This article was the basis for an Aug. 9 report. Regarding the situation, Zhang Wentian pointed out: Japan's occupation of Pingjin was only the beginning of a large-scale war of aggression against China's headquarters.This war pushed China towards the launch of a nationwide war of resistance.The mainland policy of Japanese imperialism is by no means content with acquiring a part of China's territory, what it wants is the whole of China!The development of the current situation will inevitably change from the current situation of local challenges to a nationwide war of resistance.Zhang Wentian affirmed that the Nanjing government had expressed its resolute resistance to Japan and had made progress in its actual actions. At the same time, he also criticized its hesitant and delusional tradition of compromise that had not been completely overcome, especially in the realization of democratic politics and democratic rights, and the release of political prisoners. However, the issue of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was not finally resolved, and they did not dare to cancel all the privileges and activities of the Japanese aggressors in China, and they did not get rid of their passive state in diplomacy.He pointed out that the main danger in the current situation is national defeatism, the illusion of stopping the Japanese invasion through concessions and compromises, and the dependence on British imperialism.

Regarding the Party's tasks, Zhang Wentian stated in his report: "At present, the center of our Party's work is to strive for the launch and victory of the nationwide War of Resistance." , Prompting the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek to accept it, thus actually playing a guiding role.In the report, Zhang Wentian put forward the "Eight Programs" to realize the "National National War of Resistance".The main points are: 1. Stop the peace talks between China and Japan, announce the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan, and announce the resolute policy of implementing a nationwide national war of resistance; 2. Mobilize the entire Chinese navy, army and air force to carry out the war of resistance; Anti-Japanese War; 5. Reorganize government organizations; 6. Realize the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and establish a national united front against Japan; 7. Realize new policies in finance, economy, land, labor, culture, and education, consolidate national defense, and improve people's livelihood; 8. Realize Anti-Japanese active diplomacy.The "eight major program" proposed by Zhang Wentian here is slightly modified on the basis of the "eight measures" proposed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on July 23 in the "Second Declaration for Japanese Imperialism to Attack North China". The "Eight Programs" put forward by Mao Zedong in "On the Policy, Method and Prospect of Opposing Japanese Imperialist Attacks" are generally consistent.

During the discussion, Mao Zedong proposed to add it to the "Ten Programs" and make a "resolution".He said that there are "elimination of counter-revolutionaries" but not "education" in the program and manifesto, and there are "education" but no "elimination of counter-revolutionaries" in my articles.Now we have a resolution to do everything that should be done.The so-called "comprehensive war of resistance", "improvement of life" requires one, "education" requires one, and the original eight plus one "resolute resistance" and "united front" make up the "Ten Programs". .Zhang Wentian agreed with Mao's opinion, and said in his speech after the discussion that it was necessary for the "Ten Programs" to be written and published.

Regarding the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Zhang Wentian put forward five principles for handling relations with the Kuomintang during the War of Resistance Against Japan in his report: (1) Adhere to the policy of cooperating with the Kuomintang, promote every progress it has made, and criticize its wavering and compromise.Against impatience, keep pushing it forward, forcing it forward.On the other hand, cooperation is not surrender, and it is opposed to the surrender tendency of satisfaction and accommodation. (2) Put forward positive ideas for the independence of our party, propose methods to guarantee victory, call on and unite the masses of the whole country, force Chiang to go to our side, and make our party actually play a guiding role.

(3) Participate in all legal groups and activities initiated by the Kuomintang (such as anti-enemy support associations, etc.), expand their mass base and democracy within the organization, and make it an open and broad united front organization.At the same time, do not give up using all open possibilities to independently carry out the work of mobilizing, organizing and educating the masses.Create a force that promotes the Nanjing government, not against it. (4) Strive for the openness and semi-openness of the party, and consolidate and expand the party's secret organization.Strengthen work among the masses and the army.

(5) Change all working methods and methods to adapt to the current new situation. These principles had a profound impact not only when we entered a new stage, but also during the entire period of the War of Resistance Against Japan.In the discussion, Mao Zedong specifically mentioned: The issue of anti-inclination in the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party completely agrees with the (Luo Fu) report and opposes two tendencies, one is impatience, and the other is suitable for the Kuomintang.It is necessary to maintain the independence of the organization and the freedom of criticism.

