Chapter 5 Chapter Four Tashi Meeting

Two days after the Zunyi Conference, on January 19, 1934, the Central Red Army moved northward from the Zunyi area and marched towards Tucheng. "Redification" of Sichuan.Unexpectedly, he was defeated by the tenacious resistance of the Sichuan Army, so he decisively decided to withdraw from the battle. Before dawn on January 29, the main force of the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River in three routes from Yuanhouchang (now Yuanhouchang) and the northwest area of ​​Tucheng to the Gulin and Xuyong areas on the northern edge of Sichuan. On February 3, the central column arrived at Shixiangzi camp in Xuyong County. On February 4, I received a telegram from Xiang Ying, secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee who stayed behind in the Central Soviet Area, to the Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.Xiang Ying criticized the Central Committee and the Military Commission for "having no instructions, no reply to calls, and no general policy for the whole country since the dispatch."

At this time, the general secretary of the Party Central Committee has not changed.After the Zunyi Conference, in fact, Bogu was no longer able to lead the work of the central government.After receiving Xiang Ying's call, he did not convene a meeting to discuss it, nor could he determine a course of action to reply Xiang Ying. Xiang Ying didn't see an answer, and on February 5, he called the Central Committee in the name of the Central Sub-bureau, raising the "two opinions" on the "action policy" of the Central Soviet Area and the "leadership of the Soviet Areas", "Please reply immediately."Xiang Ying asked the central government to make a decision as soon as possible and lead.It is really urgent and urgent.

The central column of the Red Army departed from Shixiangzi on February 5 and marched towards Tashi (the county seat of Weixin County, Yunnan Province), marching in an area called "Three Provinces of Jiming".At the junction of the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan, and at the confluence of Chishui River and Weihe River, there is a ferry, which is called "Chahe" locally, and the place marked on the old map is called "Jiming Three Provinces".It means that it is located at the junction of three provinces, and the crowing of the rooster can be heard in all three provinces.According to the local custom, "Jiming Three Provinces" not only refers to the ferry, but also generally refers to the townships in the three provinces near the ferry. On February 5, the central column planned to camp in Shuitianzhai, a small town in Weixin County in the "Three Provinces of Jiming".No, the bandits guarded the two gun towers to obstruct them, and the Red Army could not immediately conquer them.It was nearly dusk, so the Military Commission's column had no choice but to bypass Shuitian Village and live in several small villages such as Upstairs, Huafang, Gaokan, and Bajiao Bay on Ersanli Road to the west of the town.The communication department of the headquarters lives in a flower house, and the comrades in charge of the central government live in Gaokan.

At this time, Zhang Wentian felt that Xiang Ying had been calling continuously for the past two days, and he had to answer; if he didn't change the leader at this time, he would miss a big deal.Now is the time to implement the "appropriate division of labor among the Standing Committee" decided at the Zunyi meeting.So it was proposed that "leadership must be changed."Originally, at the Zunyi meeting, many comrades in the Politburo had elected Zhang Wentian to replace Bo Gu as general secretary. That night, the Standing Committee met to discuss the division of labor and made a decision to replace Bo with Luo and let Zhang Wentian take overall responsibility within the party.For this reason, the Party Central Committee also issued a statement to revoke Bogu's position as General Secretary, officially announcing the completion of Boluo's handover.

At the time, members of the Politburo were in favor of the decision.Only Kai Feng, an alternate member of the Politburo, told Bogu not to hand over power behind his back.Bogu didn't listen.He obeyed the decision made by the majority comrades of the Politburo, and handed over to Zhang Wentian several sets of picks containing important documents, records, and seals of the Central Committee.Bo Gu stayed on as a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee. When Zhang Wentian was ordered to be in crisis, he immediately poured all his energy and talents into the position of general secretary, cooperated with Mao Zedong, united the comrades in charge of the Politburo and the Military Commission, implemented the spirit of the Zunyi Conference, and corrected the mistakes of the "Left" military line. Take on the historical task of leading the entire party and the entire army to achieve strategic transformation and crush the enemy's encirclement and interception.

During the four or five days from the evening of February 5th to February 9th, the Central Red Army marched in Weixin territory, from the flower house in Shuitianzhai, to Shikan, to Zhuangzi on Dahetan, and to Tashi Town. Zhang Wentian Continuously presided over the meetings of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (referred to as the Tashi meeting in history), passed the "summary resolution on smashing the enemy's five "encirclement and suppression"" (the "Zunyi meeting resolution"), and made a series of important decisions. The "Tashi Conference" presided over by Zhang Wentian on February 5 after taking office as General Secretary was the continuation and finalization of the Zunyi Conference.Since then, a new chapter in the history of "Mao-Luo cooperation" (that is, the cooperation between the general secretary of the Party Central Committee Luo Fu and the de facto supreme commander of the Red Army Mao Zedong) began.In February 1935, Tashi was the location of the general headquarters that led the entire party and army to complete a great historical turning point.

