Chapter 14 Chapter Thirteen Peaceful Resolution of the Xi'an Incident

After the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in September, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China urged Chiang Kai-shek to stop the civil war, start negotiations early, realize the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and jointly resist Japan. Northern Shaanxi, went to Shanghai, and prepared to send Zhou Enlai as the representative of the Communist Party of China to negotiate with the Kuomintang and sign the "Anti-Japanese National Salvation Agreement."However, Chiang Kai-shek's proposals for the CCP did not increase day by day.After quelling the "Guangdong Incident", Chiang Kai-shek immediately increased his troops in Shaanxi and Gansu to "encircle and suppress" the Red Army.He turned upside down at the negotiating table, with a tough attitude, trying to solve the Northwest issue in one fell swoop through military offensive and political negotiation, and realize his ambition of "dissolving the Communist Party" and incorporating the Red Army.Under the fierce attack of the Kuomintang army, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on the one hand, "caused a movement to stop the attack on the Red Army from all aspects" and "in this way forced Chiang to stop suppressing the Communist Party." On November 22, 1936, Mao Zedong and Zhang Wentian sent a telegram to Pan Hannian, published in " Literature and Research, No. 4, 1985. ; On the other hand, the Battle of Hill Castle was organized in late November to show the prestige of the Red Army.During the negotiations, they "did not insist on excessive demands" and agreed to "rename the Red Army under Chiang's command.".However, Chiang Kai-shek still insisted on going his own way, and instead severely supervised Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng's "invasion and suppression" of the Red Army.

In order to urge Chiang Kai-shek to give up the policy of "suppressing the Communist Party" and implement the anti-Japanese national salvation, the two generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng decided to "remonstrate" against Chiang Kai-shek after repeated admonitions were ineffective but were reprimanded. In the early morning of December 12, 1936, Zhang and Yang jointly launched the Xi'an Incident that shocked China and foreign countries.They arrested Chiang Kai-shek in Huaqing Pool in Lintong, east of Xi'an, and imprisoned more than a dozen Kuomintang military and political officials from Nanjing, including Chen Cheng, Jiang Dingwen, Wei Lihuang, and Zhang Chong, in Xi'an.

Just before the action (12:30 on the 12th), Liu Ding, the representative of the CPC Central Committee stationed at Zhang Xueliang's place, sent a telegram to the Party Central Committee stationed in Bao'an to report the imminent major incident in Xi'an. Immediately after the incident, Zhang and Yang telegraphed the whole country, proposing "reorganize the Nanjing government", "stop all civil wars", "immediately release the patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai", "release all political prisoners throughout the country", "immediately convene a meeting to save the country", etc. a political opinion.

How to deal with this sudden incident suddenly became the focus of the struggle of various political forces in China and a major issue of international concern. On the morning of December 13, the day after the Xi'an Incident, Zhang Wentian convened and presided over an enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in Baoan's own cave to discuss the situation after the Xi'an Incident and how to deal with it.Reported by Mao Zedong.The participants unanimously agreed with Mao Zedong's analysis and affirmed that the Xi'an Incident was an act of resistance to Japan and a revolutionary action.According to the minutes of this meeting.However, due to the suddenness of the incident, the situation is still not very clear about the policy for handling the incident, and the understanding is not completely appropriate, nor is it consistent.It should be said that this is normal and inevitable.

As usual, at this meeting, Zhang Wentian listened to the reports and discussions before speaking.In response to the opinions in the report and discussion, he discussed the main contradiction exposed by the Xi'an Incident and the basic policy that the Chinese Communist Party should adopt. In Zhang Wentian's view, it was inappropriate to make two interrelated propositions at the meeting: First, on the issue of political power, he advocated the establishment of a substantial "government" centered on Xi'an, with the Northwest as the anti-Japanese front line, influencing the whole country, leading National Anti-Japanese War.2. Regarding the handling of Chiang Kai-shek, he advocated anti-Chiang and proposed to try and eliminate Chiang.He believed that Chiang's crimes should be exposed in front of the people, and demanded that Chiang Kai-shek be removed and handed over to the people for trial.