Military issues were also discussed at the meeting.Mao Zedong pointed out that before today it was to prepare for mobilization, and after today it will be implemented.The Red Army should be an independent command and decentralized guerrilla warfare.Group operations are not good for the Red Army.We should be vigilant to ensure the development and expansion of the Red Army.Before this meeting, Luo and Mao had telegraphed Zhou Enlai, Bogu, and Lin Boqu on the Red Army's operational principles on August 1.See "Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" (10), the 1986 edition of the Party School Press of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.On the same day, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also issued the "Instructions on the Work in the South's Guerrilla Areas". On the issue of reorganization of troops, there were already more than a thousand guerrillas led by He Ming in July 1937. The lesson of being suddenly surrounded and disarmed by the Kuomintang army, the instructions put forward the principle of "preserving and consolidating the revolutionary armed forces and guaranteeing the party's absolute leadership."

After the political meeting on August 9, Mao Zedong drafted the "Ten Programs of the Chinese Communist Party for Anti-Japanese and National Salvation——To Mobilize All Forces and Struggle for Victory in the War of Resistance" and the propaganda and agitation outline for the current situation and tasks "In order to mobilize all forces for victory in the War of Resistance Struggle", Zhang Wentian drafted the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks".Weekly Volume 1, Issue 15 (published on September 6, 1937), the Luochuan meeting had already been held at this time, but the date of signing the documents was August 15, 1937. .The 15 items proposed in the document include the principles for handling the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the basic requirements of the Ten Programs proposed in Zhang Wentian’s report; Based on certain principles", "the Red Army serves as a strategic guerrilla detachment", "under the general strategic policy, carry out independent guerrilla warfare and give full play to the strengths of the Red Army".Ibid, p. 319.It can be seen from this that the political meeting of the Central Bureau on August 9 made full preparations for the Luochuan meeting in late August.

On the evening of August 22, 1937, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Fengjia Village (where the Red Army headquarters was located at that time), more than ten kilometers northeast of Luochuan County in northern Shaanxi, and the meeting lasted for 4 days.Attendees in the order listed in the meeting minutes are: Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Bogu, Zhang Guotao, Kai Feng, Peng Dehuai, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, Guan Xiangying, He Long, Liu Bocheng, Zhang Hao, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Luo Ruiqing, Zhang Wenbin, Xiao Jinguang, Zhou Jianping, Lin Boqu, Xu Xiangqian, Fu Zhong, a total of 22 people.Some people said that there were 23 participants in the meeting, and one was Zhou Kun, but there was no record.Zhang Wentian presided over the meeting, and Mao Zedong made a report on military issues and the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.Zhang Wentian made a long speech during the discussion, and on August 24 he made a supplementary report according to the minutes of the meeting. The name of the "supplementary report" is recorded according to Zhu De's speech: "Luo Fu's supplementary report is very detailed in analysis, and I agree with it." The title of the meeting record is "Report". In order not to repeat with Mao Zedong's report, the author used Zhu De's formulation at that time .After discussion, he made a conclusion. Zhang Wentian analyzed the political situation at that time from five aspects: Japan, the Nanjing government, local military and political authorities, the masses, and countries around the world. Strive for victory in the Anti-Japanese War.He analyzed the situation of the left, center, and right factions in the KMT: the left in Nanjing firmly advocated the war of resistance, and their influence and status have increased, but they cannot play a decisive role today; the center, represented by Chiang Kai-shek, has begun to have the determination to resist the war. A fundamental shift is a big step forward.Along with this basic change, there was a considerable change in democratic politics, and the unity and unity of all aspects of the country under the joint resistance against Japan also improved. The Central Army also showed its heroism in the War of Resistance.But at the same time, it should be noted that the Nanjing government's war of resistance was forced, so it must be passive resistance. The mass movement, which is a serious weakness, contains the great danger of leading to the failure of the War of Resistance.The rightists represented by Wang Jingwei dare not openly oppose the Anti-Japanese War under the pressure of today's anti-Japanese war, but they secretly acted, colluded with Japan, pulled the Chinese faction to the right, and spread national defeatism.Starting from the analysis of the political situation, Zhang Wentian pointed out that our general policy is to develop the national war of resistance that has already begun into a comprehensive, whole-nation war of