Below, we basically follow the order of the Tashi meeting, and describe how the Party Central Committee cooperated with Mauro continued and finally completed the tasks of the Zunyi meeting here, commanding the whole party and the army to achieve a great historical turning point. After the Politburo Standing Committee implemented the "Boluo Handover" on February 5, Zhang Wentian immediately presided over an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to discuss the most urgent question that had to be answered immediately: the strategic policy and organizational issues of the Central Soviet Area.

After discussing and making a decision, Zhang Wentian immediately called Xiang Ying in the name of the central government on the night of February 5 and transferred to the central sub-bureau, and gave a clear answer to their calls on February 4 and 5.Regarding the strategic policy, the reply telegraphed instructions: "The sub-bureau should persist in guerrilla warfare in the Central Soviet Area and its adjacent Soviet areas" and "do not allow any wavering in this basic principle"; and pointed out: "Immediately change your organization and struggle methods It must be adapted to the environment of guerrilla warfare, and many of the large rear organizations and troop organizations and many old ways of fighting are not suitable."Regarding organization and leadership, it was decided to establish the Central Military Branch of the Revolutionary Military Commission, "organized by Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, He Chang and other two people, with Xiang as the chairman." The main spirit of the Zunyi Conference was specified, the strategic policy of the Central Soviet Area was specified, leading cadres were appointed, and a new organizational connection and leadership relationship between the Central Committee and the Central Soviet Area was re-established.Restoring the marginalized Chen Yi to his military leadership embodies the spirit of the Zunyi Conference.

On February 13, the Central Committee sent another long telegram to the Central Sub-bureau of the Soviet Area, announcing the "details of the resolution" on February 5 in detail.After receiving telegrams on the specific implementation of Xiang Ying's report on the 19th and 21st, on the 23rd, the Secretariat of the Central Committee replied to Xiang Ying and transferred it to the Central Sub-bureau, detailing the specific issues that should be paid attention to in the implementation of the central instructions.As a result, the Central Soviet Area began to implement a strategic change, and clarified the direction of adhering to the guerrilla warfare in southern Jiangxi.

On February 6, the Military Commission column entered from Gaokan to Shikanzi, and arrived at Dahetan on the 7th.Zhang Wentian presided over the enlarged meeting of the Politburo consecutively, summarizing the lessons learned from the defeat of the Tucheng Battle, and discussing the most urgent issue of the strategic direction of the Central Red Army. The meeting calmly analyzed the situation at that time, and believed that the enemy had strengthened the defense along the Yangtze River and was chasing and intercepting the Central Red Army with superior forces. The plan to establish a base area in the Soviet area is "impossible to realize".If the plan is not changed, the Red Army will inevitably face the enemy on the banks of the Yangtze River, and the consequences will be disastrous.So he decisively decided to change the strategic direction, abandoning the plan to cross the river into Sichuan between Luzhou and Yibin, and took advantage of the time when the enemy's main force was concentrated in the southern Sichuan line and northern Guizhou was relatively empty, "returning troops to northern Guizhou" and "taking the border of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou as the development area".

At 19:00 on February 7, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the "Instructions on the Development of Our Army to the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou Border" at Dahetan to the heads of the corps, notifying the "Decision of the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission": instead of "taking the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border In order to develop the region, the situation will be developed with the victory of the battle".He also ordered all the legions to quickly get rid of the pursuit of the enemy in Sichuan and concentrate on the Tashi area on the Sichuan-Yunnan border.This change in strategic direction won the initiative for the Red Army to get out of the difficult and dangerous situation at that time. At the same time, the meeting discussed the issue of the "drawdown" of the Red Army troops.In order to meet the needs of the current battle and enrich the combat effectiveness of each company, in order to effectively eliminate the enemy's vital forces and facilitate continuous operations, it was decided to downsize the combat units of each legion on the spot. On February 8, the central column continued to advance in the direction of Tashi in the mountains and reached Zhuangzi on the same day.Here, Zhang Wentian continued to preside over the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, where the "Zunyi Meeting Resolution" was discussed and passed.The full name of this resolution is: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Summary Resolution on Opposing the Enemy's Five Encirclement and Suppression". At the Zunyi meeting in mid-January, it was decided: "Designate Comrade Luo Fu to draft a resolution, entrust the Standing Committee to