Zhang Wentian pointed out in his speech that on the issue of resistance to Japan, the main contradiction is the contradiction between the anti-Japanese faction and the "national compromise faction" (represented by Chiang Kai-shek).This "mutation" of Zhang Xueliang in Xi'an "is the beginning of an action to expose the national compromisers."The significance of this action is to make the whole situation "develop in the direction of nationwide resistance to Japan."Proceeding from the analysis of the contradictory nature and development trend of the Xi'an Incident, Zhang Wentian put forward the fundamental policy for handling the incident: "transfer the local anti-Japanese united front to the national anti-Japanese united front", and foresees that our party's work will also have a positive impact. A shift: "Going to legally enter the political arena".On the issue of political power, Zhang Wentian made it clear that we "do not adopt the policy of confrontation with Nanjing. We do not organize confrontation with Nanjing (actually the form of political power)".Zhang Wentian believes that "the slogan of reorganizing the Nanjing government is not bad" put forward by Zhang and Yang, and our correct strategy should be "taking resistance against Japan as the highest banner", "defensive in the military and offensive in politics", and "mobilize the masses to intimidate Nanjing". ", in order to promote the slogan of "reorganizing the Nanjing government", rather than "controlling Nanjing" or even "overthrowing the Nanjing government".As for the treatment of Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Wentian clearly advocated that "we should try our best to win over the compromisers, and divide and isolate them", and clearly stated that "we should try our best to strive for the orthodoxy of the Nanjing government."The "compromise faction" mentioned here is the "national compromise faction", which is different from the "pro-Japanese faction", "surrender faction" and "traitorous forces". .The "orthodoxy of the Nanjing government" mentioned here naturally firstly includes the Chairman of the Generalissimo who was detained in Xi'an.

At the meeting, members of the Standing Committee attached great importance to the strategies and guidelines proposed by Zhang Wentian.But the telegrams after this meeting, such as the telegrams from Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Li Yi (that is, Zhang Xueliang) at noon that day, the telegrams from the Red Army generals to Zhang and Yang on the 14th, the telegrams from the Red Army generals to the Kuomintang and the National Government on the 15th, and the "Red Army Generals" on the 16th. The Zhonghua News reported that in the first few days it did not implement the strategies and guidelines proposed by Zhang Wentian, and did not leave the idea of ​​"Xi'an as the center" and "trial Jiang" to deal with the outstanding Xi'an Incident.

The development of the situation and the clarity of the attitudes of all parties soon proved that the Xi'an Incident could not be resolved peacefully by following the assumptions of "taking Xi'an as the center" and "examining Chiang Kai-shek".After the incident broke out, domestic and foreign reactions were strong and complicated.He Yingqin, Minister of Military and Political Affairs of the Nanjing Government, and other pro-Japanese factions strongly advocated the "crusade" against Zhang and Yang; , Yang did not express support, and almost unanimously demanded the restoration of Jiang's freedom.The attitudes of various countries are different. Japan tried its best to provoke China to expand the civil war. When it learned that Nanjing had decided to "crusade", it was elated and ready to go. Pravda and Izvestia published consecutive comments, accusing Zhang and Yang, and also hoped that the incident would be resolved peacefully.After the Xi'an Incident broke out, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China immediately decided to send representatives to discuss major plans at the invitation of Zhang and Yang. On December 17, Zhou Enlai and others flew to Xi'an by Zhang Xueliang's special plane, had talks with Zhang and Yang, and successively called the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to report the changes in the situation in Xi'an Bureau, domestic and foreign reactions to the Xi'an Incident, and state their own opinions on solving the incident.After Jiang was detained, in fact, how to deal with Jiang became the focus of the confrontation between Nanjing and Xi'an.Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Bo Gu and others gradually formed a decision to peacefully resolve the Xi'an Incident based on further observations of the incident situation.

On December 18, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China called the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, pointing out that "if your party wants to rescue Chiang, it is by no means effective in mobilizing a large army to attack Zhang and Yang."This telegram puts forward five conditions: "Stop all internal stations and unite to resist Japan", "Jiang's crusade against Zhang and Yang, and all the Central Army attacking the Red Army reinforces Jinsui", and states that "if your party can realize the above urgent demands of the people of the whole country, Not only will the country and the nation be saved, but Chiang’s safety and freedom should not be a problem.”

On December 19, Zhang Wentian presided over an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, and formally discussed the policy for resolving the Xi'an Incident for the second time.At this time, six days had passed since the Xi'an Incident.As Zhang Wentian pointed out at the meeting, "During the six days, both the phenomenon and the essence of this event [expressed] more fully."Zhang Wentian's speech at the Politburo meeting on December 19, 1936, quoted here and below, was published in "Party Literature" No. 3, 1988. The enlarged meeting of the Politburo on the 19th was different from the meeting on the 13th. It was held after the core leadership of the Party Central Committee agreed and lost no time in making a decision of "peaceful mediation".