resistance, mobilize all forces to strive for victory in the war of resistance, and accomplish the tasks of the democratic revolution from it— —Unify China and establish a democratic republic.This is a way that hasn't been done before.In terms of the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, we must adhere to the policy of uniting with the Kuomintang and promote its progress; we should not only oppose the "left" impatience, but also prevent the right's tailism and capitulationism, maintain independent organizations, and criticize freedom.As for the Central Army and the local forces, we should see that the main ones are the Central Army and Chiang Kai-shek.To win over local powerful factions is not simply to be regarded as a bridge, but do not relax the main target of the Central Army.Zhang Wentian emphasized that only when the Communist Party gains leadership in the War of Resistance can the victory of the War of Resistance be guaranteed.Based on the new situation, he pointed out that we must come up with methods and point out the way to win the War of Resistance, which is the basis for striving for leadership.The new Ten Programs are the specific road to victory, and we must adhere to the realization of the "Ten Programs for Anti-Japanese and National Salvation". The strategic and protracted war of the Anti-Japanese War is a focus of Zhang Wentian's supplementary report and speech.His supplementary report and speech expounded and developed the strategic policy of protracted war proposed in Mao Zedong's report.In his speech on August 22, Zhang Wentian pointed out that winning the War of Resistance is an arduous, protracted, and changing process of struggle, and we must prepare for a protracted war. In a supplementary report on August 24, Zhang Wentian said that the Kuomintang was unwilling to mobilize the people of the whole country to fight against Japan.This kind of war of resistance may achieve partial victories (such as Shanghai and Nanjing), but it cannot achieve a complete and final victory. On the contrary, there is a possibility of serious failure!Only by transforming into a comprehensive and nationwide war of resistance can we win the final victory!He then pointed out that this comprehensive war of resistance by the whole nation is a protracted war.He said: The issue of protracted war should be emphasized.Don't be proud of victory, don't be discouraged by failure.A protracted war includes offense, defense, retreat, etc. The comprehensive resistance of the whole nation is a process of arduous struggle.Precisely because of the weaknesses in the current war of resistance, setbacks, failures, compromises, and mutinies may occur, and new large-scale attacks may occur. We cannot resist and have to retreat, but this is only a partial failure rather than a complete failure.Taking these circumstances into account enables us to persevere rather than defeatist.The persistence of the war is because there are many difficulties in the course of the war.We must make a fuss in this process, realize our proposition, and strive for the final victory of the War of Resistance.In the process, the Communist Party will inevitably gain leadership.He pointed out that Japan's weaknesses must be seen. Its internal contradictions, economic weakness, etc., determine that it cannot persist in a protracted war. Zhang Wentian's exposition on protracted war aroused heated discussions.During the discussion, Mao Zedong continued to elaborate on the strategic policy of protracted resistance to Japan; Zhu De and Zhou Enlai also put forward their opinions on supporting the protracted war in North China. Regarding the Red Army's combat policy and the dispatch and use of troops, there were heated discussions at the meeting, and opinions were not very consistent.The participants all believed that the Red Army should march out to fight the enemy in time, but they had different opinions on the specific timing and use of troops.Some advocated that the KMT should issue a declaration of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the Communist Party’s public and legal status should be guaranteed before dispatching;Some advocated that the Red Army should be dispatched in batches, one-third first, because the war is long-term and cruel, not to mention that the Kuomintang still has 10 divisions around the border area; some advocated dispatching all of them to the front.With regard to the operational policy, there is also a debate between mountain guerrilla warfare and mobile guerrilla warfare.Zhang Wentian is not a military strategist, but he also expressed his views at the meeting.He believes that the principle of independence is the principle of command, and external restraint, as long as it does not hinder my independence; combat is mainly guerrilla warfare, and in general it is to make money.The same goes for the use of strength.Be careful and use it well.The War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war. We must preserve our strength and expand it as much as possible.We declare that all troops will be dispatched; depending on the situation in all aspects, we will continue to dispatch troops when it is favorable.The influence of the Red Army is not determined by how quickly it comes out.We can't completely listen to the masses, and don't be dominated by the enthusiasm of the masses.We must see clearly the basic interests of the revolution.Only by being able to