review it, and send it to the branch for discussion." During the twenty-odd days after the Zunyi meeting, Zhang Wentian seized all available Time, based on the "counter-report" he made at the Zunyi meeting, absorbed the speeches of Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhou Enlai and other comrades at the meeting, and combined with the development and changes of the situation after the meeting and new decisions, drafted the "Zunyi meeting resolution" This is a document of great historical significance. The Zunyi Conference was the first meeting where the Communist Party of China used the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to resolve its own line, principles and policies.It is a life-and-death turning point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party, marking the Chinese Communist Party from naivety to maturity. The "Zunyi Conference Resolution" expounds the content and results of the Zunyi Conference, summarizes the spirit of the Zunyi Conference, and is a historical document that embodies this great turning point.It is a summary of the experience and lessons of the anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, the crystallization of the collective wisdom of the party and the army, is dominated by Mao Zedong's military thought, and is the first systematic exposition of Mao Zedong's strategy and tactics for China's revolutionary war.As the author of the "Speech Outline" at the Zunyi Conference, the spokesperson of the "anti-report", and the drafter of the "Resolution", Zhang Wentian has made indelible achievements.Of course, the reason why Zhang Wentian was able to complete this mission entrusted by history is inseparable from the education and help of Mao Zedong.He said: "Before and after the Zunyi Conference, I received the first education about the law of leading China's revolutionary war from Comrade Mao Zedong, which was of great benefit to me." It should be said that the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" is also "Mao Luo cooperation" masterpiece. The "Zunyi Conference Resolution" clearly stated: Comrade Bogu's report on the summary of the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns" was "basically incorrect" and "he overestimated the objective difficulties in his report" and "this will inevitably lead to objectively The opportunistic conclusion that five 'encirclement and suppression campaigns' could not crush at all". The "Resolution" pointed out that "the correct strategy and tactics cannot be used in military leadership" and "the strategy and tactics in military leadership are basically wrong". . The "Zunyi Conference Resolution" (hereinafter referred to as the "Resolution") used a lot of space to demonstrate the above conclusions convincingly by comparing the correct and wrong strategies and tactics in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, and systematically criticized Bo Gu , Li De's strategic and tactical mistakes in military leadership, and systematically discussed the strategic and tactical principles represented by Mao Zedong, created collectively by the Red Army, and in line with the laws of China's revolutionary war.It is mainly reflected in the following four aspects: ① In terms of the use of troops, we should "concentrate superior forces" rather than "disperse forces". The "Resolution" criticizes the leaders of the purely defensive line, "almost always dispersing (mainly the dispersing of the First and Third Army Corps) forces in order to resist the advance of the enemy on all sides". "As a result of this division of troops, we are often in a passive position, making our troops weak everywhere, and making it easy for the enemy to attack us individually." The "Resolution" stated that the correct principle is "concentrate superior forces" and "destroy the enemy one by one".Point out that only in this way can the Red Army always grasp the initiative. ②The method of crushing fortressism is "mobile warfare" rather than "positional warfare". The "Resolution" pointed out that the leaders of the purely defensive line "absolutely deny the experience of mobile warfare in the past, and absolutely deny the tactics of luring the enemy in and destroying them."They created a "theory that victory can only start with tactics", thinking that only divided troops and short assaults can deal with fortressism.They abandoned the Red Army's special mobile warfare, and adopted positional warfare that was beneficial to the enemy but extremely unfavorable to the Red Army, which led to the defeat of the war. The "Resolution" discusses the strategic and tactical principles of using mobile warfare to smash the fortress doctrine: "Inside the fortress line is to wait for the enemy to advance in large numbers and destroy the enemy's troops; outside the fortress line, that is, when the Red Army moves to a vast area without fortifications. Force the enemy to leave the fort to engage us in mobile warfare." ③The method of dealing with the enemy's protracted war is a protracted war in the whole war and a quick decision in the campaign rather than the opposite. We should "maintain the vitality" and "wait for favorable opportunities" instead of adopting "desperateism". The "Resolution" pointed out from the height of summarizing the law of China's revolutionary war: "It must be understood that China's civil war is not a short-term war, but a long-term and protracted war." Therefore, under favorable conditions, the Red Army should shift from defense to counter-offensive, and eliminate The enemy; under unfavorable conditions, they can retreat temporarily to maintain the vitality of the Red