The meeting was reported by Mao Zedong.He focused on the analysis of the dual nature of the impact of the incident. On the one hand, it is the bright side, which "can further promote the division of anti-Japanese and pro-Japanese wars and expand the war of resistance against Japan"; on the other hand, it is the dark side. All Yang's anti-Japanese propositions were ignored", "all troops were mobilized to attack Zhang and Yang", and the civil war was in danger of breaking out and prolonging.He went on to analyze the resulting two prospects of the Xi'an Incident: the prospect of victory or the prospect of failure, explaining that we should "split our hands"; Crack down on crusaders".He also said: "There is a difference between the telegram published now and the previous telegram, and it is more fair from the standpoint of a third party." . Zhang Wentian’s speech at this meeting complemented Mao Zedong’s report, and the following points are particularly noteworthy: First, regarding the two prospects of the Xi'an Incident, Zhang Wentian believed: "One is the launch of the nationwide anti-Japanese war, and the other is the expansion of the civil war." Regarding the handling policy, he pointed out: "Our policy should be determined to strive to become a nationwide anti-Japanese war, and insist on stopping the war." Civil war, unified anti-Japanese policy." Second, firmly advocated resisting Japan and not opposing Chiang.Zhang Wentian emphasized: "We should focus on anti-Japanese war" and "not stand against Chiang Kai-shek."He criticized: "The slogan of demanding that Chiang Kai-shek be handed over to the people's public trial is inappropriate."It can be seen that he was one of the first leaders of the Party Central Committee who linked the treatment of Chiang with the overall situation of the Anti-Japanese War and was unwavering on this issue. Third, in terms of avoiding the expansion of the civil war and striving for the national anti-Japanese strategy, Zhang Wentian gave full play to the idea of ​​"dividing the two hands" in Mao Zedong's report, and proposed that "we should try our best to buy time for peaceful mediation", "we should get closer to Zhang and Yang, We should win battles, expand our influence, and prepare for defensive warfare against civil war.”Zhang Wentian summarized our "two hands" as "peaceful mediation" and "defensive warfare", which became the basic policy for peacefully resolving the Xi'an Incident. Fourth, express your views on the attitude of the Soviet Union.After the Xi'an Incident, the Comintern's instructions on the 16th were not translated due to code confusion, and the resent telegram had not yet arrived (arrived on the 20th), and Soviet newspapers began to criticize Zhang and Yang Heng from the 14th.How to treat Soviet public opinion became an important issue in unifying internal thinking.Zhang Wentian explained that the Soviet Union had something to hide, "it can only be said in this way", otherwise it would cause "confrontation with Nanjing", and at the same time pointed out unequivocally, "Such public opinion naturally hinders local interests to some extent"; And categorically stated that of course we cannot adopt the Soviet Union's proposition.Under the circumstances at the time, such an explanation was most conducive to the unification of internal thinking. It can also be clearly seen from this that the policy of peaceful mediation is an independent decision made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China after considering the situation. The pressure of the Soviet Union or the instructions of the Communist International. The meeting on the 19th produced two main documents, one was the "Chinese Soviet Central Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Telegram on the Xi'an Incident", and the other was the "Central Committee's Instructions on the Xi'an Incident and Our Tasks" issued by the party, which became our The party's program for peacefully resolving the Xi'an Incident.From the study of meeting minutes, writing style, etc., it can be roughly concluded that the "power on" was written by Mao Zedong, and the "instruction" was written by Zhang Wentian. After the meeting on the 19th, Zhang Wentian made unremitting efforts to achieve the policy of peacefully resolving the Xi'an Incident. Among them, the telegram sent by the Secretariat of the Central Committee to Zhou Enlai on the 21st is particularly worth mentioning. This telegram brilliantly analyzes the current situation as "Japan's alliance with the right faction in Nanjing in an attempt to seize the center faction of Chiang Kai-shek, causing major civil turmoil. We should support the leftists, win over the centrists, overthrow the rightists, and turn the civil war into a war of resistance.”Proposed the initial reorganization of the Nanjing government, the retreat of the crusade army from Shaanxi and Gansu, the protection of democratic rights, the cessation of the policy of suppressing communism and the joint resistance against Japan with the Red Army, and the establishment of cooperative relations with countries sympathetic to China's anti-Japanese movement, which are equivalent to the six conditions of "open and honest negotiations" by Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng. , calling for "establishment of peace" under these conditions