Chapter 13 Chapter Twelve From "Resisting Japan and Opposing Chiang" to "Forcing Chiang to Resist Japan"

According to the Wayaobao Conference Resolution, the broad national united front was carried out under the guidelines of "anti-Japanese" and "anti-Chiang" and "Soviet People's Republic".At that time, the Red Army had just arrived in northern Shaanxi after the Long March. In order to survive and develop in the encirclement and suppression of the Kuomintang army, it had to take expanding and consolidating the base areas in the Soviet area and developing the Red Army as its basic tasks. Naturally, the focus of the united front was only It can be placed on the joint Northeast Army, Northwest Army, the development of work in the White Area, and the development of the mass anti-Japanese and national salvation movement.At that time, Chiang Kai-shek, who betrayed the revolution in 1927, massacred workers and peasants during the ten-year civil war, and forged a bloody feud with the Chinese Communist Party, and still insisted on his anti-communist and non-resistance policies under the current situation of Japanese aggression and the enemy, was regarded as the main enemy. One is that it is inevitable, and it is determined by the historical situation of China's revolutionary struggle and the specific environment in which the party and the Red Army live.

However, the Chinese Communist Party puts the interests of the country and the nation first.The basic point of the broad national united front strategy is to resist Japan.Therefore, whether the anti-Japanese united front includes Chiang Kai-shek does not depend on the subjective wishes of the CCP, but depends on whether Chiang's resistance to Japan.Therefore, as soon as there were signs of Jiang's wavering in the direction of resisting Japan, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, etc. immediately proceeded from reality, actively and flexibly used the united front strategy, and adjusted their strategy against Chiang in a timely manner.However, from "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" to "forcing Chiang to resist the Japanese" and even "unity with Chiang to resist the Japanese", the change of Chiang's strategy was not easy. It was gradually carried out in the repeated political contests and military struggles with the Kuomintang Nanjing government from 1936 to 1937. Achieved.

On February 27, 1936, Dong Jianwu (pseudonym Zhou Jiwu) and Zhang Zihua, who were entrusted to send a secret letter to the Nanjing government and negotiate with the Communist Party on the issue of joint anti-Japanese war, arrived in Wayaobao. This brought the question of whether "anti-Japanese" and "anti-Chiang" should continue to be raised in front of leaders of the CCP such as Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai.Prior to this, Zhang Xueliang's opinion of "not agreeing to fight Chiang" in the Luochuan meeting had already attracted the attention of Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

At the beginning of March 1936, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong and others received a telegram from Bogu from Wayaobao on the front line of Shilou in Shanxi. They learned that the Nanjing authorities sent a special person to Wayaobao through their relations, expressing that they would negotiate with the CCP on the issue of joint resistance against Japan. The central government responded immediately, prompting the CCP to change its policy towards Chiang. Why did Chiang Kai-shek, who had fought a ten-year civil war with the Communist Party and the Red Army, propose to negotiate with the Chinese Communist Party to fight against Japan at this time?The decisive factor is that after the North China Incident, the aggressive actions of Japanese imperialism to monopolize China directly endanger and threaten the interests of Britain, the United States and other countries and the Chiang Kai-shek clique.In order to safeguard its interests and consolidate its rule, Chiang had to adjust its internal and external policies.At the Fifth National Congress of the Kuomintang in November 1935, Chiang began to express that he would change the policy of compromise and concession.Although he still talked about "peace", he said at the same time that "peace reaches a period of complete despair" and "sacrifice reaches the last moment."At the same time, externally, the relationship with the Soviet Union was improved in order to win the support and help of the Soviet Union; internally, it attempted to use both political and military tactics to "dissolve the Communist Party" through "negotiations" while carrying out military "encirclement and suppression". And the effect of "incorporating" the Red Army.

In December 1935, Chiang Kai-shek expressed to Bogomolov, the Soviet ambassador to China, that he hoped that the Soviet Union could "promote the unity of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party."Bogomolov rejected the Soviet government as an intermediary in the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. In January 1936, Chiang told the Soviet ambassador to China that he was "ready to agree to the legalization of the Chinese Communist Party, but the Chinese Red Army cannot exist."Later, Chiang stated that "it is possible to reach an agreement with the Communist Party on the following basis: the Red Army recognizes the authority of the central government and the headquarters, while retaining its current establishment and participating in the War of Resistance Against Japan." In addition, Chiang Kai-shek also sent Chen Lifu at the end of 1935 Secretly went to the Soviet Union to negotiate, hoping to conclude a military alliance against Japan.Later, Jiang considered that the time was not yet ripe, so he ordered Chen, who had already been in Germany, to return to Nanjing to negotiate with the Soviet ambassador to China.He also ordered Deng Wenyi, the Chinese military attache in the Soviet Union who had returned to China to report on his duties, to rush back to Moscow to contact some senior Soviet generals and the CCP delegation to the Communist International.

At home, Chiang Kai-shek managed to establish ties with the Communist Party.He assigned Chen Lifu to open up relations with the Communist Party, and at the same time asked Song Ziwen to find a way. Chen Lifu handed over the task to Zeng Yangfu, an important member of the CC department and deputy minister of the Ministry of Railways.At the end of November 1935, Zeng handed over the task to Chen Xiaocen, the labor section chief of the Ministry of Railways.Chen Yu used to be a classmate of Beiyang University in Tianjin. He joined the "Consciousness Society" in his early years and had an old friendship with Zhou Enlai and his wife.Chen Xiaocen invited Lu Zhenyu through Jian Bozan and established contact with the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party of China.In addition, Chen Xiaocen met Mr. Huang from Ningxia through Zuo Gong, an underground member of the Communist Party of China. Mr. Huang's real name is Wang Xuxiang, and his party name is Zhang Zihua.Zhang Zihua suggested that the Kuomintang send people directly to northern Shaanxi.

Soong Ziwen approached Soong Ching Ling to discuss how to convey to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China the message that the Kuomintang requested negotiations. In January 1936, Soong Ching Ling invited Pastor Dong (Ken Wu) to his home.Dong is a member of the Communist Party and Song Ziwen's classmate at St. John's University.Soong Ching Ling handed Dong a letter asking him to go to northern Shaanxi to hand it over to the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.Before leaving, Song Qingling gave him a letter of appointment signed by Minister of Finance Kong Xiangxi to appoint Dong as "Northwest Economic Commissioner" to ensure the convenience and safety of the journey.