Army, waiting for and striving for a new favorable opportunity for counterattack and attack. "This is the first basic principle." The "Resolution" also pointed out another basic principle, "that is, in order to carry out a long-term protracted war, for every 'encirclement and suppression' and every battle, we must strive for a quick conclusion of the war situation."The leaders of the purely defensive line did not understand the dialectics of the Chinese Revolutionary War, "protracted warfare and quick-decision warfare". Get up", "This is playing with war", is "crime". The "Resolution" stated that in order to maintain vitality and wait for favorable opportunities, "even if part of the land in the Soviet area is given up, or even the main force temporarily leaves the base areas of the Soviet area, it is not hesitant."Because of a strong Red Army, even if the Soviet area suffers losses, it will eventually be able to recover, and only by relying on the Red Army can a new Soviet area be created. The "Resolution" also pointed out from the perspective of anti-inclination struggle, "under the principle of protracted war", we must oppose the two wrong tendencies of conservatism and adventurism. ④ For the Fujian 19th Route Military Coup, the policy of "direct cooperation" should be adopted in the military rather than the opposite. The "Resolution" pointed out that using conflicts within the enemy "is one of our important strategies for smashing the enemy's 'encirclement and suppression'".The Fujian Nineteenth Route military uprising was an "important key" to smashing the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression campaign", and it was necessary to adopt a "direct coordination policy with the Nineteenth Route Army" in the military.However, at that time, Bogu and others adopted the opposite strategy strategically, thus "losing this precious opportunity". The "Resolution" also made a systematic summary of the process of implementing strategic transfer and breaking out of the encirclement, and made a profound criticism of the principled mistakes of Bo Gu and Li De.First of all, it not only delayed the timing of the implementation of the strategic retreat, but also "completely ignored" the "maintenance of vital forces".The adoption of "the contradictory attitude of "preparing to break through on the one hand and 'defending the central area with all strength' on the other hand" caused great losses to the Red Army.Then, and more seriously, the breakout operation is basically regarded as not a resolute and fighting one, "but a kind of panic-like escape and relocation action", starting from Ruijin to Liping, guiding the breakout westward expedition The basic strategic policy of China is "war avoidance".As a result, during the three-month breakout campaign, the Red Army was almost always passively beaten, almost everywhere it became a cover battle, and the change in the strategy of the Red Army was used to force the enemy to change the entire plan of the Central Soviet Area, so as to smash the five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, and even maintain the Red Army's vitality at a high level. Basic tasks cannot be completed.Finally, when they reached the Hunan-Guizhou border, Bo Gu, Li De and others did not know how to change their actions and policies according to the changed situation. The "Resolution" linked the breakout operation with the anti-fifth "encirclement and suppression" war, and pointed out "the future of the development of the purely defensive line: either desperate desperation or escapism." The "Resolution" is a glorious document that combines Marxism with the reality of the Chinese revolution.It is to carry out and deepen the "struggle against the purely defensive line in the military" throughout the party, "completely correct the mistakes made in the military leadership in the past, and improve the leadership of the Military Commission", and realize "from the tactics of positional warfare (short assault ) to the resolute and rapid transformation of mobile warfare tactics” laid the ideological and theoretical foundation for the Central Red Army and the Red Army across the country to break through the encirclement and transfer, crush the enemy’s encirclement, pursuit and interception, and win the Long March. The "Resolution" is the first systematic summary of the military thought represented by Mao Zedong.The basic principles of military line and strategy and tactics that it briefly discusses in line with the characteristics of China’s revolutionary war were not only used and enriched and developed in the Long March, but also more widely used and enriched in the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation And development.Undoubtedly, Mao Zedong's military thought is the product of the people's war and the crystallization of the wisdom of Mao Zedong, Zhu De and the generals of the people's army.Zhang Wentian made an indelible contribution to the theoretical generalization of Mao Zedong's military thought with the "Resolution" he drafted. The "Resolution" is also a sign that Zhang Wentian has completely shaken off the "Left" dogmatism and turned to the correct line. It is a peak in his life and career, and a boundary marker for his ideological leap.Zhang Wentian was able to split from the "Left" group, and was able to draft and preside over the adoption of the "Resolution", entirely out of self-independence and self-consciousness.People can clearly see that the "Resolution" adopted some correct thoughts and viewpoints in many articles published by Zhang Wentian from the Fujian Incident to the eve of the Long March, and even used the