Chapter 6 Chapter Five: Zhang Wentian Supports the Establishment of Mao Zedong's Military Leadership

The Long March was an unprecedented and extremely difficult military operation.Military leaders and commanders are at the forefront.Therefore, apart from General Secretary Yiluo Daibo, the Zunyi meeting's decision on the change of leaders is the most important change of military leaders.Zhang Wentian supported Mao Zedong as the military commander, and made unremitting efforts to establish Mao Zedong's leading position in the Red Army starting from Huang Ping's orange forest talk.Although there were many small twists and turns, generally speaking, Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong cooperated very well on this important and critical issue.

Mao Zedong was elected as a member of the Standing Committee at the Zunyi Conference.At that time, there were five members of the Politburo Standing Committee: Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Bo Gu, and Chen Yun.Before the Zunyi Conference and at the Zunyi Conference, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang and others proposed to restore Mao Zedong's military leadership, but it has not been formally decided that he will participate in the military leadership.On January 18, the day after the Zunyi meeting, a Politburo meeting was held.At the meeting, the Standing Committee made a division of labor and decided: "Take Comrade Mao Zedong as the helper of Comrade Enlai's military command."From then on, Mao Zedong returned to the leadership position of the army and directly participated in the military command of the Central Red Army.

After Mao Zedong took part in the military command of the Red Army, the Central Red Army adopted a highly flexible policy of mobile warfare according to changes in the enemy's situation.After the troops were drawn down in Tashi, they implemented the decision of "returning troops to northern Guizhou", marched eastward, crossed the Chishui River for the second time at Taipingdu and Erlangtan, and marched towards Zunyi.He caught the enemy by surprise and killed a carbine. On February 25, the Central Red Army conquered Tongzi.After half a day of fierce fighting on the way, they seized Loushan Pass and took Zunyi City on the 28th.In this battle, Wang Jialie's 8 regiments were defeated, Wu Qiwei's 2 divisions were wiped out, more than 2,000 guns were seized, and about 3,000 people were captured. It was the first major victory since the Long March.Mao Zedong was very happy when he won the battle of mobile warfare. He recited a poem on horseback: "Recalling Qin'e Loushanguan", singing the victory of the Loushanguan battle and expressing his mood from depression to cheerfulness.word cloud:

The Central Red Army rejoiced up and down, full of joy of victory.The Military Commission column entered Zunyi City again in early March. From making the strategic decision of "returning troops to the north of Guizhou" to crossing Chishui to win the victory at Loushan Pass, the Central Red Army won one victory after another, which made Zhang Wentian more convinced that Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical principles were correct, and admired Mao Zedong's military command even more ability.He was even more convinced that Mao Zedong was more likely to win if he commanded the battle in the front.After the Second Occupation of Zunyi, Zhang Wentian proposed to set up a former enemy headquarters and asked Mao Zedong to go to the front as the former commander-in-chief.Mao Zedong also said in a speech at a central meeting in 1943, "Luo Fu proposed that I be the commander-in-chief of the former enemy."

On March 4, Zhu De, chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and vice-chairmen Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang issued an order: "In order to strengthen and unify operations, we hereby set up a front enemy headquarters for this campaign, and entrust Comrade Zhu De as the front enemy commander, and Comrade Mao Zedong as the front enemy commander." Political Commissar." Quoted from "Forty-One Military Telegrams Before and After the Zunyi Meeting" in "Documentation and Research" No. 1, 1985.According to the practice in the Red Army, the political commissar is the highest leader of the party in the army, so the political commissar of the former enemy is customarily called the commander-in-chief of the former enemy.Back then, the political commissar of the former enemy was actually the commander-in-chief of the former enemy.This new establishment and appointment obviously handed over to Mao Zedong the power to command the campaign flexibly in the front.However, the entire military leadership system of the Red Army has not changed, and Zhou Enlai is still responsible for the final decision of the military.

After Mao Zedong took office as the commander-in-chief of the former enemy, he left Zunyi with the former enemy headquarters and arrived at Yaxi and Gouba.Since then, Wang Jiaxiang has made some comments, often asking the central government to hold meetings to discuss military operations.In view of the lack of democracy in Bogu's past leadership, Zhang Wentian adopted Wang Jiaxiang's opinion and convened several such meetings.Mao Zedong also said in a speech at a central meeting in 1943: "At Daguxinchang, Luo Fu has to hold a central meeting of 28 people every day." Zhang Wentian did not understand at that time that daily military command required complete centralization.Holding this kind of meeting will hinder the necessary arbitrary treatment of the front commanders according to the changes in military conditions; and the disputes at the meeting will even disturb the deployment of the front commanders.