After learning about this, the Special Section of the Shanghai Communist Party decided to send Zhang Zihua to northern Shaanxi with Dong Jianwu.Zhang Zihua obtained Zeng Yangfu's consent through Chen Xiaocen, and traveled westward with Dong, arriving in Xi'an in January 1936.It was mid-winter, with ice and snow everywhere, and the Soviet area in northern Shaanxi was under siege and blockade by the Kuomintang army. Dong and Zhang stayed in Xi'an for 40 days, failing to find a suitable means of transportation and a safe route to enter the Soviet area.They had no choice but to ask Zhang Xueliang for help, and went under the cover of the Northeast Army.Finally arrived at Wayaobao on February 27, 1936.Dong Jianwu changed his name to Zhou Jiwu after entering the Soviet area.

The next day, Dong Jianwu and Zhang Zihua met with Bo Gu, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee who stayed behind in Wayaobao.Presented the secret letter entrusted by Soong Ching Ling, and also talked about the situation in Nanjing: Sun Ke, Yu Youren, Zhang Qun, Feng Yuxiang, etc. of the Kuomintang all advocated alliance with Russia and the Communist Party; Some advocated uniting Japan against the Red Army; Chiang Kai-shek himself had a tendency to compromise with the Red Army against Japan. Bogu immediately telegraphed Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, and Peng Dehuai who were on the front line in Shanxi, and Zhou Enlai who was inspecting the work on the front line in northern Shaanxi. On March 2, Zhang, Mao, and Peng Fu called Bo Gu and Dong Jianwu to go to Shanxi Shilou together to discuss matters with the Kuomintang.At the same time, Zhou Enlai was also asked to come to Shilou.At this time, Dong felt that the trip had been postponed for many days. If he went to Shilou, it would take a lot of time. In order to enable the KMT and the Communist Party to negotiate quickly, it is better for the CCP to give an answer to the intention of the Nanjing authorities, and he should rush back to Nanjing. , Shanghai Fuming.Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, and Peng Dehuai replied at 12:00 noon on March 4th with the signatures of "Zhang, Mao, and Peng" to "Bo Gu Zhuan Zhou Jiwu", saying: "I welcome the awareness and wisdom of the Nanjing authorities. To unite the forces of the whole country to resist Japan and save the country, my brother and I are willing to start concrete and practical negotiations with the Nanjing authorities." Five points for negotiations with the Nanjing authorities: "When my brother returns to Nanjing, I sincerely hope to put forward the following opinions: (1) Stop all civil wars (2) Organize the National Defense Government and the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces; (3) Allow the main Red Army of the country to quickly concentrate in Hebei, and first resist the advance of the Japanese invaders; (4) Release political prisoners and allow the people political freedom; ( 5) Carry out preliminary and necessary reforms in internal affairs and economy." Finally, he said, "I agree that my brother will return to Nanjing immediately, so that we can quickly discuss major plans." Dong Jianwu left Wayaobao and returned to Nanjing the next day with this secret document.

The telegrams of Zhang, Mao, and Peng put forward the basic conditions for a joint resistance against Japan with the Kuomintang when the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was interrupted for ten years and they began to re-contact directly in the country.The telegram did not mention "anti-Chiang" but emphasized "stop the civil war and unite to resist Japan." It was the first time to express to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing authorities that under the premise of resisting Japan, the policy of "anti-Chiang" was not unchangeable. In mid-March, Zhang Zihua followed Bo Gu to the Damai suburb of Xi County, Shanxi (now Jiaokou County).Together with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, etc., Zhang Wentian listened to Zhang Zihua's report on his contacts with Zeng Yangfu and Chen Xiaocen, learned about Chen Lifu and Song Ziwen's search for the Communist Party Central Committee to hold secret negotiations, and learned about the KMT's top figures Sun Ke and Yu Yu. Youren, Feng Yuxiang, Hu Hanmin, Chen Lifu and other pro-British and American factions had the intention of uniting the Communist Party and Russia to resist Japan.

At this time, Wang Shiying, director of the Liaison Department of the Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, also came here.Wang Shiying reported to Zhang Wentian and other leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China the situation of the contact between the Northern Bureau and Nanjing. In January 1936, Zhou Xiaozhou, the representative of the Northern Bureau, met with Chen Xiaocen accompanied by Lu Zhenyu, and opened up the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. On March 16, Li Kenong also rushed to Shilou.He just had the second "Luochuan Talks" with Zhang Xueliang on March 4 and 5.On March 5th, Li had telegraphed the Party Central Committee to briefly report on the results of the talks. At this time, he reported in detail to Zhang Wentian and other central leaders in person.With regard to the policy towards Chiang, Zhang Xueliang "disagreed with discussing Jiang" during the first "Luochuan Talks" on January 19. In this meeting, he stated his views more frankly, advocating that the resistance against Japan must be "alliance with Chiang."At that time, because Zhang Xueliang escorted Dong Jianwu and Zhang Zihua to northern Shaanxi, he had already learned from Dong and Zhang that the Nanjing authorities were planning to secretly negotiate with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to jointly resist Japan; The five conditions negotiated by the authorities were telegraphed to Zhang Xueliang; therefore, on the one hand, Zhang Xueliang was more confident and bold to join the Communist Party and the Red Army, and on the other hand, he believed that Lao Jiang had the possibility of resisting Japan. From March 20 to 27, 1936, Zhang Wentian presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (commonly known as the "Shanxi Conference") on the front line in Shanxi.It should be noted that this meeting was held not only because Liu Changsheng, who had just returned from Moscow, brought the documents of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, which needed further study and implementation, but also because of the new situation of major changes in the relationship between the KMT and the Communist Party. There is an urgent need to summarize and make necessary adjustments to the united front strategy determined at the Wayaobao Conference. At the Shanxi Conference, Zhang Wentian made a report on the resolutions of the Seventh National Congress of the Communist International and the issue of the united front. Zhang Wentian's report at the Politburo meeting on March 20, 1936 was included in "Selected Works of Zhang Wentian" published by People's Publishing House in 1985 under the title "The "Seventh National Congress of the Communist International" and the Policy of Our Party's Anti-Japanese United Front".The following quotations are based on "Selected Works of Zhang Wentian".He summed up the main spirit of the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, "One is to concentrate on fighting against war and fascism, and the other is to establish a broad united front."Judging from this, the Wayaobao Conference Resolution "basically conforms to these resolutions."In view of the fact that the resolutions of the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China talked about many issues about Europe and few specific issues about China, Zhang Wentian proposed the guiding ideology for implementing the international resolutions: "make it nationalized and make it suitable for our specific environment." This is For the first time, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly proposed the idea of ​​"nationalizing" the instructions of the Communist International.Zhang Wentian not only put forward this guiding ideology, his report also embodies this guiding ideology. In the report, Zhang Wentian analyzed the “new changes” in the world situation over the past six months after the conclusion of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in August 1935 and the development and changes in China’s domestic situation as Japan continued to occupy North China.He pointed out that there have been new changes in China's domestic class relations. In addition to the "obvious differentiation" of the national bourgeoisie, "many factions are active under the slogan of anti-Japanese war", and some landlords and comprador groups "want to find a way to unite with Russia and the Communist Anti-Japanese War”, “Nanjing government and some warlords are also negotiating with us”.All this proves that in China, especially in North China, "the situation of the outbreak of national revolutionary war is taking shape."In this situation, "the task of the Communist Party of China is to prepare for a large-scale national revolutionary war against Japanese imperialist aggression."In terms of strategic tasks, Zhang Wentian repeatedly emphasized that the party's "central task is to resist Japan" and "oppose Japanese imperialism, especially the central task"; The key is to establish a united front—the anti-Japanese people's united front"; we "must and may form an upper-level united front with various political factions."He believes that there is "no rigid formula" for the use of the united front strategy. It is necessary to use each event according to different circumstances to carry out united front work in various classes and even various reactionary classes.He said: "Without analyzing each individual in the counter-revolutionary faction and treating them as the same, there can be no united front. There can be no united front without tactics and mere memorization of teachings." Regarding "Chiang", although he is still referred to as the representative of "the most reactionary fascists", in terms of tactics, the formulation of "anti-Japanese" and "anti-Chiang" has been changed, and "anti-Japanese" has been placed prominently At the "central" position, there was a tendency to replace "resist Japan and oppose Chiang" with "jointly resist Japan". Zhang Wentian also focused on the specific policy for realizing the upper-level united front.He pointed out that we should "first pay attention to those factions that are popular, powerful, and anti-Japanese"; to conclude agreements with various political factions and armed forces, partial and local agreements can be made first.This kind of agreement can be open or secret, but it must be "focused on winning over the masses" and "principled". After the agreement is concluded, we must "faithfully abide by it."He also emphasized that the party will never abandon its position in the upper-level united front.It is necessary to "propagate the position of the Communist Party of China as the only correct position"; never give up "serious criticism" of allies;These principles put forward by Zhang Wentian directly guided the secret negotiations with the Nanjing government and the joint work with the Northeast Army, Northwest Army and other local powerful factions. Regarding the development direction of the United Front, Zhang Wentian did not copy the provisions of international resolutions.Proceeding from China’s reality, he pointed out that compared with European countries, the regimes that established the united front in China (the Anti-Japanese Allied Forces and National Defense Government) “have two differences: one is the unbalanced development of the revolution, and the other is that there are already Soviets.”He put forward an important guiding ideology: In China, "it is possible to establish this kind of government first in some areas." Zhang Wentian also discussed three conditions that are suitable for China's characteristics, which are different from those required by international resolutions for the formation of such a government: 1. The regime of the landlord and bourgeoisie in some areas has been severely paralyzed, so they are powerless to prevent the rise of this regime. Second, the broadest masses have risen against Japanese