language to express these thoughts and viewpoints.Among the many articles published by Zhang Wentian from the Fujian Incident to the eve of the Long March, at least the following are directly related to the Zunyi Conference Resolution: "On the Soviet Government's Manifesto and the Struggle Against Opportunism" (1933 November 21, 1934), "We Want Victory Anyway" (April 27, 1934), "Against Petty Bourgeois Ultra-Leftism" (June 24, 1934), "The Current Central Task of the Fujian-Jiangxi Party "(July 26, 1934), "All for the Defense of the Soviets" (September 26, 1934).In connection with Zhang Wentian's revolutionary experience and ideological development, we can fully see the inevitability of Zhang Wentian's "transformation" at the Zunyi Conference.This is the result of his earnest study of Marxism-Leninism and his contact with the reality of the Chinese revolution in the leadership position of the Central Committee, gradually understanding the "Left" errors from the contradictions between theory and practice, subjectivity and objectivity, and gradually understanding the laws of Chinese society and Chinese revolution; It was he who, in the midst of inner-party conflicts and inner-party struggles, from thought, theory to line, policy, policy, through the education of facts, repeated comparisons, distinguished right from wrong, completely negated the wrong leadership of Bo Gu and Li De, affirmed and accepted It is the result of Mao Zedong's correct thinking and military strategy and tactics.This also shows that the election of Zhang Wentian to replace Bogu as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee by the majority of comrades in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee was not accidental, but a historical choice. While fully affirming the great significance of the "Resolution", of course, we should not avoid the "transition" period in the "Resolution" or the old traces that have not been fully realized or inevitably need to be preserved temporarily.Needless to say, this also reflects that the "transformation" of Zhang Wentian, the drafter of the "Resolution", is still not thorough enough.For example, while the "Resolution" criticizes the mistakes of the purely defensive line in the military, it still affirms that "the political line of the Party Central Committee is undoubtedly correct"; Its nature is "specific right opportunism within the party"; the "Resolution" criticized and rejected the military advisers sent by the Communist International, and for the first time independently resolved the line, principles, strategies and tactics of China's revolutionary war. The article still cites international directives as a weapon of criticism from time to time; the "Resolution" also regards the Nineteenth Route Army in the Fujian Incident as "a faction within the counter-revolutionaries" in general because it is still limited by the traditional concept of the lower-level united front. After the "Zunyi Meeting Resolution" was discussed and passed at the Politburo meeting on February 8, it was immediately engraved with "sent to the branch for discussion".Before printing and distributing the full text of the resolution, in order to convey the spirit of the meeting to cadres at all levels as soon as possible, Zhang Wentian wrote the "Outline of the Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Summarizing and Destroying the Experience and Lessons from the Five "Encirclement and Suppression" Wars" (hereinafter referred to as the "Outline of the Resolution of the Zunyi Meeting"), On the same day that the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" was passed, it was released in the name of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee.This document succinctly described the general idea and main points of the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" in a space of more than 2,000 words.Not many days later, the full text was telegraphed to the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps, the Red Fourth Front Army and the Central Military Region.The power generation time of this piece is February 28, 1935 in the mimeograph stored in the Central Archives.Has been included in "Zunyi Conference Documents".In this way, the general idea and main points of the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" were conveyed to the entire army in February. On February 9, 1935, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others arrived in Tashi Town.The town is located in the west of Zhaling, and it was named "Zhaxi" in the Qing Dynasty. At the same time, it also took the pronunciation of the local minority Yi, which means a place with plenty of water.This town is not small, and it is the seat of Weixin County Government.Zhang Wentian immediately convened an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in the Jiangxi Guild Hall in the town to discuss the issue of the "downsizing" of the Central Red Army and the strategic policy and organizational issues of the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps. On February 7, the Dahetan meeting had made a decision to change the strategic policy and "return troops to northern Guizhou" to develop towards the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border. The Jiangxi Guild Hall meeting held on the 9th resolutely decided to "downsize" the combat units of the various regiments of the Central Red Army in order to implement this strategic policy.The next day, on February 10, the Military Commission issued the "Order on the Downsizing of the Legions", specifying that the guiding ideology of this downsizing is: "In order to meet the needs of the current