A major debate revolves around whether to attack Dagu Xinchang Dagu Xinchang, now the county seat of Jinsha County, Guizhou Province, referred to as Xinchang.The problem erupted. At 1 o'clock on March 10, 1935, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen of the First Army Corps called the Military Commission, suggesting to attack Dagu Xinchang. During the daytime of March 10, Zhang Wentian convened an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in Yaxi to discuss whether to launch a "new battle with drums".The following describes the situation of this meeting. Most of the comrades at the meeting advocated fighting, only Mao Zedong insisted not to fight.Mao Zedong believed that the Red Army could only reach Xinchang on the 12th, when the Yunnan Army also rushed there to join the Guizhou Army, and at the same time the Sichuan Army could flank the Red Army, so he opposed the attack.Mao Zedong said that we can't fight, and fighting is tough, and the loss of troops is not worth it. We should destroy the enemy in mobile warfare.But he failed to convince everyone that they still wanted to fight.There was no argument at the meeting.Mao Zedong was in a hurry, and said, "Go and fight for the post of commander-in-chief of the former enemy."Someone said: "The minority obeys the majority, if you don't do it, you don't do it." Zhang Wentian presided over the meeting, and made a decision to attack Daguxinchang by generally implementing the principle of democracy that the minority obeys the majority.Mao Zedong was dismissed within a few days of his appointment as the former commander-in-chief, and the former commander-in-chief was temporarily replaced by Peng Dehuai.

After the meeting adjourned, Mao Zedong was really worried, and deeply felt that attacking the new field of playing drums would bring great losses to the Red Army.So, I went to talk to Zhou Enlai overnight with a lantern, asking him to issue the attack order later, and think again.Zhou Enlai adopted Mao Zedong's opinion.At 21:00 that night, a telegram was issued in the name of the Military Commission, and the troops concentrated in the Pingjiazhai, Fengxiangba, and Huamiaotian areas in order to seek new maneuvers.Early the next morning, Zhang Wentian presided over the meeting again to discuss this issue, and Mao and Zhou persuaded everyone.The Military Commission immediately issued "Instructions on Our Army Not Attacking New Fields" to the First, Third, and Fifth Army Corps.

This event is of great significance to the establishment of Mao Zedong's military leadership, as well as to the maintenance of the Red Army's vitality and the guarantee of victory in battle.Left a deep impression on Mao Zedong's memory.More than 20 years later, when Mao Zedong spoke at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on April 5, 1959, he used this past event as an example when he talked about the first item of "Working Methods", "Be resourceful and decisive".He said: "For example, in the Gouba meeting, I still had three votes first, and only one vote later. I opposed playing drums and going around Sichuan, and the whole audience opposed me. At that time, I didn't waver. I said, either Just listen to me. I ask you to listen to me and accept my suggestion. If you don’t listen, I will obey. There is nothing I can do. After the meeting, I will talk with En. I said, no, it’s dangerous. He was shaken. Sleep One night, another meeting the next day, listened to me."

The debate on whether to attack Daguxinchang finally came to the correct conclusion not to fight according to Mao Zedong's opinion, avoiding possible military losses.Afterwards, Mao Zedong proposed to Zhang Wentian: set up a new "three-person regiment" with full power to command the military, with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Wang Jiaxiang as members.Zhang Wentian very much agreed with Mao Zedong's proposal.The debate about playing drums in new battles shows that Mao Zedong is still brilliant.From this incident, Zhang Wentian also realized that the military command must make decisions on the fly, often holding a central meeting to make decisions, which is not good for the military command.I am a layman in fighting wars, and set up a new "three-person group", so that the conflicts between King Mao can be resolved by themselves, and it saves the trouble of convening a meeting.