and "restoring Chiang Kai-shek's freedom when the above-mentioned conditions are sufficiently guaranteed" in order to change the entire situation and achieve "unification of China and unanimity against Japan".The policy of "releasing Chiang Kai-shek" determined in this telegram was the key to peacefully resolving the Xi'an Incident.Compared with the five conditions agreed by Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang on the 17th, the conditions put forward in the telegram have been developed, and are more specific, practical and comprehensive.These six conditions immediately became the basis for negotiations agreed by both Xi'an and Nanjing.As a result of the negotiations, these conditions were also "fully recognized" by Jiang and the people from Nanjing (Song Ziwen, etc.), and the six conditions that Jiang finally formally promised were basically the same as those proposed by the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee on December 21. . The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to send Bogu to lead the delegation of the Communist Party of China Ye Jianying (Zhou Enlai was already in Xi'an) to Xi'an with the latest opinions of the Central Committee.Bogu arrived on the 23rd and moved into the third floor of the east building of Zhang Xueliang's mansion. He immediately communicated to Zhou Enlai who lived there and divided the work.The next night, Zhou Enlai met Chiang Kai-shek and reached an agreement to stop the civil war. On December 25, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek regained his freedom after verbally promising six conditions. Zhang Xueliang refused to listen to Bo Gu and Enlai's dissuasion, and personally sent Jiang Jing Luoyang back to Nanjing. On December 27, Zhang Wentian presided over an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to discuss the situation and policy after the release of Chiang Kai-shek.He pointed out: "Now generally speaking, the prospect of ending the civil war is dominant. At present, we are moving in the direction of the War of Resistance Against Japan. However, we should estimate some possible obstacles in the middle. We should take [measures] to send the middle The vacillation finally came to an end", "We use all our strength to strive for the realization of the future of the War of Resistance Against Japan".On the same day, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Instructions on Chiang Kai-shek's Release" to the party, pointing out: "Chiang Kai-shek's acceptance of the anti-Japanese proposition and Chiang Kai-shek's release are the beginning of a new stage for the whole country to end the civil war and unite in the anti-Japanese war. But to fully realize the anti-Japanese tasks, There is still a process of struggle to overcome many difficulties." "In the struggle, push the Kuomintang centrists headed by Chiang Kai-shek to finally end their vacillating position, and resolutely embark on the road of reforming internal affairs and fighting against the outside world." However, Chiang Kai-shek will not change course easily.After he returned to Nanjing, the "obstacle" really happened.He prevented Zhang Xueliang from returning to Xi'an, and directed a strange drama that first "tried", then "pardoned", and then "managed", depriving Zhang Xueliang of his freedom.At the same time, 37 divisions were mobilized to advance towards Xi'an in five ways. At the beginning of the new year in 1937, the situation suddenly became dangerous.The battle clouds over the northwest are dense, and the civil war is on the verge of breaking out.At this critical juncture, Zhang Wentian, together with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, etc., made unremitting efforts to stop the civil war and maintain peace. On January 2, 1937, Zhang Wentian presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to discuss the situation and policy of Zhang Xueliang after he was detained.Zhang Wentian analyzed the situation, put forward countermeasures based on the overall situation, and pointed out: "Chiang's attitude is still wavering, and our policy is to win over him from time to time." If not, we must separate from the pro-Japanese faction.”Zhang Wentian proposed, "The Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee should issue a telegram explaining the current situation, opposing the civil war, demanding that Zhang Xueliang be released, and asking Nanjing to send troops to aid Sui." On January 5, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong jointly called Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu in Xi'an to implement the spirit of the meeting on January 2.This telegram also made specific deployments from both civil and military hands.Politically, "promptly support Chiang Kai-shek to welcome Zhang and send a telegram"; in military affairs, Peng Dehuai and Ren Bishi were required to "quickly order the 15th Army to leave southern Shaanxi".At the same time, the 1st Red Army and the 15th Red Army immediately marched southward.Within a few days, large units of the Red Army appeared near Xi'an, galloped around Shangluo, and strongly supported the Northeast Army and the Seventeenth Route Army. On January 5th, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong also jointly signed a telegram to order Pan Hannian in Shanghai to contact Song Ziwen