battle, and to enrich the combat effectiveness of each company, in order to effectively eliminate the enemy's It has vital force and is convenient for continuous operations."Chen Yun organized and led the drawdown.In addition to the cadre regiment, the whole army is organized into 16 regiments.Some cadres were also mobilized to lead hundreds of people to form the "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Sichuan Southern Guerrillas" to persist in the struggle in the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border areas. The Politburo meeting also made a decision on the strategic policy and organizational issues of the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps. On February 11, 1935, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to the comrades in charge of the Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan and Guizhou Provincial Committees and the Second and Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army, stating: "The general policy is decisive battle defense rather than simple defense, and mobile warfare rather than positional warfare." .Instruct them to "take advantage of the disunity of the enemy's command in Hunan and Hubei and the exhaustion of He Jian's troops. When the enemy leaves the fortress and advances, gather the main force of the Red Army, select the enemy's weak points, and defeat them one by one in mobile warfare without losing the opportunity." It is necessary to adopt methods such as exhaustion, confusion, temptation, and deception to create conditions conducive to combat."Regarding the military leadership of the Second and Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army, the telegram instructed that "a sub-committee of the Revolutionary Military Committee should be organized, with He, Ren, Guan, Xiao, and Wang as members, and He as the chairman, to discuss the principles of strategy and tactics and the principles of the Red Army's actions. ".2. In the list of members of the Sixth Army Branch Committee, He is He Long, Ren is Ren Bishi, Guan is Guan Xiangying, Xia is Xia Xi, Xiao is Xiao Ke, and Wang is Wang Zhen. After receiving the telegram from the Central Committee on February 11, the Second and Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army realized that the central government’s formulation was “quite different from the previous ones” and “so they called the central government.”The Central Secretariat presided over by Zhang Wentian immediately telegraphed the full text of the "Outline of Resolutions of the Zunyi Conference" to the Second and Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army, as well as the Central Military Region and the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. Zhang Wentian also paid close attention to the Red Fourth Front Army after he took over as general secretary.In addition to the timely telegram "Outline of the Resolution of the Zunyi Conference" mentioned above, on February 16, the Red Fourth Front Army Central Committee was telegraphed about the change in the strategic policy of the Red Army.The message stated: "(The Central Red Army) failed to succeed in the battle with the Guo and Pan brigades of the Sichuan enemy near Tucheng on January 28, and the concentrated main force of the Yunnan enemy was also blocking the Sichuan-Yunnan border, which made our field army's plan to cross the river impossible. Realized. Therefore, the Military Commission decided that our field military reform will be carried out in the vast areas of the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border area, and strive to create a new Soviet base area in this vast area." Quoted from Zili Pingping: "The History of the Long March of the Chinese Red Army", Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 1996 Annual Edition, p. 130.After the Zunyi meeting, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and the Military Commission telegraphed the Fourth Red Army on January 22. The Central Red Army decided to "transfer to western Sichuan" and "be able to cross the river to the north in about mid-February", and instructed the Fourth Army to cooperate and "concentrate The Red Army went all out" and "attacked west of the Jialing River". After Zhang Wentian succeeded Bogu as the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee on February 5, in just four or five days, he marched all the way from Gaokan in the west of Shuitianzhai, to Shikanzi, to Dahetan, to Zhuangzi, and finally to Tashi Town , held meetings all the way, passed the "Zunyi Conference Resolution", made the decision of "returning troops" and "drawing down", decided the strategic policy and organizational leadership of the Central Soviet Area and the Red Second and Sixth Army Corps, and established contact with the Red Fourth Front Army in time , and soon took up the historical mission of leading the whole party and the whole army to achieve a great strategic transformation in a timely and effective manner.After the most urgent task was completed, Zhang Wentian put on the agenda in time the very important task of conveying and implementing the spirit of the Zunyi Conference to the Central Red Army. At 9 a.m. on February 10, 1935, the Military Commission column held a meeting of battalion, section chief and above cadres in Tashi Town. Zhang Wentian made a report on "Summary of the Five Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" and Current Tasks".The time, place, meeting name, and report title of Zhang Wentian's report are all recorded in the "Luo Fu Report" on February 10, 1935, recorded in Wu Yunfu's diary.Wu Yunfu was the deputy director and political commissar