win battles, mobilize the masses, establish base areas, and set an example can we truly improve our faith.He pointed out: "Correct leadership, exemplary work, humble attitude, hard work style, and preparation for protracted war are the elements for us to strive for leadership." "In the recent period, [the central government] can only be in Yan'an." Mao Zedong made a summary on August 25.The meeting passed the "Decision on the Current Situation and the Party's Tasks" and the "Ten Programs for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation". The Luochuan meeting is an important meeting in the history of the Communist Party of China.It put forward the party's program and policies in the war of resistance against Japan at the moment of historical transition when the war of resistance against Japan broke out, stipulated the party's comprehensive line of resistance against Japan and the principle of independence, determined the strategic policy of protracted war and the Red Army's independent mountain guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear With the development of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Eighth Route Army's operational policy was further improved to: "Basically guerrilla warfare, but mobile warfare under favorable conditions will not be relaxed." See Mao Zedong's "On Protracted War", "Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Volume 2 , People's Publishing House, 1991 edition, p. 500.Correctly guiding the Red Army to realize the strategic transformation from the regular army to the guerrilla army, from mobile warfare to guerrilla warfare, laid a political and ideological foundation for realizing the leadership of the party in the War of Resistance Against Japan and mobilizing all forces for victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.Zhang Wentian contributed to the success of this meeting. After the Luochuan meeting, a United Front symposium was held on August 27.Zhang Wentian presided over the meeting, discussing and discussing "the Communist Party attracts the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang attracts the Communist Party" in the United Front, that is, the question of who influences whom, and its essence is the question of who leads the Communist Party and the Kuomintang in the United Front.The issues discussed and the content of Zhang Wentian's speech are all recorded in the meeting minutes.When the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were established through cooperation for the second time, and when the Communist Party re-entered the national political stage openly and legally after ten years of struggle, it is practical and politically farsighted to raise this issue sharply. Zhang Wentian made two speeches at the symposium.He specifically raised the issue of "vigilance", pointing out that the danger of capitulationism is increasing, and the more the United Front develops, the danger of right deviation will increase.Some comrades often only see the aspects of unity but not the aspects of disunity, see the same but fail to see the differences, and only emphasize one aspect while ignoring the other. This is wrong.Zhang Wentian believes that our party itself also has factors that are dangerous to the right.One is that there are many farmers, and they are easily deceived and seduced by others.Women, money, and status are all very attractive; when people pour rice soup, it is easy to trust them.Another factor is the lack of experience in struggle. We have rich experience in the Agrarian Revolution, but we are not familiar with other methods of struggle, while the KMT has considerable experience, including money, people, and status.Aiming at the danger of rightist capitulation, Zhang Wentian put forward the main measures of correction and prevention.He particularly emphasized the need to strengthen the struggle between the two fronts and oppose right-leaning capitulationism in the united front; he seriously proposed strengthening ideological education within the party, especially carrying out Marxist national revolutionary education in the united front.He also pointed out that we should not turn proletarian consciousness into something mysterious. It is proletarian consciousness that uses Marxist methods to solve problems. After the Luochuan Conference, in order to implement the political line and military strategic guidelines determined by the Luochuan Conference and create a new situation for the entire nation to fight against Japan, Zhang Wentian cooperated with Mao Zedong to assess the situation, and guided the party's actions in a timely manner according to changes in the situation, and did a lot of work. Work. After the Luochuan Conference, in response to the capitulationist tendency in the united front after the establishment of the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong promptly called the comrades in charge of the Shanghai Party, pointing out that they only knew about the unity of the Kuomintang and accommodated its demands, but did not know about its wrong policy Struggle is a surrender to the Kuomintang.This tendency is growing among some "left" leaders and party members."Leftist" leaders such as Zhang Naiqi play the role of bringing the revolutionary masses to the bourgeoisie today.Their erroneous claims (such as "fewer calls, more suggestions") should be properly criticized in the newspapers, and the struggle against