quickly, asking Song Ziwen to fulfill his promise and fulfill Zhou Enlai's Xi'an and Chiang and Song's agreement on "truce and withdrawal of troops", "preliminary reorganization of the Nanjing government", "Release political prisoners", "Stop suppressing the Communist Party, unite with the Red Army to resist Japan", "Unite with Russia and cooperate with Britain and the United States", and "handle Zhang Xueliang to the Northwest". On January 7, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued "Instructions on the Propaganda Policy of the Xi'an Incident" to Liu Shaoqi. On January 8, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Government of the Soviet Union issued "Electrical Calls to Stop the Civil War for Peace". While focusing their firepower on the pro-Japanese faction, they strategically urged and forced Chiang Kai-shek, who was on "leave" in Fenghua, to fulfill his promise to stop the crisis of civil war . On January 9, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong replied to Zhou and Bo, pointing out that "maintaining the current situation in the Northwest and not firing unless it is absolutely necessary is the current basic policy."The CCP has spared no effort to maintain the hard-won domestic peace. After Chiang Kai-shek set up his position, on January 9, he proposed two negotiation plans, A and B, concerning the Northeast Army, the Seventeenth Route Army, and the Red Army garrison areas.The general idea of ​​Case A is "Northeast Army Gan, the Seventeenth Route Army stationed in Shaanxi, the Red Army returned to northern Shaanxi, and the Central Army stationed in Xi'an on the Longhai Line."The difference between Case B and Case A is mainly that the Seventeenth Route Army moved to Gansu, and the Northeast Army moved eastward to Henan and Anhui, and the "Trinity" naturally disintegrated.Chiang Kai-shek showed his hand at this time, and Zhijie did his best to differentiate.Because the issue of Zhang Xueliang’s return to Shaanxi has not been resolved, and the issue of the whereabouts of the troops has been added, the connection between the two issues and the priority of the solution, as well as the pros and cons of the two options, will inevitably cause controversy within the Northeast Army and create rifts. . Sure enough, the Northeast Army quickly formed two factions with clear barriers, the main peace and the main battle.The veteran faction advocated negotiations on the basis of Case A, while some young factions composed of middle- and lower-level military officers advocated that Zhang Xueliang should first be rescued and returned to Shaanxi, believing that negotiating while Zhang was detained was tantamount to "betrayal."The contradiction is very sharp and the situation is more serious. At this time, telegrams between Zhou, Bo, Luo and Mao kept going back and forth.According to Luo and Mao's telegrams, Zhou Enlai sent two letters to Jiang, requesting the withdrawal of troops and the release of Zhang; and coordinated with many parties, he insisted on choosing Case A and peacefully resolving it. At the same time, Zhang Wentian directed our party's organizations in the white areas to instigate mediation among all parties to maintain domestic peace. On January 15, Zhang Wentian called Bei Xuefeng and Pan Hannian, underground parties in Shanghai, asking them to instigate Han Fuju and Liu Xiang to issue telegrams, advocating a peaceful settlement and restoring Zhang Xueliang's freedom; asking them to try to find someone to inform Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi about this matter; People moved to Song Ziwen, "asking him to continue to assume the responsibility of mediation and expressing our support for his sincerity in mediation"; they also asked them to inquire about the current course of action of He Yingqin and other pro-Japanese factions from Xiong Shihui through Du Zhongyuan in order to decide on countermeasures.Pan Hannian telegraphed Zhang Wentian on the same day: "I have asked my elder sister (note: Soong Ching Ling) to discuss matters with Song Ziwen, and tried to let him be in charge of mediation." Open to Nanjing", etc.On this day, Liu Xiang, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi jointly issued a telegram, calling on the central army in Shaanxi to stop the offensive and adopt a political solution, and hoped that Chairman Chiang would return to Beijing immediately to preside over the plan. On January 25, Zhang Wentian called Liu Shaoqi of the Northern Bureau again, pointing out that "vigorously mobilizing all parties to resolve the Xi'an issue peacefully is the key to the current situation" and asked him to "use various methods to mobilize Yan Xishan to mediate." While the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was making various efforts to consolidate the "Trinity" and peacefully resolve the Xi'an issue, the forces of the main fighters in the Northeast Army were rapidly expanding.Because Chiang Kai-shek placed Zhang Xueliang under house arrest and ignored the demands of the Communist Party and Xi'an to release Zhang and return to Shaanxi, the young and strong faction in the Northeast Army "resolute and tough" did not consider accepting the two cases.They launched a signature campaign, advocating a decisive battle with the Central Army in order to rescue Zhang Xueliang.The