On March 12, near Gouba, Zhang Wentian presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and submitted the proposal for the establishment of a new "three-person group" to the meeting for discussion.The meeting decided: Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang will form a new "three-person regiment" (also known as the "three-member military leadership group").The time and location of the establishment of the three-member military leading group, according to the conclusion of the "Investigation Report on Some Situations of the Zunyi Politburo Enlarged Meeting" by the Party History Data Collection Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: "The three-member military group was established on March 11, 1935. It was established around Yaxi and Gouba in Guizhou." When Mao Zedong talked about this more than 30 years later, he said: "Later, a three-member regiment was established. The leader of the regiment was Zhou Enlai, one of the members was me, and the other was Wang Jiaxiang. "A talk by Mao Zedong in 1967. So far, the Zunyi Conference's important decision to change leadership has finally been completed.Mao Zedong entered the most important military leadership organization at that time.This shows that Mao Zedong's correct proposition was further accepted by the whole party and the army, and Mao Zedong's leading position in China's revolutionary war was further established. After the establishment of the new "Three-member Military Leading Group", the military operations of the Central Red Army, under the command of Mao Zedong, adopted a strategy of attacking the east and attacking the west. From March 16th to 17th, the Red Army crossed Chishui three times in Maotai, the wine town, and entered Sichuan again, which attracted the enemy troops to move to the west of Sichuan.At this time, the Red Army took the enemy by surprise and crossed Chishui four times at Taipingdu and Erlangtan from March 21 to 22.Immediately afterwards, the Red Army crossed the Wujiang River south and pretended to attack Guiyang.Just as the enemy troops in Yunnan were reinforcing Guiyang, the Red Army had already crossed the Hunan-Guizhou Highway and headed south, then rushed westward, heading straight into Yunnan, forming a threat to Kunming.Mao Zedong commanded the Red Army of the Central Committee to shoot Kunming in a feint, and then rushed to the northwest, reaching the south bank of the Jinsha River.At the beginning of May, he rushed to cross the Jinsha River at Jiaopingdu, Luquan County.After the enemy learned of the Red Army's actions, it took 11 days to catch up to the river.It took the Red Army only 9 days to cross the river. The Red Army won the victory of crossing the Jinsha River, jumped out of the encirclement, and left the pursued and intercepted enemy far away, realizing the strategic goal of crossing the river to the north determined by the Zunyi Conference.It was a decisive victory in a strategic shift. Battle of crossing Chishui four times On January 29, 1935, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River from Yuanhouchang (now Yuanhou Town) and Tucheng in Chishui County to the west.This is a crossing of Chishui. From February 18th to 21st, cross the Chishui River at Taipingdu and Erlangtan.This is the second crossing of Chishui. From March 16th to 17th, cross the Chishui River from near Maotai to the west.This is Sandu Chishui. From March 21st to 22nd, cross the Chishui River again at Erlangtan, Jiuxikou, and Taipingdu.This is Sidu Chishui.It fully embodies the great power of Mao Zedong's strategic thinking on mobile warfare, and also shows Mao Zedong's excellent military command ability.Mao Zedong himself said that crossing Chishui four times was the proudest stroke of his life. However, at that time, the understanding of Mao Zedong's military command was not unified.Implement Mao Zedong's flexible and maneuverable tactics, and frequently shift the combat area, sometimes to the east, sometimes to the west, sometimes to take the main road, sometimes to take the small road, sometimes to take the old road, and sometimes to take the new road, and the only purpose is to fight against the enemy under favorable conditions. Seek victory in battle.Many people are not used to this method of warfare, nor do they fully understand it.In carrying out this policy of mobile warfare, although we have won many battles, it is impossible to win every battle; we have traveled many roads in detours, sometimes in order to throw off the enemy and confuse the enemy, so that we cannot see the necessity of it for a while; Sometimes in order to adapt to changes in the enemy's situation, it seems that a lot of wrong roads have been taken, but it is unavoidable and must be taken;In the continuous strides of advance and retreat, the troops were very tired, and there were a lot of downsizing.Therefore, although the top and bottom are obedient to orders, there are also different opinions and complaints.The disagreement mainly revolved around whether to walk or fight. Some people complained that the troops only walked and did not fight, and that the troops were not defeated but would be dragged down. Around mid-April, shortly after Liu Shaoqi became the director of the Political Department of the Three Army Corps, he would learn about the mood of the troops, combined with the opinions he heard and his own opinions, and wrote a telegram to the Central Military Commission, and Yang Shangkun, political commissar of the Three Army Corps, also signed it , issued in the names of Liu and Yang.Lin Biao, the head of the First Army Corps, has always complained that