imperialism and traitors, but have not entered into the struggle for Soviet power; Third, some people in power who are willing to resist Japan and the masses openly demand that the Communist Party, the Soviets, and the Red Army unite and fight against Japan. Jiang.He also pointed out that the establishment of such a regime should not be "passive and wait", but "come from struggle".These expositions became the guiding ideology for independently developing anti-Japanese base areas and establishing anti-Japanese democratic regimes. Zhang Wentian's report summed up the experience of united front work in the three months since the Wayaobao meeting, answered new questions raised in practice under the new situation, enriched and developed the party's anti-Japanese national united front strategy, and was approved by the Politburo. The meeting approved the five conditions for negotiating with the Kuomintang proposed by Zhang, Mao, and Peng in the telegram to Dong Jianwu on March 4, and clearly pointed out: Japan is the main enemy, the Kuomintang is splitting, and Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang are wavering The five negotiating conditions proposed by the central government are not only for Nanjing but also the basic conditions and content for negotiating with everyone.The meeting also determined that the negotiations with the Kuomintang army would be concentrated in the Military Commission, and the negotiations with the Kuomintang should be concentrated in the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee, all of which would be under the command of the Standing Committee.After the meeting, Zhang Wentian published "Several Issues Concerning the Anti-Japanese People's United Front" which summarized the main ideas and policy principles of the Shanxi Conference on the United Front issue. At the end of March and the beginning of April 1936, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Chen Cheng to lead ten divisions of the Central Army into Shanxi, and cooperated with Yan Xishan to block the Red Army's eastern expedition, and ordered the Northeast Army and the Seventeenth Route Army to attack the Shaanxi-Gansu base area.In such a serious situation, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did not change the policy set by the Shanxi Conference.At the Politburo meeting on April 6, Zhang Wentian still pointed out that "Chiang Kai-shek is divided internally", our strategy is to take "resolute actions" in the military, and "on the other hand, we are still actively conducting diplomacy with him."That is to continue to secretly negotiate with Chiang on the issue of ending the civil war and uniting to resist Japan. In response to some people in the party who proposed that "the crusade against Chiang has become the center. The Military Commission will order the crusade", on April 9, Zhang Wentian in Wayaobao and Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai on the front line in Shanxi simultaneously sent telegrams to each other to talk about the The countermeasures coincided with the same opinions. They believed that "the decree against Chiang should not be issued at present", "our banner is the decree against Japan, and we will implement a unified resistance to Japan under the banner of stopping the civil war", and "the central slogan is to stop the civil war."On that night, Zhou Enlai replied to Zhang Xueliang's proposition of forcing Chiang Kai-shek to resist Japan and uniting Chiang Kai-shek in the Fushi talks, saying: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has considered the policy towards Chiang Kai-shek.Zhang Wentian agreed with Mao Zedong, Peng Dehuai, and Zhou Enlai in the three places, which shows that the CCP leadership has indeed changed its policy towards Jiang. On April 25, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Declaration for the Establishment of the Anti-Japanese People's Front of Various Factions in the Country", and the name of "Chinese Nationalist Party" was publicly placed first among dozens of party groups. On May 5th, in order for the Red Army to return to Hexi, the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet and the Central Military Commission issued the "Armistice Discussion and Unified Anti-Japanese Telegram" (commonly known as "May 5 Telegram"). Talk about "stop the civil war and unite against Japan", and even have the expectation of "promoting the final awakening of Chiang Kai-shek...".It can be seen that Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others judged the situation and were not swayed by the superficial phenomenon that the Eastern Expedition was hindered. Maturity of political strategy. It should be noted that the change in "Jiang's" strategy is only the beginning at this time.At that time, "not issuing orders against Chiang" and not mentioning the slogan of "anti-Chiang" did not mean that the policy of "resisting Japan and opposing Chiang" had changed to the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" or "uniting with Chiang to resist Japan".From the texts, declarations, and speeches at that time, it can be seen that this was done mainly out of strategic considerations, to "execute Chiang Kai-shek under the banner of the Order Against Japan" and "call on the people of the whole country, Chiang Kai-shek's officers and soldiers unanimously opposed Chiang Kai-shek's acceptance of Hirota's three principles, and opposed blocking the Red Army and disrupting the anti-Japanese rear." Before the masses" Zhang Wentian's speech at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo on May 8, 1936.Adopting this strategy "best to win over the backward people and Chiang's forces" can promote the division within the Nanjing government and the Chiang's.But as mentioned earlier, leaders of the CPC Central Committee such as Zhang Wentian put the interests of the country and the nation first. Since February, there has indeed been a major change in the strategy towards Chiang.In the relationship between "anti-Japanese" and "anti-Chiang", "anti-Japanese" is highlighted as the center; the slogans of "anti-Chiang" and "against Chiang" are not publicly mentioned, and the slogan of "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" is replaced by the slogan of "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" Slogan; in terms of alliance targets, distinguish the different factions within the Nanjing government and the Central Army, from uniting with local forces to uniting with the anti-Japanese faction of the Chiang Kai-shek faction, and so on.Therefore, after the release of the "May 5 Power Supply" on May 5, if Chiang Kai-shek can really wake up, change his course, and actually start negotiations for a joint anti-Japanese war, then the policy of the Chinese Communist Party will change from "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" to "unite with Chiang to resist the Japanese" ", that is, it is natural. However, Chiang Kai-shek did not "put down the butcher's knife and become a Buddha immediately" as the CCP's "May 5 power supply" hoped.Not only did he not really "awaken" at this time, but he was also very unwise, thinking that the retreat of the Red Army to Hexi was an opportunity for him to use force to destroy the Red Army.Therefore, at this time, he had no sincerity in negotiating. Instead, he dispatched troops and sent Tang Enbo and Yan Xishan's troops to cross the Yellow River west, and cooperated with Gao Guizi and Jing Yuexiu to attack the northeast of the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area, and asked the Northeast Army and the Seventeenth Route Army to attack In the southern and central parts of the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area, the troops of the "two horses" (Ningxia warlords Ma Hongbin and Ma Hongkui) were required to prevent the Red Army from advancing westward.Under the encirclement and "suppression" of the Kuomintang army, the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area gradually shrank, and even the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had to withdraw from Wayaobao and move to Baoan in late June.Since Chiang Kai-shek insisted on his reactionary policy of "to fight against the outside world, we must first settle the inside" and insisted on opposing the Communist Party and destroying the Red Army, the Communist Party and the Red Army could only contend and deal with him.At this time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s estimate of Chiang Kai-shek was: Among the two opposing factions of “uniting with Japan against the Communist Party” and “uniting with the Communist Party against Japan”, he undoubtedly put his focus on the side of “uniting with Japan against the Communist Party”.Therefore, at the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (May 8-9) held after the Eastern Expedition returned to northern Shaanxi, Zhang Wentian pointed out that the entry of Jiang's troops into Shanxi to stop the Red Army's Eastern Expedition was a breakthrough in "He Mei The Agreement forbids the restriction of Chinese troops stationed in North China, but implements the most important item of "joint defense against communism" in the "Hirota Three Principles" of Japan's policy toward China; The Northeast Army and the National Defense Government are the key to the overall situation", "now the center [is] to promote the establishment of the Northwest National Defense Government".In order to consolidate and expand the base areas and smash Chiang's "encirclement and suppression", the meeting decided to immediately organize the Western Field Army to go west and concentrate its forces to attack the "two horses" who were resolutely anti-communist.All of this was really forced by Jiang and had no choice. The Communist Party of China made the decision to fundamentally change the policy of "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" and the slogan of the "People's Republic", and determined the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist the Japanese" and adopting the slogan of "Democratic Republic". It was realized at the two meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.And this is closely related to the outbreak of the "Guangdong Incident". The outbreak of the "Guangdong Incident" and the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang held from July 10 to 14 in order to solve the problems caused by the "Guangdong Incident" by the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek were opportunities for the Chinese Communist Party to fundamentally change its policy towards Chiang. On June 1, 1936, Chen Jitang from Guangdong, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi from Guangxi formally requested the Nanjing government to declare war on Japan; then, the Guangdong Army and the Guangxi Army jointly sent troops to Hunan in the name of "going north to resist Japan".Chiang Kai-shek dispatched troops and generals to stop them.Mao Zedong made a speech on June 9 in support of Guangdong and Guangxi's "Going Northward to Resist Japan." Zhang Wentian presided over meetings of the Politburo and the Standing Committee on June 12 and 14 consecutively to discuss the "Southwest Issue." The Manifesto of Going North to the Anti-Japanese War expresses solidarity with Guangdong and Guangxi for "holding high the banner of anti-Japanese righteousness and going north." Needless to say, at that time Zhang Wentian and other leaders of the Party Central Committee supported the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang military actions of the local factions, adopted a strict attitude of "exposing" Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government, and adopted a policy of dividing Chiang Kai-shek's army. Instead of repeating the slogan of "anti-Chiang", they held high the banner of "anti-Japanese", "demanding that the Nanjing government immediately repent, agree to the request of Guangdong and Guangxi, and mobilize the whole of China's navy, land and air force to go north to fight against Japan", "demanding that Chiang Kai-shek immediately realize that the people of the whole country stop the civil war and unite to resist Japan" call” and did not give up their stand for unity.Although the internal instruction did not change the policy of "resisting Japan and opposing Chiang Kai-shek", it stated that "our strategy