capitulationist tendencies must be started.The telegram pointed out that the national united front not only does not cancel criticism and struggle against the Kuomintang's wrong policies, but only on this basis can the united front be enriched and consolidated so that it can continue to advance.Under the current situation, we should seize the opportunity to take offensive criticism and struggle against the Kuomintang's wrong policies. In order to promote the development of the mass anti-Japanese and national salvation movement in the Kuomintang-ruled areas, the Central Secretariat issued an instruction on October 17, clearly stating that the danger of tailism and capitulationism in mass work began to become the main danger within the party.Request to publicly criticize the KMT's wrong policy of "controlling" and "arranging" (actually arranging but not handling) the people's national salvation movement, strive for the initiative of the Communist Party in the national salvation movement, adhere to the policy of promoting civil rights and improving people's livelihood to mobilize the masses, Independently organize various mass national salvation groups and carry out multi-faceted national salvation movements. .Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong issued two instructions on the policy of Shanghai's national salvation work on October 18 and November 12, 1937. The previous time called for the expansion of the mass foundation of the national salvation groups and independent and democratic national salvation activities, and exposed the Kuomintang and the post-resistance of the enemy with facts. In order to achieve the democratic transformation of the anti-enemy support associations; after the fall of the last deployment in Shanghai, the open national salvation groups should be turned into secrets, and the working methods should also be changed. The center of the entire national salvation movement will be transferred to Wuhan. .In Xi'an, the accommodating tendency in the relationship between the two parties has been corrected.Zhang Wentian fully affirmed and firmly supported the open letter sent by the Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Shaanxi Provincial Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang on October 10, 1937. This open letter criticized the Shaanxi Anti-Enemy Support Association arranged by them for "controlling", "restricting" and "oppressing" the people Salvation movement.Zhang Wentian published "The Truth of the Dispute Between the Shaanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Shaanxi Provincial Party Headquarters of the Kuomintang" in the weekly magazine, and resolutely refuted the accusation that the open letter was "traitors sowing dissension" in an editorial manner.The Weekly, Volume 1, Issue 24. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also adhered to the principle of independence in reorganizing the guerrilla areas in the south, and corrected and prevented the mistakes of right opportunism.Following the He Ming Division of the Western Fujian Red Army being deceived by the Kuomintang and disarmed in July, the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region lost its independence in negotiations with the Kuomintang in Wuhan in September.Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Bogu, Ye Jianying, Zhou Enlai, Lin Boqu, Dong Biwu, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Ren Bishi on September 14, 1937, pointing out: "In the united front, local parties tend to fall into right opportunism, which has become the main danger within the party. , please pay close attention." Instructed to deny the original negotiation conditions, redefine the method, insist on the conditions such as "the Kuomintang shall not insert a single person", and strictly refrain from repeating the same mistakes in negotiations in other border regions. . On October 1, 1937, the Secretariat of the Central Committee issued the "Instructions of the Central Committee on the Work Policy of the Southern Guerrilla Zones", pointing out that the southern guerrilla zones are the strategic fulcrum of the southern revolutionary movement, which was achieved in ten years of bloody battles.The Kuomintang is trying to pull out these strategic fulcrums, but we must maintain these strategic fulcrums.The complete concentration of the guerrillas in all districts according to the requirements of the Kuomintang is very unfavorable to us, so in principle we do not reject the concentration, but it should not be concentrated unconditionally.In fact, some should be concentrated after all problems are solved, and some should not be concentrated at all.As for the concentrated troops, the Kuomintang should be refused to send personnel to intervene, and the Kuomintang should not interfere with the leadership and command and operations.This ensured the party's absolute leadership over the 14 guerrilla areas in the south and the New Fourth Army (reorganized officially announced on October 12, 1937). On the issue of reforming political institutions and participating in the political power, Zhang Wentian pointed out in his speech at the Luochuan Conference that he should join the government only after determining the common program of resisting Japan and saving the country, allowing the Communist Party to open up, and mobilizing the masses to resist the war. .This shows the principled stand of the Communist Party