the Red Army is taking the "bow and back road", advocating bowstrings and shortcuts.What do you say, "This will drag down the troops, and it's okay to lead and command like him?" Lin Biao also wrote a letter to Zhou, Mao, and Wang's "three-person military team".The gist of the letter was: Mao, Zhou, and Zhu followed the army to preside over the grand plan, and asked Peng Dehuai to be the commander of the former enemy, and quickly march northward to join the Fourth Front Army. In the "three-person military team", Wang Jiaxiang did not understand Mao Zedong's tactics. He reflected to Zhang Wentian that it was not an option to keep fighting in circles and not fighting.Wang Jiaxiang asked for a meeting to resolve this issue. Since the senior leaders of the Red Army have differences on strategic and tactical issues, it is necessary to hold a meeting to discuss and resolve them. The Red Army crossed the Jinsha River on May 9th, jumped out of the siege and interception of hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops, and gained the initiative in action.After crossing the river, the Red Army approached the city of Huili.In Huili County, a division of the Liu Wenhui Department of the Sichuan Army was defending, and there were reinforcements from Xichang and other places.Taking advantage of the fact that the chasing enemy was unable to cross the river in the near future, the troops rested in the Huili area. On May 12, the Field Army Headquarters issued an order: "We decided to stay in Huili and its vicinity for five days (until the 15th) to strive for necessary rest and replenishment after a long march." In order to unify thinking and affirm Mao Zedong's military command since the Zunyi Conference, Zhang Wentian discussed with Mao Zedong and hosted an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee—the Huili Conference—in the iron field outside Huili City on the afternoon of May 12. Those who participated in the meeting were: Zhou, Mao and Wang of the three-member military group, commander-in-chief Zhu, member of the Politburo Standing Committee Chen Yun, commanders of the first and third armies and political commissars Lin, Nie, Peng and Yang.In order to prevent enemy planes from bombing and strafing, a grass shed was temporarily built as the venue.The ground floor of the head of the legion was laid in this grass shed.Drinking water and eating were sent by Liu Ying, secretary-general of the central team, with guards. The meeting was chaired by Zhang Wentian and made a report.Zhang Wentian discussed the outline of the report with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang before the meeting.Zhang Wentian severely criticized Lin Biao and others for their suspicion and wavering of Mao Zedong's military command as being rightist. At the meeting, Mao Zedong refuted Lin Biao's so-called "walking back" fallacy, pointing out: "If you don't want to suffer more in order to get rid of chasing the enemy now, you will suffer even more in the future." Mao Zedong also accused Peng Dehuai of believing that Lin Biao's letter It was Peng Dehuai who instigated it.He also said that Lin's letter and Liu and Yang's telegrams were all reflections of rightist sentiment. Although Mao Zedong did not explicitly criticize Zhang Wentian's participation in the incident in his speech, it can be heard from the voice that Mao Zedong suspected that Zhang Wentian was combined with Peng Dehuai.Although Zhang and Peng felt aggrieved in their hearts, unity was the most important thing in front of the enemy, and they did not argue at the meeting or at the meeting.Peng Dehuai "made a self-criticism, saying: Because the two battles of Lubanchang and Xishui were not fought well, he was a little bored. He wanted to know how to fight a good battle so as to get rid of the passive situation. Boredom is right deviation." Peng Dehuai also criticized at the meeting Lin Biao's letter: The leader was changed only at the Zunyi meeting, and it is inappropriate to propose changing the command of the former enemy at this time; it is even more inappropriate to specifically mention me." The conference was held for two or three days, and finally Zhang Wentian, general secretary of the Party Central Committee, made a conclusion.He affirmed that Mao Zedong's military command was correct since the Zunyi Conference, and criticized Lin Biao's mistakes in opposing mobile warfare, complaining among the troops, and even attempting to change the military leadership. The Huili meeting also discussed the action plan after crossing the Jinsha River, and decided that the Red Army would continue to march northward, cross the Dadu River, and join the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army.The meeting also appointed Liu Bocheng as the commander of the advance team. The Huili meeting was an important meeting on the Long March, and its main results were positive. First, through the Huili meeting, with the support of Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, etc., Mao Zedong's policy of getting rid of the enemy's heavy encirclement in mobile warfare, which was proved by the practice of the battle of crossing Chishui four times, was confirmed.Misperceptions and vacillating sentiments that doubt or oppose the maneuver approach have been criticized. On October 15, 1935, when Chen Yun reported the situation of the Red Army's Long March to the Comintern, he talked about the significance of the meeting and said: "This meeting summed up and affirmed that the leadership of the Red Army is correct. The meeting pointed out that the new leadership team Well-directed." Second, Mao Zedong's