is to make this launch last, expand, enrich and transform it into a sacred national revolutionary war for the entire Chinese people to fight against Japan with armed forces." Call for the mobilization of all other anti-Japanese armed forces, request the Nanjing government to send troops to resist Japan, oppose blocking Guangdong and Guangxi against Japan, and oppose launching a civil war. At the same time, use every opportunity to expand the anti-Japanese and national salvation movement.” Letter from Zhang Wentian and Zhou Enlai to Feng Xuefeng on July 6, 1936.In fact, it is "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" in appearance, and "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" through armed mobilization and national salvation movements is in fact. In order to solve the problems caused by the "Guangdong Incident", the Kuomintang scheduled to hold the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee on July 10.On June 20, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a letter to the "All Executive Committee Members and Gentlemen" who attended the Kuomintang Central Plenary Session, once again formally proposing to immediately stop the civil war and immediately unite to carry out the sacred war of resistance against Japan.Said "I hope that any of you will take the life of the War of Resistance", and said "We are always ready to negotiate with any organization, any Central Committee member, any military and political leader of your party on cooperation to save the country".Chiang Kai-shek was not excluded, and secret negotiations with Nanjing have been going on through several channels. In short, from February to July 1936, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai and others adapted to the changing international and domestic situation and flexibly adjusted their strategy against "Chiang". The policy of "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" began to change. With the development of the situation and the change of Jiang's policy towards the Communist Party and the Red Army, the slogan of "anti-Chiang" has different strengths and weaknesses, but it has not completely abandoned the policy of "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang"; ” and even the intention and certain actions of “Uniting Chiang Kai-shek against Japan”, but due to Jiang’s insistence on the policy of anti-Communism and destroying the Red Army, there were setbacks from time to time, and the policy of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan” has not yet been fully established. Changing the policy of "resisting Japan and opposing Chiang" and replacing it with the policy of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" was decided at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee chaired by Zhang Wentian on August 10, 1936.After the meeting, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Letter to the Chinese Kuomintang", advocating the second cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; within the party, it issued the "Instructions on the Issue of Forcing Chiang to Resist Japan".Immediately afterwards, Zhang Wentian presided over the enlarged meeting of the Politburo held from September 15 to 17, and passed the "Resolution on the New Situation of the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement and the Democratic Republic."So far, the strategy of the anti-Japanese national united front gradually became more and more perfect. "Forcing Chiang to resist Japan" and promoting the second Kuomintang-Communist cooperation became the main content of the anti-Japanese national united front strategy. The outbreak of the "Guangdong Incident" and the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee held by the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek from July 10 to 14 in order to solve the problems caused by the "Guangdong Incident" were opportunities for the Chinese Communist Party to fundamentally change its policy towards Chiang. In the first half of 1936, under the situation that the Japanese imperialist aggression forces penetrated into North China step by step and supported the puppet Mongolian army approaching Suidong and Suibei, the contradictions between Britain and the United States and Japan grew day by day, and the contradictions between the Kuomintang and Japan grew day by day. The rift between the pro-Anglo-American faction and the pro-Japanese faction is growing.Chiang Kai-shek indicated that he would change his policy of compromise and concession in his diplomacy with Japan, but he had not yet given up negotiations with Japan.The patriotic forces within the KMT who advocated alliance with the Communist Party to fight against Japan were even more dissatisfied with the continuing policy of compromise and concession by those in power. Some local powerful factions used the banner of anti-Japanese to oppose Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.All this made it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government to continue to implement the policy of non-resistance towards Japan.Chiang Kai-shek stated at the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang: "The minimum we have for diplomacy is to maintain the integrity of territorial sovereignty." , is our final sacrifice."This plenum showed that Chiang Kai-shek's domestic and foreign policies had begun to change in real terms.Although this change is not complete, it has indeed made some progress compared with the past.Externally, Chiang Kai-shek still did not propose to launch the War of Resistance Against Japan immediately, but he has stated that he will not continue the policy of compromise and concession with Japan (during the seven talks held between the foreign minister of the Nanjing government and the Japanese ambassador to China from September to November after the meeting, Chiang said that His diplomacy was indeed tougher than before); internally, Chiang Kai-shek was still reluctant to put forward the task of uniting against Japan, but he did express it in his slogans of "modern country", "unification and peace within the country" and in his proposals such as "National Defense Conference" and "National Assembly". They expressed their willingness to talk about unity and even use the united front. After the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang in mid-July, the Nanjing side sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, proposing four conditions for new negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.As early as mid-May, when Zhang Zihua went to northern Shaanxi for the second time, he brought back Chen Lifu’s four solutions to the KMT-CCP ​​issue proposed by Chen Xiaocen, who conveyed his personal opinions: (1) Welcome the armed forces of the Communist Party to participate in the war against Japan. (2) When the Communist Party’s armed forces participate in the war against Japan, they will receive the same treatment as the Central Army; (3) The Communist Party can submit any opinions to the public opinion organ to be established; (4) The Communist Party can choose a region to test its political and economic ideals . At the beginning of August, the "Letter from Nanjing" (called "Letter from August") received by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the four new items proposed in it were quite different from the four items mentioned in May above. As Mao Zedong pointed out, Nanjing On the one hand, "now we are focusing on unification."According to Mao Zedong's report at the Politburo meeting on August 10, 1936. The text of the "August Letter" has not been seen so far, and there is no exact record of the four items mentioned. Judging from the meeting minutes of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 10, it mainly includes the following points: In the name of the Red Army of Workers and Peasants; (2) Reunification of political power, abolition of the name of the Soviet government; (3) Accommodating all factions and concentrating talents from all over the country; (4) The Communist Party stopped confiscating land from landlords and other policies.The central idea was to "reunify first and then resist Japan." Under the "centralized and unified" command and leadership of the Kuomintang, the Nanjing government, and Chiang Kai-shek, the domestic military and political problems should be actually resolved before resisting Japan.This is a practical step taken to implement the strategy of "unifying and securing the interior" at the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Committee of the Kuomintang.At the same time, Zhou Enlai also received a private letter with corresponding content. Pan Hannian arrived in Baoan on August 8, 1936, just as the Party Central Committee was studying the new situation in the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, considering how to respond to the "August Letter" from Nanjing, and adjusting its strategy towards Chiang.Pan was sent to the White Area during the Long March.After he arrived in Shanghai, due to changes in the situation, he went to Moscow in August 1935 to participate in the work of the Chinese Communist Party's delegation to the Communist International. In March 1936, Deng Wenyi, military attache of the embassy of the Nanjing government in the Soviet Union, contacted the Chinese Communist Party delegation to the Communist International in Moscow to negotiate with the KMT and the Communist Party.When Wang Ming met with Deng, he proposed that since the central committees of both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were in the country, the negotiations should be held in the country, and he wrote a letter to introduce Deng to the Soviet area to contact the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (the trip did not take place).Later, Wang Ming sent Pan Hannian back to China.Pan arrived in Hong Kong in early May. In July, as the liaison of the Communist Party, he first met Zhang Chong, a representative of the Kuomintang in Hong Kong, and then went to Nanjing to meet with Zeng Yangfu, a representative of the Kuomintang.Pan asked to have talks with Chen Guofu immediately. He had hoped that Pan would come to Nanjing to meet Chen Guofu after returning to northern Shaanxi to listen to the opinions of the CPC Central Committee on the cooperation negotiations between the two parties (that is, the opinions on the "August Letter" from Nanjing).Pan Nai set off for northern Shaanxi via Xi'an.After arriving at the security guard, he set up an army bed in front of the kang in Zhang Wentian's cave dwelling.He immediately reported to Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, etc. on the situation of contact with the Kuomintang in Moscow in the spring of 1936 and recently in Hong Kong and Nanjing. "Anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" slogan, with Nanjing as the primary negotiating opponent, etc.).The Nanjing side was eager to get a reply from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to their new four points, which prompted the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to make a quick decision.Therefore, Zhang Wentian called a meeting of the Politburo on August 10, 1936, two days after Pan Hannian returned. The meeting was presided over by Zhang Wentian, and Mao Zedong made a "report" and "conclusion".The meeting determined that the Communist Party "negotiated with Nanjing."Regarding the principles and conditions of the negotiations, they can be summed up as follows: recognize Nanjing as a major force in the national movement, clearly point out that resistance to Japan must be against Chiang, and now it is not appropriate. We must unite with Chiang and cooperate with Nanjing; We will talk about unity with him, recognize the unified command and unified organization, agree to cancel the name of the Red Army and the name of the Soviet, but we must ensure that the Red Army troops and base areas are under the leadership of the Communist Party; and other practical issues as negotiating conditions. Zhang Wentian made an important speech at the meeting. The following quotations and overviews can be found in the minutes of Zhang Wentian’s speech at the Politburo meeting on August 10, 1936.It comprehensively expounds the strategic thinking of the Communist Party of China to unite with Chiang Kai-shek and cooperate with Nanjing to form the anti-Japanese national united front under the new situation.He believes that now Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government have "many changes in tactics", and at the same time "began to show his wavering" in strategy, "but it cannot be said to be a fundamental change."