of the Third Bureau of the Central Military Commission, leading the radio communication work. The venue temporarily built a table with wooden boards, and there were no slogans or other layouts.The cadres attending the meeting sat casually on benches and listened attentively to the report made by the new general secretary. Zhang Wentian told everyone that after the capture of Zunyi last month, an enlarged meeting of the Politburo was held there to summarize the opposition to the enemy's five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and the Western Expedition.He said that the main reason why we cannot crush the "encirclement and suppression" is not objective but subjective.We have made mistakes in military leadership and combat command. The enemy adopts the strategy and tactics of protracted warfare and fortressism. We should use decisive battle defense, that is, offensive defense, concentrate superior forces to attack the enemy's weak points, and eat him in mobile warfare. Destroy the enemy one by one along the way or part of it, so as to crush the "encirclement and suppression".However, Huafu (that is, Li De) used the tactical principle of "short assault" to fight, so that we could not destroy the enemy in mobile warfare.Fortresses were built everywhere on the borders of the Soviet areas, and fortresses faced fortresses, competing with the enemy for consumption, bullets, and manpower. As a result, the Central Soviet Area was unable to crush the "encirclement and suppression". Zhang Wentian pointed out that the strategy of decisive battle defense must first of all find a favorable opportunity to engage in a decisive battle with the enemy in order to switch to counterattack and offense.However, under unfavorable conditions, we must retreat and avoid fighting in order to maintain the vitality of the Red Army.In order to find favorable opportunities, it is also necessary to give up part or most of the land in the Soviet area.From this, he said that it was too late to withdraw from the Soviet area this time.In seven, eight, nine and three months, we consumed a lot of strength.In fact, after the Battle of Guangchang, they should withdraw from the Central Soviet Area to preserve their vitality.When we started the Western Expedition in October, we didn't make it clear in our minds that the transfer was for war, not for refuge and relocation.As a result, there was a big move, all the pots and pans were brought, and the rear facilities were huge, so the combat troops could only be turned into cover teams. Zhang Wentian announced to everyone that Mao Zedong was elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and the changes in the central organization such as the cancellation of the "Supreme Triumvirate". When Zhang Wentian gave a report, the atmosphere at the venue was very lively, which aroused discussions from time to time.After the report, there is free speech, and whoever wants to speak can speak on stage. Luo Mai (Li Weihan) spoke first, expressing his support for the decisions of the Zunyi Conference and the Resolution of the Zunyi Conference, and criticized Kaifeng's wrong attitude by name.Most of the comrades who spoke criticized the mistakes of the purely defensive line based on their own personal experience.The name-calling not only accused Bo Gu and Li De, but also involved Kai Feng and Luo Mai.According to Liu Ying: "In the Torrent of History", Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 1992 edition, pp. 62-63.At the meeting, Kaifeng also made a preliminary self-criticism about his own mistakes.According to "Kai Feng's Autobiography".From the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" to the Western Expedition, everyone suffered greatly from the "Left" military line, and there were many dissatisfaction and complaints. Now that Zhang Wentian conveyed the spirit of the Zunyi Conference on behalf of the new central leadership, the cadres' hearts were brightened. Get excited and pour out all the opinions that are smoldering in your heart.The report meeting became a meeting to criticize the wrong leadership of the "Left". The meeting finally passed the "Resolution", saying: "I fully agree with Comrade Luo Fu's report on opposing the summary of the five 'encirclement and suppression' campaigns, and unanimously support the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee." It was a coincidence that the Spring Festival had just passed, and it was raining for days, making people upset. On February 10, after Zhang Wentian made a summary report on opposing the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns," it snowed heavily that night.The next morning, when the Military Commission column left Tashi Town, the ground was covered in white, as if God had purposely created another world for the Red Army.Soon it cleared up, and the bright red sun was hanging in the sky.Looking far away, it is really wrapped in red makeup and is extraordinarily enchanting.The cadres who have heard the message are happy and feel extra warm. After Zhang Wentian conveyed the spirit of the "Zunyi Conference Resolution" in Tashi, Mao Zedong and Chen Yun also went to the corps cadre meetings to convey the "Zunyi Conference Resolution".The responsible comrades of the various regiments participating in the Zunyi Meeting and the Tashi Meeting also notified the cadres above the regiment by means of telegrams or individual notices.The column cadres of the Military Commission who participated in the report meeting in Tashi returned to their units and used the opportunity of the marching break to communicate and organize discussions.This is recorded in the