of independence. On September 25, the Secretariat of the Central Committee issued the "Draft Decision on the Participation of the Communist Party in the Government", proposing that the Communist Party would participate in the government of the anti-Japanese national united front of the whole people, but not the government of the Kuomintang's one-party dictatorship. Enemy-occupied areas can participate in politics, representative institutions such as the National Assembly are allowed to participate, and united front organizations of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party can carry out flexible methods to promote political democratization. After the outbreak of the nationwide Anti-Japanese War, the most important thing is of course the military front.Mao Zedong directly led the transformation of the military strategy and the military deployment of the Eighth Route Army. Zhang Wentian also made worthy contributions in discussing the strategic thinking of protracted warfare and the strategic policy of independent guerrilla warfare. After the Luochuan Conference, on the sixth anniversary of the September 18th Incident, Zhang Wentian wrote "On the Persistence of the Anti-Japanese National Revolutionary War" Weekly Volume 1, Issue 17, signed by Luo Fu Weekly, and published Peng Dehuai's "Strive for a Protracted War of Resistance". Prerequisites for Victory" (Volume 1, No. 25), Zhou Enlai's "How to Carry Out a Protracted War of Resistance" (No. 30) and other articles discussing and guiding the Protracted War of Resistance Against Japan.At a central meeting held on December 19 after the December meeting in 1937, Zhang Wentian made a report titled "The Current Situation of the Anti-Japanese War and the Party's Tasks" and further analyzed in detail "one's own power", "Japanese power" and "International Power" discusses the principle of expanding and consolidating the united front and winning the war of resistance through protracted war.According to the records kept by the Central Archives.All of these contributed to the birth of Mao Zedong's brilliant book "On Protracted War" (May 1938). Zhang Wentian firmly supported Mao Zedong's operational policy of using guerrilla warfare to cooperate with friendly forces and "independent mountain guerrilla warfare". On November 8, 1937, Taiyuan fell.In North China, the regular war with the Kuomintang as the main body basically ended, and the guerrilla war with the Communist Party as the main body began to take the lead.Zhang Wentian wrote the article "Making Shanxi a Strategic Fulcrum of Northern Guerrilla Warfare" on November 15, which was published in Volume 1, Issue 25 of the Weekly, signed by Luo Fu.Summarized the development process and lessons of the Shanxi Anti-Japanese War since the Lugouqiao Incident, not only affirmed Yan Xishan's progress from "Defending the Anti-Japanese War" to organizing the "Sacrifice League" and then organized the "Field Mobilization Meeting", but also criticized him for failing to break through the one-sided line of anti-Japanese war. Incur a rout.The article pointed out that after the fall of Taiyuan, "we are not pessimistic about the future of Shanxi. The Eighth Route Army is still in Shanxi. It is mobilizing, organizing and arming the people on a large scale." stage".The article declares, "The Communist Party's policy in Shanxi is to make Shanxi the strategic fulcrum of guerrilla warfare throughout the north to resist the advance of the Japanese invaders to the Northwest and Central Plains."Zhang Wentian explained the great significance of this strategic fulcrum in popular language: "The Communist Party must set a model example in the north to prove to the people of the whole country: no matter how (powerful) the planes and artillery of the Japanese army are, no matter how the Japanese invaders occupy We still have the means to fight against the enemy in our central cities and traffic arteries, consume them, wear them out, disintegrate them, attack them, and finally expel and destroy them completely." He hoped that Yan Xishan and all the forces in Shanxi now will work with the Communist Party Keep going, persist in guerrilla warfare, and strive for the final victory in the War of Resistance. The strategic tasks proposed by Zhang Wentian in this article are completely consistent with Mao Zedong's instructions on the tasks and military deployment of the North China Eighth Route Army after the fall of Taiyuan.Since then, various departments of the Eighth Route Army have further carried out independent mountain guerrilla warfare in the rural areas behind enemy lines in Shanxi, and established anti-Japanese base areas such as Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, Northwest Shanxi and Daqingshan, Shanxi-Hebei-Henan, and Southwest Shanxi. The Shanxi New Army also developed rapidly. By the end of 1939 There are already 9 brigades and 50 regiments. It is really "the Eight Routes helped the new army develop guerrilla attacks and recover lost towns, and the results are obvious." .The mountainous areas and villages of Shanxi Province have become the vast battlefields behind enemy lines.Yan Xishan was greatly benefited by it, and said with emotion that the Eighth Route Army of the Communist Party in Shanxi now has the light of ten foreign independence forces, the Jinsui Army has the light of one foreign candle, and the Central Army has only the light of one incense stick.