crisis of civil war loomed again. At a time when conflicts were acute and the situation was dangerous, Zhang Wentian set off from Yan'an on January 25 and arrived in Xi'an secretly on January 27.He immediately discussed the situation and policy issues with Zhou Enlai, Bogu and others.Later, he secretly lived in the home of one of Wang Yizhe's adjutants. On the night of the 27th, more than 50 young officers of the Northeast Army "petitioned" at Zhou Enlai's residence, raising 8 issues, urging the release of Zhang before withdrawing troops, and opposing a peaceful settlement.Zhou Enlai tried his best to persuade them, but they would not listen.After the meeting, someone even threatened on the spot, "If you don't fight, we will have trouble with you."In the middle of the night, Zhou and Bo learned that some of them had drawn up an assassination list, which included the names of the peacemakers and communists. The next morning, Bo Gu went to Zhang Wentian's place of residence and reported the situation at night, saying: "The situation is very tense now, and you are extremely exposed living here."Bogu has prepared vehicles to send Zhang Wentian to the Red Army's former enemy general headquarters in Yunyang Town, Jingyang County.At this time, how to win over the "leftists" has become the key to peace and war.Before leaving Xi'an, Zhang Wentian sent Mao Zedong a report to Peng and Yi Ren, analyzed the peace and war situation in Xi'an, and proposed that "our policy should be to fight for peace without hesitation." Zhang Wentian arrived in Yunyang on the 28th. Peng Dehuai was not at the headquarters at the time. He immediately discussed with Ren Bishi, Yang Shangkun, and Wang Jiaxiang (who were recuperating there at the time and went to Moscow for treatment on standby) to discuss countermeasures under the current situation.On the same day, Zhang Wentian called Mao, Zhou, and Bo in his own name, and put forward important suggestions: Militaryly, the main force of the Red Army took the initiative to "retreat to the northern Weibei"; politically, Zhu and Mao made a speech on this action, advocating peaceful unity and unity to resist , resolutely opposed a new civil war, stated that the Red Army was willing to obey the guidance of the Nanjing central government, and "demanded that Generalissimo Chiang should immediately cancel the false inspection and preside over the central government."The telegram stated: "The demonstration of this attitude is extremely important at the moment," and "If everyone agrees, Chairman Mao will be in charge, and the talk will be broadcast tomorrow."At this time, the Tongguan negotiations between Xi'an and the Central Army have reached an agreement. The Northeast Army will withdraw the troops from the south bank of the Weihe River to the north bank, which will be completed in seven days.At a time when practical steps were being taken towards a peaceful settlement, Zhang Wentian's proposals, after discussing with the generals of the former enemy's general headquarters, to voluntarily withdraw to the north, openly express their opposition to the civil war, obey the guidance of the Nanjing government, and urge Jiang to fulfill his promises, were really a kind of proposal that was in harmony with the situation. The strategy of responding to the friendly forces, taking the retreat as the advance, and striving for the initiative. On the mornings of the 29th and 30th, Zhang Wentian called Mao, Zhou, and Bo again and again, expressing support for the peaceful policy and the principle of self-defense. At this time, the battle between Xi'an and Zhan became more intense. On the 29th, a meeting of officers of the Northeast Army and above decided: before Zhang Xueliang returns to Shaanxi, he will not withdraw his troops; if the Central Army advances further, it will fight to the death.At the same time, Yang Hucheng's plan to fight at all has also risen.By the 30th, the main combat faction had almost completely controlled the situation, forming a situation in which they would fight the Central Army regardless of whether the Red Army participated or not. The issue of the Red Army's course of action was brought up again.At this critical juncture, Zhou Enlai, Bogu and Ye Jianying rushed to Yunyang at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon on the 30th to discuss countermeasures with Zhang Wentian, Peng Dehuai, Ren Bishi and Wang Jiaxiang.The meeting held that our wish is to accept Case A and achieve peace, but at present, all factions in Xi’an advocate a war with the Central Army. In this way, there are only two options for the Red Army: either fight with friendly forces and we will not participate; or fight with the Central Army. They fight together.Of course, whether we fight or not, our basic policy of fighting for peace remains unchanged.However, if the former method is adopted, it is bound to confront the friendly army.Therefore, if the friendly army fights with the central army, they can only fight together, and strive to achieve peace in the process of fighting.This meeting decided to change the policy of not participating in fights.At 10 o'clock that night, the participants telegraphed the agreed policy to Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhang Guotao in Yan'an under the names of "Zhou, Bo, Peng, Ren, Wang, and Luo".At 12 