根据这样的估计，张闻天指出，我们的策略应该“不仅揭破他的欺骗，而是更要推动他的动摇”，也就是促使国民党、蒋介石及其军队的抗日倾向继续发展，转向真正抗日。至于怎样“推动”蒋“动摇”，怎样在承认南京政府和蒋的统一指挥又取消了红军、苏维埃名义的情况下，来争取共产党对统一战线的领导权，张闻天在发言中也作了比较全面的回答。他认为，除了“从实际行动来揭破”蒋的欺骗、退让、妥协之外，还要从以下各方面来争取领导权：一是“尽量发动群众斗争，来实现我们的领导”；二是“用统一战线来在他内部进行一切活动，特别是他的军队、他的组织内进行活动”，“联结很多力量”；三是提出“停止内战，民主自由”来“与蒋联合”；四是广泛运用统一战线来“巩固我们的力量”，“要巩固组织，扩大组织”，“把我们的党大大的巩固起来”，“巩固红军工作是非常重要的”，“要把红军力量（按：指一、二、四方面军三大主力）统一起来”。张闻天还指出，“要继续反对关门主义”。同时，他又提起大家对右的机会主义倾向的警觉，强调“防止蒋在统一战线中的叛变，记取1927年大革命的教训”。在毛泽东作了结论之后，张闻天最后又明确指出，要依据这次会议议定的内容，形成三个文件：一、公开宣言，二、秘密信，三、秘密文件。 会后，张闻天即同毛泽东、周恩来等一起，致力于落实这次会议决定，实行中国共产党对国民党、蒋介石方针的重大转变：从“抗日反蒋”到“逼蒋抗日”。 8月12日，洛甫、张浩、周恩来、博古、王稼祥、彭德怀、凯丰、毛泽东八位政治局成员联名致电朱德、张国焘、任弼时，通报八月会议的重要决定。关于对国民党、蒋介石的策略方针，电文指出：“认定南京为进行统一战线之必要与主要的对手，应与南京及南京以外之国民党各派，同时的分别的进行谈判。依据过去与南京谈判的基础，在忠实进行抗日准备，实行国内民主与实行停止'围剿'等前提之下，承认与之谈判苏维埃红军的统一问题。”电文提出“继续停战议和请蒋抗日的号召，目前阶段实行他不来攻我不去打，……他若来攻，则一面坚决作战，一面申请议和”，“在抗日进军路上，遇到蒋介石部队和其他部队，实行先礼后兵政策”等等，并说明“所有以上对南京的策略，都是为着分化南京，揭破其欺骗，孤立其首领，争取其群众，排斥其汉奸部分，而推动其爱国部分，使之走向真正抗日救亡的道路”。张闻天等人的这份电报是传达八月政治局会议精神的第一个文献。 接着，毛泽东、张闻天即起草文件：以书信形式发表的“公开宣言”《中国共产党致中国国民党书》关于《致国民党书》的起草，周恩来1945年4月30日在中共七大会上发言说是“毛泽东同志写的”（见《周恩来选集》上卷，第192页）。吴亮平在1981年12月6日同萧扬、张培森和笔者谈话，说“是张闻天同志起草的”。连庆浦在1981年12月4日同萧扬、张培森谈话，也说“是洛甫同志起草”。她说：我于1936年6月底到杨家园子，那是洛甫同志的驻地。几天后，去保安。中央在保安住定后，洛甫同志的文电就要我抄写，因为他觉得我写的字较好。后来我的工作定在中央机要科，任务就是抄报。洛甫同志起草的文电经我抄写的很多。《致国民党书》是洛甫起草，拿来让我抄写的。这里面有“贵党二中全会”等字样，当时给我的印象很深。笔者曾就这个问题向刘英请教。刘英说，当时重要问题闻天都同毛主席商量，商量后写成文件、电报。文件、电报张写得多些，但重要的写后都给毛看过，经毛修改。张很尊重毛，许多重大问题主导意见是毛的。写《致国民党书》的具体经过我已记不清了。按当时情况，像这样的文件很难说是哪一个人写的。如果张起草了初稿，也必定请毛修改过。和“秘密文件”《中央关于逼蒋抗日问题的指示》。8月下旬，正是在文件已经起草但尚未定稿的时候，接到了共产国际执委会书记处8月15日致中共中央书记处的电报。收到时间“8月下旬”。“国际电报”认为，“把蒋介石和日寇等量齐观是不对的。这个方针在政治上是错误的，因为中国人民的主要敌人是日本帝国主义，在现阶段，一切都应服从抗日。此外，不能同时有效地进行既反对日寇又反对蒋介石的斗争”。“国际电报”指出：“必须采取停止红军同蒋介石军队之间的军事行动，并同蒋介石军队协同抗日的方针”；“最好由中国共产党发表声明，主张建立统一的中华民主共和国”；“争取同国民党及其军队达成协议和建立抗日民族统一战线”，等等。八月政治局会议决定的“和南京谈判”、“与蒋联合”的方针，同共产国际上述“政治指示”精神、方向以至基本策略是一致的，但是，对蒋介石及他代表的南京当局“估计还是不足的”这主要表现在八月政治局会议在确定放弃“反蒋”方针实行“与蒋联合”政策的同时，仍然倾向于采取把蒋“击塌”，使其“瓦解”、“破产”的“倒蒋”政策。毛泽东、张闻天、周恩来等得到8月15日“国际电报”以后，对抗日民族统一战线的实质与性质认识更加明确了，对南京方针就“完全转变过来”了。 毛泽东、张闻天等在接到“国际电报”后采取的第一个重要行动，是对已经起草好的《中国共产党致中国国民党书》作必要的补充后，立即于8月25日发出。这封公开信是中国共产党“新的宣言”，包括了建议第二次“国共合作”，建立“统一的民主共和国”等新内容。 这封信义正辞严地指出，“九一八”以来，日寇乘虚而入，得寸进尺，沦亡惨祸迫在中华民族的目前，这完全是国民党及其政府的错误政策招来的。“如果你们还要继续内争，不把向内的枪口转到向外，不把退让的政策转到抗战，不把分离的局面转到团结，不把涣散的情况转到统一，则祸患之来，不堪设想，而诸位先生千秋万世的罪名亦将无可以挽回。”中共中央向国民党中央委员和全体党员大声疾呼：“立即停止内战，组织全国的抗日统一战线，发动神圣的民族自卫战争，抵抗日本帝国主义的进攻。” 这封信称蒋为“蒋委员长”，承认他对国民党五次全会政策所作的新的解释“较之过去有了若干进步”，表示“诚恳的欢迎这种进步”；同时又对蒋认为目前“并未达到和平绝望的时期”、“［牺牲］并未达到最后关头”的说法提出批评。信件列数东北四省的沦亡，察哈尔大部的失去，冀东防共自治政府猖獗，冀察政委会的傀儡化，日本大军的进驻冀察，华北经济权的丧失，泛滥全中国的公开走私……直至华南自治运动的策动等等事实，说明“在全国人民看来，和平早已绝望，牺牲早已到了最后关头，除了发动全国人民全国武装力量的坚决的自卫战争外，中国领土主权的全部沦亡是无法挽救的”。 针对蒋介石、国民党强调“集中统一”，这封信一方面承认当前全国人民“迫切要求停止内战，集中统一，以便一致抗日”，一方面指出“全国人民现在所要的是抗日救国的集中统一，而不是媚外残民的集中统一”。信件尖锐地揭露，连年不绝的内战与不统一，是国民党“攘外必先安内”政策造成的。“以这种错误政策，来求集中与统一，真是缘木求鱼，适得其反”。同时，信件又提出“民主共和国”的纲领作为“现代国家”“集中统一”的纲领。在信件中，中共中央郑重宣言：“我们赞助建立使全中国统一的民主共和国，赞助召集由普选权选举出来的国会，拥护全国人民和抗日军队的抗日救国代表大会，拥护全国统一的国防政府”，宣布在全中国民主共和国建立时，苏区成为其“一个组成部分”，红军愿意服从抗日联军总司令部的指挥，实际上对南京方面“八月来信”中提出的统一条件作了公开的具体答复。 这封信明确地提出了“国共重新合作”的建议。它向一切中国国民党人宣言，我们愿意同你们结成一个坚固的民族统一战线，去反对全民族的最大敌人——日本帝国主义，如像1925年至1927年第一次中国大革命时两党结成反对民族压迫与封建压迫的伟大的统一战线一样。信件向国民党尖锐地提出：“还是同日本帝国主义及汉奸们一道，建立防共统一战线即亡国统一战线呢？还是同中国共产党及全国人民一道，建立抗日统一战线即救国统一战线呢？现在是已经到了决定的关头了”。公开信最后说：“国共合作的关键，现在是在贵党的手中。”“至于我们方面，是早已准备着在任何地方与任何时候派出自己的全权代表，同贵党的全权代表一道，开始具体实际的谈判，以期迅速订立抗日救国的具体协定，并愿坚决的遵守这个协定。” 前已指出，《中国共产党致中国国民党书》是八月政治局会议决定写的，直接的动因是答复国民党五届二中全会后南京方面的“八月来信”。所以，信中对国民党五届二中全会宣言和蒋介石报告的分析、批评，对他们公开所提纲领、方针和秘密所提谈判条件的评论、答复和建议；信中对中国共产党自“九一八”以来救亡图存的一贯主张和抗日统一战线政策的阐述，“国共重新合作”的建议，立即开始具体实际谈判的表态，以至使用“贵党”、“蒋委员长”的称谓，都表达了八月政治局会议的内容和精神，体现了张闻天提出的“揭破其欺骗，推动其动摇”的策略思想。同时，这封信又是在接读了8月15日的“国际电报”之后改定发出的，所以信件中加进了共产国际提出的“民主共和国”的口号。 八月政治局会议决定放弃“抗日反蒋”而采取新的方针。至于用什么口号来代替“抗日反蒋”，还在酝酿之中，语言一时没有确定。曾有过“请蒋抗日”（8月12日洛甫等致朱、张、任电）的提法，显然不够准确。“联蒋抗日”，虽然客观反映了策略的目的和主要内涵，但是对中共和蒋之间的关系、蒋的被动以及此事实现须经过一个过程等等，难以体现出来。因为蒋氏对抗日、对统一战线还是在动摇之中，他还并不真心想同共产党联合，他也还没有放弃对苏区与红军的包围和进攻。所以，还要通过政治、军事的各种斗争，造成一种局面，使得蒋介石别无选择，不得不同意建立这种以国共两党第二次合作为主要内容的抗日统一战线。既然“请蒋抗日”、“联蒋抗日”的提法均不贴切，抗日统一战线的建立又必然要经历一个对蒋逼迫的过程，那么，用一个“逼”字（起先用“迫”字），就最为恰切了。1936年8月30日在张闻天、林育英、周恩来、博古、毛泽东联名致朱德、张国焘、任弼时的电报中，第一次用“迫蒋抗日”来概括党中央放弃“抗日反蒋”后采取的统一战线的基本方针：“迫蒋抗日，造成各种条件使国民党及蒋军不能不与我妥协，以达到两党两军联合反对日本的目的。” 1936年9月1日，张闻天起草的中共中央《关于逼蒋抗日问题的指示》。在党内发布，向全党说明党的策略方针转变的内容和必要性。指示说：“目前中国的主要敌人，是日帝，所以把日帝与蒋介石同等看待是错误的，'抗日反蒋'的口号，也是不适当的。”“在日帝继续进攻，全国民族革命运动继续发展的条件之下，蒋军全部或其大部有参加抗日的可能。我们的总方针，应是逼蒋抗日。一方面继续揭破他们的每一退让，丧权辱国的言论与行动，另一方面要向他们提议与要求建立抗日的统一战线，订立抗日的协定。”“我们目前中心口号依然是'停止内战一致抗日'”，“在逼蒋抗日的方针下并不放弃同各派反蒋军阀进行抗日的联合。我们愈能组织南京以外各派军阀走向抗日，我们愈能实现这一方针”。指示还向全党通报了国共两党将进行联合抗日的谈判；党中央赞助建立“民主共和国”，届时“苏区可成为统一民主国的一个组成部分”，“红军将服从统一的军事指挥”。这个指示的发布，标志着“逼蒋抗日”方针的正式确定。这个指示精炼地阐述的策略、方针，成为抗日战争爆发之前中国共产党行动的纲领。从此，抗日民族统一战线工作进入了一个以“逼蒋抗日”、实现国共第二次合作为主要内容的新阶段。 在适时解决了最为迫切的对蒋方针问题以后，紧接着，张闻天又主持了9月15日至17日举行的政治局扩大会议，并在会上作《目前政治形势与一年来民族统一战线问题》的报告。 张闻天详细分析了国际、国内的形势变化，指出，统一战线，根据目前形势应有部分修改。他根据八月政治局会议和“国际电报”所作政治指示，总结了一年来抗日民族统一战线策略取得的许多成绩，肯定了瓦窑堡会议决议所确定的政治路线基本上是正确的，在此基础上，分析了认识上的不足，策略上的欠缺或失当，对新的形势下抗日民族统一战线的部分修改、调整，策略内容的充实、发展，作了系统的论述。张闻天指明，“各党派联合，主要是国共联合。”统一战线的口号是：“建立民主共和国”。现在的策略是：“实现联合国民党抗日”。即用各种办法推动正在动摇中间的国民党、南京政府和蒋介石走向抗日。张闻天对“停止一切内战一致抗日”作出新的解释：应反对反蒋战争，不应同情反蒋战争，主要的战争目标要放在抗日上面；对蒋的进攻，应站在自卫的立场上来反对。张闻天还强调：“我们在统一战线中要取得领导，这是我们基本任务。我们要保持我党的独立、纯洁。” 9月17日，会议通过了张闻天起草的《关于抗日救亡运动的新形势与民主共和国的决议》（以下简称《决议》）。九月会议是八月会议的继续与深化。因而这个决议贯彻了八月会议的决定，又吸收了“国际电报”的意见，同时也鲜明地体现着张闻天本人在八月会议上阐述、九月会议报告中加以发挥与系统化的策略思想。 《决议》向全党阐明，“在目前形势下，有提出建立民主共和国口号的必要”。 《决议》指出，“在日本帝国主义不断进攻之下，中国人民的抗日救亡运动现在已经进入一个新的阶段”。国民党南京政府“现在是在动摇的中间”。“在日寇继续进攻，抗日民族救亡运动继续发展，国际形势新的变动等条件之下，国民党南京政府有缩小以至结束其动摇地位，而转向参加抗日运动的可能”。“推动国民党南京政府及其军队参加抗日战争，是实行全国性大规模的严重的抗日武装斗争之必要条件”。 《决议》在准备进入国共合作、联合抗日的新阶段的关键时刻，及时提出了不少极其重要的统一战线的原则。如：绝不放松对于南京政府错误政策的严厉的批评与斗争；从广大人民的民主要求出发，领导群众的日常经济政治斗争，加强共产党在民族统一战线中的政治领导作用，决不放弃党对于苏区人民与原有武装力量的绝对领导；在统一指挥之下保持红军组织上与领导上的独立性，充分注意红军的扩大与巩固；扩大与巩固共产党，保障党在政治上、组织上的完全独立性和内部一致性，等等。如果说，实践证明，“民主共和国”的口号只是在宣传上发挥了作用，那么，这些策略原则则一直指导着共产党同国民党进行的复杂曲折的谈判。不仅如此，在整个抗日战争中，党在统一战线中都坚持和运用了这些原则，并在实践中有许多新的创造和发展。从这个意义上说，这个决议不仅对国共第二次合作的形成具有指导意义，而且对整个抗日战争的胜利也有深远的影响。 总之，九月会议后产生的“民主共和国决议”同八月会议后产生的“致国民党书”和“逼蒋抗日指示”一样，表明张闻天同毛泽东、周恩来等一起，善于使党的策略适应新的