leadership over the Red Army established after the Zunyi Conference was further consolidated through the Huili Conference.This is inseparable from the fact that Mao Zedong's military thought has been proven correct in practice and confirmed through debate. The Huili Conference has an important historical position in the victory of the Red Army's Long March and the victory of the Chinese revolution.It can be seen from the progress of the Huili meeting that "Mauro cooperation" played a decisive role in the success of this meeting. But at the same time, it should be noted that the Huili meeting also has obvious deficiencies, and its methods of struggle are not entirely appropriate. Zhang Wentian commented in "Yan'an Rectification Movement Notes in 1943": "The Huili meeting was basically correct, and it was necessary to fight against some centrifugal tendencies and wavering emotions among the cadres at that time. But I think the way of fighting is still too much. Because The mistakes of these comrades are in essence only individual mistakes, as long as they are properly criticized and explained, the mistakes will be corrected, and there is no need to suppress them with the hat of opportunism.” It should also be noted that the negative impact of the Huili Conference on Mao-Roman relations and Mao-Peng relations is far-reaching. Mao Zedong accused Lin Biao's letter of being "instigated" by Peng Dehuai and being "rightist".In this regard, Peng Dehuai did not argue, and adopted the attitude of "it will become clear after a long time". At the Lushan Conference in 1959, Mao Zedong brought up the matter again. Lin Biao stated on the spot that "that letter has nothing to do with Comrade Peng Dehuai" and that "Peng didn't know when he wrote the letter."It wasn't until then that Peng Dehuai came out to explain the whole story.Regarding Liu and Yang's telegram, Peng said that after Liu Shaoqi wrote it, "bring it to me and Yang Shangkun to sign. I think it's different from mine, so I sent it in the name of Liu and Yang without signing it."As for Lin Biao's letter, Peng Dehuai said: "I only saw it during the meeting, and "I had no conversation with Lin Biao" beforehand, so this letter "has nothing to do with me"; at the meeting, "I also criticized Lin Biao's letter."Regarding Mao's accusation, Peng said: "I was a little sad when I heard it at the time, but the enemy is now, and the pursuit of the enemy is forced on the Jinsha River. To make a statement. I took the attitude of being clear after a long time, but made self-criticism."It was not until the 1959 Lushan Conference that Peng Dehuai was branded as an "anti-party group" and this matter became a major crime that he felt that this kind of openness was not effective.Peng Dehuai later said: "In the past 24 years, the chairman has said about it four times. I have not gone to the chairman to declare this matter, nor have I discussed this matter with any other comrades. Judging from the current experience and lessons, we should still It’s better to talk clearly, so as not to accumulate the general ledger, and at the same time, it can also avoid the use of provocateurs.” Zhang Wentian is the host of the meeting.He criticized the subordinates on behalf of the Central Committee at the meeting, but he himself did not receive direct and obvious criticism.However, Mao Zedong listened to the guesses and judgments of individual comrades, but always believed that Zhang Wentian went to the Three Army Corps to collude with Peng to oppose him.This misunderstanding has been buried in Mao Zedong's heart until the rectification movement in Yan'an.In a small talk meeting in June and July of 1941, Mao Zedong criticized Zhang Wentian's shortcomings, especially mentioning Zhang Wentian's "serious political vacillation before the Huili meeting", saying that Zhang "incited comrades Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai, the leading army leaders, to oppose' Three-member regiment, ask Lin and Peng to replace the command of the "three-member regiment" and so on."Regarding this, Zhang Wentian expressed his "reservations" on the spot. "After returning home that night, I wrote a letter of affirmation to Mao about this matter, but it was not sent out later. It is useless to think about the matter without circumstantial evidence." At the Politburo meeting in September 1943, Mao Zedong once again "proposed and this matter".Zhang Wentian took it seriously this time.He "took advantage of the opportunity of many comrades in Yan'an to do a little investigation work", and clarified in the "Rectification Notes" he wrote later: "It can be roughly determined now that the words that I once incited Lin and Peng to oppose the three-person group were true. Comrade Wang Jiaxiang’s rumors! (Comrades Lin and Peng made an official statement on this matter)” On the Long March, the enemy is at hand.The excessive struggle, doubts, and misunderstandings at the Huili meeting did not affect the unity of the leading comrades of the Central Committee and the senior generals of the Red Army against the enemy.During the rectification period in Yan'an, for the whole party, this was not a big deal, so let's forget it after talking about it, and didn't make a special conclusion.However, the Huili meeting had a far-reaching impact on the relationship between Mao and Luo and Mao and Peng.The misunderstanding continued to the Yan'an rectification movement, and the solid facts could not really dispel the doubts, and the erroneous attack on Peng Dehuai and Zhang Wentian at the Lushan Conference in 1959 must be said to have also been shadowed by the Huili Conference.