o'clock in the middle of the night, Mao, Zhu, and Zhang replied in telegrams agreeing, summarizing the current course of action as "the trinity, advance together if you advance, and retreat together if you retreat", and use this attitude to strive for the final peace. The decision made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the middle of the night on the 30th deeply moved the friendly forces. On the night of the 31st, the highest military meeting of the Northeast Army, the Seventeenth Route Army, and the Red Army was held, and a decision was finally made to resolutely promote the success of the peace talks. At this critical moment, a small number of "extreme elements" among the young officers of the Northeast Army ignored the overall situation. On the morning of February 2, they shot and killed General Wang Yizhe, who was the first in the Northeast Army to resolutely unite with the Communist Party to resist Japan and advocate a peaceful solution.Under extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances, Zhou Enlai calmly dealt with the aftermath, and finally brought the situation under control, and the overall peace was maintained without collapse.Even so, the damage caused by the "February 2 incident" is irreparable.Hearing this unfortunate incident, Zhang Wentian couldn't help shaking his head and sighing. After the "February 2 Incident", the Northeast Army split internally, and the Seventeenth Route Army had difficulty gaining a foothold. Xi'an immediately lost its strength and status to negotiate with Nanjing.The two friendly armies were appointed to be slaughtered by Jiang, Zhang Xueliang had no hope of returning to Shaanxi, and the situation where the "Trinity" realized the Northwest Great Alliance actually disintegrated. When Zhang Wentian returned to Yan'an from Yunyang in early February, the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang was approaching to resolve policy issues after the Xi'an Incident.On February 5, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek established five policies on the current situation, such as "avoiding civil war internally", "not talking about anti-Japan, but talking about the war of resistance", and "searching for talents of upright character in each province", and set them as five policies. The basis for the discussion of ending the civil war and the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party at the third session of the Central Committee. In order to consolidate the domestic peace that has been achieved and promote the formation of the national anti-Japanese national united front, Zhang Wentian presided over the drafting of the "Communist Party Central Committee to the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang", which was sent on February 10, 1937.The telegram proposed to the Kuomintang that under the policy of "peaceful unity, unity, and resistance to aggression," it would "stop all civil wars, concentrate China's strength, and unite with the outside world," "guarantee freedom of speech, assembly, and association, and release all political prisoners." At the meeting of representatives from all walks of life and armies, the five requirements of gathering talents from all over the country to jointly save the country, "quickly completing all preparations for the joint war of resistance", and "improving people's lives" were designated as "national policies".It stated that the Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee "if it can resolutely determine this national policy", the CCP is willing to make "the policy of stopping the armed riots to overthrow the Nationalist Government nationwide", "the Workers' and Peasants' Government will be renamed the Special Administrative Region Government of the Republic of China, and the Red Army will be renamed the National Revolutionary Army." 1. Four "guarantees" including "implementing a thorough democratic system of universal suffrage" and "stopping the policy of confiscating land from landlords" in the special zone.This was a big concession made by the Communist Party to the Kuomintang. Its purpose was to resolve the situation of the two regimes in the country, facilitate the formation of an anti-Japanese national united front, and unanimously oppose Japanese aggression. "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang" further promoted the struggle between the anti-Japanese faction and the pro-Japanese faction within the Kuomintang. Although the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang held from February 15 to 22, 1937 did not formulate a clear anti-Japanese policy, did not review past policy mistakes, and did not abandon the anti-Communist stance, but the negotiation terms it proposed were consistent with the Communist Party’s commitment to the three parties. The conditions proposed in the telegram of the Central Plenary Session were close, and in fact, they began to accept the policy of the KMT and the Communist Party to cooperate in resisting Japan, and changed from a political situation of civil war and non-resistance to Japan to a direction of peace and resistance to Japan.So far, the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" has achieved the expected results, and the Chinese Communist Party's anti-Japanese national united front strategy has achieved initial success.