diary of Wu Yunfu, who was in charge of radio communication work at the time: "On February 16, I rested in Baisha. . . . I started the machine at the station of the first unit, reported to the meeting, conveyed Luo Fu's report and solicited the opinion of the operator." On February 16th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued the "Message to All Red Commanders and Soldiers", conveying the strategic decision of the just held Tashi Conference and conducting extensive mobilization. The "Message to All Red Commanders and Soldiers" pointed out: "In the past, the Party Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to cross the Yangtze River to develop northern Sichuan in order to redify the whole of Sichuan and to achieve closer contact and cooperation with the Fourth Front Army. Zunyi is the center of the border area of ​​Sichuan and Guizhou, and continue to advance towards the Yangtze River. However, this decision is due to the fact that the Sichuan and Yunnan warlords concentrated their efforts on using the natural danger of the Yangtze River to deploy defenses on the Yangtze River to stop us, and because the Party Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission did not want to sacrifice our Red Army because of regional issues. Therefore, we decided to stop developing northward, and finally decided to establish base areas in the three provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan." He proposed: "Winning big battles and destroying the enemy" is "our most central task at present"; in order to improve our combat effectiveness, "enrichment The company and strengthening the combat effectiveness of the company are our urgent tasks at present"; and the "downsizing" is "precisely to achieve this goal." The "Report to All Red Commanders and Soldiers" also positively expounded the operational principles of mobile warfare on "frequently shifting combat areas" and "seeking favorable opportunities and areas to destroy the enemy".The implementation of all these laid a spiritual and material foundation for the Red Army to cross Chishui for the second time, regain Zunyi, and win the first major victory since the Long March. Since then, Zhang Wentian has continued to do a lot of work to convey and implement the spirit of the Zunyi Conference.He once specifically conveyed the spirit of the Zunyi Conference to the cadres doing local work, pointing out: Now our local work policy also needs to be changed.When attacking local tyrants, don't sweep the grounds out, only confiscate what the troops need, such as food, money, etc., don't move anything that the troops don't need, and don't destroy it, and don't smash the three tanks (rice tanks, vegetable tanks, and water tanks) . In early March, after the Second Occupation of Zunyi, the Central Military Commission called a meeting of cadres above the group level in the Catholic Church, and Zhang Wentian conveyed the spirit of the Zunyi meeting.Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang and others all attended the meeting.After the presentation, free speeches were also made, and some comrades were so happy that they wept. Later, when Zhang Wentian reported to the cadres of the Ninth Army Corps in Lizhou, he also conveyed the spirit of the Zunyi Conference. On May 19, Zhang Wentian gave a report in the Lizhou Catholic Church. Strengthening the leadership of the work in the white area and restoring contact with the Communist International are also important aspects of implementing the spirit of the Zunyi Conference. The "Zunyi Conference Resolution" pointed out: "The work of the party in the white areas must be established and strengthened. There must be a complete change in the leadership of the mass struggle in the white areas." Together with Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian made arrangements for this. On March 5, 1935, Zhang Wentian and others received a call from Ren Bishi of the Second and Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army, informing the Shanghai Central Bureau to send someone to contact them, saying: The Shanghai Central Bureau, the Communist Youth League, the labor union and the special technical organization "were all severely damaged, and the cadres were sacrificed. Many", the work has completely collapsed, I hope the central government will pay attention to contact it.按：1935年2月19日夜，国民党根据担任过中共上海中央局书记的叛徒李竹声、盛忠亮（即盛岳）的告密，勾结工部局，进行全市性的大逮捕，上海中央局和文委等领导同志三十多人被捕。张闻天随即代表党中央派他的得力助手潘汉年（时任红军总政治部宣传部部长兼地方工作部部长）前往上海，一方面设法恢复上海党组织和工作，一方面设法恢复同共产国际的联系。潘汉年改名杨涛，化装成不法商贩，编入一帮被红军拘捕的贩卖“云土”（云南出的鸦片）的商贩队伍中间。潘同这帮人很快混熟，策划他们一起脱逃，红军并不追赶。他们对这位“杨涛大哥”感佩异常，一路护送，所经关卡，通行无阻，直到贵阳。在那里，潘汉年通过党的关系，转途柳州、梧州，经香港到达上海。潘汉年派出的时间和契机，据黄启钧：《关于一九三五年陈云、潘汉年前往共产国际的经过情况》，《党的文献》1990年第2期。 另外，在4月17日渡北盘江之前，张闻天主持中央会议，讨论要派一位负责同志出去做白区工作。张闻天提议由他自己前往，大家都不赞成。据张闻天：《1943年延安整风笔记》。在四渡赤水、南渡乌江、直逼昆明之际，中央曾决定派中央政治局常委、组织部部长陈云回上海恢复白区党的组织。想从昆明走，不果而折回。陈云在《我的自传》（1940年7月10日）中说：“到昆明时，中央决定派我去沪”，“想从昆明走，不果，折回红军中”。转引自《陈云传》（上），中央文献出版社2005年版，第171页。过泸定桥以后，5月31日，张闻天主持中央常委会又议此事，决定派陈云、罗迈（即李维汉）到白区工作。6月初，张闻天同他们二位谈话，说明白区工作很重要，中央拟派他们去上海恢复白区党的组织。后罗迈因中央另有安排没有去，陈云则在6月七八日红军攻占天全、芦山后，随军到达天全县北面雪山脚下的灵关殿，只身悄悄离开。陈云由地下党员、灵关小学教员席懋昭护送，并故意让一个被红军扣留的国民党天全县教育局长溜掉，让他与假装躲避红军外逃的陈云、席懋昭相遇后结伴同行。这样一路顺利通过检查，经天全到了那个教育局长的荥阳县城的家里，后经雅州（今雅安）抵成都。陈云带着刘伯承的信，找到刘伯承在成都美丰银行任职的朋友。陈云托他给上海章乃器（时任浙江实业银行副总经理）汇去请章转交上海地下党的活动经费，并托人在成都《新新新闻》报上化名刊登一则“遗失私章”的《廖家骏启事》，向中央发出平安到达成都的信号。陈云离开成都后经内江直奔重庆，又持刘伯承亲笔信找到刘在重庆开中药铺的弟弟刘叔禹。在刘叔禹家住了十多天，登上民生公司的轮船直航上海。 8月间，陈云同上海地下党组织取得联系，并同先期到达上海的潘汉年接上头。上海地下党在1935年2月和7月连遭大破坏，白色恐怖严重，经与共产国际联系并经组织决定，潘汉年与陈云先后离开上海前往莫斯科。潘汉年参加了8月举行的共产国际七大。陈云于9月中旬到达莫斯科。10月15日，就在莫斯科穆霍瓦雅大街1号共产国际总部的会议室里向共产国际执委会书记处会议作了《关于红军长征和遵义会议情况》的报告。这个报告的俄文记录稿标题为《共产国际执行委员会书记处1935年10月15日史平同志报告》。史平是陈云的化名。